Sittings · Document

Report (2025/2165(INI)) 2026-01-14

Implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2025

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14.1.2026 A10-0265/30

Amendment 30

Thijs Reuten

on behalf of the S&D Group

Wouter Beke, Nathalie Loiseau, Mārtiņš Staķis

Report A10-0265/2025

Thijs Reuten

Implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2025

(2025/2165(INI))

Motion for a resolution

Citation 28 c (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

– having regard to the conclusions of the ninth EU-Lebanon Association Council, held in Brussels on 15 December 2025,

Or. en

14.1.2026 A10-0265/31

Amendment 31

Thijs Reuten

on behalf of the S&D Group

Wouter Beke, Nathalie Loiseau, Cristian Terheş, Mārtiņš Staķis

Report A10-0265/2025

Thijs Reuten

Implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2025

(2025/2165(INI))

Motion for a resolution

Citation 28 d (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

– having regard to its decision of 16 December 2025 to consider the Commission proposal for a Reparations Loan to Ukraine1a under urgent procedure, as per Rule 170(6) of its Rules of Procedure,

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1a Commission proposal of 3 December 2025 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Reparations Loan to Ukraine and amending Regulation (EU) 2024/792 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Ukraine Facility (COM(2025)3502).

Or. en

14.1.2026 A10-0265/32

Amendment 32

Thijs Reuten

on behalf of the S&D Group

Wouter Beke, Nathalie Loiseau, Mārtiņš Staķis

Report A10-0265/2025

Thijs Reuten

Implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2025

(2025/2165(INI))

Motion for a resolution

Recital F a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Fa. whereas, compared to the 2021 version, the US National Security Strategy (NSS) of 4 December 2025 reflects a radical shift in long-standing US foreign policy, for example in its assessment of the challenges posed by aggressor state Russia and rival China, and includes critical references to alleged democratic shortcomings in certain EU Member States and announces actions akin to foreign interference; whereas the NSS frames global developments largely in terms of economic nationalism and strategic interests, revealing a more transactional approach to traditional allies and thus questioning the principles that have underpinned US foreign policy for decades; whereas the NSS was publicly welcomed by the Kremlin’s spokesperson and met with concern in several EU capitals, raising questions about its impact on transatlantic unity and the credibility of collective deterrence; whereas the NSS groundlessly blames the EU for blocking US efforts to end the war in Ukraine;

Or. en

14.1.2026 A10-0265/33

Amendment 33

Thijs Reuten

on behalf of the S&D Group

Wouter Beke, Nathalie Loiseau, Mārtiņš Staķis

Report A10-0265/2025

Thijs Reuten

Implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2025

(2025/2165(INI))

Motion for a resolution

Recital F b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Fb. whereas following the United States’s January 2026 military intervention in Venezuela, the Trump administration reiterated its ambition to annex Greenland, including possibly through military intervention; whereas this represents a fundamental threat to the rules-based international order, the EU’s strategic security interests and the transatlantic alliance, and shows a blatant disdain for fundamental principles of international law, including the principle of non-aggression towards sovereign nations;

Or. en

14.1.2026 A10-0265/34

Amendment 34

Thijs Reuten

on behalf of the S&D Group

Wouter Beke, Nathalie Loiseau, Mārtiņš Staķis

Report A10-0265/2025

Thijs Reuten

Implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2025

(2025/2165(INI))

Motion for a resolution

Recital T a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Ta. whereas China’s ‘Justice Mission 2025’ military exercise resulted in numerous crossings of the median line of the Taiwan Strait by Chinese aircraft, as well as crossings of the median line and repeated attempts to violate Taiwan’s contiguous zone by Chinese ships, and the blocking-off of a large number of maritime areas in an exercise of encircling and blockading Taiwan and its ports, and the conducting of long-range live firing exercises, with missiles landing in Taiwan’s contiguous zone;

Or. en

14.1.2026 A10-0265/35

Amendment 35

Thijs Reuten

on behalf of the S&D Group

Wouter Beke, Nathalie Loiseau, Cristian Terheş, Mārtiņš Staķis

Report A10-0265/2025

Thijs Reuten

Implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2025

(2025/2165(INI))

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

2. Reiterates its support for any initiative that would enable the EU and its Member States to take coordinated, united and proportionate action against all violations of their airspace, including shooting down airborne threats; reiterates its calls on the Commission and the Council to develop an action plan on preventing and countering the escalation of Russian hybrid warfare against EU Member States in the terrestrial, aerial, maritime and digital domains originating in Russia or any other country, including options for EU retaliatory measures that match the severity and intensity of hostile activities undertaken against the EU; calls on the Member States to review, in coordination with NATO and NATO allies, the rules of engagement for all types of threats to ensure they are capable of responding to the most innovative threats; stresses that the EU must show resolve and signal that any attempt by a non-EU country to violate the sovereignty of its Member States will be met with immediate retaliation; underlines that Russia’s hybrid warfare will continue unabated unless its actions elicit political or military retaliation; underlines that the EU, in close coordination with NATO, should take further action to prevent hybrid warfare on European soil, including through appropriate restrictions on Russian diplomats and the interdiction of the Russian shadow fleet using all available means; calls on the Council and the Commission to increase the effectiveness and impact of sanctions on Russia in order to definitively undermine Russia’s ability to continue waging its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine and threatening the security of other neighbouring countries; urges the EU and its Member States to work together to ban trade and commercial activities with Russia and Belarus, particularly focusing on any potential dual-use items, as well as the transit of goods to and from the EU via their territories, and to reinforce sanctions; calls for further sanctions targeting Russia’s primary sources of revenue; calls on the Council, along with its US partners, to maintain and extend its sanctions policy against Russia, to apply a similar sanctions policy to all enabling states, including Belarus, Iran and North Korea, and to sanction Chinese entities supplying dual-use goods and military items essential for the manufacturing of drones and missiles; calls for targeted sanctions against Russia’s shadow fleet and for further action against it using the full spectrum of legal means to halt, obstruct or impede its operations, given its possible involvement in the launch of drones targeting critical infrastructure; calls on the Council to systematically tackle the issue of sanctions circumvention by malicious non-EU entities based in the EU through thorough investigations and tougher penalties for entities that violate sanctions or fail to exercise due diligence in export controls and end-user verification; reiterates that any form of military support provided to the aggressor by states such as Iran, North Korea and China must entail direct consequences for all other relations with those countries;

2. Reiterates its support for any initiative that would enable the EU and its Member States to take coordinated, united and proportionate action against all violations of their airspace, including shooting down airborne threats; reiterates its calls on the Commission and the Council to develop an action plan on preventing and countering the escalation of Russian hybrid warfare against EU Member States in the terrestrial, aerial, maritime and digital domains originating in Russia or any other country, including options for EU retaliatory measures that match the severity and intensity of hostile activities undertaken against the EU; calls on the Member States to review, in coordination with NATO and NATO allies, the rules of engagement for all types of threats to ensure they are capable of responding to the most innovative threats; stresses that the EU must show resolve and signal that any attempt by a non-EU country to violate the sovereignty of its Member States will be met with immediate retaliation; underlines that Russia’s hybrid warfare will continue unabated unless its actions elicit political or military retaliation; underlines that the EU, in close coordination with NATO, should take further action to prevent hybrid warfare on European soil, including through appropriate restrictions on Russian diplomats and the interdiction of the Russian shadow fleet using all available means; welcomes, in this regard, the ongoing EU-G7 discussions on exploring a maritime services ban on all Russian oil exports, as an alternative to the oil price cap; calls on the Council and the Commission to increase the effectiveness and impact of sanctions on Russia in order to definitively undermine Russia’s ability to continue waging its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine and threatening the security of other neighbouring countries; urges the EU and its Member States to work together to ban trade and commercial activities with Russia and Belarus, particularly focusing on any potential dual-use items, as well as the transit of goods to and from the EU via their territories, and to reinforce sanctions; calls for further sanctions targeting Russia’s primary sources of revenue; calls on the Council, along with its US partners, to maintain and extend its sanctions policy against Russia, to apply a similar sanctions policy to all enabling states, including Belarus, Iran and North Korea, and to sanction Chinese entities supplying dual-use goods and military items essential for the manufacturing of drones and missiles; calls for targeted sanctions against Russia’s shadow fleet and for further action against it using the full spectrum of legal means to halt, obstruct or impede its operations, given its possible involvement in the launch of drones targeting critical infrastructure; calls on the Council to systematically tackle the issue of sanctions circumvention by malicious non-EU entities based in the EU through thorough investigations and tougher penalties for entities that violate sanctions or fail to exercise due diligence in export controls and end-user verification; reiterates that any form of military support provided to the aggressor by states such as Iran, North Korea and China must entail direct consequences for all other relations with those countries;

Or. en

14.1.2026 A10-0265/36

Amendment 36

Thijs Reuten

on behalf of the S&D Group

Wouter Beke, Nathalie Loiseau, Mārtiņš Staķis, Cristian Terheş

Report A10-0265/2025

Thijs Reuten

Implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2025

(2025/2165(INI))

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

5. Underlines that Russia’s defeat by Ukraine and ensuring Ukraine’s success are the most effective and cost-efficient investments in European security for the short and medium-term; recalls that Ukraine’s security contributes to that of Europe as a whole; strongly condemns the drone incursions from Hungarian territory into Ukrainian airspace and the recent statements by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán questioning Ukraine’s sovereignty; considers the United States’ policy ambivalence and its reduction in military support as counterproductive to bringing a swift and permanent end to Russia’s aggression; urges Europe, alongside key, like-minded partners, to enhance their military support to Ukraine, including through the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) training initiatives and the financing and provision of military support such as air defence systems and deep strike capabilities, in order to create the conditions for peace; welcomes, as a significant demonstration of the EU’s continued support, the European Council’s decision of 18 December 2025 to meet a substantial part of Ukraine’s budgetary needs through 2026 and 2027 by providing Ukraine with a EUR 90 billion financial assistance package in the form of EU-backed loans; welcomes Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2600 of 12 December 20251a enacting the indefinite immobilisation of Russian sovereign assets; regrets that the Commission and the Council were unable to find a solution to address the concerns expressed by various Member States on the Reparations Loan using the cash balances associated with Russian sovereign assets; welcomes the Council’s calls for Parliament to continue working on the technical and legal aspects of the instruments establishing a Reparations Loan based on the cash balances associated with Russia’s immobilised assets; underscores that this would increase the pressure on Russia, reduce Ukraine’s growing debt burden, ensure that Russia, and not EU taxpayers, bears the cost of its aggression, and secure Ukraine’s future compensation for the damages this aggression is causing; reiterates its call on the Member States, together with their G7 partners, to immediately endorse the Commission proposal to use all frozen Russian assets as the basis for a substantial loan to Ukraine; welcomes the fact that, as a result of deliveries from European countries, military aid allocations to Ukraine in the first half of 2025 exceeded those of the 2022-2024 period, despite decreased US contributions; notes, however, critical gaps in tech delivery of air defence and deep strike capabilities; calls for a coalition of willing EU Member States to explore how to set up a defensive European-led Integrated Air Protection Zone (IAPZ), employing combat air patrols (CAPs) over uncontested areas of Ukraine to intercept Russian projectiles; stresses that an IAPZ would help to protect Ukrainian civilians from indiscriminate attacks, offer proactive defence against Russian incursions into EU airspace, and shift the balance of power to help force Russia to the negotiation table; calls for enhanced coordination among the EU Military Staff in response to threats along the eastern flank, including real-time monitoring and rapid information sharing; underlines that valuable insights can be gained from Ukraine’s battlefield experience to improve the EU’s overall situational awareness and hybrid threat response; calls for better coordination among European countries in the provision of both economic and military support to Ukraine;

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1a Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2600 of 12 December 2025 on emergency measures addressing the serious economic difficulties caused by Russia’s actions in the context of the war of aggression against Ukraine (OJ L, 2025/2600, 13.12.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/2600/oj).

Or. en

14.1.2026 A10-0265/37

Amendment 37

Thijs Reuten

on behalf of the S&D Group

Wouter Beke, Nathalie Loiseau, Mārtiņš Staķis

Report A10-0265/2025

Thijs Reuten

Implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2025

(2025/2165(INI))

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

5. Underlines that Russia’s defeat by Ukraine and ensuring Ukraine’s success are the most effective and cost-efficient investments in European security for the short and medium-term; recalls that Ukraine’s security contributes to that of Europe as a whole; strongly condemns the drone incursions from Hungarian territory into Ukrainian airspace and the recent statements by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán questioning Ukraine’s sovereignty; considers the United States’ policy ambivalence and its reduction in military support as counterproductive to bringing a swift and permanent end to Russia’s aggression, and that it represents an unprecedented and deeply concerning turn in US positioning towards European security; urges Europe, alongside key, like-minded partners, to enhance their military support to Ukraine, including through the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) training initiatives and the financing and provision of military support such as air defence systems and deep strike capabilities, in order to create the conditions for peace; reiterates its call on the Member States, together with their G7 partners, to immediately endorse the Commission proposal to use all frozen Russian assets as the basis for a substantial loan to Ukraine; welcomes the fact that, as a result of deliveries from European countries, military aid allocations to Ukraine in the first half of 2025 exceeded those of the 2022-2024 period, despite decreased US contributions; notes, however, critical gaps in tech delivery of air defence and deep strike capabilities; calls for a coalition of willing EU Member States to explore how to set up a defensive European-led Integrated Air Protection Zone (IAPZ), employing combat air patrols (CAPs) over uncontested areas of Ukraine to intercept Russian projectiles; stresses that an IAPZ would help to protect Ukrainian civilians from indiscriminate attacks, offer proactive defence against Russian incursions into EU airspace, and shift the balance of power to help force Russia to the negotiation table; calls for enhanced coordination among the EU Military Staff in response to threats along the eastern flank, including real-time monitoring and rapid information sharing; underlines that valuable insights can be gained from Ukraine’s battlefield experience to improve the EU’s overall situational awareness and hybrid threat response; calls for better coordination among European countries in the provision of both economic and military support to Ukraine;

Or. en

14.1.2026 A10-0265/38

Amendment 38

Thijs Reuten

on behalf of the S&D Group

Wouter Beke, Nathalie Loiseau, Cristian Terheş, Mārtiņš Staķis

Report A10-0265/2025

Thijs Reuten

Implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2025

(2025/2165(INI))

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 6

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

6. Underlines that in order to ensure effective deterrence against Russian aggression and sustainable peace in relation to Ukraine, credible and robust security guarantees must be offered, and coordinated collaboratively by all able and willing European and non-European partners; underscores that security guarantees should be established as Treaty obligations, guaranteeing an adequate response should Ukraine’s security be compromised, and complemented by measures to strengthen Ukraine’s own military deterrence; welcomes the conclusions of the meeting of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ in Paris on 6 January 2026; strongly welcomes the proposal for a multinational ‘reassurance force’ for Ukraine, and encourages all EU Member States to thoroughly reflect on how they can best support such a force; welcomes the agreement to finalise politically and legally binding commitments to restore peace and security in the case of a future armed attack by Russia, and a clear framework for support to Ukraine, including sustaining its long-term military capabilities and deepened defence cooperation; regrets, however, that these security guarantees would only be implemented once a ceasefire is agreed upon, and that Vladimir Putin shows no willingness for such a ceasefire; notes the talks on a ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism; underlines the need to follow up on these ambitious proposals;

Or. en

14.1.2026 A10-0265/39

Amendment 39

Thijs Reuten

on behalf of the S&D Group

Wouter Beke, Nathalie Loiseau, Mārtiņš Staķis

Report A10-0265/2025

Thijs Reuten

Implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2025

(2025/2165(INI))

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

12. Remains concerned about Türkiye, a member of NATO, displaying ambiguous behaviour through its lack of sanctions against Russia and its continuous challenges to the sovereignty and sovereign rights of EU Member States; condemns Türkiye’s violation of Syria’s territorial integrity; is deeply concerned by attacks led or supported by Türkiye in north-eastern Syria, as they not only result in civilian casualties and increase the number of internally displaced persons, but also threaten the effectiveness and continuity of the fight against Daesh;

Or. en