On the situation in Colombia after the wave of recent terrorist attacks

B100366/2025

European Parliament resolution on the situation in Colombia after the wave of recent terrorist attacks

(2025/2855(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Colombia,

– having regard to the remarks by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Kaja Kallas at the European Parliament plenary session of 17 June 2025, after Colombian Senator Miguel Uribe Turbay was shot from behind during a rally, on the threat to democratic processes and peace in Colombia,

– having regard to the statement by the Spokesperson of the European External Action Service of 11 August 2025 following the death of Senator Miguel Uribe Turbay in Colombia,

– having regard to the statement by the Bureau of the Delegation for relations with the countries of the Andean Community of 12 August 2025 on the recent wave of political violence in Colombia, including the murder of Colombian Senator Miguel Uribe Turbay,

– having regard to the statements by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on Colombia, in particular that of 15 August 2025 condemning the assassination of Miguel Uribe Turbay in Colombia and calling on the state to guarantee the safety of political leaders,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas since 2022, Colombia has witnessed persistent and shifting dynamics of armed and terrorist violence, with the security situation steadily deteriorating in rural and urban areas alike;

B. whereas illegal armed groups continue to expand their control across Colombia, such as the ELN (National Liberation Army) and FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) dissidents, including the powerful Segunda Marquetalia faction, the Estado Mayor Central faction led by alias Iván Mordisco, and the paramilitary group Clan del Golfo; whereas these groups profit from drug trafficking, extortion, kidnapping, illegal mining and cross-border smuggling, using this revenue to finance terrorism and attacks against the civilian population, and employing increasingly sophisticated methods such as explosive-laden drones;

C. whereas in the first three months of 2025, a 45 % increase in violent incidents was recorded in Colombia compared to the same period in 2024; whereas according to a military intelligence report cited by one of the nation’s leading newspapers, El Tiempo, in the first half of 2025, illegal groups grew in size by more than 1 000 members, reaching a total of nearly 22 000 nationwide; whereas these groups may now be present in 562 municipalities across 29 of Colombia’s 32 departments;

D. whereas in mid-January 2025, a wave of massacres in the Catatumbo region of Norte de Santander, sparked by clashes between ELN units and dissident FARC factions, left at least 80 dead, including civilians, and forced the displacement of tens of thousands of people;

E. whereas this year has been marked by a series of terrorist attacks against both security forces and civilians, with the most recent incidents in August 2025 including a car bomb in Cali – the third largest city in Colombia – that killed six people and injured more than 60 others, and a terrorist attack in Antioquia, where FARC dissidents of the Estado Mayor Central faction led by alias Iván Mordisco shot down a helicopter, killing at least 12 police officers; whereas these events form part of an escalating pattern of coordinated assaults across the country, demonstrating the ability of illegal armed groups to directly threaten Colombia’s institutions and democracy, with the clear intention of creating instability in the run-up to the 2026 elections;

F. whereas on 7 June 2025, Miguel Uribe Turbay, a prominent opposition Senator and pre-presidential candidate, was the victim of an assassination attempt during a rally in Bogotá; whereas despite medical efforts, he died from his injuries on 11 August 2025; whereas in the months preceding the attack, Uribe and his legal team had submitted more than 20 formal requests to the National Protection Unit (UNP) for an increase in his security detail, warning of credible threats to his life, with the final request made just two days before the shooting; whereas the UNP repeatedly refused to increase his security, and on the very day of the attack, his security detail was inexplicably reduced from seven to only three agents; whereas this grave oversight – now the subject of criminal complaints against UNP leadership for ‘negligence’ and ‘omission’ – highlights serious state failures in guaranteeing the safety of political opponents and protecting democratic participation in an atmosphere of escalating terrorist violence;

G. whereas the country’s presidency has heightened polarisation through divisive and aggressive discourse; whereas such rhetoric has intensified political polarisation and drawn widespread condemnation, including from leaders such as former president of the Colombian Senate Iván Name (2023-2024), who warned that ‘this manner of dividing and singling out has been interpreted by criminal groups as a signal that encourages violence’; whereas a formal criminal complaint has been filed by Senator Uribe’s legal team alleging that the President’s remarks, including a social media post two days before the attack questioning Senator Uribe’s democratic credentials and invoking his family legacy, contributed to creating a hostile and charged atmosphere that may have instigated the politically motivated assassination;

H. whereas drug cartels and transnational crime structures, including the Cártel de los Soles in Venezuela, support terrorism by sustaining armed groups within and outside Colombia, and supplying arms, financial flows and safe havens across the border, thereby worsening regional instability and undermining Colombia’s sovereignty and democracy;

I. whereas the Cártel de los Soles, an alleged Venezuelan criminal network led by Nicolás Maduro and other high-ranking military regime officials including Diosdado Cabello, Jorge Rodríguez, Delcy Rodríguez and General Padrino López, among others, has been designated by the US Department of the Treasury as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group for its role in facilitating narco-terrorism, including the trafficking of cocaine produced by FARC dissidents, providing material support and leveraging state institutions to corrupt military and judicial functions;

J. whereas some armed groups operating in Colombia, such as the ELN, are already designated on the EU’s list of terrorist organisations; whereas although the FARC was removed from that list following the 2016 Peace Agreement, the evolution of the security context has led to the emergence of new violent actors, which, under the criteria established by EU law, clearly qualify as terrorist organisations; whereas this notably includes the FARC’s dissident factions, especially the Estado Mayor Central, which have carried out systematic attacks against civilians and security forces, as well as transnational criminal structures such as the Clan del Golfo and the Cártel de los Soles, which facilitate terrorist activities and provide shelter and safe havens across borders;

K. whereas the presidential policy of negotiating simultaneously with multiple illegal groups under the ‘total peace strategy’ has not only favoured the consolidation of and increase in these illegal groups, but also enabled organised crime to gain territory and power in areas with historically limited state presence; whereas in recent years, public order and humanitarian conditions have deteriorated significantly including in conflict-affected regions, with increased rates of forced displacement, confinement, child recruitment and massacres;

L. whereas President Petro intends to propose a budget cut to the Colombian Ombudsperson’s Office, which has documented over 1 500 killings of human rights defenders and other individuals since its establishment in 1992;

1. Strongly condemns the assassination of Colombian Senator and pre-presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay and expresses its condolences to his family and loved ones;

2. Further condemns and deplores the recent waves of terrorist attacks that have rocked the country, and the general rise in violence at the hands of terrorist groups that has been witnessed in the country;

3. Expresses its condolences to the families of the numerous victims, many of whom were members of the security forces, and to the people of Colombia;

4. Calls on the authorities to investigate these terrorist attacks to the fullest extent possible so that the perpetrators can be brought to justice; highlights that in order to bring the perpetrators to justice, the authorities must investigate not only the individuals who carried out the acts, but also the intellectual instigators and facilitators behind them;

5. Notes, with grave concern, the proliferation and consolidation of organised crime and indiscriminate terrorist group activities in Colombia’s regions bordering Venezuela; stresses that these territories have become corridors for drug trafficking, arms smuggling and money laundering facilitated by transnational structures such as the Cártel de los Soles, with the active complicity of the highest-ranking Venezuelan regime officials; underlines that this cross-border nexus not only fuels terrorism and strengthens Colombian insurgent and dissident groups, but also poses a direct threat to regional stability, democratic governance and Colombia’s sovereignty;

6. Considers that inflammatory statements spread by the presidency have contributed to increased polarisation, political violence, hate speech and instability in the country; recalls that the responsibility of ensuring the security of the country and its citizens remains in the hands of the highest authorities;

7. Expresses concern over the documented rise in political violence against candidates and leaders in 2025, which may risk undermining electoral guarantees; calls for transparent communication from institutions, adequate resourcing of the electoral authorities, and robust security measures to ensure that the upcoming 2026 elections are conducted in a free and safe manner;

8. Calls on the Colombian authorities to do their utmost to prevent the escalation of violence, by increasing security measures and refraining from exacerbating the polarisation in the country through inflammatory statements;

9. Calls on the Council and the VP/HR to update the EU’s list of terrorist organisations so as to reflect the current realities in Colombia and the wider region; urges the Council to include, alongside existing listings such as the ELN, the Clan del Golfo in particular, the FARC dissident factions, notably the Segunda Marquetalia and Estado Mayor Central, and the Cártel de los Soles, an organisation that provides support, shelter and logistics to Colombia’s armed terrorist groups; stresses that recognising these actors as terrorist organisations under EU law is essential to cut their financial networks, strengthen international cooperation, and enhance support for Colombia’s institutions and democracy and the protection of civilian populations;

10. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Parliament of Colombia, the United Nations, and the Organization of American States.