On flagship European defence projects of common interest

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on flagship European defence projects of common interest

(2025/2144(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 42(2) and 42(3),

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular Articles 2, 107(3)(b) and 346,

– having regard to Article 2(e) of Protocol No 10 on permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) established by Article 42(6) TEU and the joint notification on PESCO signed by ministers of 23 EU Member States on 13 November 2017,

– having regard to the Versailles Declaration adopted at the informal meeting of heads of state or government on 11 March 2022, in particular paragraph 22 thereof,

– having regard to the ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’, which was approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 25 March 2022,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 18 May 2022 on the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward (JOIN(2022)0024),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry’ (JOIN(2024)0010),

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 5 March 2024 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Defence Industry Programme and a framework of measures to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products (‘EDIP’) (COM(2024)0150), in particular Article 15 thereof regarding European Defence Projects of Common Interest (EDPCI),

– having regard to the joint white paper from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund (EDF)1,

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 19 March 2025 for a Council regulation establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the reinforcement of the European defence industry Instrument (COM(2025)0122),

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 22 April 2025 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2021/694, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697, (EU) 2021/1153, (EU) 2023/1525 and 2024/795, as regards incentivising defence-related investments in the EU budget to implement the ReArm Europe Plan (COM(2025)0188),

– having regard to the scoping paper of the Commission of 29 September 2025 entitled ‘Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030’,

– having regard to the report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the Council of 11 April 2025 entitled ‘Annual progress report on the Implementation of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence’,

– having regard to the conclusions of the European Council of 22 and 23 June 2017, particularly those of paragraph 8 on PESCO, and of 6 March 2025, particularly those of paragraph 3(f),

– having regard to the national security strategies of the EU Member States,

– having regard to special report 04/2025 of the European Court of Auditors of 3 October 2024, entitled ‘Opinion 02/2024 concerning the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Defence Industry Programme and a framework of measures to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products (EDIP)’, and in particular paragraph 42 thereof,

– having regard to the 2024 annual report by the European Defence Agency (EDA), as well as its report of 14 November 2023 entitled ‘The 2023 EU Capability Development Priorities’, and the 2024 report entitled ‘Coordinated Annual Review on Defence’,

– having regard to the progress report of the PESCO Secretariat of September 2025 on PESCO projects,

– having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 on the future of European competitiveness and Chapter 4 thereof on increasing security and reducing dependencies,

– having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together: Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’, and in particular Chapter 7 thereof,

– having regard to The Hague Summit Declaration issued by NATO heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in The Hague on 25 June 2025,

– having regard to the tenth progress report of 10 June 2025 on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2018,

– having regard to the cooperative equipment programmes managed by the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR),

– having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the white paper on the future of European defence2, and in particular its paragraphs 4 and 58,

– having regard to its resolution of 2 April 2025 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 20243, and in particular its paragraph 46,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 October 2025 entitled ‘Preserving Peace - Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0027),

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Security and Defence (A10-0000/2025),

A. whereas the challenges posed by the decline in global peace and security and the emergence of new and evolving threats to EU security require the EU and its Member States to significantly increase their defence investment in order to develop military and intelligence capabilities that enable them to defend their sovereignty and to act and respond autonomously or in partnership with their allies, particularly within NATO, to immediate and future threats;

B. whereas warfare, historically dominated by conventional weapons, appears to be evolving ‘from steel to web’; whereas it is increasingly incorporating cyber capabilities and networked operations, and warfare strategies are being transformed through new technologies and artificial intelligence (AI) and are no longer limited to massed firepower and large-scale confrontations, but moving towards miniaturisation and decentralisation of systems, as evidenced by the use of drone swarms, AI-enabled weapons, smart mines, and portable missile systems in battlefields; whereas fighter jets, ships, battle tanks and armoured vehicles are becoming more vulnerable to precision strikes and therefore require greater protection, as they are still essential to military operations;

C. whereas in its joint communication of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy’ the Commission highlights that only 18 % of total equipment spending by EU Member States was devoted to EU collaborative defence equipment procurement in 2022, far below the current 35 % collective benchmark set by Member States at the EDA Ministerial Steering Board in 2007; whereas the end users of defence products are primarily the national armed forces of Member States and the latter can therefore only consider increasing their investments in defence industrial projects if these projects concern the development of military capabilities of common interest to their armed forces;

D. whereas the Strategic Compass on Security and Defence sets the objective of developing incentives to stimulate Member States’ collaborative investments in joint projects and the joint procurement of defence capabilities that are developed in a collaborative way within the EU;

E. whereas the proposed regulation establishing the EDIP provides for the implementation of European Defence Projects of Common Interest (EDPCI); whereas EDPCI consist of collaborative industrial projects aimed at reinforcing the competitiveness of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) throughout the Union, while contributing to the development of Member States’ military capabilities critical for the security and defence interests of the Union, and including those securing access to all operational domains, namely land, maritime, air, space and cyber;

1. Acknowledges the significant increase in defence expenditure among EU Member States as a clear reflection of their determination to respond to the deteriorating security environment, by enhancing military capabilities, strengthening deterrence, and reinforcing their collective commitment to European and transatlantic defence; acknowledges also that strengthening Europe’s security and defence requires not merely an increase in national defence spending but a comprehensive shift towards greater coordination, efficiency and integration in the way that Member States develop, resource and implement their defence policies;

2. Notes that, despite increased defence efforts, the EU and its Member States continue to face persistent shortfalls in strategic collective capabilities, command and control structures, and sustainable military capacity; underlines that these gaps significantly limit the EU and its Member States’ ability to sustain a prolonged large-scale defence engagement, particularly in the face of acts of hybrid warfare; calls for urgent measures to address these critical capability shortfalls through enhanced cooperation, coordinated planning, and targeted investments to ensure defence readiness;

3. Stresses that filling capability gaps requires developing autonomous Strategic Enablers without which Member States’ armed forces cannot effectively conduct joint military operations; recommends in this regard, the development of a safe and secure common architecture for command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance, as well as common defence capabilities in the areas of space, strategic airlift, air-to-air refuelling and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) risk prevention; praises the work of the EDA, which provides an overview and analysis of the EU defence landscape and offers recommendations on opportunities for collaboration on capability development and acquisition through the Capability Development Priorities (CDP) and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD);

4. Recognises that there are immediate defence needs that can be met with supplies or support from non-EU countries; further emphasises that European security remains heavily dependent on the defence industry of non-EU countries; stresses that, in the current geopolitical context and given the requirement for the EU to assume greater responsibility for defence, there is a need for a managed transition from dependency on non-EU countries to strategic autonomy and strengthening the EDTIB;

Developing defence capabilities through flagship projects in priority areas

5. Acknowledges the endorsement by the European Council of the Roadmap Defence Readiness 2030 – Preserving Peace and the Member States’ commitment to developing four initial European Readiness Flagships – the European Drone Defence Initiative, the Eastern Flank Watch, the Air Defence Shield and the Defence Space Shield; notes that these proposed flagship projects cover a very wide range of defence capabilities; urges the Commission, the Member States and the EDA to therefore clearly identify the specific objectives and timeline for the implementation, technological scope and expected size of each of these projects;

6. Recognises the need to establish a widely agreed upon definition of ‘flagship projects’ as large-scale, pan-European collaborative initiatives in defence capability and industrial development, including Strategic Enablers within a common framework such as EDIP that allow their identification and implementation in a coherent manner within EU defence and industrial policies; underlines that defining flagship projects is crucial to ensuring effective collaboration among Member States, pooling resources to address critical capability gaps and moving towards a genuine European Defence Union;

Identifying and ensuring the proper set-up and implementation of flagship projects

7. Stresses that the objectives of flagship projects must be aligned with those of agreed EU defence objectives; emphasises, too, that they should address innovative technological areas for defence and contribute to the development of cutting-edge defence capabilities that respond to the requirements of modern warfare, including the rising need to network military operations, troops and weapons, ensure cyber defence, develop intelligence data collection, storage, processing, sharing and decision support tools, operate deep and precise strikes and counter drone attacks;

8. Emphasises that flagship projects should aim to foster closer cooperation and innovation in governance mechanisms at EU level, showing best practices towards a common and coordinated strategy for European defence; stresses, too, that good governance of flagship projects must be based on a shared vision and effective coordination among their ‘programmatic actors’, namely the governments, military headquarters and public procurement agencies of EU Member States and defence industrial companies; considers that flagship projects could benefit from and build on existing cooperation within the framework of PESCO and EDF projects;

9. Acknowledges the creation of the EDPCI as a new tool under the EDIP; recognises that flagship projects could be developed under its framework;

10. Calls for the inclusion of the widest range of industrial actors in flagship projects, including mid-caps and small and medium-sized enterprises, to enable the spread of innovation across the entire spectrum of the EDTIB;

11. Stresses the need to prevent military technologies, in particular sensitive emerging technologies and critical dual-use items, especially in the area of space, quantum technologies and AI, from being transferred to destinations of concern outside the EU; urges Member States participating in flagship projects to commit to following common approaches and to defining and agreeing on a common strategy for granting export licenses for products resulting from flagship projects;

Governance of flagship projects and the role of Parliament

12. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to further present proposals for flagship projects addressing the development of defence capabilities and allowing Member States to better align their national efforts with agreed EU defence objectives;

13. Recommends that the Commission, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the EDA participate in a supporting role to facilitate the implementation of flagship projects;

14. Commits to exercising its scrutiny and legislative and budgetary role in relation to the selection, implementation and financing of flagship projects on the basis of regular and comprehensive information and reports from the Commission;

Ensuring the financing of flagship projects in the long term

15. Calls on the Commission to explore ways of establishing a specific fund under the next multiannual financial framework to ensure the long-term financing of flagship projects; underlines the need for adequate and appropriate funding for flagship projects that does not compromise the funds allocated to other strategic areas of the EU budget devoted to defence;

16. Shares the European Court of Auditors’ observation regarding the EDIP proposal that the time needed to complete flagship projects is likely to exceed the two-year implementation period provided for by the EDIP; stresses, therefore, that for flagship projects to benefit from EDIP funding, the Member States concerned must commit to co-financing them for their entire duration, well beyond an initial two-year period;

17. Invites EU Member States to consider systematically earmarking part of their national defence budgets for the development of partnership initiatives and the procurement of defence equipment produced within the framework of flagship projects;

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18. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, NATO, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the EU security and defence agencies and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

A new defence for a long-lasting peace.

The nineteenth century was an age forged in Steel. Its emergence transformed the world, laying the foundation for an era of unprecedented industrial power and disruptive warfare. By the time of World War I, Steel had become not merely a material but the backbone of modern conflicts: a force that shaped structural design, logistics, defence, and military strategy alike. This revolutionary material fed and sustained an unprecedented industrial revolution and a new weapon systems: cannons, munitions, naval fleets, armoured vehicles and aircraft, helmets, infrastructures. Merging the new industrial framework and a large-scale production of materials required to support the needs of the front.

Today, warfare dominated by big powerful instruments, the conventional weapons of the 19th Century, appears to be evolving “from Steel to Web”. The new technologies are transforming strategies, the cyber domain and artificial intelligence, no longer limited to massive firepower and large-scale confrontations, moving towards miniaturization and decentralization of systems, as drone prove, AI-enabled weapons, smart mines, and portable missile systems in battlefields. Even the role of human power is changing: there is less and less employment of direct human involvement and presence in the frontline. Conflicts today present a total new landscape and totally new threats.

The challenges posed by the emergence of new and evolving threats to EU security require today the EU and its Member States to deal with a new defence framework to defend their collective sovereignty, act and respond autonomously or in partnership with their allies, particularly within NATO, to immediate and future threats.

Change

After three decades marked by a trend toward disarmament across the EU, the changes to the global and regional security environment and new threats to the security of the European continent, have made it necessary for EU Member States to increase their efforts to acquire more military capabilities for their defence. At the NATO Summit on 25 June 2025 in the Hague, 23 EU and NATO member states committed to invest 5% of their Gross Domestic Product annually on core defence requirements as well as defence-and security-related spending by 2035.

Choice

The expected surge in total military spending by the EU and its Member States should translate into several hundred billion of investment in new defence equipment, over the next years.

Until now, the development and procurement of defence equipment in the framework of European cooperation, remains rather the exception. Furthermore, the Commission has indicated that 78% of the defence acquisitions by EU Member States between the start of Russia’s war of aggression in February 2022 and June 2023 were made from outside the EU, with the US alone representing 63% of it.

Building a decision architecture

Against this backdrop, the EU has explored over the years new directions and launched new initiatives to strengthen and develop defence capabilities in a collective and cooperative manner. As part of EU effort to help EU Member States to work together for developing new capabilities, the concept of projects of common interest for European defence has been a long-standing feature of policy-making.

The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) mechanism, launched in 2017, has fostered several tens projects of joint development. Furthermore, the Strategic Compass on Security and Defence adopted in March 2022 calls for the collaborative development of next-generation capabilities in all operational domains. With the Versailles Declaration, EU Member States also committed in March 2022 to fostering industrial initiatives, including through important projects of common European interest and industrial alliances. In the political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024−2029 "Europe's choice", the President of the Commission listed the tasks to pool resources to counter biggest common and cross-border threats through flagship European Defence Union projects. The White Paper for Defence Readiness 2030 released by the Commission in March 2025 specified areas for which Member States should urgently pool their efforts, including a set of such projects, to be defined by Member States, that would benefit from EU incentives. The Commission's proposal of March 2024 for a regulation establishing the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) provides the first regulatory framework for these projects. In its special report on this proposal, the European Court of Auditors drew the attention to the need to secure long-term financial support as a prerequisite for their selection. Lastly, in its scoping paper of 29 September 2025 on Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030, the Commission proposes to launch a set of four initial European Readiness Flagships.

Flagship projects of common interest for European defence need strategic guidance and recommendations on their selection, implementation, financing and oversight, with the aim of maximizing their impact, while ensuring cohesion between Member States. They should be large-scale, pan-European, collaborative initiatives in defence capabilities and industrial development.

Filling capability gaps requires developing autonomous Strategic Enablers to facilitate Member States' armed forces in effectively conducting joint military operations, in order to achieve a safe and secure common architecture for command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance, as well as common deterrence to ensure the maximum defence for a long-lasting peace for states and their citizens.

ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she included in her report input on matters pertaining to the subject of the file that she received, in the preparation of the draft report, from the following interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register1, or from the following representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies:

1. Interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.