On the institutional consequences of the EU enlargement negotiations
A-10-2025-0177
Committee on Constitutional Affairs · Rapporteur: Sandro Gozi
- Voted on · Adopted 310–277–53 · See the decision →
- Full procedure 2025/2041
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This resolution addresses the institutional consequences of EU enlargement, arguing that the EU must reform its institutions and decision-making to remain efficient, powerful, and democratic as new members join.¶¶¶ It calls for reforms including moving to qualified majority voting in more areas, adapting the composition of Parliament, the Commission and the Council, strengthening Parliament's powers, and revising the EU budget.¶¶¶ It proposes using existing Treaty flexibility, such as passerelle clauses and enhanced cooperation, and insists on targeted Treaty changes to enable these reforms.¶¶¶
Committee position. The Committee on Constitutional Affairs proposes a resolution calling for comprehensive institutional reforms to prepare the EU for enlargement, including changes to decision-making, institutional composition, and budgetary governance.¶¶
Key points
- Enlargement is a geostrategic investment that promotes democracy and stability, but the EU must reform internally to absorb new members effectively.¶¶
- The EU should move from unanimity to qualified majority voting in the Council, including for intermediate steps in enlargement, to avoid delays from bilateral issues.¶
- The composition of Parliament should be adapted with a permanent seat allocation mechanism respecting degressive proportionality, and its size kept workable.¶
- The Commission's composition must remain balanced, and any reduction in the College of Commissioners must ensure geographic, demographic and gender balance.¶
- The Council's voting system should be redefined to balance larger and smaller countries, with higher thresholds for sensitive decisions, and greater transparency.¶
- The Article 7 TEU procedure should be reformed by ending unanimity in European Council decisions, introducing a clear timeframe, and making the Court of Justice the arbiter.¶
- The next multiannual financial framework should include a mandatory revision clause for enlargement, transitional measures for cohesion and agriculture, and move away from the 1% GNI limit.¶¶
- Parliament should gain full legislative initiative and equal footing with the Council, and its scrutiny rights should be reinforced.¶¶
- European elections should be harmonized with uniform rules, and the remaining member state should ratify Council Decision 2018/994.¶
- Differentiated integration, including enhanced cooperation and PESCO, should be used within the Treaty framework, and a European defence system could be created under Article 42(6) TEU.¶¶¶
- Targeted Treaty changes are indispensable, and the European Council should follow up on Parliament's proposals under Article 48 TEU.¶
Who is affected
- EU institutions (Parliament, Council, Commission) will need to adapt their composition and decision-making processes.¶¶¶
- Candidate countries would be involved earlier in EU institutions, potentially with observer status.¶
- Member states would face changes in voting rules, with more decisions by qualified majority.¶
- The European Parliament would gain more powers, including legislative initiative.¶
Figures and deadlines
- GDP per capita of Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia is around or below 50% of the EU's.¶
- Adding 10 new member states would shrink the GDP per capita gap with the US by 10%.
- Substantial enlargement with strong convergence could add up to USD 10 trillion to EU GDP by 2035.
- Countries joining in 2004 saw GDP per capita increase by 30% on average.¶
Legal basis: Articles 31(3), 48 and 49 TEU; Articles 81(3), 83, 136, 153(2), 192(2), 312(2) and 333 TFEU¶¶