Sittings · Document
On Hybrid warfare and the protection of the EU’s territorial integrity and critical security and defence infrastructure
Committee on Security and Defence · Rapporteur: Rasa Juknevičienė
Parliament's resolution on hybrid warfare and the protection of the EU's territorial integrity and critical security and defence infrastructure states that hybrid acts can amount to warfare and calls for a proactive EU response.¶¶¶ It names Russia, acting directly or via proxies such as Belarus, as the gravest hybrid-threat state actor, and also points to China, Iran and North Korea.¶ It demands action on information warfare and FIMI, cybersecurity, critical infrastructure, situational awareness, sanctions, EU-NATO coordination and support to partner countries.¶¶¶ It asks for a cross-domain action plan against hybrid warfare, a single coordination point between the Commission and the EEAS, and a horizontal EU sanctions framework for hybrid threats.¶¶
Committee position. The Committee on Security and Defence proposes that Parliament adopt the resolution, which recognises hybrid acts as a form of warfare and calls for a proactive EU response across information, cyber, critical infrastructure, situational awareness, sanctions and partner cooperation.¶¶¶
Key points
- States that hybrid operations are deliberate, intelligence-led acts by states and proxies, designed to stay below the threshold of armed conflict, and that hybrid acts can constitute warfare.¶
- Says the aim of hybrid warfare is to destabilise, divide and undermine the EU and its Member States, including by disrupting the defence industrial base and critical infrastructure.¶
- Affirms Russia, directly or via proxies such as Belarus, is the gravest hybrid-threat state actor, and notes campaigns by China, Iran, North Korea and non-state actors.¶
- Calls on the Commission and the Council to assess existing EU legal frameworks, close gaps, and treat sub-threshold hybrid operations as collective security matters requiring a combined civil-military response.¶
- Calls for the EU FIMI toolkit to integrate countermeasures against advanced influence techniques, for stronger enforcement of platform transparency rules, and for FIMI to be treated as a serious security threat.¶¶¶
- Calls for standardised pre-bunking and rapid-response mechanisms, a strengthened Rapid Alert System, and full use of the FIMI Toolbox and FIMI Deterrence Playbook, including coordinated public attribution and restrictive measures.¶¶
- Calls for whole-of-government and whole-of-society resilience approaches, civic education, media literacy, support to independent media and fact-checking networks, and cognitive vulnerability mapping and resilience benchmarks.¶¶¶
- Stresses the need for sovereign cyber capabilities for detection, attribution, response and intelligence, including offensive capabilities, and for connecting counter-FIMI mechanisms with cybersecurity capabilities.¶¶
- Calls for harmonised incident-reporting obligations, support for the EU Cybersecurity Reserve and PESCO Cyber Rapid Response Teams, and examination of the prerequisites for proportionate, legally compliant cyber countermeasures with NATO.¶¶¶
- Condemns hybrid attacks on critical infrastructure, including energy, transport, communications, satellite and undersea cable infrastructure, and calls for its protection, resilience and diversification of supply chains.¶¶¶
- Calls for a shared threat picture, increased intelligence sharing through SIAC and EU INTCEN, a secure information-sharing system, and a 'Black Book of Hybrid Aggression by Russia, China and others'.¶¶¶
- Calls for a cross-domain action plan against hybrid warfare, a single point of coordination between the Commission and the EEAS, a horizontal EU sanctions framework for hybrid threats, and operationalisation of Article 42(7) TEU.¶¶¶
Who is affected
- EU Member States, which must increase intelligence sharing, implement resilience law and harmonise laws on hybrid response operations.¶¶¶
- Critical infrastructure operators and private owners, which must be covered by public-private cooperation frameworks and defence-relevant resilience standards.¶
- Candidate, potential candidate and partner countries, notably Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and the Western Balkans, which receive hybrid resilience support.¶¶
- NATO, with which the EU is asked to align situational awareness, exercises and counter-drone capabilities.¶¶¶
- Online platforms, which face calls for stronger enforcement of transparency rules on recommendation systems, political advertising and coordinated inauthentic behaviour.¶
Figures and deadlines
- approximately EUR 1.56 billion: projected budget for Russian state-controlled media in 2026, 7 % higher than in 2025¶
- 12-nautical-mile territorial sea limit: threshold beyond which Australia criminalises damage to submarine cables¶
- 2028-2034: multiannual financial framework under which an EU legal and financial framework for critical energy infrastructure is urged¶
- past 10 years: period to be documented in the proposed 'Black Book of Hybrid Aggression'¶
Legal basis: Articles 42(7) and 222 TEU¶
Written by a language model from the full text only; every figure comes from the text and ¶ links to the paragraph it rests on. Check the text itself before relying on it.