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Recommendation on EU-China political relations

TA-10-2026-0334 · P10_TA(2026)0334 · PE775.469

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✦ In short · AI summary of this text, generated 8 Oct 2026

Written by a language model from the full text only; every figure comes from the text. The paragraph links open the paragraph a statement rests on — check the text itself before relying on it.

Parliament's recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the EU foreign policy chief sets out how the EU should handle relations with China. It asks for principled engagement, economic de-risking, action against Chinese support for Russia's war in Ukraine, and firm defence of human rights, Taiwan and the rules-based order. It calls for sanctions on entities aiding Russia, safeguards on sensitive technology transfers, stronger screening of Chinese investment, and use of the Anti-Coercion Instrument against rare earths pressure. It demands that China lift sanctions on European parliamentarians and entities, ratify the ICCPR, end repression in Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong, and stop transnational repression and forced returns of North Korean refugees. It urges deeper ties with Taiwan, India and Indo-Pacific partners, a Global Gateway alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative, and an EU Special Envoy for the Korean Peninsula.

Key points

  1. Recommends that the Council, Commission and foreign policy chief reinforce multilateralism, keep dialogue with China on global challenges, and press China to uphold a rules-based order as a UN Security Council member.
  2. Condemns China's role as a decisive enabler of Russia's war against Ukraine and asks for clear, time-bound demands, extended restrictive measures and enforcement against shadow shipping and re-export schemes.
  3. Calls for urgent action against weaponisation of critical dependencies, economic de-risking in strategic sectors, and investigation of Chinese coercive behaviour on rare earths, including possible use of the Anti-Coercion Instrument.
  4. Asks for climate, energy and industrial policies that avoid new dependencies on Chinese components, targeted investment in European capacity, and action against unfair competition in green technologies.
  5. Calls for strict customs duties on small parcels valued at EUR 150 or less and the EU-wide handling fee, and tighter controls on unsafe goods sold through Chinese online platforms.
  6. Urges stronger FDI screening in strategic sectors, action against Chinese monopolies in chokepoints, and mechanisms so no single member state faces Chinese economic coercion alone.
  7. Demands reciprocity and a level playing field in trade and investment, removal of barriers violating WTO commitments, and proportionate EU action if China fails to open its market.
  8. Calls for closer alignment with like-minded partners, including India and Indo-Pacific actors, and welcomes the EU-Australia Strategic Partnership on sustainable critical and strategic minerals.
  9. Confirms the One China policy as the framework for EU decisions on Taiwan, opposes unilateral changes to the status quo, and calls for closer security coordination and continued EU-Taiwan economic and technological cooperation.
  10. Asks for diplomatic pushback against Chinese escalation in the Taiwan Strait and the South and East China Seas, support for freedom of navigation under UNCLOS, and contingency measures to deter disruptive actions.
  11. Calls for stronger EU resilience against Chinese hybrid threats, disinformation and espionage, transparency on algorithms and data flows, and rigorous implementation of the FDI Screening Regulation.
  12. Condemns repression of ethnic and religious minorities, demands access to Tibet after the 2026 floods, calls for release of political prisoners, and asks China to ratify the ICCPR and ILO conventions.

Who is affected

  • EU member states and institutions, which are asked to coordinate a unitary China strategy and protect critical assets.
  • European businesses and researchers, who face calls for safeguards on technology transfers and clearer guidance on engagement with Chinese entities.
  • Chinese authorities, who are urged to lift sanctions, stop support for Russia, and end human rights violations.
  • Taiwan, which the EU is asked to support through deeper economic and technological cooperation and security coordination.
  • Developing countries in Africa, Latin America and the Western Balkans, which are offered Global Gateway alternatives to Chinese infrastructure lending.

Figures and deadlines

  • EUR 305,8 billion: EU trade deficit with China in 2024.
  • 98 %: Chinese critical raw materials share of rare earth elements imported by the EU.
  • EUR 150 or less: value of small non-European parcels subject to customs duties since 1 July 2026.
  • 1 November 2026: date the EU-wide handling fee on small parcels applies from.
  • 1 October 2026: date China's revised National Defence Mobilisation Law came into effect.
  • 26 August 2026: date of the Nepal-Tibet border flash floods.
  • 406 refugees: number China reportedly forcibly repatriated to the DPRK since 2024.
  • 178th: China's place in the 2025 World Press Freedom Index.