What changed

D. whereas, despite broad international condemnation and unprecedented sanctions, Russia is escalating its war efforts through targeted attacks on critical energy infrastructure, residential buildings and civilian infrastructure;infrastructure, as well as on cultural heritage and religious sites, such as the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra; whereas millions of people in Ukraine survived the recent freezing winter temperatures with limited electricity, heating and running water; whereas the environmental damage caused by Russia over the past four years has also had devastating consequences for Ukraine’s natural resources and critical ecosystems and for its people’s health, livelihoods and security;

X. whereas the joint statement signed on 11 December 2025 by Commissioner Marta Kos and Ukraine’s Deputy Prime Minister Taras Kachka (known as the Kos-Kachka plan) is a 10-point reform priority plan to be implemented by the end of 2026; whereas those reforms concern strengthening the rule of law, judicial procedures and the independence of Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions; whereas the full and unequivocal implementation of these steps will be an important tangible demonstration of Ukraine’s commitment; whereas relevant think tanks judge that approximately 15 % of the plan had been implemented by mid-2026;

AD. whereas the new law on public procurement, which was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on 27 May 2026 and came into force on 24 June 2026, is widely considered to be a genuine reform, aligned with EU legislation and establishing transparency and anti-corruption safeguards for large tenders; whereas the adoption of this legislation unlocked USD 3,4 billion in direct budget support for Ukraine from the World Bank;

AE. whereas on 15 June 2026, the EU opened accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova on Cluster 1: Fundamentals, consisting of: Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights, Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security, Chapter 5: Public procurement, Chapter 18: Statistics, and Chapter 32: Financial control; whereas negotiations on the fundamentals cluster are the first to be opened and the last to be closed in the accession process and progress on that cluster determines the overall pace of negotiations;

AF. whereas various Member States have circulated non-papers on the dynamics of Ukraine’s EU accession and options to reinforce future EU accession treaties;

AG. whereas joint analysis by the European External Action Service and Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation has identified Russian foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) strategies and operations to undermine and erode public support for Ukraine’s EU accession process, in both Ukraine and the EU;

11. Calls for the EU and its Member States to combat Russian disinformation about theits war,war of aggression and Ukraine’s EU accession process, by fully restricting activities associated with Russian state-controlled media organisations and their contributors across EU Member States, extending relevant individual sanctions lists, pursuing legal accountability for those complicit in state-run propaganda, strengthening digital literacy, promoting fact-based information with special attention to countries specifically targeted by Russian propaganda outside Europe and holding social media platforms accountable for spreading harmful content by strictly enforcing the Digital Services Act;

18. welcomes the G7 leaders’ statement on Ukraine of June 2026, including the commitment to (a) support the new momentum on the battlefield and its acceleration, including by considering extending to Ukraine the benefit of licenses to allow for an increase in Ukraine’s military production and (b) increase the pressure on the Russian war economy; calls for the EU and its Member States to take all necessary steps to ensure practical implementation;

19.20. Calls, in light of the need for greater pressure on Russia, for increased and more comprehensive and structural sanctions against Russia and its allies, with the aim of depriving it of resources necessary to finance its military machine and sustain its aggression against Ukraine, including targeted individual sanctions under the EU Global Human Rights and Sanctions Regime (EU Magnitsky Act) against those responsible for grave human rights violations; calls for greater alignment of sanctions lists with those of like-minded partners; strongly calls for increased administrative capacity and financial resources to improve design, implementation and enforcement of EU sanctions; insists that no sanctions should be lifted before a peace agreement is negotiated and sustainably implemented; calls on the Council and the Member States to systematically tackle the issue of sanctions circumvention; emphasises that sanctions are having a clear impact on the Russian economy, but reiterates that the sanctions regime needs to be broader and its implementation stricter if it is to have the required effect of limiting Russia’s funds for its war of aggression; calls, therefore, for the reinforcement and expansion of sanctions targeting Russia’s primary sources of revenue, including but not limited to the energy, raw materials, financial and transport sectors; calls for the EU and its Member States to work in a coordinated manner towards banning trade and commercial activities with Russia and Belarus, paying particular attention to goods and technologies with potential dual-use applications, and to prohibit the transit of goods to and from the Union via their territories; calls for a full ban on Russian steel products;products and on the export of alumina to Russia;

20.21. Calls for intensified efforts to dismantle Russia’s shadow fleet operations, which pose a substantial and growing risk to maritime safety,safety and the environment, particularly in the strategically vital Baltic Sea; calls in this regard for closer cooperation between authorities in Member States around the Baltic Sea to ensure shadow fleet operations are stopped effectively; urges the Member States to strictly respect EU legislation and halt all imports of the Russian liquefied natural gas and natural gas, revenues from which have been steadily supporting the Russian war machine and undermining the effectiveness of EU sanctions and the EU’s support for Ukraine;

22.23. Commends the Commission’s announcement in January 2026 that it would provide EUR 90 billion in critical support for Ukraine’s budgetary and military needs over the 2026-2027 biennium and welcomes the necessary flexibility featured within the package under the derogation regime laid down in Article 13(5) of the proposed regulation establishing the Ukraine Support Loan for 2026 and 2027; welcomes the fact that the Council is finally in a position to resolveresolved the deadlock preventing the operationalisation of the Ukraine Support Loan and callsthe forunblocking of the Ukraine Assistance Fund, under the European Peace Facility, to be unblocked;Facility; calls on the Governments of Hungary, Slovakia and the Czechia to reconsider their opt-out arrangement and participate in the guarantees for the loan; welcomes the first instalment of EUR 3,2 billion under the Ukraine Support Loan, which was disbursed to Ukraine on 25 June 2026;

30.31. Strongly urges all Member States, and in particular the new Hungarian Government, to stop vetoing the opening of negotiating clusters and to cease using Ukraine’s EU membership prospect in domestic politics and political campaigning; welcomes the opening of the first fundamental cluster of accession negotiations and expects that subsequent clusters will follow suit;

32.33. Calls on the Council, the Commission and the Member States to exercise maximum innovative thinking to ensure that discussions around Ukraine's EU membership do not become a negative factor in peace talks, for other accession countries, or for Ukraine's domestic politics; calls on the Member States to engage actively and constructively in the discussion of proposals aiming to advance Ukraine’s European integration, while reflecting the EU’s strategic interests, taking into account the dynamics in accession countries, including Russia’s attempts to undermine public support for EU enlargement and accession, and advancing the future security of Ukraine and the European continent; repeats its call to enhance the EU's capacity to act through the simplification of decision-making processes, such as the introduction of qualified majority voting for intermediate steps in the enlargement process when deciding on the opening and closing of individual negotiating clusters and chapters, fully in line with the Treaties;

34. Recalls its previously adopted position on the Volhynia massacre, regrets the recent unnecessary and unprovoked escalation by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy by renaming an elite military unit of the Ukrainian Armed Forces after the heroes of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA); regrets the disregard for Polish sensitivities and grief related to the UPA’s estimated many tens of thousands of victims and their families, especially in the light of Poland’s steadfast support for Ukraine’s fight against Russian aggression; considers that this decision undermines neighbourly relations and previous efforts to address unresolved and painful aspects of bilateral historical relations in a spirit of true and sincere reconciliation and is not in line with European values; calls for de-escalation and renewed efforts in good faith towards reconciliation;

41. Stresses the importance of nurturing a constructive political culture and fostering trust-based cooperation among political parties in Ukraine; notes the active participation of Ukrainian parliamentarians in the Jean Monnet Dialogue for Peace and Democracy with the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and this year marks 10 years since its launch in October 2016; commends this format as a sustained and constructive instrument of inter-party dialogue that has helped the leadership and all parliamentary factions and groups of the Verkhovna Rada to build consensus on institutional reforms; encourages the Verkhovna Rada to convene a further round to consolidate the reforms required for Ukraine’s accession process;

43.46. Commends the adoption of the 10-point reform priority plan (the so-called Kos-Kachka plan) agreed between the EU and Ukraine in December 2025, as an important step towards strengthening the rule of law, advancing judicial reform and reinforcing anti-corruption efforts; welcomes the ongoing work to implement the plan and encourages Ukraine to deliver concrete results as soon as possible, moving key reforms beyond discussion or working-group stages; highlights that the level of implementation of the plan at mid-2026 at the level of approximately of 15 %, as measured by the Ukrainian think-tank community should be considered unsatisfactory for Ukraine;

55. Calls on the Ukrainian authorities to remove from national legislation violations of generally recognised European and international standards of parliamentary independence, such as the free representative mandate, the separation of powers, and the principle of legal certainty, insofar as they concern the erroneous equating of a member of the parliament of Ukraine with the status of a public official; stresses that a member of parliament of Ukraine exercises a representative mandate and does not belong to any administrative hierarchy, is not appointed to a position, does not perform official functions, and therefore cannot be defined in national legislation as a public official;