Sittings · Document

Adopted text 2026-09-15

Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield

Official HTML ↗ PDF DOCX
✦ In shortFull text
✦ In short · AI summary of this text, generated 18 Sept 2026

Parliament's resolution responds to the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield and sets out what the EU should do to protect democracy against foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), hybrid attacks and disinformation. It welcomes a European Centre for Democratic Resilience but says the Centre needs a legal act, a clear mandate, dedicated budget and staff, governance with all Member States and Parliament, and integration of existing tools by the end of 2026. It calls for full enforcement of the Digital Services Act, Digital Markets Act, Artificial Intelligence Act, European Media Freedom Act and political advertising rules, and for action on platform recommender systems, Telegram, influencers, monetisation of disinformation and AI chatbots. It asks for stronger protection of media and journalists, support for civil society, culture and academia, and protection of critical infrastructure including undersea cables, energy and electoral systems. It calls for stronger justice and home affairs cooperation, more sanctions and their enforcement, and an external dimension supporting candidate and neighbourhood countries against FIMI and hybrid threats. It asks for EU preparedness measures, including a crisis-alert app, a household preparedness booklet, EU-wide exercises and a European Preparedness Day on 24 February.

Key points

  1. Welcomes the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield but says its measures do not fully reflect the needed ambition and should be strengthened, with binding actions and full enforcement of existing EU law.
  2. Finds the threat landscape increasingly complex, with FIMI, hybrid attacks and disinformation by malicious third-country actors, and names Russia as the primary external threat to Europe's security and democratic integrity.
  3. Insists that priorities such as countering FIMI and hybrid threats, electoral resilience, cybersecurity, civil society and independent media must be sufficiently funded in the upcoming multiannual financial framework.
  4. Welcomes the proposed European Centre for Democratic Resilience but says it lacks a clear mandate, legal act, dedicated budget, personnel, governance and timeline, and should consolidate rather than duplicate existing structures.
  5. Calls for a legal act establishing the Centre as a structurally autonomous EU entity, governance including every Member State and Parliament, and integration of the Rapid Alert System, a unified FIMI intelligence database, EUvsDisinfo, ECNE and the Commission's task force by the end of 2026.
  6. Calls for the Centre to have a stable multidisciplinary staff, to feed independent analysis into Digital Services Act, European Media Freedom Act, political advertising and AI Act risk assessments, and to have sufficient and predictable funding including a dedicated budget line.
  7. Calls for full implementation and enforcement of the digital acquis, action against engagement-based recommender systems that pose systemic risk, and resistance to US pressure and sanctions against EU actors enforcing the Digital Services Act.
  8. Calls for completion of investigations into X, Meta and TikTok, assessment of Telegram's possible classification as a very large online platform, and action on covert AI manipulation, influencer transparency and monetisation of disinformation.
  9. Calls for protection of freedom of expression, safeguards for users challenging content moderation and monetisation decisions, and measures against inauthentic accounts that preserve online anonymity.
  10. Calls for support for independent media and journalists, implementation of the European Media Freedom Act and Anti-SLAPP Directive, protection from spyware, and action on online advertising market distortions.
  11. Calls for support for civil society, culture and academia, including sustainable funding through the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme and AgoraEU, and a legislative proposal protecting scientific research.
  12. Calls for protection of critical infrastructure against sabotage, including undersea cables, energy infrastructure and electoral systems, and for stronger justice, sanctions and external action against hybrid threats.

Who is affected

  • Online platforms and search engines, especially very large ones, which face calls for stricter enforcement, risk mitigation and transparency.
  • Media and journalists, who would gain stronger protection, funding and safeguards against surveillance and abusive lawsuits.
  • Civil society organisations, which are called to receive sustainable funding and a stronger role in policymaking.
  • Candidate and neighbourhood countries, which would receive capacity-building, funding and cooperation against FIMI and hybrid threats.
  • EU institutions and Member States, which are asked to strengthen security, preparedness and coordination.

Figures and deadlines

  • EUR 2,95 billion fine against Google for distorting competition in online advertising.
  • EUR 5,5 million in EU emergency funding for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
  • EUR 9 billion proposed budget for the AgoraEU programme for 2028-2034.
  • EUR 120 fine imposed on platform X for breach of Digital Services Act transparency obligations.
  • 1 481 press freedom violations documented in 2025, affecting 2 377 media-related persons or entities across 36 European countries.
  • 1 in 10 respondents likely to ask AI for voting advice, with another 13 % who might, in a Dutch survey.
  • At least 11 incidents of submarine cable damage recorded since 2023 in the Baltic Sea.
  • 21 packages of EU sanctions adopted since 2022 in response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine.

Legal basis: Article 2, Article 5, Article 10 and Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union; Article 114 and Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Written by a language model from the full text only; every figure comes from the text and ¶ links to the paragraph it rests on. Check the text itself before relying on it.