On the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2025

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2025

(2025/2165(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular the provisions on the common security and defence policy (CSDP),

– having regard to the Versailles Declaration adopted at the informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government on 11 March 2022,

– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security, which was approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 25 March 2022,

– having regard to the Civilian CSDP Compact – Towards more effective civilian missions, approved by the Council on 22 May 2023,

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States1,

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/890 of 18 March 2024 amending Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 establishing a European Peace Facility2,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/10923,

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 19 March 2025 for a Council regulation establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the reinforcement of the European defence industry Instrument (COM(2025)0122),

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 22 April 2025 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2021/694, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697, (EU) 2021/1153, (EU) 2023/1525 and 2024/795, as regards incentivising defence-related investments in the EU budget to implement the ReArm Europe Plan (COM(2025)0188),

– having regard to the conclusions of the European Council, particularly those of 26 June 2025, 20 March 2025 and 6 March 2025,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry’ (JOIN(2024)0010),

– having regard to the political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029, entitled ‘Europe’s choice’, presented on 18 July 2025 by the candidate for the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen,

– having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ and, in particular, Chapter 4 thereof on increasing security and reducing dependencies,

– having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

– having regard to the joint white paper from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Joint white paper for European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120),

– having regard to the security and defence partnerships signed by the EU and Canada on 23 June 2025 and by the EU and the United Kingdom on 19 May 2025,

– having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty, which came into force in 1949,

– having regard to the The Hague Summit Declaration issued by the heads of state and government of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in The Hague on 25 June 2025,

– having regard to the 10th progress report of 10 June 2025 on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017,

– having regard to the three joint declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed by the Presidents of the European Council and the Commission and the NATO Secretary General on 10 January 2023, 5 July 2018 and 6 December 2016 respectively,

– having regard to its resolution of 2 April 2025 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 20244,

– having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the white paper on the future of European defence5,

– having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia’s war of aggression6,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Security and Defence (A10-0000/2025),

A. whereas the EU’s security environment has deteriorated and strategic competition is increasing in our wider neighbourhood;

A deteriorating geopolitical context

1. Stresses the seriousness and urgency of the threats to European security emanating from Russia and its allies; reiterates its full support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in the face of Russia’s continued war of aggression and barbaric attacks on civilians; underscores that Russia is also attacking Member States and aims to undermine our societal resilience through violations of airspace, hybrid warfare such as (attempted) assassinations, cyberattacks, sabotage of critical infrastructure and disinformation;

2. Highlights Russia’s growing aggression and hybrid war against the Republic of Moldova with a view to destabilising the pro-EU government through unprecedented levels of malign interference and the continued militarisation of Transnistria; is concerned about the Georgian Government’s alignment with false Russian narratives; stresses the need to further safeguard the US-brokered agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan through broader confidence-building and transitional justice efforts;

3. Notes the negative influence of Russia in the Western Balkans; expresses concern about the stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH);

4. Notes the deep instability in the Middle East, North and Central Africa regions; deplores the fact that escalations and the violation of international law in Gaza and the broader region diminish the chances of long-term peace for all people in the Middle East; notes with concern the escalation of conflict between Israel and Iran and attacks on Lebanon, Syria and Qatar; regrets the instability in Libya and the setbacks in the Sahel; deplores continued instability in Yemen and condemns Houthi attacks on shipping vessels; stresses the long-term security risks for Europe of such developments in these regions;

5. Notes with concern Russia’s intensified militarisation and its aggressive posture, increased climate change-driven competition in the Arctic and malign activities in European territorial waters and exclusive economic zones, including through the activities of the Russian shadow fleet; calls for action by the EU and its Member States using all possible means and maximum creativity to stop the shadow fleet, enhance Arctic surveillance and protect critical infrastructure;

6. Notes with growing concern the continued pressure on freedom of navigation and critical infrastructure in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait as well as on the status quo and territorial integrity of Taiwan;

7. Notes the growing importance of dual-use space-based activities for European strategic autonomy and the rising number of operators in space; stresses the need for improved governance of space;

8. Notes the dichotomy between the very high levels of public support for a CSDP and the varying support by Member States for its implementation, despite the unprecedented threats and changing geopolitical circumstances;

9. Stresses the Union’s obligation and strategic long-term global interest in maintaining the rules-based international order;

10. Expresses its dismay at the current ambiguity of the EU-US defence and security relationship; acknowledges NATO’s crucial role for Europe’s collective defence but warns of the risks posed by the growing short-sighted isolationism and self-centredness in US foreign policy and its shifting focus, which could be perceived as undermining its security commitments to Europe;

Addressing capability gaps and spending issues

11. Stresses – given the rapid deterioration of the geopolitical context – the need to replenish depleted stocks, close critical capability gaps and ensure interoperability of armed forces; considers it critical to develop, in line with the recommendations of the white paper of 19 March 2025, air and missile defence, artillery systems, ammunition and missiles, drone and counter-drone systems, military mobility, AI, quantum, cyberwarfare and electronic warfare, strategic enablers and critical infrastructure protection; calls for joint efforts by the Union and its Member States to address these gaps also through a set of European Defence Projects of Common Interest;

12. Calls on the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) to propose ways for the Union to acquire joint military assets, such as strategic enablers, to be deployed by Member States; welcomes the operationalisation of the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity as a step forward in strengthening the Union’s ability to respond;

13. Calls for the EU and NATO to streamline their capability development and planning processes and ensure their consistency; urges the EU to align with NATO’s standards to bolster interoperability and NATO-EU complementarity;

14. Calls for the creation of a single market for defence; calls for the removal of the political, economic and regulatory barriers and practices in Member States that undermine the efficiency and competitiveness of the single market for defence; welcomes initiatives to strengthen the European preference in defence procurement, without unduly affecting the immediate replenishing of stocks, as well as to ramp up production capacity and accelerate innovation;

15. Calls for appropriate measures to be taken to facilitate and incentivise the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB), including through private investment; calls for the Union and the Member States to urgently devise mechanisms to use windfall profits and clawback funds, especially during the current periods of ramp-up, supply shortages and demand peaks, to drive European-level defence and dual-use innovation and competitiveness, including through the establishment of a ‘European DARPA’ (akin to the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency);

16. Urges the EU to support Ukraine’s defence capabilities and the integration of the Ukrainian defence technological and industrial base (DTIB) into the EDTIB, while supporting EDTIB activities in Ukraine; welcomes the Commission’s initiatives in this regard; urges Member States’ armed forces and the EDTIB to learn critical lessons from Ukraine’s capability development and battlefield innovations;

17. Calls for EU military mobility corridors to the eastern flank to be extended, including to Ukraine, and for these to be equipped with the necessary military fuel infrastructure; calls for the mainstreaming of counter-mobility in the design of military corridors;

18. Welcomes recent substantial defence expenditure increases; notes the focus on national defence spending, which leaves critical issues around fragmentation, potential budgetary and operational synergies, and interoperability unresolved; stresses the need to ensure that Union funds are channelled into collaborative projects with clear European added value; is of the view that, without structural European reform and collaboration, increased national spending may lead to continued duplication and inefficiencies;

19. Calls for a European financial architecture for defence based on European solidarity, cohesion, competitiveness and efficiency; urges the Commission and the Member States to position the next multiannual financial framework so as to enable a genuine European defence union (EDU), including the necessary support and incentives for the EDTIB, and the delivery of Readiness 2030 commitments;

20. Underlines that reinforcing the EDTIB and defence capabilities alone are insufficient to strengthen European defence and deterrence; stresses that Europe’s fundamental challenges to effective deterrence lie in political unity and posture, military doctrine and the ability to exercise effective command and control outside of NATO structures; underlines that strengthening our capabilities without forcefully reacting to Russia’s tests of EU military preparedness undermines our deterrence; stresses in this regard the need to revise the EU’s Strategic Compass;

21. Urges the Union to invest significantly in its intelligence and information security, including through improved vetting procedures, better implementation of security classification schemes, and secure systems for sharing and accessing intelligence; urges the Member States to intensify intelligence sharing with the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INTCEN);

Reinforcing CSDP missions and operations

22. Calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to reinforce CSDP missions with flexible, modular mandates adapted to security contexts and host country needs; stresses the need for adequate and efficient funding, streamlined support structures, and better allocation of seconded staff; urges the Member States to match their ambitions by fulfilling their pledges and commitments made in Council decisions; notes persistent obstacles, including resource gaps, vacancies, high turnover, national caveats, risk aversion, poor coordination with EU programmes and partners, and weak strategic communication; underlines that the CSDP missions and operations offer the most tangible external projection of the Union’s force and as such are a critical component of the Union’s strategic tools;

23. Reiterates its call for support for CSDP missions and operations defending against cyberwarfare and countering foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) in particular in the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership countries; strongly encourages the use of similar rapid response operational capabilities for other cross-cutting issues, as appropriate;

24. Commends the achievements of the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM) in bolstering the capacity of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to defend Ukraine and of the European Union Advisory Mission Ukraine (EUAM) in implementing, under difficult conditions, its mandate to foster an efficient, resilient and accountable civilian security sector;

25. Commends the contribution of the EU Partnership Mission in the Republic of Moldova (EUPM Moldova) to enhancing the country’s resilience in crisis management and against hybrid threats; welcomes the role of the EU Monitoring Mission to Georgia (EUMM) and the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) in building confidence;

26. Recommends that the out-of-country reserve forces of EUFOR Operation ALTHEA be fully manned, sustained and maintained at all times, given their importance for the operation’s deterrent effect in Bosnia and Herzegovina; strongly supports an active deterrent role for EUFOR and the extension of its mandate by the UN Security Council as well as NATO contingency planning, in the light of prolonged attacks on the BiH Constitution and the potential security implications; commends the role of the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo in strengthening security and stability;

27. Considers that the EU Mission for the Support of Palestinian Police and Rule of Law (EUPOL COPPS) and the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) Rafah can play a broader operational role in supporting the Palestinian Authority’s state-building and capacity-building efforts; encourages Israel and the Palestinian Authority to maintain full cooperation with both missions;

28. Notes with concern that the Sahel has become a ‘blind spot’ in CSDP, with missions reduced or wound down, limited impact on stabilisation and a reduction in the Union’s security footprint in that important African region;

29. Calls for the VP/HR to put forward proposals to develop European defence education, joint operational training and exercises, and leadership programmes for the armed forces and political leadership, complementary to national and NATO equivalents, learning from CSDP missions and operations to strengthen the CSDP and support implementation of Article 42(7) TEU;

Engaging in partnerships, including cooperation with NATO

30. Welcomes the signing of EU security and defence partnerships with eight countries so far; calls for further security and defence cooperation with like-minded partners and for ways to be explored for deepening engagement with the most constructive partners;

31. Stresses that NATO remains a crucial component of collective transatlantic territorial defence and that the EU and NATO play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in enhancing international security; considers, however, that the term ‘European pillar of NATO’ lacks definition and masks the failure of EU Member States to properly implement the CSDP, in particular TEU Article 42, paragraphs 2 and 7; considers further that the Union and its Member States must be ready to act on the basis of these provisions in the unlikely event of paralysis of NATO decision-making;

32. Calls for stronger military-security cooperation with candidate countries whose alignment with, and implementation of, the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) is above 80 %;

Future European security architecture: genuine CSDP – if not now, then when?

33. Expresses deep concern that Russia’s repeated aggression has eroded Europe’s security architecture, undermining the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and exposing the failure of related institutional and political processes; stresses that only cooperation between all states, based on jointly agreed rules, can safeguard against war and provide common security; calls for progress on the strategic thinking needed to design a new European security architecture;

34. Stresses that unprecedented threats and shifting geopolitics profoundly affect EU strategic interests; underlines the need for a common threat perception and public awareness; underscores that these challenges and opportunities make it urgent to implement the CSDP as the basis for a genuine EDU and, ideally, to seize this pivotal moment for treaty change to meet new security and defence needs in line with citizens’ expectations;

35. Urges the Union and its Member States to define operational procedures and mechanisms in the event of a Member State triggering Article 42(7) TEU, and to ensure coherence between Article 42(7) TEU and NATO equivalents; reaffirms the call for a Council of Defence Ministers and for a move from unanimity to qualified majority voting under Article 31 TEU;

36. Stresses the need to strengthen EU structures, decision-making and operational autonomy; reiterates the call for greater coherence in CSDP governance linking Member States, the VP/HR and the Commissioners; welcomes the role of the Commissioner for Defence and Space in relation to CSDP, in line with Article 42(3) TEU; notes the organisational disconnect between the European Defence Agency and the Commission’s Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space – both bodies implementing CSDP mandates yet one reporting to the VP/HR, the other reporting to the Commissioner for Defence and Space – and highlights possible synergies through institutional reform, while acknowledging that current cooperation is satisfactory;

37. Notes the importance of Coalitions of the Willing as a result of the current treaty framework and disunity among Member States, especially in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; notes however that their use moves the Union further away from the practical implementation of TEU Article 42, paragraphs 2 and 7; notes that Article 42(6) TEU on permanent structured cooperation has been interpreted in a limited fashion to mean cooperation on the development of capabilities without covering cooperation on executive and operational aspects; urges, therefore, that operational PESCO under Article 42(6) TEU be explored, including on secure military communications, command and control, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities through European space-based systems;

Enhancing parliamentary control of the CSDP

38. Calls for Parliament’s oversight and scrutiny role to be strengthened in line with the expansion of the EU’s role in defence and the increase in spending on EU defence policies and programmes; considers that its new fully fledged Committee on Security and Defence should play a leading role in this process;

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39. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the VP/HR, the President of the Commission and competent Commissioners, the UN Secretary General, the NATO Secretary General, the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the EU security and defence agencies and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and partner countries.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

The threat landscape for the Union has worsened in the last year. Russia has intensified its war of aggression against Ukraine with additional support from its allies including North Korea, Iran, Belarus and China. Russia predictably shows no interest in peace. Equally, Russia continued, and even intensified its hybrid war against Europe, including in Moldova, Georgia and the Western Balkans. At the same time, the increasing isolationism of the Trump administration and its wavering attitude towards NATO, Europe, multilateralism and the rules-based order means that Europe is increasingly isolated. The highly volatile Middle East and North Africa region cause further risks for European security and European responses to the various conflicts have diminished our posture and ability to protect our strategic interests.

In spite of unprecedented spending increases, assurances of NATO’s capacity and European industrial ramp-up, we remain insufficiently prepared for what might come and our deterrence is insufficient to ward off Russia’s tests of our military preparedness, or worse.

Europe continues to face multiple challenges: assuming the responsibility for support to Ukraine as a moral obligation and a long-term investment in our own security while ramping up production, learning new battlefield tactics, replenishing our own stocks, building societal resilience and pushing forward deep structural reforms to increase the long-term autonomy, competitiveness, integration and pace of innovation of the EDTIB.

The Union’s leadership in the area of strengthening the EDTIB is highly needed and welcome, but the report outlines that current solutions – while ambitious – do not resolve long-standing structural issues that prevent full implementation of the CSDP, including in relation to military doctrine, fragmentation, political unity and the lack of a common threat perception. The draft report reviews the current ‘CSDP missions and operations’ but urges to give more practical effect to the other aspects of CSDP in relation to collective defence and working towards a genuine European Defence Union. It highlights the need for a functioning pan-european internal defence market and adequate and societally acceptable European funding solutions.

The report flags that the lack of unity among Member States has necessitated Coalitions of the Willing but that such initiatives should ideally be placed within EU structures through an operational form of permanent structured cooperation. The report argues the current context should imply an architectural moment for the CSDP, or at minimum to give full practice effect to the full scope of the current CSDP. It makes a number of practical recommendations in this regard.

This is the first CSDP report under the authorship of the SEDE Committee since it was granted the status of a full-fledged committee. The Rapporteur has spoken with a wide range of interlocutors. They have universally flagged the importance of the Parliament’s forward thinking on the CSDP, while many acknowledged to have little knowledge of the annual CSDP report itself. This has informed the shape of the report.

The report recognises that the credibility of Europe’s deterrence and defence lies not only in material capabilities but also in its political unity and the courage and resolve to act. The deteriorating global security landscape leaves no room for inaction towards a genuine European common security and defence policy: if not now, when.

ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that he included in his report input on matters pertaining to the subject of the file that he received, in the preparation of the draft report, from the following interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register1, or from the following representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies:

1. Interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register

NATO.

EEAS (Service for Foreign Policy Instruments).

European Policy Centre.

EEAS (Peace, Security and Defence).

DG DEFIS.

Centre for European Policy Studies.

EEAS (Civilian Operations Headquarters).

EEAS (EU Intelligence and Situation Centre).

European Commissioner for Defence and Space.

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteurs declare that they have submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.