Skip to content
Adopted text

Institutional consequences of the EU enlargement negotiations

TA-10-2025-0247 · P10_TA(2025)0247 · PE774.293

Official HTML ↗ PDF DOCX
✦ In shortFull text
✦ In short · AI summary of this text, generated 4 Sept 2026

Written by a language model from the full text only; every figure comes from the text. The paragraph links open the paragraph a statement rests on — check the text itself before relying on it.

Parliament's resolution on the institutional consequences of EU enlargement argues that enlargement is a geostrategic investment and that the EU must reform its institutions to remain efficient, powerful and democratic as it grows. It calls for moving from unanimity to qualified majority voting where possible, reforming the budget and Parliament's powers, and using Treaty flexibility, including passerelle clauses and enhanced cooperation, to prepare for enlargement.

Key points

  1. Enlargement is a long-term geostrategic investment that promotes democracy, stability, security and prosperity across the continent.
  2. Russia's war against Ukraine and other geopolitical challenges make enlargement more urgent; successful enlargement requires long-term vision and bold decisions.
  3. Each enlargement wave brings institutional challenges that should be addressed before new members join; every past enlargement was preceded or accompanied by internal reforms.
  4. Unanimity in the Council can slow accession due to bilateral issues; Article 49 TEU allows moving to qualified majority voting without Treaty change.
  5. Institutional reforms should improve efficiency, make the EU more powerful globally, and increase democracy, legitimacy and accountability.
  6. Candidate countries should be closely involved in EU institutions early, for example through observer status, as in the 2004 enlargement.
  7. Parliament's composition must remain workable while ensuring fair representation; a permanent seat allocation mechanism should be identified, respecting degressive proportionality.
  8. The Commission's size must consider enlargement; any reduction must ensure geographical, demographic and gender balance.
  9. Qualified majority voting should be redefined to balance larger and smaller countries, with higher thresholds for sensitive decisions.
  10. Article 7 TEU procedure should be strengthened by ending unanimity in European Council decisions, introducing a clear time frame, and making the Court of Justice the arbiter of violations.
  11. The next multiannual financial framework must include a mandatory revision clause for enlargement, transitional measures for cohesion and agriculture, and move away from the 1 % GNI limit.
  12. Parliament should gain full legislative initiative and equal footing with the Council; uniform electoral rules and ratification of Council Decision 2018/994 are needed.

Who is affected

  • Candidate countries: would be involved early in EU institutions, possibly with observer status, and benefit from financial and technical assistance.
  • Member States: would face changes in Council voting, Commission size, and budget contributions.
  • European Parliament: would gain legislative initiative and stronger scrutiny rights.
  • European Commission: would see changes in its composition and role in legislative initiative.

Figures and deadlines

  • 1 % of aggregated gross national income: the self-imposed limit for the EU budget that should be moved away from.

Legal basis: Articles 31(3), 48 and 49 TEU; Articles 81(3), 83, 136, 153(2), 192(2), 312(2) and 333 TFEU