Sittings · Document
P10_TA(2026)0079
Tackling barriers to the single market for defence
Committee on Security and Defence
PE778.252
European Parliament resolution of 11 March 2026 on tackling barriers to the single market for defence (2025/2143(INI))
The European Parliament,
– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),
– having regard to the Versailles Declaration adopted at the informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government on 11 March 2022,
– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security, approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 25 March 2022,
– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States1,
– having regard to Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community2,
– having regard to Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC3,
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/10924,
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1525 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 2023 on supporting ammunition production (ASAP)5,
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/2418 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 on establishing an instrument for the reinforcement of the European defence industry through common procurement (EDIRPA)6,
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/2643 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2025 establishing the European Defence Industry Programme and a framework of measures to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products (‘EDIP Regulation’)7,
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/2653 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2025 amending Regulations (EU) 2021/694, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697, (EU) 2021/1153 and (EU) 2024/795, as regards incentivising defence-related investment in the EU budget to implement the ReArm Europe Plan8,
– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 of 27 May 2025 establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the Reinforcement of the European Defence Industry Instrument9,
– having regard to the Commission proposal of 17 June 2025 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the acceleration of permit-granting for defence readiness projects (COM(2025)0821), to the Commission proposal of 17 June 2025 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EC) No 1907/2006, (EC) No 1272/2008, (EU) No 528/2012, (EU) 2019/1021 and (EU) 2021/697 as regards defence readiness and facilitating defence investments and conditions for defence industry (COM(2025)0822), and to the Commission proposal of 17 June 2025 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2009/43/EC and 2009/81/EC, as regards the simplification of intra-EU transfers of defence-related products and the simplification of security and defence procurement (COM(2025)0823), as part of the Defence Readiness Omnibus package of 17 June 2025,
– having regard to the conclusions of the European Council on European defence, particularly those of 6 March 2025, 20 March 2025, 26 June 2025 and 23 October 2025,
– having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on the implementation of Directive 2009/81/EC, concerning procurement in the fields of defence and security, and of Directive 2009/43/EC, concerning the transfer of defence-related products10,
– having regard to its resolution of 2 April 2025 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 202411,
– having regard to its resolution of 25 November 2025 on the institutional aspects of the Report on the future of European Competitiveness (Draghi Report)12,
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry’ (JOIN(2024)0010),
– having regard to the political guidelines for the next European Commission for the period 2024-2029, entitled ‘Europe’s choice’, presented on 18 July 2025 by the then candidate for Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen,
– having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (Draghi report) and, in particular, Chapter 4 thereof on increasing security and reducing dependencies,
– having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’ (Niinistö report),
– having regard to the report by Enrico Letta of 10 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a Market – Speed, Security, Solidarity: Empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens’ (Letta report),
– having regard to the joint white paper from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Joint white paper for European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120),
– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Security and Defence (A10-0017/2026),
A. whereas decades of defence procurement that focused on the national level, industrial fragmentation, regulatory barriers, underinvestment, divergent threat assessments and foreign policy objectives, lack of integrated capability planning and aggregated demand, as well as competition over intellectual property, have prevented the emergence of an effective and fully integrated single market for defence and have weakened interoperability in Member States’ defence systems, thereby incurring significant extra costs for the taxpayer while undermining the EU’s ability to protect the safety of its citizens, weakening the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) and preventing European strategic autonomy, resilience and competitiveness from being fully realised;
B. whereas the Letta and Draghi reports highlight a combination of structural weaknesses affecting the competitiveness of the EDTIB and identify fragmentation, insufficient public defence spending and limited access to financing as core challenges, and therefore recognise the need to build a true single market for defence; whereas the White Paper on the Future of European Defence emphasises that action should focus on rules and procedures for defence procurement, intra-EU transfers of defence products and mutual recognition of national certification permits; whereas the Niinistö report also underlines the need to enhance Europe’s overall preparedness, including the integration of civilian and military resilience, and points out that those needs can also be met more efficiently with a single market for defence;
C. whereas a resilient, competitive and innovative European defence industrial base is essential to deliver on the Strategic Compass and to ensure the EU’s ability to deter and defend in the light of the Readiness 2030 agenda; whereas this requires a coherent industrial and technological policy that supports interoperable capabilities, secures critical supply chains, supports small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and promotes dual-use innovation;
D. whereas defence companies established in smaller Member States have been particularly affected by other Member States’ overly stringent approach to intra-EU transfers and export controls in the past, demonstrating how one choke point can undermine EU-wide supply chains; whereas SMEs face particular entry barriers to defence markets; whereas current EU competition rules and State aid frameworks lack tailored provisions for cooperative cross-border defence projects, which risks hindering industrial collaboration and consolidation; whereas no specific block exemption or similar facilitative mechanism exists for defence projects funded by EU financing instruments, creating legal uncertainty for companies engaging in joint research and development (R&D); whereas the lack of an adequate intellectual property and licensing framework for publicly funded defence R&D restricts multi-producer manufacturing of certified European designs and limits the effectiveness of joint procurement instruments;
E. whereas the European defence industry is facing a severe shortage of skilled workers and an ageing workforce, which threatens to create bottlenecks in production, hindering expansion; whereas different national security clearance requirements for defence industry personnel and companies prevent increased cross-border collaboration by subjecting firms or engineers cleared for handling classified information in one Member State to lengthy, duplicate vetting in others; whereas the rapid adoption and application of innovative technologies by Europe’s armed forces is hindered by lengthy development cycles and a high aversion to risk;
F. whereas in order to increase public support for these investments, the economic returns and benefits need to be spread across the EU in a balanced and proportional way, taking into account the specificities of national defence industrial bases; whereas cross-border cooperation should also ensure the fair and full participation of SMEs and small mid-caps in the defence value chain and strengthen regional cohesion across the EU; whereas defence investments have the potential to create high-quality jobs across a wide range of regions, thereby helping to achieve cohesion objectives;
G. whereas recent events have exposed the risks of supply chain concentration in Europe’s defence sector, with critical defence products and inputs often dependent on a single or very limited number of suppliers; whereas such concentration creates single points of failure and vulnerabilities in times of crisis, underscoring the urgent need for diversification and redundancy in supply sources;
H. whereas according to the Draghi report, European collaborative procurement accounted for only 18 % of expenditure on defence equipment procurement in 2022, well below the benchmark of 35 % agreed on in the European Defence Agency (EDA) frameworks; whereas the EU has set the political objective of sourcing at least half of its defence equipment from European production by 2030;
I. whereas the objective of creating a single market for defence is ultimately a means to achieve Europe’s security and strategic autonomy, not an end in itself; whereas defence industrial integration should serve the EU’s ability to protect its citizens and values, ensure resilience and deterrence, and uphold its freedom of action; whereas a balance must be struck between market efficiency and the imperatives of sovereignty and solidarity;
J. whereas joint defence capability planning, development, production and procurement in the EU would allow for increased efficiency and effectiveness of public investment and industrial and operational gains, thereby increasing the social and political acceptance of necessary increases in defence investment in times of constrained budgets and significantly improving the ability of the EU and its Member States to achieve full defence readiness before 2030 and a genuine European defence union; whereas such joint action in the EU should be coordinated with NATO planning processes and should avoid unnecessary duplication of actions;
K. whereas the Member States will only consider increasing their investment and cooperation in common defence projects if these involve the development of military capabilities of common interest to their armed forces;
L. whereas the EU has presented a number of initiatives aimed at reinforcing EU defence readiness, enhancing investment conditions and incentivising joint action, yet it has not, to date, proposed the transformative measures required for the establishment of a genuine single market for defence products; whereas the EU’s rules on defence procurement (Directive 2009/81/EC) and on intra-EU transfers (Directive 2009/43/EC) have not yet been comprehensively updated despite significant changes in the security environment; whereas stakeholders often find both directives overly complex and Member States’ transposition slow and problematic, requiring disproportionate administrative effort and giving rise to fragmentation of the internal market;
M. whereas in the light of growing geopolitical threats, notably Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine and its hybrid attacks and provocations against the EU, as well as terrorism and instability in the Middle East and Africa, 90 % of EU citizens rightly expect increased EU cooperation in the area of security and defence, including within NATO and with other like-minded partners, to protect citizens and defend the EU’s interests and values on the global stage; whereas the increasingly unstable security environment in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood calls for a coherent and coordinated response, particularly to ensure the unimpeded movement of defence products and services;
The vision of a single market for defence in the Union
1. Recalls that, according to the Draghi report, enhanced cooperation could lead to enormous efficiency savings of up to 30 % of annual defence spending across the EU and significantly boost the effectiveness of current defence spending; underscores the broader advantages of this for EU competitiveness, resilience and strategic sovereignty, since it promises significant employment opportunities, economic development and technological leadership throughout the EU; emphasises that a true single market for defence is crucial for fostering the competitiveness of European companies, not only within the EU but also on the global market, where they have to compete with, among others, US prime contractors;
2. Believes that the dramatic challenges and threats faced by the EU and its Member States require a complete rethinking of the way they cooperate and coordinate on defence matters; underlines that the EU and its Member States must fundamentally change their understanding of defence industry production by developing a true single market for defence, as called for in the Letta, Draghi and Niinistö reports and in the White Paper on the Future of European Defence; urges the Member States to overcome nationalist reflexes towards their national industrial base, to give greater consideration to the benefits of EU-level defence cooperation in their national defence planning, and to acknowledge the essential role of active support from the EU institutions and agencies in facilitating and coordinating such cooperation, while strengthening mutual trust among all stakeholders;
3. Stresses that only a true single market for defence can provide the means required to truly establish and maintain a competitive, innovative and resilient EDTIB that is able to deliver the equipment needed in the required time periods and at the scale required and to unlock the full economic, industrial and financial potential of the EDTIB; underlines that a true single market for defence is essential to close the capability gaps and re-establish deterrence and is therefore a necessary cornerstone of a strong, sovereign and competitive Union;
4. Urges the Member States and the Commission to act swiftly to create a true single market for defence, acting on both the supply and demand sides; recalls that the aggregation of demand through common procurement and life cycle management, regulatory simplification and cross-border industrial integration at EU level is urgently needed to address such barriers and reduce reliance on non-EU countries, as outlined in the Letta and Draghi reports;
5. Recalls the importance of ensuring democratic legitimacy, public trust in institutions, accountability and transparency in order to secure the necessary public support for increased expenditure in the field of defence; underlines the importance of guaranteeing a fair and balanced distribution across the EU of the costs and benefits of the surge in European defence spending;
Obstacles to a single market for defence
6. Underlines that the current structure of the defence industrial landscape leads to unnecessary duplication, external dependencies and inefficiencies, and hampers the strengthening of the EDTIB and the EU’s defence readiness; underlines that, coupled with underinvestment and the lack of programming of long-term defence spending, this fragmentation prevents the realisation of economies of scale that could arise from pooling defence equipment procurement and production across European companies; highlights the vital need to overcome fragmentation in the EU defence industrial landscape, exploiting potential economies of scale, and to gather greater insight into the barriers to the single market for defence; emphasises that a single market for defence must guarantee equitable opportunities for participation for industries and research organisations, including start-ups, from all Member States, including smaller economies, and should not result in an overly centralised defence industrial model; underlines that such a market design contributes to economic cohesion by creating high-quality manufacturing and R&D jobs in various EU regions, including less economically developed ones; notes, furthermore, that such geographical diversification contributes to resilience and security of supply and also helps to avoid the creation of monopolies and disadvantages for SMEs and mid-caps;
7. Deplores the lack of results from current coordinated capability planning and spending on defence products across the EU, which has led to divergent rules and eligibility criteria and inefficient spending of funds, creating legal uncertainty and often leading Member States to prioritise bilateral cooperation with non-EU countries; regrets that nationally determined priorities frequently prevent fruitful cooperation within the EU;
8. Deplores the persistent mutual trust deficit among Member States, which is reflected in, among other things, a reluctance to create regional centres of industrial competence, a limited degree of cross-border cooperation and joint capability planning, an insufficient level of intra-EU procurement of defence-related goods and services, and duplicated or precautionary restrictions on intra-EU transfers of defence equipment, hindering the development of fully integrated European supply chains and posing a significant obstacle to the development of a genuine single market for defence;
9. Believes that the current EU legislative frameworks do not provide conditions for procurement of goods with fast innovation cycles, such as in the area of drone development; expresses concern that the single market for defence is still undermined by the insufficiently harmonised application of its rules by the Member States and by disproportionate use of the exemption provided for under Article 346 TFEU, which hampers the push towards joint EU defence procurement; highlights the need for dedicated support for SMEs and small mid-caps to facilitate their involvement in the defence industry supply chain, with a view to increasing innovation while building industrial redundancies that increase the EU’s resilience and security of supply;
10. Expresses concern that the single market for defence is still undermined by the insufficiently harmonised application of its rules by the Member States; is concerned, in particular, by the frequent use of Article 346 TFEU, which the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has ruled in several cases as having been used in an unjustified manner and thus misused; stresses the need to shift towards an approach of safeguarding the EU’s essential security interests, given the current geopolitical situation and the threats to the EU’s unity;
11. Considers that the Member States’ full respect for the EU Common Position on arms exports13 constitutes an important pillar of a functioning single market for defence; considers that the absence of a harmonised EU export control system and a lack of mutual recognition of different permits, licences, certifications and security clearances continue to generate obstacles to the functioning of a single market for defence through their impact on intra-EU transfers; recalls that defence production currently relies heavily on integrated cross-border supply chains in the EU, with components sourced from multiple Member States, which, in the event of an export block, creates uncertainty for industry and supply chains; stresses the need for a practical solution that takes into account the reality of present dependencies on non-EU countries, also given the growing importance of critical raw materials for the EDTIB and the potential exposure to coercive measures by non-EU countries; emphasises that, without guaranteed and planned access to inputs such as rare earths, semiconductors and high-grade metals, Europe’s ambitious defence ramp-up and strategic autonomy objectives cannot be met;
12. Considers coordination between the EU’s and the Member States’ defence capability development processes and NATO’s Defence Planning and Review Process to be essential to ensure coherence and interoperability between Member States and non-EU NATO allies; regrets the lack of a cooperation agreement between NATO and the EU dedicated to the exchange of information on NATO standards (STANAGs), which the EU could then enforce through binding instruments; stresses that the lack of enforcement of standards has led to inefficiencies, duplications and a lack of interoperability in the past decades and continues to pose a problem;
Breaking down the barriers
13. Urges the Council and the Commission to equip EU defence programmes with sufficient funding under the next multiannual financial framework to effectively incentivise the Member States to engage in joint capability development and procurement and to incentivise their defence industries to engage in closer cross-border cooperation; highlights the potential of new frameworks, such as the European Defence Projects of Common Interest, including the four flagship projects proposed in the Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030, and the Structures for European Armament Programmes, to deliver on those objectives with the assistance of sufficient long-term funding; stresses that funding should prioritise projects with clear European added value, interoperability, long-term industrial sustainability and operational impact;
14. Notes the current limitations in the manufacturing capacity of the European defence industry, which is nevertheless expanding, and calls on the Member States to apply a ‘buy European’ approach, which prioritises the common procurement and increased production of defence products from the EDTIB, Ukraine, European Economic Area/European Free Trade Association (EEA/EFTA) countries and, as an additional complementary layer, other non-EU countries with which the EU has signed a Security and Defence Partnership, as this would ensure a predictable order volume for the EDTIB, drive up private investment in R&D for defence products, and help the EDTIB to deliver innovative defence products in sufficient volumes; calls on the Member States to sign contracts that deliver stable and medium- to long-term aggregated demand signals for European products, thereby creating the investment certainty for the EDTIB to scale up;
15. Urges the EU and its Member States to treat Ukraine as an integral part of the single market for defence to the utmost extent possible by facilitating industrial partnerships, access to joint procurement mechanisms, and participation in EU programmes, such as the European Defence Fund (EDF) and the dedicated Ukraine Support Instrument under EDIP, to enable Ukraine’s progressive integration into EDTIB supply chains, taking into account the fact that Ukraine’s future lies in the EU and that its integration would provide benefits for both the EDTIB, through Ukraine’s advanced and battle-proven defence technologies and innovative industrial capacities, and for Ukraine’s defence technological and industrial base;
16. Believes that the implementation of Directive 2009/81/EC on defence and sensitive security procurement needs to be significantly improved and calls on the Commission to propose an ambitious revision; underlines the usefulness of allowing Member States to make use of each other’s framework contracts to increase the EU’s defence readiness in the short term, as it allows them to procure faster and more efficiently, while expecting that, in the long term, procurement will be conducted through common or joint framework contracts designed in line with European procurement criteria from the outset; calls on the Member States to make use of different contract forms that provide for innovation, competition and private capital investments, ensuring full compliance with competition rules, integrity requirements and anti-corruption standards, and recalls that European capital markets play a key role in financing defence innovation; further believes that aspects linked to security and defence, such as the presence of civilian components in military goods, should be taken into account in any review of Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement14; calls, in this context, on the Commission to present an updated version of the defence innovation partnerships in the upcoming comprehensive revision of Directive 2009/81/EC, to better adapt this instrument to the specificities of the defence market and the current challenging security context;
17. Underlines that, in the application of EU competition and State aid rules, the Commission must prioritise the unity and integrity of the single market to avoid distortions of competition and to safeguard the level playing field and cohesion between the Member States, paying particular attention to smaller Member States whose fiscal capacities to support their national defence industries are comparatively more limited; stresses that the extensive use of national subsidies to support defence investment risks fragmenting the single market and undermining the level playing field for companies, especially SMEs, across the EU;
18. Calls on the Commission to issue a recommendation for an interpretation of Article 346 TFEU in order to facilitate a harmonised and uniform approach throughout the EU, addressing the need to protect strictly the essential security interests of Member States, and for Article 346 to be used exceptionally, in line with the current reality of an interdependent security architecture in the EU; considers that the Commission should be enabled to assess the overall implementation of Article 346 TFEU, on a case-by-case basis, to remedy any potential structural misuse, in line with the CJEU case-law and with the current reality of an interdependent security architecture in the EU;
19. Underlines the need to provide targeted support, in particular for the testing of prototypes of new products, and to prioritise investment in emerging and breakthrough technologies; stresses the added value of close cooperation with Ukrainian defence and technological stakeholders in these highly innovative domains; underlines the importance of safeguarding the financial viability of companies, including SMEs, that invest in such innovation; stresses that specific measures should facilitate cross-border SME cooperation, particularly in cyber, AI, and unmanned and dual-use technologies, building on existing excellence centres in Member States;
20. Calls on the Member States and the Commission to establish a European ‘defence innovation accelerator’ initiative, analogous to concept models such as the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) or NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), that would fund high-risk, high-reward defence research projects and provide fast-track pathways for testing and integrating breakthrough technologies into European defence capability programmes; notes that existing EU R&D instruments, including the EDF, the EU Defence Innovation Scheme (EUDIS) and the Hub for EU Defence Innovation (HEDI), leave ownership of results with beneficiaries and grant the Commission and co-financing Member States only limited, non-production related rights; calls on the Commission to design an appropriate intellectual property regime that is tailored to the sensitivities of the defence domain, while also being sufficiently attractive to both national defence ministries and industry, in order to ensure that the programme can address capability needs and priorities;
21. Underlines the need to simplify rules and abolish hurdles related to intra-EU transfers of defence products, including mutual recognition of criteria and certification and a simplification of prior authorisation requests; deplores the limited use of general transfer licences under Directive 2009/81/EC and the wide recourse to individual licences and calls on Member States to make full use of the possibilities for simplifying rules and reducing administrative burdens within the current legal framework; calls on the Commission to urgently present proposals to further harmonise intra-EU transfers of defence products, to ensure more simplified circulation of such products within the EU, in particular by eliminating authorisation requirements for components that are already integrated or are to be integrated into a defence product and cannot be transferred or exported as such; calls, furthermore, on the Member States to work towards that same goal and to swiftly transpose and apply the measures proposed in the Defence Readiness Omnibus as regards intra-EU transfers of defence products; calls on the Member States to fully respect the EU Common Position on arms exports and to explore, wherever possible, further harmonisation of export rules for defence goods; suggests, as possible starting points, harmonising export control systems, extending general transfer licences or using the Aachen Treaty, and strengthening the ICT Directive15 to facilitate the intra-EU transfers of defence-related products;
22. Calls on the Commission, the EDA and the Member States to work on a scheme for mutual recognition of security clearances and certifications, so that clearances issued in one Member State are also accepted in other Member States; proposes the establishment of a voluntary convention on mutual recognition agreements on security clearances among EU Member States, whereby a company or individual holding a national security clearance in one Member State would have that clearance recognised by others that join the agreement, subject to appropriate information sharing and oversight; invites the EDA to facilitate the development of this framework and calls on the Member States to conclude it swiftly;
23. Stresses the imperative of strengthening the resilience of the European defence supply chains and reducing single points of failure and exposure to potential coercive measures by non-EU countries, exemplified by China’s threats to limit exports of raw materials; demands that the implementation of the Critical Raw Materials Act16 place specific emphasis on defence needs;
24. Calls for the Commission and the Member States to create incentives for supply chain diversification, including support for new market entrants and SMEs; stresses that the pursuit of cost efficiency must not undermine national security of supply; calls on the Commission to monitor supply chain risks and identify areas of dangerous concentration, reporting regularly on progress in supply diversification; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to address situations in which sub-suppliers from non-EU countries refuse to deliver materials if they are to be used in military applications; stresses the need for a legal framework ensuring contractual reliability throughout defence supply chains; calls for the Commission to establish strategic stockpiles in line with the EU Preparedness Union Strategy; emphasises, in that regard, the importance of the security of supply regime established under EDIP;
25. Underlines the need to ensure that defence industrial production, investment and value creation are geographically balanced and contribute to economic and social convergence within the EU while enhancing resilience through geographical diversification and reflecting the reality of security threats faced by the Member States in their respective neighbourhoods; calls for defence investment planning to be carried out in a manner that strengthens social cohesion within and between regions and Member States, while at the same time enhancing resilience in times of defence crises, provided that this does not undermine the aim of cost efficiency, speed and competition;
26. Invites the Commission to issue clear guidance on how defence and security considerations are to be weighed in merger control decisions affecting the EDTIB, in line with EU competition policy; further invites the Commission to explore targeted adaptations of EU competition rules to better support the defence industry’s unique needs, such as the introduction of a targeted block exemption for defence R&D projects financed by EU programmes; emphasises that security of supply and reduction of strategic dependencies should be treated as positive criteria when assessing mergers or as aid measures in the defence sector;
27. Stresses the need to develop a more proactive role for the EU in sustaining investment in dual-use technologies and products, in particular when they are part of the supply chains of defence products, as a means of enhancing the EU’s security of supply and resilience to hybrid and emerging threats; advocates the promotion of civilian commercialisation of these technologies as a way to expand market opportunities, create positive spill-overs and strengthen the EDTIB, fostering synergies between military and civilian development; calls on the Commission and the Member States to create incentives to limit to the EU the supply chains of the most critical inputs for defence products, including through a strengthened Defence Equity Facility, focused on late-stage commercialisation, scale-up finance and SME access to testing corridors and cyber ranges; stresses that the emerging ‘new space’ sector and its innovative potential regarding dual-use technologies should be fully exploited with regard to defence and civilian developments;
28. Calls on the Commission to assess the legal, procedural and regulatory adjustments that would be necessary to ensure that the EU and its Member States can rapidly adapt defence procurement and production rules in the event of war or a major security crisis and to ensure no disruption of the single market; further calls on the Commission to ensure that such an exercise is aligned with the security of supply regime included in EDIP; emphasises the importance of preparedness in the form of a contingency framework for emergency procurement and industrial ramp-up, which could be activated swiftly if needed;
29. Believes that the EU institutions and agencies should enhance their role of facilitating coordination between the Member States and welcomes the EDA’s contribution, particularly through the Capability Development Plan and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, emphasising that its expertise should be fully exploited; underlines the crucial role of the EDA in promoting a single market for defence and calls on the Member States to strengthen the EDA’s mandate and resources in this respect; supports a greater involvement of the EDA in EU defence initiatives and in identifying persisting barriers to the single market for defence; calls for the development and regional deployment of HEDI within the EDA, with a view to expanding its role as a central platform connecting SMEs, start-ups, research centres and prime contractors; firmly believes that reinforcing the EDA will help to foster the mutual trust and cooperation needed to advance the single market for defence, as the EDA is uniquely positioned to bridge national and European interests; welcomes also the contribution of multilateral procurement agencies, such as the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation, which promote the harmonisation of equipment among Member States and non-EU partner states;
30. Highlights the need for further European funding dedicated to tackling the commercialisation gap in innovation of defence products; calls for strengthened instruments to ensure that SMEs and mid-caps have real and scalable access to private capital and defence programmes, including through streamlined procurement, innovation-friendly rules and cross-border matchmaking support, thus ensuring their increased participation and a fairer allocation of funds; stresses the importance of establishing regional defence tech incubators under HEDI’s umbrella to support cross-border SME consortia, provide mentorship on navigating defence procurement, and facilitate the testing and validation of innovative technologies in collaboration with military end users;
31. Underlines the need for the EU and NATO to sign a comprehensive cooperation agreement on capability planning and development to ensure coherent and complementary planning and interoperable defence capabilities, and on standardisation; emphasises that such cooperation must respect the autonomy of both organisations while avoiding duplication and promoting fair burden-sharing; calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the EDA, to prepare a legislative proposal that would create a harmonised EU framework for legally binding technical standards and certification of defence products, drawing on the European Defence Standards Reference System (EDSTAR) and, where appropriate, by codifying selected NATO STANAGs into EU legislation; further calls on the Commission to propose a framework for joint European testing and certification of defence equipment instead of having separate national validation for each defence product, including common testing and certification facilities; calls on the Member States to align their procurement and capability development efforts with NATO defence planning priorities, ensuring full interoperability of systems and avoiding parallel structures; underlines that a stronger and more integrated European defence industry should enhance Europe’s contribution within NATO and transatlantic burden-sharing, while maintaining open cooperation with trusted partners such as Ukraine, EEA/EFTA countries and Security and Defence Partnership states; encourages the implementation of NATO’s Rapid Adoption Action Plan aimed at accelerating national procurement processes and efforts to reform acquisition cycles, testing protocols and certification frameworks, ensuring that military innovation keeps pace with the threat environment;
32. Takes note of the defence-related recommendations presented by former Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta in 2024 in his report entitled ‘Much More Than a Market'; notes that tax obstacles and different procedures on value added tax in collaborative procurement programmes hamper the achievement of the objectives of Defence Readiness 2030, the ramping up of defence industries and the expansion of joint programmes; calls on the Commission to follow up on the Letta report and increase efforts to reduce tax obstacles;
33. Calls on the Member States to promote careers in defence technology to young professionals, including through awareness campaigns about the sector’s contribution to Europe’s security and technological innovation; encourages the establishment of public-private partnerships between defence companies, educational institutions and governments to create talent pipelines; urges the Member States and the Commission to propose, in dialogue with social partners, including unions, sector-specific skills strategies such as training programmes and opportunities for life-long learning to fill current and future skill gaps in the defence industry; suggests, to that effect, that the Union of Skills agenda explicitly include the defence sector, facilitating the mobility of skilled workers across Member States to where they are most needed;
34. Calls on the Commission to further quantify the potential financial and operational benefits of a single market for defence, including efficiency gains and an increase in collective military capability, through an independent impact assessment; calls for the creation of a single contact point where stakeholders can report obstacles, gather evidence and monitor compliance by the Member States;
35. Welcomes the European Council conclusions of October 2025 calling for an annual report on EU defence industrial readiness, and calls for this to be complemented by a ‘defence single market scoreboard’, published by the Commission in cooperation with the EDA; stresses that this scoreboard should track indicators such as the share of defence procurement conducted jointly or through open, EU-wide competition, levels of cross-border industrial cooperation, SME participation rates and reductions in system duplication; underlines that it should also capture the socio-economic benefits of EU defence programmes across the Member States and regions, including job creation and industrial development, in order to guide policy refinement and reinforce public trust;
36. Firmly believes that, in order to guarantee democratic legitimacy and the transparency of EU defence policies in times of hybrid warfare and disinformation campaigns, Parliament must play a central role in the planning, oversight and scrutiny of those policies; underlines that transparency and accountability must be ensured; calls on the Commission, the Council, the Member States and the EDA to ensure secure channels for exchange of classified and confidential information with Parliament, the defence industry and national authorities;
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37. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.