Sittings · Document

Report (2025/2256(INI)) 2026-06-09

2025 Commission report on Türkiye

10.6.2026 A10-0106/7

Amendment 7

Tomasz Froelich, Alexander Sell

on behalf of the ESN Group

Report A10-0106/2026

Nacho Sánchez Amor

2025 Commission report on Türkiye

(2025/2256(INI))

Motion for a resolution

Recital B

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

B. whereas EU accession negotiations have effectively been at a standstill since 2018, owing to the deterioration of the rule of law and democracy in Türkiye and in a context of tense bilateral relations at that time;

B. whereas even though EU accession negotiations have effectively been at a standstill since 2018, Türkiye is still a beneficiary of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance; whereas Türkiye has received more than EUR 10 billion in pre-accession aid funds and has been allocated a further EUR 12.3 billion for migration management and humanitarian aid for the period up to 2027; whereas the total amount of direct EU support to Türkiye will exceed EUR 24 billion by 2027;

Or. en

10.6.2026 A10-0106/8

Amendment 8

Tomasz Froelich, Alexander Sell

on behalf of the ESN Group

Report A10-0106/2026

Nacho Sánchez Amor

2025 Commission report on Türkiye

(2025/2256(INI))

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 1

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

1. Reaffirms its appreciation for the long-standing aspirations of the majority of the Turkish people regarding accession to the EU and maintaining Türkiye’s candidate status, despite the persistent lack of progress and political will; acknowledges the fatigue that, as a consequence, continues to grow among stakeholders on both sides of the process; underscores, however, that any development in the accession process requires tangible progress in upholding the rule of law and democratic processes and believes that, in the absence of such progress, Türkiye’s EU accession process cannot be resumed;

1. Recommends that EU accession negotiations with Türkiye should be officially closed, in the interest of both the EU and Türkiye; considers Türkiye to be an important strategic partner of the EU and invites the European Council to request that the Commission develop a strategic partnership between the EU and Türkiye as an alternative path to membership;

Or. en

10.6.2026 A10-0106/9

Amendment 9

Tomasz Froelich, Alexander Sell

on behalf of the ESN Group

Report A10-0106/2026

Nacho Sánchez Amor

2025 Commission report on Türkiye

(2025/2256(INI))

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 19

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

19. Remains deeply concerned about women’s rights, and particularly about the high level of gender-based violence and the high incidence of femicide in Türkiye; urges the Turkish authorities to improve the legislative framework and its implementation, including by fully applying Protection Law No 6284, in order to effectively tackle all forms of violence against women and the practice of so-called honour killings, provide stronger protection mechanisms and end the persistent policy of impunity by holding abusers to account; regrets that despite having declared 2025 the ‘Year of the Family’, the Turkish Government has opted for a highly ideological and regressive approach that has targeted gender equality as a threat, further reducing the visibility of women in public space, and often treating violence against women and girls as a private family matter, which contributes to impunity; reiterates its strong condemnation of Türkiye’s withdrawal, by presidential decree, from the Istanbul Convention and reiterates its call to reverse this decision and re-ratify it; is concerned by the fact that civil society organisations dealing with women’s rights continue to face growing pressure, including by means of systematic administrative harassment and judicial prosecutions; urges the Turkish Government to address the persistent lack of gender equality in economic life, as Türkiye has one of the lowest female labour force participation rates among OECD countries, as well as a persistent low level of participation by women in decision-making and policymaking processes;

19. Remains concerned about women’s rights, and particularly about the high level of gender-based violence and the high incidence of femicide in Türkiye; encourages the Turkish authorities to improve the legislative framework and its implementation, including by fully applying Protection Law No 6284, in order to effectively tackle all forms of violence against women and the practice of so-called honour killings, provide stronger protection mechanisms and hold abusers to account; takes note of the fifth National Action Plan to Combat Violence against Women 2026-2030; calls for the EU to respect the national identity of Türkiye; respects, in this regard, Türkiye’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention; notes that several EU Member States, such as Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Lithuania and Slovakia, have not ratified the Istanbul Convention; is concerned by the fact that civil society organisations dealing with women’s rights continue to face growing pressure, including by means of systematic administrative harassment and judicial prosecutions; encourages the Turkish Government to facilitate the participation of women in economic life; notes that, following the 2023 parliamentary elections, the ratio of women parliamentarians in the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye reached approximately 20 %, the highest level in the Assembly’s history; notes that, following the 2024 local elections, the number of women mayors in provinces tripled;

Or. en

10.6.2026 A10-0106/10

Amendment 10

Tomasz Froelich, Alexander Sell

on behalf of the ESN Group

Report A10-0106/2026

Nacho Sánchez Amor

2025 Commission report on Türkiye

(2025/2256(INI))

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 20

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

20. Continues to condemn the ongoing violations and lack of protection of the fundamental rights of LGBTI+ persons in Türkiye, including arbitrary detentions, the persistence of hate speech, hate crimes, physical attacks and discriminatory rhetoric, and continued media stereotyping and stigmatisation on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity; deplores the fact that, instead of tackling this continued discrimination, the Turkish authorities have even intensified their repression by using the Year of the Family initiative as a platform to specifically target the LGBTI+ community and their rights; is deeply worried about several draft law proposals leaked over the past year, which included, for the first time in the history of the Republic of Türkiye, the criminalisation of any expression of LGBTI+ identities and consensual same-sex sexual activity; calls on the Turkish authorities to refrain from any reform of the Turkish penal code that would contravene Türkiye’s international obligations, including those under the ECHR; deeply regrets that in 2025, the Turkish Government continued to ban the Kuir fest and the Pride March in Istanbul and other locations, as well as many other anti-homophobia activities, while at the same time granting official permission for anti-LGBTI+ rallies and demonstrations that promote exclusion and discrimination; deplores the judicial closure of the İzmir-based Genç LGBTI+ Association, amid heightened harassment of civil society organisations working on LGBTI+ issues,’ based on charges of ‘obscenity’ that are increasingly being used to target activists and artists, including Turkish pop singer Mabel Matiz; welcomes the decision of 23 February 2026 of an Ankara court to acquit human rights defender and LGBTI+ activist Enes Hocaoğulları of all charges; regrets the unjustified prosecution he has suffered, including 35 days of pre-trial detention for exercising his freedom of speech at a Council of Europe conference in March 2025;

20. Notes that Türkiye is a culturally and socially conservative country where the institution of the family and public morality are respected; notes, in this regard, the decision of the Turkish authorities to ban Istanbul Pride in 2025 in the name of social peace, family structure and moral values; notes the Turkish Government’s plans to amend the Turkish penal and civil code to restrict gender reassignment therapy, in order to legally enforce the protection of children and tackle harmful trends targeting them;

Or. en

10.6.2026 A10-0106/11

Amendment 11

Tomasz Froelich, Alexander Sell

on behalf of the ESN Group

Report A10-0106/2026

Nacho Sánchez Amor

2025 Commission report on Türkiye

(2025/2256(INI))

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 22 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

22a. Condemns the fact that Türkiye is employing a new global religious strategy to bypass legal and political restrictions in the EU on the operations of the Turkish religious authority Diyanet, thereby shifting away from dispatching imams to Europe towards recruiting young members of the Turkish diaspora in Europe and training them in Türkiye; further condemns the fact that Diyanet’s global strategy is backed by massive state funding and aims to expand a network of religious, educational and social influence;

Or. en

10.6.2026 A10-0106/12

Amendment 12

Tomasz Froelich, Alexander Sell

on behalf of the ESN Group

Report A10-0106/2026

Nacho Sánchez Amor

2025 Commission report on Türkiye

(2025/2256(INI))

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 35

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

35. Continues to commend Türkiye for hosting around 2.7 million refugees, including 2.3 million Syrians under temporary protection as at January 2026; notes that, according to Frontex reporting in January 2025, irregular migration along the Türkiye–EU border declined by approximately one quarter in absolute numbers; reiterates the importance of Türkiye’s collaboration for the effective and orderly management of migration flows; further notes the fact that since 2011, the EU has contributed close to EUR 12.5 billion to assist Türkiye in supporting refugees and host communities; supports the continuation of EU funding to further sustain the healthcare, education, protection and integration of refugees in Türkiye; calls for the EU and the Member States to maintain and, where possible, scale up financial assistance for the humanitarian and protection space in Türkiye, increasing efforts to support Turkish civil society organisations and refugee-led organisations;

35. Continues to commend Türkiye for hosting around 2.7 million refugees, including 2.3 million Syrians under temporary protection as at January 2026; notes that, according to Frontex reporting in January 2025, irregular migration along the Türkiye–EU border declined by approximately one quarter in absolute numbers; reiterates the importance of Türkiye’s collaboration for the effective and orderly management of migration flows; further notes the fact that since 2011, the EU has contributed close to EUR 12.5 billion to assist Türkiye in supporting refugees and host communities; notes that, according to Special Report 06/2024 by the European Court of Auditors, the EUR 6 billion Facility for Refugees in Türkiye could have achieved greater value for money and shown more impact;

Or. en

10.6.2026 A10-0106/13

Amendment 13

Tomasz Froelich, Alexander Sell

on behalf of the ESN Group

Report A10-0106/2026

Nacho Sánchez Amor

2025 Commission report on Türkiye

(2025/2256(INI))

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 36

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

36. Expresses concern about the deterioration of the protection environment for Syrian refugees in Türkiye, including the suspension of health insurance, the closure of refugee camps without adequate alternatives and the downscaling of services provided by international non-governmental organisations and the UN; furthermore, remains concerned about the situation of minority groups, refugees and migrants who continued to face discrimination, violence and forced returns in 2025; highlights that Türkiye must continue to protect Syrian refugees until the conditions for their return are met; calls on the Turkish authorities to reinstate ‘go-and-see’ visits or equivalent mechanisms enabling informed return decisions; notes with concern that there are credible reports uncovering human rights violations at EU-funded removal centres in Türkiye and calls on the Commission to launch a transparent and independent investigation into the matter; calls on the Commission to ensure utmost transparency and accuracy in the allocation of funds and to make sure that EU-funded projects, particularly those related to removal centres and border control, comply with all relevant human rights standards; calls on Türkiye to ensure the full and non-discriminatory implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement of 2016 and the EU-Türkiye Readmission Agreement vis-à-vis all Member States; stresses that migrants’ vulnerability must not be instrumentalised for political purposes against the EU or its Member States; urges Türkiye to continue cooperating in good faith with all EU Member States in the field of migration, ensuring that a clear signal is sent to human smugglers to deter further illegal flows;

36. Notes that, following the fall of Bashar al-Assad, the pace of returns of Syrians to their homeland increased significantly, with over 550 000 Syrians returning between December 2024 and late 2025; supports Türkiye’s policy of facilitating these returns and encourages the Member States to follow Türkiye’s example of returning Syrians; calls on the Commission to ensure utmost transparency and accuracy in the allocation of funds and to make sure that EU-funded projects, particularly those related to removal centres and border control, comply with all relevant human rights standards; calls on Türkiye to ensure the full and non-discriminatory implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement of 2016 and the EU-Türkiye Readmission Agreement vis-à-vis all Member States; urges Türkiye to continue cooperating in good faith with all EU Member States in the field of migration, ensuring that a clear signal is sent to human smugglers to deter further illegal flows; emphasises that this cooperation must not involve any attempt to instrumentalise migration for political purposes against the EU or its Member States;

Or. en

10.6.2026 A10-0106/14

Amendment 14

Sarah Knafo

on behalf of the ESN Group

Report A10-0106/2026

Nacho Sánchez Amor

2025 Commission report on Türkiye

(2025/2256(INI))

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 36 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

36a. Condemns the Turkish authorities’ use of migration flows as an instrument for exerting geopolitical pressure on the EU and its Member States; considers that such actions constitute a serious breach both of the obligations arising from Türkiye’s candidate status and of the fundamental values ​​of the EU;

Or. en

10.6.2026 A10-0106/15

Amendment 15

Tomasz Froelich, Alexander Sell

on behalf of the ESN Group

Report A10-0106/2026

Nacho Sánchez Amor

2025 Commission report on Türkiye

(2025/2256(INI))

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 42 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

42a. Notes that Türkiye is one of the biggest drone producers in the world; notes that leading Turkish drone producers are expanding their industrial and technological partnerships with firms across the EU, encompassing strategic agreements, technology transfer and joint ventures; notes that, in this way, Türkiye is becoming an important partner in European defence architecture;

Or. en

10.6.2026 A10-0106/16

Amendment 16

Tomasz Froelich, Alexander Sell

on behalf of the ESN Group

Report A10-0106/2026

Nacho Sánchez Amor

2025 Commission report on Türkiye

(2025/2256(INI))

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 44

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

44. Recognises, as regards Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Türkiye’s efforts in terms of its facilitation and potential mediation role, as underpinned by its hosting of several direct talks between both sides in Istanbul, as well as through the provision of military, diplomatic and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, including defence equipment, which has contributed to Ukraine’s defence efforts; acknowledges that Türkiye has traditionally maintained a position of not supporting sanctions adopted outside the UN framework; nevertheless continues to regret the fact, that Türkiye does not align with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia, while welcoming the measures it has taken to prevent the circumvention of sanctions via Turkish territory, such as to prevent the re-export of common high priority items, which are delivering some results, and calls for alignment with the EU sanctions framework against Russia; urges the Turkish authorities to increase their efforts to detect and prevent the circumvention of restrictive measures, in particular on advanced technology items used for military purposes by Russia, to prevent the ‘false transit’ of these items to Russia via Central Asia, to extend these measures to other economically critical goods, to reduce the use of energy resources originating from Russia, and to address the risks linked with Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ in terms of maritime and environmental safety; further expresses concern that Türkiye has not restricted the operations of Russian state-controlled media in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; notes the widespread presence of pro-Russian narratives and Russia-linked disinformation in the Turkish information space, particularly on Ukraine, NATO and energy security; calls on Türkiye to strengthen efforts to counter foreign information manipulation and disinformation; notes with concern that, through the TurkStream and Blue Stream pipelines, Türkiye is a major importer of Russian natural gas, as well as a major source of oil and petroleum products; reiterates its concern about Türkiye’s close cooperation with Russia on the development of large nuclear power plants, including the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, which is expected to become operational in 2026, and which is owned and will be operated by Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation, Rosatom; urges the Turkish Government to join the Espoo Convention, which commits its parties to notifying neighbouring countries on major projects under consideration that are likely to have a significant adverse environmental impact across boundaries;

44. Recognises, as regards Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Türkiye’s efforts in terms of its facilitation and potential mediation role, as underpinned by its hosting of several direct talks between both sides in Istanbul, as well as through the provision of military, diplomatic and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, including defence equipment, which has contributed to Ukraine’s defence efforts; acknowledges that Türkiye has traditionally maintained a position of not supporting sanctions adopted outside the UN framework; nevertheless continues to regret the fact, that Türkiye does not align with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia, while welcoming the measures it has taken to prevent the circumvention of sanctions via Turkish territory, such as to prevent the re-export of common high priority items, which are delivering some results, and calls for alignment with the EU sanctions framework against Russia; urges the Turkish authorities to increase their efforts to detect and prevent the circumvention of restrictive measures, in particular on advanced technology items used for military purposes by Russia, to prevent the ‘false transit’ of these items to Russia via Central Asia, to extend these measures to other economically critical goods, to reduce the use of energy resources originating from Russia, and to address the risks linked with Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ in terms of maritime and environmental safety; further expresses concern that Türkiye has not restricted the operations of Russian state-controlled media in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; notes the widespread presence of pro-Russian narratives and Russia-linked disinformation in the Turkish information space, particularly on Ukraine, NATO and energy security; calls on Türkiye to strengthen efforts to counter foreign information manipulation and disinformation; notes with concern that, through the TurkStream and Blue Stream pipelines, Türkiye is a major importer of Russian natural gas, as well as a major source of oil and petroleum products; notes that Türkiye’s plans for nuclear power are a key aspect of the country’s economic growth strategy, and that Türkiye aims to cut back its reliance on Russian gas for electricity; notes that the Akkuyu nuclear power plant is expected to become operational in 2026 and is owned and will be operated by Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation, Rosatom; notes that Türkiye is planning two more plants, as well as small modular reactors; urges the Turkish Government to join the Espoo Convention, which commits its parties to notifying neighbouring countries on major projects under consideration that are likely to have a significant adverse environmental impact across boundaries;

Or. en