Sittings · Document
On flagship European defence projects of common interest
Committee on Security and Defence · Rapporteur: Lucia Annunziata
MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION
on flagship European defence projects of common interest
(2025/2144(INI))
The European Parliament,
– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 42(2) and 42(3) thereof,
– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Articles 2, 107(3)(b), 114 and 346 thereof,
– having regard to Article 2(e) of Protocol No 10 on permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) established by Article 42(6) TEU and the joint notification on PESCO signed by ministers of 23 EU Member States on 13 November 2017,
– having regard to the Versailles Declaration adopted at the informal meeting of heads of state or government on 11 March 2022, in particular paragraph 22 thereof,
– having regard to the ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’, which was approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 25 March 2022,
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 18 May 2022 on the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward (JOIN(2022)0024),
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 March 2023 entitled ‘European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defence’ (JOIN(2023)0009),
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry’ (JOIN(2024)0010),
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 21 February 2025 entitled ‘EU Action Plan on Cable Security’ (JOIN(2025)0009),
– having regard to the joint white paper from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120),
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund (EDF)1,
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/2643 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2025 establishing the European Defence Industry Programme and a framework of measures to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products (EDIP Regulation), in particular Chapter IV thereof regarding European Defence Projects of Common Interest (EDPCIs),
– having regard to the Commission proposal of 19 March 2025 for a Council regulation establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the reinforcement of the European defence industry Instrument (COM(2025)0122),
– having regard to the Commission proposal of 22 April 2025 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2021/694, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697, (EU) 2021/1153, (EU) 2023/1525 and 2024/795, as regards incentivising defence-related investments in the EU budget to implement the ReArm Europe Plan (COM(2025)0188),
– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 of 27 May 2025 establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the Reinforcement of the European Defence Industry Instrument,
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 October 2025 entitled ‘Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0027),
– having regard to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment,
– having regard to the scoping paper of the Commission of 29 September 2025 entitled ‘Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030’,
– having regard to the report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the Council of 11 April 2025 entitled ‘Annual progress report on the Implementation of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence’,
– having regard to the conclusions of the European Council of 22 and 23 June 2017, particularly those of paragraph 8 on PESCO, and of 6 March 2025, particularly those of paragraph 3(f),
– having regard to the conclusions of the European Council of 23 October 2025,
– having regard to the national security strategies of the EU Member States,
– having regard to European Court of Auditors Opinion 02/2024 of 3 October 2024 concerning the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Defence Industry Programme and a framework of measures to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products (EDIP)’, and in particular paragraph 42 thereof,
– having regard to the 2024 annual report by the European Defence Agency (EDA), as well as its report of 14 November 2023 entitled ‘The 2023 EU Capability Development Priorities’, and the 2024 report entitled ‘Coordinated Annual Review on Defence’,
– having regard to the progress report of the PESCO Secretariat of September 2025 on PESCO projects,
– having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 on the future of European competitiveness and Chapter 4 thereof on increasing security and reducing dependencies,
– having regard to the report by Enrico Letta of 17 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market’ and, in particular, Chapter 3 thereof on a single market to play big: scale matters,
– having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together: Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’, and in particular Chapter 7 thereof,
– having regard to the Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation of 10 January 2023,
– having regard to The Hague Summit Declaration issued by the NATO heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in The Hague on 25 June 2025,
– having regard to the 10th progress report of 10 June 2025 on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2018,
– having regard to the cooperative equipment programmes managed by the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR),
– having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the white paper on the future of European defence, and in particular paragraphs 4 and 58 thereof,
– having regard to its resolution of 2 April 2025 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2024, and in particular paragraph 46 thereof,
– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Security and Defence (A10-0014/2026),
A. whereas the challenges posed by the decline in global peace and security, the pursuit by Russia of its war of aggression against Ukraine, and the emergence of new and evolving threats to EU security require the EU and its Member States to significantly increase their defence investment in order to develop military and intelligence capabilities that enable them to defend their sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and to bolster deterrence, as well as to act and respond autonomously or in partnership with their allies, particularly within NATO, to immediate and future threats;
B. whereas rising attacks on European critical infrastructure, including cyberattacks and sabotage, seriously threaten our daily life and economic activities across the EU, and require a coordinated EU response through large-scale European projects;
C. whereas warfare, historically dominated by conventional weapons, appears to be evolving ‘from steel to web’; whereas it is increasingly incorporating cyber capabilities and networked operations, and warfare strategies are being transformed through new technologies and artificial intelligence (AI) and are no longer limited to massed firepower and large-scale confrontations, but moving towards miniaturisation and decentralisation of systems, as evidenced by the use of drones and drone swarms across all domains, AI-enabled weapons, smart mines, and portable missile systems in battlefields; whereas fighter jets, ships, artillery, battle tanks and ground vehicles are becoming more vulnerable to precision strikes and therefore require greater protection, as they are still essential to military and security operations; whereas there remains a need to produce and deploy traditional weapons systems and ammunition on a large scale, when necessary;
D. whereas this new paradigm of conflict means that no region of the EU is exempt from the potential threat of aggression, interference, disinformation, psychological subversion or hybrid attacks; whereas strategic preparation for a prolonged conflict remains crucial to ensuring long-term security and defence resilience;
E. whereas space is becoming an increasingly congested and contested strategic domain, with the growing weaponisation of both ground and space segments; whereas NATO has recognised space as the fifth strategic operational domain, acknowledging the increasing security challenges originating from space and, consequently, the need to make it more secure;
F. whereas in its joint communication of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy’, the Commission highlighted that only 18 % of total equipment spending by EU Member States was devoted to EU collaborative defence equipment procurement in 2022, far below the current 35 % collective benchmark set by Member States at the EDA Ministerial Steering Board in 2007; whereas the Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 sets a target of organising at least 40 % of defence procurement as joint procurement by the end of 2027; whereas in order to ramp up European defence industry capacity, on 23 October 2025, the European Council called on the Member States to increasingly gear defence investments towards joint development, production and procurement with the support of the EDA; whereas the coordination of efforts among Member States to ensure efficient allocation of resources, reduce fragmentation and accelerate the development of innovative defence technologies is essential for the establishment of a fully operational market; whereas achieving these objectives requires stronger incentives and a reduction in administrative burdens, while ensuring that cooperation remains market-driven, based on defence capability requirements and the complementary defence planning processes of the EU, its Member States and NATO;
G. whereas ‘European Readiness Flagships’, as presented by the Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030, are based on a comprehensive approach to defence, encompassing both protection against direct military attacks and preparedness for hybrid threats; whereas they represent an opportunity to foster innovation, interoperability and competitiveness within the EU defence industry, by developing innovative joint industrial partnerships on frontier technologies, substantially strengthening the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) and making it less dependent on third-country technologies;
H. whereas Member States located on the eastern borders of the EU are the most exposed to serious threats and are essential to the security of the EU as a whole; whereas in its conclusions of 23 October 2025, the European Council noted that the immediate threats on the EU’s eastern flank and the provision of concrete support to Member States need to be addressed as matters of priority; whereas the Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 highlights the European Drone Defence Initiative and the Eastern Flank Watch as the initiatives to be launched first; whereas, as proposed, the Eastern Flank Watch is set to reinforce the EU’s eastern borders, by integrating ground, naval and air defence capabilities with effective and state-of-the-art counter-drone systems and technologies that are also instrumental to the European Drone Defence Initiative;
I. whereas the end users of defence products are primarily the national armed forces of Member States and the latter can therefore only consider increasing their investments in defence industrial projects if these projects concern the development of military capabilities of common interest to their armed forces; whereas Article 346 TFEU provides that any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material;
J. whereas the Strategic Compass on Security and Defence sets the objective of developing incentives to stimulate Member States’ collaborative investments in joint projects and the joint procurement of defence capabilities that are developed in a collaborative way within the EU;
K. whereas Regulation (EU) 2025/2643 establishing the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) provides for the implementation of EDPCIs; whereas EDPCIs consist of collaborative industrial projects aimed at reinforcing the competitiveness of the EDTIB throughout the Union, while contributing to the development of Member States’ military capabilities critical for the security and defence interests of the Union, and promoting open and modular architecture, dual-use innovation, and the cross-border participation of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and mid-caps across all operational domains, namely land, maritime, air, space and cyber; whereas the EDIP also includes the Structures for European Armament Programme (SEAPs), a new legal framework that can be used for collaborative armament initiatives under the umbrella of flagship projects;
L. whereas as emphasised in the Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030, Ukraine remains Europe’s first line of defence and forms an integral part of Europe’s defence and security architecture; whereas cooperation between the defence industries of the EU and Ukraine, in particular in the context of flagship projects or EDPCIs, is of great importance for their respective markets, competitiveness and innovation potential;
1. Acknowledges the overall increase in defence expenditure among EU Member States as a clear reflection of their determination to respond to the deteriorating security environment, by enhancing military capabilities, strengthening deterrence and reinforcing their collective commitment to European and transatlantic defence; notes that some Member States, in particular those located on the eastern borders of the EU, have met or exceeded NATO’s spending target of devoting 2 % of their GDP to defence expenditure by the end of 2025;
2. Acknowledges also that strengthening Europe’s security and defence requires not merely an increase in national defence spending, but a comprehensive shift towards greater coordination, efficiency and integration in the way that Member States develop, resource and implement their defence policies; stresses that this shift from a predominantly national approach to defence towards a shared understanding of the Union’s collective security and deterrence posture must be conducted with full respect for the sovereignty of Member States and their competences in the fields of security and defence, in line with Article 4(2) TEU;
3. Notes that, despite increased defence efforts, the EU and its Member States continue to face persistent shortfalls in strategic collective capabilities, command and control structures, and sustainable military capacity; highlights, in particular, that Member States have identified the following initial priority capability gaps: air and missile defence, artillery systems, missiles and ammunition, drones and counter-drone systems, strategic enablers, including in relation to space and critical infrastructure, military mobility, cyber, AI and electronic warfare, ground combat, and maritime security; underlines that these gaps significantly limit the ability of the EU and its Member States to bolster deterrence and sustain a prolonged large-scale defence engagement, in the increased likelihood of acts of hybrid or conventional warfare; calls for urgent measures to address these critical capability shortfalls through enhanced cooperation both on strategic and industrial matters, coordinated planning, and targeted investments to ensure defence readiness; recognises the efforts made by the EDTIB stakeholders to tackle such challenges;
4. Stresses that filling capability gaps requires developing autonomous strategic enablers without which Member States’ armed forces cannot effectively conduct joint military operations; recommends, in this regard, the development of a safe and secure common architecture for command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance, as well as common defence capabilities in the areas of space, strategic airlift and sealift, air-to-air refuelling and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear risk prevention; praises the work of the EDA, which provides an overview and analysis of the EU defence landscape and offers recommendations on opportunities for collaboration on capability development and acquisition through the Capability Development Priorities and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence;
5. Recalls that NATO and the EU play complementary, coherent and mutually reinforcing roles; calls for greater engagement in cooperation by EU Member States and NATO allies, in line with the third Joint Declaration of 10 January 2023 on EU-NATO cooperation, in order to develop defence capabilities and fill existing gaps; highlights that all European efforts in that regard should be made in close coordination with NATO, with the aim of strengthening industrial cooperation and interoperability; calls for increased European engagement in existing NATO structures for cooperation and also recalls the need to ensure the coherence of output between the EU’s capability development planning process and the NATO Planning and Review Process; calls for improved interoperability of military equipment between EU Member States and NATO allies, in particular by ensuring compatibility between their standards and specifications;
6. Recognises that there are immediate defence needs that still need to be met with supplies or support from non-EU countries; further emphasises that European security remains heavily dependent on the defence industry of non-EU countries; stresses that, in the current geopolitical context and given the requirement for the EU to assume greater responsibility for defence, there is a need for a managed and gradual transition from dependency on non-EU countries to strategic autonomy and strengthening the EDTIB; concurs with the objective of significantly reducing or progressively phasing out, as far as possible, reliance on non-EU manufacturers and suppliers, including in the field of raw materials and rare earth minerals, where equivalent solutions exist or can be developed within the EU, which are essential for EU strategic autonomy and security of supply; calls, therefore, for measures to strengthen the EDTIB and enhance its competitiveness, including through an ambitious and dynamic EU preference for defence procurement, open and competitive markets for EU companies, cross-border industrial cooperation within the EU and with trusted and like-minded partners, and fair access to procurement for SMEs;
7. Highlights that without the establishment of a fully functioning single EU market for defence products and services, the increase in national defence spending risks being dissipated through inefficiencies, thereby contributing to further fragmentation of the EDTIB; calls on the Member States to strengthen joint defence procurement and enhance cooperation on defence capability development in order to enhance interoperability and interchangeability, ensure efficient resource allocation, reinforce the EDTIB, attract private investment, reduce fragmentation in the EU defence market, and decrease the variety of different defence products addressing similar operational needs across the Union; emphasises that procurement in the context of flagship projects should be carried out jointly by participating Member States and that flagship projects should contribute to the goal of organising 40 % of defence procurement as common procurement by the end of 2027;
Developing defence capabilities through flagship projects in priority areas
8. Acknowledges the proposal by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to launch a set of initial European Readiness Flagships, as part of the Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030; takes note of the European Council’s endorsement of this roadmap and the Member States’ commitment to developing four initial European Readiness Flagships – the European Drone Defence Initiative, the Eastern Flank Watch, the European Air Shield and the European Space Shield; notes that these proposed flagship projects cover a very wide range of defence capabilities; notes, furthermore, that they are of a cross-cutting nature and that they contribute to the full-spectrum security interests of the Union; urges the Commission, the participating Member States and the EDA to therefore clearly identify the specific objectives, timeline and milestones for the implementation, financing proposals, governance mechanisms, technological scope and expected size of each of these projects; highlights the need for an operational concept and clear governance to determine who does what, especially in cases with cross-border implications, for example when a hostile drone flies from one Member State to another; stresses that the design and implementation of these projects should be comprehensive, ensuring that they incorporate conventional defence components alongside advanced technologies, in order to guarantee operational sustainability in the event of protracted conflicts; calls on the participating Member States to ensure that the milestones of each project are met, finalise the capability coalitions outlined in the roadmap and do their utmost to launch flagship projects swiftly, in line with the European Council conclusions of 23 October 2025;
9. Welcomes the approach proposed for the European Drone Defence Initiative, which aims to develop a technologically advanced, multilayered system with interoperable capabilities to detect, track and neutralise drones, and capabilities to hit ground targets by leveraging drone technology for precision strikes; recognises that counter-drone capabilities should be fully interoperable and connected between Member States in order to ensure situational awareness at EU level and EU Member States’ ability to act together and secure critical infrastructure in cooperation with NATO; recognises the challenges of achieving a functional drone defence system under this initiative and therefore calls for the implementation of pilot projects involving a smaller number of Member States as an initial step, leading to a 360-degree approach once systems are sufficiently operational and effective to be deployed more widely;
10. Stresses that flagship projects should take into account the specific defence and deterrence requirements of the EU’s eastern flank; welcomes the approach proposed for the Eastern Flank Watch, which is designed to build up the capacity of Member States bordering Russia to face a wide range of threats and risks, including hybrid threats, the use of Russia’s shadow fleet to conduct sabotage operations and surveillance, and the risk of armed aggression; highlights that it consists of integrating the four elements of ground defence, situational awareness, air defence and counter-drone systems, and maritime security in the Baltic and Black Seas; supports the proposed objective to establish a comprehensive border defence capability, thereby contributing to the security of the whole Union, with multi-domain surveillance systems, drone and counter-drone capabilities, electronic warfare capabilities, precision strike systems, and responsive operational coordination; calls for the inclusion of measures to strengthen forward resilience, reinforce infrastructure protection measures and cyber defence capabilities, and ensure regional interoperability and full operational readiness in case of crisis;
11. Stresses that flagship projects represent a strong opportunity to strengthen the competitiveness, efficiency and innovation capacity of the EDTIB; recognises the need to establish a widely agreed upon definition of ‘flagship projects of common interest’ as large-scale, pan-European collaborative initiatives involving as many Member States as possible, in defence capability and industrial development, including strategic enablers within a common framework such as EDIP that allow their identification and implementation in a coherent manner within EU defence and industrial policies; underlines that defining flagship projects is crucial to ensuring effective collaboration among Member States, pooling resources to address critical capability gaps, and moving towards a genuine European Defence Union;
12. Underlines the strategic importance of strengthening the EDTIB through cooperation with Ukraine, associated countries in the framework of the cooperation established under the Agreement on the European Economic Area, like-minded non-EU countries, and countries with which the EU has signed security and defence partnerships; emphasises, in this regard, that the Ukrainian defence industry has acquired key technological expertise and know-how based on lessons learned from the experience of the Ukrainian armed forces in the battlefield and acknowledges the proposed Drone Alliance with Ukraine; recommends that, in order to tackle the slow innovation cycles in the EU, to link research and development and production, and to ensure continuous technological development, the flagship projects be open, as far as possible and with full respect for the security interests of the EU and its Member States, to the participation of Ukraine, associated countries and countries that have signed a security and defence partnership with the EU;
Identifying and ensuring the proper set-up and implementation of flagship projects
13. Stresses that the objectives of flagship projects must be aligned with those of agreed EU defence objectives and coherent with NATO targets for capability development; emphasises, furthermore, that they should address innovative technological areas for defence and contribute to the development of cutting-edge defence capabilities that respond to the requirements of modern warfare, including the rising need to network military multi-domain operations, troops and weapons, ensure cyber defence, develop intelligence data collection, storage, processing, sharing, unmanned systems and AI-based decision support tools, operate deep and precise strikes and counter drone attacks; highlights the importance of the ethical and responsible use of AI systems in full compliance with international humanitarian law;
14. Calls on the Commission and the EU Member States to integrate the cyber domain and digital technologies into EU core defence priorities, in order to ensure data sovereignty and collective preparedness against hybrid and cyber threats; stresses that ensuring cyber security and resilience should be a cross-cutting objective of all flagship projects, ensuring secure digital infrastructure, the protection of command-and-control systems and the integrity of data flows across operational domains, in line with the EU Cyber Defence Policy and the Strategic Compass priorities;
15. Stresses the need for flagship projects that cover the space domain – an increasingly militarised strategic domain – as it is an area on which several security-related activities depend, such as secure communications and intelligence gathering; stresses, furthermore, the importance of integrating flagship projects with strategic transport and logistics infrastructure, such as cross-border military mobility corridors and dual-use infrastructure, in particular in eastern and south-eastern Europe, which are critical for rapid deployment and resilience along the eastern flank;
16. Emphasises that flagship projects should aim to foster closer cooperation and innovation in governance mechanisms at EU level and among EU Member States, showing best practice towards a common and coordinated strategy for European defence, while also taking into account the knowledge acquired in Ukraine about the conduct of modern warfare; stresses that the Commission should establish clear short-, medium- and long-term strategies for developing flagship projects, ensuring that long-term research and development and innovation efforts are coherently coordinated with short-term investments in critical defence capabilities, in order to guarantee both technological advancement and immediate operational readiness; stresses, furthermore, that good governance of flagship projects must be based on a shared vision and effective coordination among their ‘programmatic actors’, namely the Commission, the governments, military headquarters and public procurement agencies of EU Member States, and defence industrial companies; considers that flagship projects could benefit from and build on existing cooperation within the framework of PESCO and European Defence Fund (EDF) projects;
17. Acknowledges that several European defence companies have already engaged over time in major transnational collaborative projects across various areas related to the security dimension; highlights that these case studies can serve as examples for the design and management of flagship projects; stresses that, beyond their development and production phases, flagship projects should also ensure the establishment of common frameworks for their operation, maintenance and life-cycle management at Union level;
18. Acknowledges the creation of EDPCIs as a new tool under the EDIP; recognises that flagship projects could also be developed under its framework; notes that EDPCIs can be developed in the context of SEAPs; stresses that EDPCIs should enhance the interoperability and resilience of supply chains and remain fully complementary to NATO capability planning as set out in the Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030;
19. Calls on the Commission to strive for full conceptual and procedural alignment between the implementation frameworks of flagship projects and existing instruments such as PESCO, EDF, EDIP and EDPCIs, so that these instruments operate coherently and mutually reinforce one another within the EU’s defence architecture; further calls on the Commission to clarify how EDPCIs are to be structured and combined in practice to form a flagship project, including the necessary governance, sequencing and coordination mechanisms;
20. Stresses the need to foster stronger synergies between research, innovation and industrial development within the EU defence ecosystem; acknowledges, in this regard, the contributing role of relevant stakeholders, such as research organisations, academic institutions, innovation hubs, technology centres, and testing and certification bodies from all Member States; calls for the inclusion of the widest possible range of industrial actors in flagship projects, especially mid-caps, SMEs and start-ups, to enable the spread of innovation across the entire spectrum of the EDTIB and to strengthen security of supply; calls for the establishment of a high-level European defence industry group to ensure effective cooperation, and for closer dialogue and engagement with industry across the whole of Europe;
21. Underlines the importance of ensuring balanced geographical participation in flagship projects, which should aim for the broadest possible participation of Member States, including those with emerging defence industries; emphasises that flagship projects should enable all participating Member States to benefit from technological advances and production capacities and contribute to strengthening capabilities and resilience across the Union as a whole; also stresses that these projects should remain open for new Member States to join, and that the participation of additional Member States over time should be encouraged and facilitated; calls for co-financing mechanisms that are flexible and inclusive, ensuring that all Member States, regardless of economic size, can participate meaningfully in flagship projects;
22. Underlines the importance of strengthening the regional dimension of the EU defence industrial strategy and stresses the potential impact of flagship projects in terms of technological spillover effects, economic benefits, skilled employment and social cohesion across regions in the EU; calls for the involvement of regional and local governments and for regions of the EU to be given the opportunity to benefit from flagship projects in order to promote joint ownership in defence matters;
23. Stresses the need to prevent military technologies, in particular sensitive emerging technologies and critical dual-use items, especially in the areas of space, quantum technologies and AI, from being transferred to hostile countries or systemic rivals outside the EU; urges the Member States participating in flagship projects to strengthen coordination and to commit to following common approaches and to defining and agreeing on a common strategy and conditions for granting export licences to non-participating non-EU countries for products resulting from flagship projects;
24. Calls for the establishment of a coordinated risk-based export control mechanism among Member States participating in flagship projects, aligned with the EU’s Strategic Compass objectives and consistent with Member States’ national competences, prerogatives and international obligations, including those under NATO;
Governance of flagship projects and the role of Parliament
25. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to further present proposals for flagship projects addressing the development of defence capabilities and allowing Member States to better align their national efforts with agreed EU defence objectives and in coherence with the relevant NATO targets for capability development; highlights that project proposals should take into account the specific needs of Member States most exposed to the risk of materialisation of conventional military and hybrid threats; underlines the importance of involving defence industries in defining the priorities and scope of future flagship projects;
26. Stresses that the selection of flagship projects should be merit-based and rely on transparent procedures, ensuring balanced geographical participation and preventing the concentration of decision-making or industrial benefits in a limited number of Member States;
27. Recommends that the Commission, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the EDA participate in an advisory, supporting and coordinating role to facilitate the implementation of flagship projects; underlines the critical role of the European Union Military Committee in giving strategic military advice and making recommendations to the Political and Security Committee, in particular on the development, assessment and review of capability objectives, and calls, in this regard, for its formal inclusion in the governance framework of flagship projects;
28. Commits to exercising its scrutiny, legislative and budgetary roles in relation to the coordination, implementation and financing of flagship projects on the basis of regular and comprehensive information and reports from the Commission; highlights its budgetary authority and responsibility with regard to the use of EU funds; calls for regular public reporting and parliamentary scrutiny to ensure accountability and foster trust in flagship projects;
Ensuring the financing of flagship projects in the long term
29. Calls for adequate and dedicated funding under the next multiannual financial framework to ensure the long-term financing of flagship projects; underlines the need for adequate and appropriate funding for flagship projects that does not compromise the funds allocated to other strategic areas of the EU budget devoted to defence; highlights the need to dedicate part of this funding to training, skills development and talent retention initiatives;
30. Stresses that developing defence capabilities collectively at Union level can generate significant economies of scale, reduce costs and ensure that public funds and taxpayers’ money are used in the most efficient and responsible manner;
31. Shares the European Court of Auditors’ observation regarding the EDIP proposal that the time needed to complete flagship projects is likely to exceed the two-year implementation period provided for by the EDIP; stresses, therefore, that for flagship projects to benefit from EDIP funding, the Member States concerned must commit to co-financing them for their entire duration, well beyond an initial two-year period; highlights the importance of long-term planning for sustained investment and industrial continuity to secure Europe’s strategic autonomy;
32. Stresses that the co-financing of flagship projects should be grounded in sound management and budgetary planning, cost efficiency and transparency; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Member States to establish milestones, performance indicators, periodic financial controls and reviews of expenditure incurred in the implementation of flagship projects;
33. Calls on the Member States to consider systematically earmarking part of their national defence budgets for the development of partnership initiatives and the procurement of defence equipment produced within the framework of flagship projects in areas where joint efforts generate added value, in line with Article 4(2) TEU and Article 346 TFEU;
34. Encourages the Member States to coordinate national defence budgetary planning with NATO capability targets in order to ensure complementarity and avoid the fragmentation of resources; invites the Member States to explore ways of establishing an off-budget financial instrument that would allow for the pooling and mutualisation of certain parts of national defence budgets at EU level, in order to cover the entire life cycle of flagship projects;
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35. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, NATO, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the EU security and defence agencies and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT
A new defence for a long-lasting peace.
The nineteenth century was an age forged in Steel. Its emergence transformed the world, laying the foundation for an era of unprecedented industrial power and disruptive warfare. By the time of World War I, Steel had become not merely a material but the backbone of modern conflicts: a force that shaped structural design, logistics, defence, and military strategy alike. This revolutionary material fed and sustained an unprecedented industrial revolution and a new weapon systems: cannons, munitions, naval fleets, armoured vehicles and aircraft, helmets, infrastructures. Merging the new industrial framework and a large-scale production of materials required to support the needs of the front.
Today, warfare dominated by big powerful instruments, the conventional weapons of the 19th Century, appears to be evolving “from Steel to Web”. The new technologies are transforming strategies, the cyber domain and artificial intelligence, no longer limited to massive firepower and large-scale confrontations, moving towards miniaturization and decentralization of systems, as drone prove, AI-enabled weapons, smart mines, and portable missile systems in battlefields. Even the role of human power is changing: there is less and less employment of direct human involvement and presence in the frontline. Conflicts today present a total new landscape and totally new threats.
The challenges posed by the emergence of new and evolving threats to EU security require today the EU and its Member States to deal with a new defence framework to defend their collective sovereignty, act and respond autonomously or in partnership with their allies, particularly within NATO, to immediate and future threats.
Change
After three decades marked by a trend toward disarmament across the EU, the changes to the global and regional security environment and new threats to the security of the European continent, have made it necessary for EU Member States to increase their efforts to acquire more military capabilities for their defence. At the NATO Summit on 25 June 2025 in the Hague, 23 EU and NATO member states committed to invest 5% of their Gross Domestic Product annually on core defence requirements as well as defence-and security-related spending by 2035.
Choice
The expected surge in total military spending by the EU and its Member States should translate into several hundred billion of investment in new defence equipment, over the next years.
Until now, the development and procurement of defence equipment in the framework of European cooperation, remains rather the exception. Furthermore, the Commission has indicated that 78% of the defence acquisitions by EU Member States between the start of Russia’s war of aggression in February 2022 and June 2023 were made from outside the EU, with the US alone representing 63% of it.
Building a decision architecture
Against this backdrop, the EU has explored over the years new directions and launched new initiatives to strengthen and develop defence capabilities in a collective and cooperative manner. As part of EU effort to help EU Member States to work together for developing new capabilities, the concept of projects of common interest for European defence has been a long-standing feature of policy-making.
The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) mechanism, launched in 2017, has fostered several tens projects of joint development. Furthermore, the Strategic Compass on Security and Defence adopted in March 2022 calls for the collaborative development of next-generation capabilities in all operational domains. With the Versailles Declaration, EU Member States also committed in March 2022 to fostering industrial initiatives, including through important projects of common European interest and industrial alliances. In the political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024−2029 "Europe's choice", the President of the Commission listed the tasks to pool resources to counter biggest common and cross-border threats through flagship European Defence Union projects. The White Paper for Defence Readiness 2030 released by the Commission in March 2025 specified areas for which Member States should urgently pool their efforts, including a set of such projects, to be defined by Member States, that would benefit from EU incentives. The Commission's proposal of March 2024 for a regulation establishing the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) provides the first regulatory framework for these projects. In its special report on this proposal, the European Court of Auditors drew the attention to the need to secure long-term financial support as a prerequisite for their selection. Lastly, in its scoping paper of 29 September 2025 on Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030, the Commission proposes to launch a set of four initial European Readiness Flagships.
Flagship projects of common interest for European defence need strategic guidance and recommendations on their selection, implementation, financing and oversight, with the aim of maximizing their impact, while ensuring cohesion between Member States. They should be large-scale, pan-European, collaborative initiatives in defence capabilities and industrial development.
Filling capability gaps requires developing autonomous Strategic Enablers to facilitate Member States' armed forces in effectively conducting joint military operations, in order to achieve a safe and secure common architecture for command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance, as well as common deterrence to ensure the maximum defence for a long-lasting peace for states and their citizens.
ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT
The rapporteur declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not include in his report input from interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register1, or from representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies, to be listed in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.
16.12.2025
OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE INTERNAL MARKET AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
for the Committee on Security and Defence
on flagship European defence projects of common interest
(2025/2144(INI))
Rapporteur for opinion: Pierfrancesco Maran
AMENDMENTS
The Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection submits the following to the Committee on Security and Defence, as the committee responsible :
Amendment 1
Motion for a resolution
Citation 2
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular Articles 2, 107(3)(b) and 346,
– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular Articles 2, 107(3)(b), 114 and 346 thereof,
Amendment 2
Motion for a resolution
Citation 13
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
– having regard to the scoping paper of the Commission of 29 September 2025 entitled ‘Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030’,
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 October 2025, entitled ‘Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0027),
Amendment 3
Motion for a resolution
Citation 19 a (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
– having regard to the report by Enrico Letta of 17 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market’ and, in particular, the chapter ‘A single market to play big: scale matters’ thereof,
Amendment 4
Motion for a resolution
Citation 23 a (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
– having regard to the Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation of 10 January 2023,
Amendment 5
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
A. whereas the challenges posed by the decline in global peace and security and the emergence of new and evolving threats to EU security require the EU and its Member States to significantly increase their defence investment in order to develop military and intelligence capabilities that enable them to defend their sovereignty and to act and respond autonomously or in partnership with their allies, particularly within NATO, to immediate and future threats;
A. whereas the challenges posed by the decline in global peace and security and the emergence of new and evolving threats to EU security, in particular since the start of Russia’s illegal and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, require the EU and its Member States to accelerate and significantly increase their collaborative security and defence investment in order to develop military and intelligence capabilities that enable them to ramp up the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity, and deter, act and respond in real time autonomously or in partnership with their allies, particularly within NATO, to immediate and future security threats;
Amendment 6
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
B. whereas warfare, historically dominated by conventional weapons, appears to be evolving ‘from steel to web’; whereas it is increasingly incorporating cyber capabilities and networked operations, and warfare strategies are being transformed through new technologies and artificial intelligence (AI) and are no longer limited to massed firepower and large-scale confrontations, but moving towards miniaturisation and decentralisation of systems, as evidenced by the use of drone swarms, AI-enabled weapons, smart mines, and portable missile systems in battlefields; whereas fighter jets, ships, battle tanks and armoured vehicles are becoming more vulnerable to precision strikes and therefore require greater protection, as they are still essential to military operations;
B. whereas warfare, historically dominated by conventional weapons, appears to be evolving ‘from steel to web’; whereas it is increasingly incorporating cyber capabilities and networked operations, and warfare strategies are being transformed through new technologies and artificial intelligence (AI) and are no longer limited to massed firepower and large-scale confrontations, but moving towards miniaturisation and decentralisation of systems, as evidenced by the use of drone swarms, AI-enabled weapons, smart mines, and portable missile systems in battlefields; whereas fighter jets, ships, battle tanks and armoured vehicles are becoming more vulnerable to precision strikes and therefore require greater protection, as they are still essential to military operations; whereas the current pace of technical evolution requires enhanced focus on innovation; whereas collaborative projects in the field of frontier technologies could help to pull resources and know-how together and boost innovation; whereas developing joint innovative partnerships on frontier technologies would substantially strengthen the EDTIB;
Amendment 7
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
B a. whereas violations by Russian drones of the airspace of EU Member States are becoming increasingly frequent, raising serious safety and security concerns; whereas these violations underline the need for a coordinated, united, and proportionate EU response and the need to strengthen the single market for defence, in order to protect citizens and critical infrastructure;
Amendment 8
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
C a. whereas fragmentation of national defence procurement rules, regulatory barriers and limited cross-border competition continue to hinder market integration and weaken the development of a well-functioning EU defence equipment market, which is a key enabler for the establishment and development of a single market for defence; whereas coordinated efforts to reduce fragmentation, improve interoperability and promote cross-industrial cooperation and joint procurement, including through European Defence Projects of Common Interest, are essential to constructing a true single market for defence and strengthening the competitiveness of the EDTIB; whereas the development of a single market for defence and the reinforcement of the EDTIB are key stepping stones towards strengthening the Union’s deterrence, resilience and strategic autonomy and towards a genuine European Defence Union;
Amendment 9
Motion for a resolution
Recital C b (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
C b. whereas enhanced cooperation and the effective leveraging of economies of scale in European defence spending could generate annual savings estimated at between EUR 18 billion and EUR 57 billion1a and reinforce the competitiveness, resilience and strategic autonomy of the EU and its Member States, advancing progress towards a genuine European Defence Union;
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1a European Parliament: Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services, ‘Improving the quality of European defence spending – Cost of non-Europe report’, 2024.
Amendment 10
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
D. whereas the Strategic Compass on Security and Defence sets the objective of developing incentives to stimulate Member States’ collaborative investments in joint projects and the joint procurement of defence capabilities that are developed in a collaborative way within the EU;
D. whereas the Strategic Compass on Security and Defence sets the objective of developing incentives to stimulate Member States’ collaborative investments in joint projects and the joint procurement of defence capabilities that are developed in a collaborative way within the EU; whereas collaborative projects help to reduce costs and prevent Member States from competing for scarce industrial resources;
Amendment 11
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
E. whereas the proposed regulation establishing the EDIP provides for the implementation of European Defence Projects of Common Interest (EDPCI); whereas EDPCI consist of collaborative industrial projects aimed at reinforcing the competitiveness of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) throughout the Union, while contributing to the development of Member States’ military capabilities critical for the security and defence interests of the Union, and including those securing access to all operational domains, namely land, maritime, air, space and cyber;
E. whereas the proposed regulation establishing the EDIP provides for the implementation of European Defence Projects of Common Interest (EDPCI); whereas EDPCI consist of collaborative industrial projects aimed at reinforcing the competitiveness and defence industrial readiness of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) throughout the Union, while contributing to the development of Member States’ military capabilities critical for the security and defence interests of the Union, and including those securing access to all operational domains, namely land, maritime, air, space and cyber; whereas some of the most critical capability gaps are of an inherently cross-border nature and require coordinated industrial responses at EU level; whereas such projects should generate mutual benefits across Member States by fostering cross-border cooperation and positive spillover effects within the internal market, thereby strengthening cohesion within the EDTIB;
Amendment 12
Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
E a. whereas flagship projects are an important opportunity to foster innovation, interoperability and competitiveness in the European defence industry, representing an important step towards strengthening the EDTIB; whereas developing such projects requires additional measures ensuring the creation of a fully functional single market for defence products, which would tackle the most important barriers within the EU;
Amendment 13
Motion for a resolution
Recital E b (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
E b. whereas, as underscored in the Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030, Ukraine remains Europe’s first line of defence and is an integral part of Europe’s defence and security architecture; whereas the EU and its Member States should continue their support for and intensify cooperation with Ukraine; whereas integrating Ukraine’s defence technological and industrial base into the EDPCIs and flagship projects will be a key factor in the successful development of a single market for defence;
Amendment 14
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
1. Acknowledges the significant increase in defence expenditure among EU Member States as a clear reflection of their determination to respond to the deteriorating security environment, by enhancing military capabilities, strengthening deterrence, and reinforcing their collective commitment to European and transatlantic defence; acknowledges also that strengthening Europe’s security and defence requires not merely an increase in national defence spending but a comprehensive shift towards greater coordination, efficiency and integration in the way that Member States develop, resource and implement their defence policies;
1. Acknowledges the significant increase in defence expenditure among EU Member States as a response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine; stresses the importance of this clear reflection of their determination to respond to the deteriorating security environment, after decades of underinvestment in European defence, by enhancing military capabilities, strengthening deterrence, and reinforcing their collective commitment to European and transatlantic defence; acknowledges also that strengthening Europe’s security and defence requires not merely an increase in national defence spending but a comprehensive shift towards greater coordination, efficiency and integration in the way that Member States develop, resource and implement their defence policies; underlines that without the development of a true single market for defence and the strengthening of European defence cooperation, rising national defence spending risks being absorbed by inefficiencies, leading to further fragmentation in the EU; stresses that, in this regard, EDPCIs can contribute to fostering a shift from a predominantly national approach to security towards a shared understanding of collective European security, thereby reinforcing solidarity, trust and strategic cohesion among Member States to prevent fragmentation in the EU, which is necessary; highlights that the development of such collaborative projects is an essential step towards enhancing collaborative defence spending, achieving economies of scale, avoiding duplications, ensuring efficient application of resources, aggregating demand, strengthening the EDTIB, creating a true single market for defence products and services, and paving the way for the development of a genuine European Defence Union;
Amendment 15
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
2. Notes that, despite increased defence efforts, the EU and its Member States continue to face persistent shortfalls in strategic collective capabilities, command and control structures, and sustainable military capacity; underlines that these gaps significantly limit the EU and its Member States’ ability to sustain a prolonged large-scale defence engagement, particularly in the face of acts of hybrid warfare; calls for urgent measures to address these critical capability shortfalls through enhanced cooperation, coordinated planning, and targeted investments to ensure defence readiness;
2. Notes that, despite increased defence efforts, the EU and its Member States continue to face persistent shortfalls in strategic collective capabilities, command and control structures, and sustainable military capacity; underlines that these gaps significantly limit the EU and all Member States’ ability to sustain a prolonged large-scale defence engagement, particularly in the face of acts of hybrid warfare; calls for urgent measures to address these critical capability shortfalls through enhanced cooperation, coordinated planning, and targeted investments to ensure defence readiness;
Amendment 16
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
2 a. Stresses that the European single defence market has the potential to become a powerful engine of growth and innovation, given the size of the EU market, its capacity to create quality jobs and the positive spillover effects on the wider economy; underlines that the development of flagship EDPCIs represents a strong opportunity to strengthen the competitiveness of European companies, in particular by facilitating procurement market access for SMEs and mid-caps operating on all levels of the supply chain, and to strengthen the efficiency and innovation capacity of the EDTIB; stresses the need to enhance European equipment procurement through a focus on domestic suppliers;
Amendment 17
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
2 b. Stresses the importance of close cooperation with the Ukrainian defence industry and its gradual integration into the EDTIB; urges the Member States and their defence industries to invest in and partner with their Ukrainian counterparts in order to maximise the potential of their production capabilities to produce critical equipment in the most efficient manner, including through participation in flagship projects; stresses that this will benefit the single market for defence and strengthen European defence cooperation; reiterates its call on the Commission and the Member States to deploy Russia’s immobilised sovereign assets to support Ukraine and the strengthening of its defence technological and industrial base;
Amendment 18
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
3. Stresses that filling capability gaps requires developing autonomous Strategic Enablers without which Member States’ armed forces cannot effectively conduct joint military operations; recommends in this regard, the development of a safe and secure common architecture for command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance, as well as common defence capabilities in the areas of space, strategic airlift, air-to-air refuelling and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) risk prevention; praises the work of the EDA, which provides an overview and analysis of the EU defence landscape and offers recommendations on opportunities for collaboration on capability development and acquisition through the Capability Development Priorities (CDP) and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD);
3. Stresses that filling capability gaps requires developing autonomous Strategic Enablers without which Member States’ armed forces cannot effectively conduct joint military operations; recommends in this regard, the development of a safe and secure common architecture for command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance, as well as common defence capabilities in the areas of space, strategic airlift, air-to-air refuelling and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) risk prevention; praises the work of the EDA, which provides an overview and analysis of the EU defence landscape and offers recommendations on opportunities for collaboration on capability development and acquisition through the Capability Development Priorities (CDP) and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD); calls on the Commission and the Member States to further cooperate with the EDA and to make full use of the CARD reports, as they provide an overview of the defence landscape in the EU and identify opportunities for collaboration within the single market; calls on the Member States to consistently share up-to-date data with the Commission and the EDA in order to systematically identify critical capability gaps and propose effective collaborative actions; calls on the Commission and the Member States to remove, as a matter of priority, the existing single market barriers hampering, in particular, the ability to address these urgent capability gaps;
Amendment 19
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
4. Recognises that there are immediate defence needs that can be met with supplies or support from non-EU countries; further emphasises that European security remains heavily dependent on the defence industry of non-EU countries; stresses that, in the current geopolitical context and given the requirement for the EU to assume greater responsibility for defence, there is a need for a managed transition from dependency on non-EU countries to strategic autonomy and strengthening the EDTIB;
4. Recognises that there are immediate defence needs that can be met with supplies or support from non-EU countries; further emphasises that European security remains heavily dependent on the defence industry of non-EU countries; stresses that, in the current geopolitical context and given the requirement for the EU to assume greater responsibility for defence, there is a need for a managed and gradual transition from dependency on non-EU countries to strategic autonomy and strengthening the EDTIB; welcomes the shift, underscored in the proposed EDIP regulation, towards increased spending on EU capabilities and the strengthening of its strategic autonomy, which in turn strengthens the global competitiveness of the EDTIB within a well-functioning single market; underlines, however, the need to establish the conditions necessary for the development of the defence industry across the entire EU market;
Amendment 20
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
4 a. Recalls that lack of standardisation remains a key obstacle to European defence readiness; calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote greater interoperability with NATO and ensure that products developed under flagship projects are in line with relevant NATO standardisation agreements (STANAGs);
Amendment 21
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
5. Acknowledges the endorsement by the European Council of the Roadmap Defence Readiness 2030 – Preserving Peace and the Member States’ commitment to developing four initial European Readiness Flagships – the European Drone Defence Initiative, the Eastern Flank Watch, the Air Defence Shield and the Defence Space Shield; notes that these proposed flagship projects cover a very wide range of defence capabilities; urges the Commission, the Member States and the EDA to therefore clearly identify the specific objectives and timeline for the implementation, technological scope and expected size of each of these projects;
5. Acknowledges the endorsement by the European Council of the Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 and the Member States’ commitment to developing four initial European Readiness Flagships – the European Drone Defence Initiative, the Eastern Flank Watch, the Air Defence Shield and the Defence Space Shield; calls on the Commission, in close cooperation with the Member States and the EDA, to present without delay proposals for implementing the first European Defence Flagship Projects, in line with the timelines and priorities set out in the joint communication; notes that these proposed flagship projects cover a very wide range of defence capabilities; urges the Commission, the Member States and the EDA to therefore clearly identify the specific objectives and timeline for the implementation, technological scope and expected size of each of these projects; underlines that removing existing barriers hindering the single market for defence products is essential for the timely completion of these key projects, as underlined in the Commission proposal to streamline and simplify rules concerning intra-EU transfers of defence products and defence public procurement rules (COM(2025)0823); stresses that the European Drone Defence Initiative should be closely linked with the proposed Drone Alliance with Ukraine, and that EU counter-drone systems should draw on the operational experience and lessons learnt from Ukraine; underlines the importance of the development of the Eastern Flank Watch initiative, as a flagship project, in order to strengthen the protection and resilience of the EU;
Amendment 22
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
6. Recognises the need to establish a widely agreed upon definition of ‘flagship projects’ as large-scale, pan-European collaborative initiatives in defence capability and industrial development, including Strategic Enablers within a common framework such as EDIP that allow their identification and implementation in a coherent manner within EU defence and industrial policies; underlines that defining flagship projects is crucial to ensuring effective collaboration among Member States, pooling resources to address critical capability gaps and moving towards a genuine European Defence Union;
6. Recognises the need to establish a widely agreed upon definition of ‘flagship projects’ as large-scale, pan-European collaborative initiatives in defence capability, defence digital infrastructure and industrial development, including Strategic Enablers within a common framework such as EDIP that allow their identification and implementation in a coherent manner within EU defence and industrial policies; underlines that defining flagship projects is crucial to ensuring effective collaboration among Member States, pooling resources to address critical capability gaps and moving towards a genuine European Defence Union; emphasises that flagship projects and the EDPCIs, as defined under the EDIP, should be fully aligned and consistent with one another, in order to ensure the optimal use of these new projects, provide predictability and clarity for industry, and strengthen political prioritisation at Union level; believes that flagship projects should involve entities from as many Member States as possible, including at least four Member States, and be open to the full participation of Ukraine; underlines that flagship projects could also be open, under certain conditions and with full respect for the security and defence interests of the EU and its Member States, to non-EU countries with which the Union has signed security and defence partnerships, provided that EU Member States keep full operating control of these projects;
Amendment 23
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
6 a. Stresses that EDPCIs constitute a key instrument for addressing critical capability gaps and shortages that cannot be filled at national level alone; underlines that developing such capabilities collectively at Union level can generate significant economies of scale, reduce duplication and ensure that public funds and taxpayers’ money are used in the most efficient and responsible manner; emphasises that, given the considerable funding needs required to achieve the Union’s defence readiness targets by 2030, resources should be strategically directed towards projects that maximise European added value and contribute to the development of common deterrence;
Amendment 24
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
7. Stresses that the objectives of flagship projects must be aligned with those of agreed EU defence objectives; emphasises, too, that they should address innovative technological areas for defence and contribute to the development of cutting-edge defence capabilities that respond to the requirements of modern warfare, including the rising need to network military operations, troops and weapons, ensure cyber defence, develop intelligence data collection, storage, processing, sharing and decision support tools, operate deep and precise strikes and counter drone attacks;
7. Stresses that the objectives of flagship projects must be aligned with those of agreed EU defence objectives; emphasises, too, that they should address filling the current critical capability gaps, as well as innovative technological areas for defence and should contribute to the development of commonly owned equipment, with common development and maintenance of capabilities; believes that these projects should focus on cutting-edge defence capabilities that respond to the requirements of modern warfare, including the rising need to network military operations, troops and weapons, ensure cyber defence, develop intelligence data collection, storage, processing, sharing and decision support tools, operate deep and precise strikes and counter drone attacks; underlines that these objectives should focus on improved interoperability and enhancing standardisation of defence products;
Amendment 25
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
8. Emphasises that flagship projects should aim to foster closer cooperation and innovation in governance mechanisms at EU level, showing best practices towards a common and coordinated strategy for European defence; stresses, too, that good governance of flagship projects must be based on a shared vision and effective coordination among their ‘programmatic actors’, namely the governments, military headquarters and public procurement agencies of EU Member States and defence industrial companies; considers that flagship projects could benefit from and build on existing cooperation within the framework of PESCO and EDF projects;
8. Emphasises that flagship projects should aim to foster closer cooperation and innovation in governance mechanisms at EU level, showing best practices towards a common and coordinated strategy for European defence; stresses, too, that good governance of flagship projects must be based on a shared vision and effective coordination among their ‘programmatic actors’, namely the governments, military headquarters and public procurement agencies of EU Member States and defence industrial companies; considers that flagship projects could benefit from and build on existing cooperation within the framework of PESCO and EDF projects; considers that flagship projects can help create or revitalise regional defence industry clusters by strengthening local industrial capacities, promoting technology transfer, synergies and industrial scaling, and reinforcing critical supply chains while extending benefits across Member States;
Amendment 26
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
9. Acknowledges the creation of the EDPCI as a new tool under the EDIP; recognises that flagship projects could be developed under its framework;
9. Welcomes the creation of the EDPCI as a new tool under the EDIP; underlines that flagship projects could be developed under its framework, thereby increasing the consistency of EU defence policy; stresses that, beyond their development and production phases, flagship projects should also ensure the establishment of common frameworks for their operation, maintenance and life-cycle management at EU level; notes that the EDIP framework provides a minimum threshold for participating entities of four Member States or associated countries such as Ukraine; stresses that such projects should enable broad participation, foster innovation and interoperability; invites the Commission to explore and propose mechanisms that would allow eligible states that did not participate in the initial production phase to join such projects at the operational and maintenance stage;
Amendment 27
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
10. Calls for the inclusion of the widest range of industrial actors in flagship projects, including mid-caps and small and medium-sized enterprises, to enable the spread of innovation across the entire spectrum of the EDTIB;
10. Calls for the inclusion of the widest range of industrial actors in flagship projects, including mid-caps and small and medium-sized enterprises, to enable the spread of innovation across the entire spectrum of the EDTIB and to allow them to scale up; calls, furthermore, for the participation of other relevant stakeholders in such projects, such as research organisations, academic institutions, innovation hubs and technology centres, as well as testing and certification bodies, in order to foster stronger synergies between research, innovation and industrial development within the European defence ecosystem; calls, furthermore, for the establishment of a high-level European defence industry group to ensure effective cooperation and closer dialogue and engagement with industry; stresses the need to ensure a fair geographical balance in the distribution of industrial benefits and participation, in order to build a fully functioning single market for defence where entities from all Member States can contribute and benefit from these initiatives;
Amendment 28
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
11. Stresses the need to prevent military technologies, in particular sensitive emerging technologies and critical dual-use items, especially in the area of space, quantum technologies and AI, from being transferred to destinations of concern outside the EU; urges Member States participating in flagship projects to commit to following common approaches and to defining and agreeing on a common strategy for granting export licenses for products resulting from flagship projects;
11. Stresses the need to prevent military technologies, in particular sensitive emerging technologies and critical dual-use items, especially in the area of space, quantum technologies and AI, from being transferred to destinations of concern outside the EU or to third countries that contravene the security and defence interests of the Union and its Member States or that do not respect the principle of good neighbourly relations, to the detriment of the single market; underscores the need to not source components from non-associated third countries that contravene the security and defence interests of the Union and its Member States; stresses that flagship projects should also contribute to reducing the Union’s dependencies on external providers outside the EU in critical areas, thereby strengthening the EU’s strategic autonomy; urges Member States participating in flagship projects to commit to following common approaches, to developing production capabilities within the internal market and to defining and agreeing on a common strategy for granting export licenses for products resulting from flagship projects;
Amendment 29
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
11 a. Recalls that the AI Act1a excludes from its scope AI systems that are exclusively used for military, defence or national security purposes; stresses that the use of AI in warfare raises ethical concerns such as accountability, compliance with international humanitarian law and the risk of conflict escalation due to reduced human oversight; suggests, therefore, defining ethical guidelines for defence AI;
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1a Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act) (OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj).
Amendment 30
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 b (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
11 b. Considers that flagship projects could represent the cornerstone of European defence cooperation; calls for the establishment of a strong and transparent governance and coordination structure for such flagship projects to overcome current fragmentation and guarantee their development and operationalisation; believes that, in line with Treaty provisions, such a structure should involve the Commission, the Member States, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EDA, and the European Parliament, among others;
Amendment 31
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 c (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
11 c. Believes that, considering their importance in the present and to the future of European defence, flagship projects should have a high threshold for the number of participating Member States so as to strengthen intra-EU technological and industrial defence cooperation; believes, therefore, that flagship projects should involve entities from as many Member States as possible, including at least four Member States, and be open to the full participation of Ukraine; underlines that flagship projects could also be open, under certain conditions and with full respect for the security and defence interests of the EU and its Member States, to non-EU countries with which the Union has signed security and defence partnerships, provided that EU Member States keep full operating control of these projects;
Amendment 32
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
12. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to further present proposals for flagship projects addressing the development of defence capabilities and allowing Member States to better align their national efforts with agreed EU defence objectives;
12. Calls on the Commission and the Member States, together with the EDA, to further develop and present proposals for flagship projects addressing the development of defence capabilities and allowing Member States to better align their national efforts with agreed EU defence objectives;
Amendment 33
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
13. Recommends that the Commission, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the EDA participate in a supporting role to facilitate the implementation of flagship projects;
13. Recommends that the Vice-President of the Commission / the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the EDA participate in a supporting role to facilitate the definition, identification, selection and implementation of flagship projects;
Amendment 34
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
13 a. Stresses that Ukraine is a key part of Europe’s defence architecture and readiness effort; believes, therefore, that developing defence and industrial cooperation with Ukraine and other non-EU countries with which the Union has signed security and defence partnerships is important;
Amendment 35
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
14. Commits to exercising its scrutiny and legislative and budgetary role in relation to the selection, implementation and financing of flagship projects on the basis of regular and comprehensive information and reports from the Commission;
14. Underscores that Parliament’s key role is to guarantee democratic control and oversight of flagship projects; commits to exercising its scrutiny and legislative and budgetary role in relation to the selection, implementation and financing of flagship projects on the basis of regular and comprehensive information and reports, including annual reports, from the Commission;
Amendment 36
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
15. Calls on the Commission to explore ways of establishing a specific fund under the next multiannual financial framework to ensure the long-term financing of flagship projects; underlines the need for adequate and appropriate funding for flagship projects that does not compromise the funds allocated to other strategic areas of the EU budget devoted to defence;
15. Calls on the Commission to explore ways of establishing increased and more targeted funding under the next multiannual financial framework, such as within the proposed European Competitiveness Fund, to ensure the long-term financing of flagship projects; underlines the need for adequate and appropriate funding for flagship projects without compromising the funds allocated to other strategic areas of the EU budget, including those already devoted to defence; invites the Commission to consider whether EU funding could also support the operation, maintenance and life-cycle management of capabilities developed under EDPCIs, in order to maximise their efficiency, interoperability and European added value;
Amendment 37
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
16. Shares the European Court of Auditors’ observation regarding the EDIP proposal that the time needed to complete flagship projects is likely to exceed the two-year implementation period provided for by the EDIP; stresses, therefore, that for flagship projects to benefit from EDIP funding, the Member States concerned must commit to co-financing them for their entire duration, well beyond an initial two-year period;
16. Shares the European Court of Auditors’ observation regarding the EDIP proposal that the time needed to complete flagship projects is likely to exceed the two-year implementation period provided for by the EDIP; stresses, therefore, that for flagship projects to benefit from EDIP funding, the Member States concerned must commit to co-financing them for their entire duration, well beyond an initial two-year period; calls on the Commission and the Member States to explore possibilities for continuing the financing of projects started under the EDIP within the next multiannual financial framework;
Amendment 38
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Motion for a resolution
Amendment
17. Invites EU Member States to consider systematically earmarking part of their national defence budgets for the development of partnership initiatives and the procurement of defence equipment produced within the framework of flagship projects;
17. Invites EU Member States to strengthen cooperation and systematically earmark part of their national defence budgets for the development of partnership initiatives and the procurement of defence equipment produced within the framework of flagship projects; encourages the Member States, before the entry into force of the next multiannual financial framework, to use part of their allocation under the already approved Security Action for Europe financial instrument to develop flagship projects;
ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT
Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur for opinion declares that he included in his opinion input on matters pertaining to the subject of the file that he received, in the preparation of the draft opinion , prior to the adoption thereof in committee, from the following interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register1, or from the following representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies:
1. Interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register
European Defence Agency
Permanent Representation of Italy to the European Union
Leonardo S.p.A. - 02550382403-01
FINCANTIERI SpA - 095079912436-63
European Commission - Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS)
2. Representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies
N/A
The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur for opinion.
Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur for opinion declares that he has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.
INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION
Date adopted
4.12.2025
Result of final vote
+ : 30
- : 5
0 : 6
Members present for the final vote
Pablo Arias Echeverría, Jeannette Baljeu, Laura Ballarín Cereza, Katarina Barley, Arno Bausemer, Anna Cavazzini, Stefano Cavedagna, Henrik Dahl, Adnan Dibrani, Regina Doherty, Klara Dostalova, Michał Dworczyk, Kamila Gasiuk-Pihowicz, Hanna Gedin, Elisabeth Grossmann, Maria Guzenina, Svenja Hahn, Pierre Jouvet, Arba Kokalari, Nikola Minchev, Piotr Müller, Gheorghe Piperea, Christel Schaldemose, Andreas Schwab, Tomislav Sokol, Kim Van Sparrentak, Marion Walsmann
Substitutes present for the final vote
José Cepeda, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Salvatore De Meo, François Kalfon, Idoia Mendia, Aura Salla, Paulius Saudargas, Joanna Scheuring-Wielgus, Susana Solís Pérez, Ivaylo Valchev, Mariateresa Vivaldini
Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote
Valérie Deloge, Niels Geuking, Milan Mazurek
FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION
30
+
PPE
Arias Echeverría Pablo, Dahl Henrik, De Meo Salvatore, Doherty Regina, Gasiuk-Pihowicz Kamila, Geuking Niels, Kokalari Arba, Salla Aura, Saudargas Paulius, Schwab Andreas, Sokol Tomislav, Solís Pérez Susana, Walsmann Marion
Renew
Baljeu Jeannette, Cifrová Ostrihonová Veronika, Hahn Svenja, Minchev Nikola
S&D
Ballarín Cereza Laura, Barley Katarina, Cepeda José, Dibrani Adnan, Grossmann Elisabeth, Guzenina Maria, Jouvet Pierre, Kalfon François, Mendia Idoia, Schaldemose Christel, Scheuring-Wielgus Joanna
Verts/ALE
Cavazzini Anna, Van Sparrentak Kim
5
-
ESN
Bausemer Arno, Mazurek Milan
PfE
Deloge Valérie, Dostalova Klara
The Left
Gedin Hanna
6
0
ECR
Cavedagna Stefano, Dworczyk Michal, Müller Piotr, Piperea Gheorghe, Valchev Ivaylo, Vivaldini Mariateresa
Key:
+ : in favour
- : against
0 : abstentions
INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE
Date adopted
27.1.2026
Result of final vote
+:
–:
0:
30
3
4
INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE
Date adopted
27.1.2026
Result of final vote
+:
–:
0:
30
3
4
FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE
Key to symbols: