What changed

B100169/2025

B100160/2025

European Parliament resolution on the need for EU support towards a just transition and reconstruction in Syria

The European Parliament,

– having regard to itsUN previousSecurity resolutionsCouncil Resolution 2254 (2015), adopted on Syria,18 December 2015,

– having regard to its recommendation of 28 February 2024 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the situation in Syria,

– having regard to UN Security Council ResolutionResolutions 22541325 (2015)(2000), of2170 18(2014), December2427 2015(2018), on2664 the(2022) situationand in2672 Syria,(2023),

– having regard to the statement of 9 December 2024 by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, on behalf of the European Union on theUN fallSecretary-General of the8 AssadDecember regime,2024,

– having regard to the Europeanstatement Councilby conclusionsthe UN Special Envoy for Syria, Mr Geir O. Pedersen of 198 December 2024,

– having regard to the Council’sstatement decisionby the High Representative of 24the FebruaryUnion 2025,for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 9 December 2024,

– having regard to Syria’s accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2013,

– having regard to Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/408 of 24 February 2025 implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria,

– having regard to the visit of the Commissioner for Preparedness, Crisis Management and Equality, Hadja Lahbib, to Syria on 17 January 2025,

– having regard to Rule 136 (2) of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 January 2025 on EU Priorities in UN Human Rights Fora in 2025,

A. whereas in December 2024, Syria witnessed momentous change, as a rebel coalition consisting of the armed group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Syrian National Army (SNA) and several other opposition forces toppled Bashar al-Assad’s murderous regime;

– having regard to the establishment of the UN Independent Institution on Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab Republic, under UN General Assembly Resolution 77/301 of 29 June 2023,

B. whereas Bashar al-Assad fled the country, having been granted political asylum in the Russian Federation;

– having regard to the International Criminal Court and universal jurisdiction cases in European courts prosecuting war crimes, crimes against humanity and violations of international law committed in Syria,

C. whereas in January 2025, the Syrian constitution of 2012 was nullified, the People’s Assembly, the Ba’ath Party and all revolutionary factions were dissolved and HTS leader Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa was declared the de facto interim President of Syria;

– having regard to the Paris Conference on Syria held on 13 February 2025,

D. whereas numerous plans have been laid out by the transitional government, including rebuilding state capacity, tackling corruption and cronyism and restoring trust in the state;

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

E. whereas Syria’s de facto interim President has pledged to form a non-sectarian, comprehensive, credible and inclusive government that reflects Syria’s ethnic and religious diversity and to increase engagement with neighbouring countries and other foreign actors;

A. whereas following the overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria by the Islamist paramilitary rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in December 2024, HTS established a transitional government under its leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, marking the end of decades of Ba’ath party dictatorship and Assad-family oppression;

F. whereas Syria finds itself in an extremely dire economic situation, with its GDP having plummeted by 64 % since the beginning of the war in 2011, its currency having lost around two thirds of its value against the US dollar in the past two years and inflation reaching a record high level of 40.2 % in 2024;

B. whereas the new Syrian leadership announced its priorities for the transitional period, including establishing legal and legitimate governance, safeguarding civil peace through the implementation of a transitional justice system and the prevention of individual reprisals, rebuilding state institutions, revitalising the national economy and restoring Syria’s role in regional and international affairs; whereas the leadership held a National Dialogue Conference on 24 and 25 February 2025, where it announced plans to create a representative legislative council, adopt a constitutional declaration for the transition period and create a constitutional committee tasked with drafting the future constitution; whereas, at the same time, the de facto Syrian authorities have stated that it could take up to three years for them to propose a new constitution for the country;

G. whereas Syria has experienced a dramatic decline in exports, by 84 %, and imports, by 70 %, as compared with pre-war levels;

C. whereas Syria’s de facto leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, was previously a member of the Islamic State of Iraq, then pledged allegiance to Al-Qaida before officially distancing himself from these organisations; whereas he has never expressed regret for being associated with these terrorist organisations; whereas HTS and Ahmed al-Sharaa are on the UN Security Council counterterrorist sanctions list; whereas certain doubts exist as to whether HTS and its leadership have fully transformed from jihadist rebels to legitimate political actors;

H. whereas since 2021, the EU has lost its status both as largest exporter to Syria and as largest importer of Syrian goods, to Türkiye and Saudi Arabia respectively;

D. whereas the security landscape in Syria remains fragmented, with ongoing tensions between various armed groups; whereas hostilities, particularly in north-eastern Syria, continue to impact civilians;

I. whereas Syria has been struggling with an unemployment rate of around 14 % for several years;

E. whereas an estimated 16.7 million Syrians are in need of humanitarian aid, 3 million face starvation and struggle with dangerous levels of food insecurity; whereas over 2 million internally displaced Syrians live in camps in north-west Syria alone;

J. whereas the conflict has led to a sharp decline in living standards, with over 80 % of Syrians living below the poverty line and facing significant challenges in accessing food, healthcare and clean water;

F. whereas Syria faces severe economic challenges, including soaring inflation, currency devaluation, electricity shortages and rising commodity prices;

K. whereas according to World Bank estimates, extreme poverty in Syria is expected to increase further, from 33.1 % in 2024 to 37.4 % in 2025;

G. whereas the Assad regime, since its inception and with direct support and assistance from Moscow and Tehran, engaged in systematic repression, mass arrests, torture, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial executions and other grave human rights violations; whereas the Assad regime was responsible for documented war crimes, including the deliberate targeting of civilians, the use of barrel bombs, siege warfare leading to mass starvation, and the deployment of chemical weapons in violation of international law; whereas the collapse of the Syrian economy was exacerbated by regime corruption, predatory economic policies and reliance on illicit activities, including the production and trafficking of Captagon;

L. whereas the humanitarian situation on the ground continues to deteriorate, with 16.7 million Syrians reliant on aid and more than half of the population heavily affected by food insecurity;

H. whereas the Syrian regime, through ethnic cleansing, conducted a brutal campaign to change the country’s demographic makeup; whereas Christians in Syria made up about 10 % of the pre-war Syrian population, totalling 2.2 million people; whereas the brutality of the war caused a mass exodus of Christians, with only about 640 000 remaining; whereas, in addition to the Syrian regime, Christians in the country have been persecuted by ISIS and other Islamist militias; whereas the Assad regime attempted to project an image as a secular protector of Christians and other minorities in Syria, but the regime reportedly intentionally destroyed churches and detained at least several hundred Christian citizens; whereas the Assad regime, with the active support of the Russian Federation, besieged and completely decimated Aleppo, the city with the largest Christian population in the country; whereas in 2024, the country was ranked as the 18th most difficult place in the world to be Christian;

M. whereas some 7 million people have been internally displaced and 5.6 million have fled to neighbouring countries and beyond;

I. whereas, despite the fact that HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa has made public statements promising safety and peaceful coexistence for minorities, including Christians, doubts persist due to HTS’s jihadist origins as well as reports about continued restrictions on religious freedom in Syria, including the monitoring and control of religious activities, the enforcement of dress codes for women, the misappropriation of properties and a ban on public religious expressions and symbols;

N. whereas in 2024, the EU allocated EUR 159 million in humanitarian aid to assist Syrians and, in addition to direct aid, pledged a further EUR 2.12 billion for 2024-2025 during the Brussels VIII Conference; whereas the EU’s assistance focuses on life-saving aid, resilience programmes and the political objective of implementing UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015);

J. whereas the January 2025 proposals to reform Syria’s school curriculum, shifting from a merely nationalist to a more Islamic orientation, illustrate the presence of supporters of radical Islam in the ranks of the new Syrian administration;

O. whereas since November 2024, 1.1 million additional people have been forced to relocate within Syria;

K. whereas transitional justice, respect for human rights and the restoration of justice are essential to achieving sustainable peace and reconciliation in Syria; whereas all parties responsible for violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses must be held accountable through transparent and independent investigations within the framework of transitional justice;

P. whereas the EU aims to facilitate engagement with Syria, its people and its businesses in key areas of the energy, transport, health and education sectors, and to facilitate financial and banking transactions associated with such sectors and those needed for humanitarian and reconstruction purposes; whereas to this end, the Council decided to suspend restrictive measures on key economic sectors on 24 February 2024;

L. whereas the European Council has recognised the need to ensure the protection of all civilians, the provision of public services and the creation of conditions for an inclusive and peaceful political transition, as well as the safe, voluntary and dignified return of Syrian refugees in line with the standards set by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees;

Q. whereas the United States imposes the most comprehensive sanctions on Syria, including secondary sanctions on foreign governments, non-US individuals and entities doing business with the Syrian Government;

M. whereas on 24 February 2025, the Council decided to suspend restrictive measures on key economic sectors in Syria, while maintaining targeted sanctions against individuals and entities responsible for war crimes and illicit activities;

R. whereas ISIS (Da’esh) continues to operate within and from Syria, relying on its centre for external operational planning in the Badia region; whereas credible assessments have highlighted that ISIS might exploit the current situation to shore up its standing and capabilities;

N. whereas the EU’s humanitarian and financial assistance to Syria amounts to over EUR 30 billion since 2011 to support displaced Syrians and neighbouring host countries;

S. whereas it remains unclear whether Russia will be able to continue to exert its economic, military and political leverage on Syria;

O. whereas the reconstruction of Syria is extremely challenging, with 90 % of its population living below the poverty line; whereas the sanctions imposed on the Syrian civilian population must first be eased before the EU Member States can make any investments;

T. whereas Türkiye’s standing continues to remain uncertain, as the Turkish-backed SNA has not been included in the transitional government; whereas it is to be expected that Türkiye will not refrain from increasing pressure on Kurdish forces in northern Syria to further tighten its grip on the territories along the Turkish-Syrian border;

P. whereas authoritarian foreign actors, including Russia and Iran and their proxies (the Wagner Group, the Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi militias and Afghan mercenaries) as well as local Syrian collaborators, played a destructive role in Syria for over a decade, actively fuelling the conflict and supporting the Assad regime’s brutal repression; whereas Russia and Iran, under the guise of strategic alliances, exploited Syria as a geopolitical battleground to expand their influence in the region, destabilising the country and obstructing diplomatic efforts for a peaceful resolution to the conflict; whereas Iran’s extensive infrastructure in Syria has largely collapsed following the fall of the Assad regime;

1. Commends the efforts of several EU foreign ministers to set up channels of communication and initiate a formal dialogue with Syria’s transitional government;

Q. whereas Russia used Syria as a testing ground for its military capabilities, tactics and intervention strategies, systematically targeting civilian infrastructure, hospitals and humanitarian aid convoys in clear violation of international law; whereas both Russia and Iran profited from Syria’s economic collapse, extracting resources, controlling strategic industries and using the country as a hub for arms and drug trafficking;

2. Calls on the Member States to support all EU diplomatic efforts towards establishing a frank and constructive working relationship with the interim government;

R. whereas approximately 10 000 ISIS fighters are currently detained in Syria; whereas over 40 000 family members of ISIS fighters are being held in camps in Syria; whereas the detention facilities are primarily guarded by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF); whereas the security of these detention centres has become a growing concern since the fall of the Assad regime; whereas the SDF has warned that recent clashes with Turkish-backed fighters in northern Syria are affecting their ability to protect the prisons, which poses a serious threat to regional and European security;

3. Calls for all necessary measures and mechanisms to be put in place to shed true and comprehensive light on the crimes perpetrated across the country under the regime of Bashar al-Assad, including through cooperation and engagement with international experts and existing international mechanisms; calls for the voices and suffering of victims and survivors to be heard and to serve as the cornerstone for achieving justice, accountability and societal reconciliation;

S. whereas several investigations into and prosecutions of serious crimes committed in Syria are ongoing under the principle of universal jurisdiction, offering hope in the pursuit of justice and accountability for acts of torture, crimes against humanity and war crimes perpetrated during the Assad regime’s rule; whereas France has issued an international arrest warrant against Bashar al-Assad, his brother Maher al-Assad, who commanded elite military units responsible for brutal repression, and two Syrian armed forces generals, all accused of complicity in crimes against humanity, including the deployment of chemical weapons in 2013; whereas multiple European courts have prosecuted former Syrian officials and intelligence officers for war crimes and crimes against humanity, further solidifying international legal efforts to hold perpetrators accountable;

4. Urges Syria’s interim government to establish an independent transitional justice committee to ensure accountability for past human rights violations committed by all factions and promote national reconciliation, and emphasises that military unification cannot be achieved without a credible justice mechanism for building trust among armed groups, including representatives of the southern factions, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and former regime officers;

T. whereas Russia and China systematically obstructed justice by vetoing UN Security Council resolutions aimed at addressing war crimes in Syria, shielding the Assad regime from international accountability and enabling impunity for atrocities; whereas Russia actively interfered in international investigations into chemical weapons attacks and other war crimes, disseminating disinformation to distort evidence and deflect blame from the Assad regime; whereas the fall of the Assad regime has created an opportunity to fully pursue justice against those responsible for the regime’s atrocities, ensuring that war criminals face prosecution;

5. Calls on Syria’s interim government to cooperate with the UN mechanisms established specifically for Syria, and calls for the EU to support those mechanisms in fulfilling their mandate, including by increasing funding for the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) and other existing justice initiatives on Syria;

U. whereas the Assad regime in Syria supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and recognised the occupied Luhansk and Donetsk regions in eastern Ukraine; whereas Ukraine’s military intelligence service systematically reported that Russia was training Syrian mercenaries to support Russia’s war against Ukraine;

6. Urges Syria’s transitional government to grant both those affected by the brutality of the Assad regime and the civil society organisations assisting them full and unrestricted access to archival documents and to support them in their truth-finding and justice-seeking efforts;

V. whereas Türkiye has maintained a significant military presence in northern Syria since 2016, conducting multiple operations aimed at establishing a buffer zone free from Kurdish-led forces, particularly the People’s Protection Units (YPG), which Türkiye associates with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK); whereas these operations have resulted in Turkish control over territories in northern Syria, with Türkiye exercising authority both directly and through allied Syrian factions; whereas in December 2024, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan asserted that Türkiye’s actions were instrumental in the rapid collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, positioning Türkiye as a dominant influence in the region; whereas in October 2023, the Turkish Parliament extended the mandate authorising military operations in Syria for an additional two years; whereas Türkiye is urged to cease its unauthorised military activities and withdraw its forces in order to respect Syria’s territorial integrity and contribute to regional stability;

7. Acknowledges the experiences and perspectives of Syrian women and calls for them to play a leading role in justice efforts;

W. whereas Türkiye has shifted its strategy in Syria following the fall of the Assad regime, aiming to increase its regional influence by supporting the transitional government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa; whereas Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan seeks to establish a cooperative administration in Damascus to position Türkiye as the dominant state in the Levant, offering military aid, training and reconstruction support to Syria, along with lucrative contracts for Turkish firms involved in rebuilding efforts; whereas in February 2025, the new Syrian authorities initiated discussions with Türkiye on establishing a joint defence pact, potentially leading to new Turkish airbases in central Syria and training programmes for Syria’s new army; whereas Erdoğan has urged Damascus to assist in eliminating the SDF, hinting at a full-scale Turkish military incursion against the Kurdish forces that he accuses of terrorism;

8. Stresses the key need for justice and accountability processes to address the role of sexualised and gender-based violence;

1. Recognises the historic fall of the Ba’ath party dictatorship and the Assad regime as an opportunity for the Syrian people to reclaim their sovereignty and establish a democratic government based on the principles of human rights, political inclusivity and the rule of law;

9. Urges the Syrian transitional government to address the suffering inflicted on children and calls for effective and inclusive pedagogical, didactical and clinical measures to be put in place;

2. Calls on all parties involved to help Syria transition away from a dictatorship, terrorism and repression, and to contribute to a peaceful, Syrian-led and Syrian-owned transition towards an inclusive, democratic governance model that ensures the representation and participation of, and equal rights for, all ethnic, religious and political groups within Syria, ensuring that all citizens have an equal voice in shaping the country’s future, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015); calls, furthermore, on Syria to break free from its notorious long-standing alliances with Tehran and Moscow, which have brought suffering to the Syrian people and destabilisation to the region;

10. Calls on the transitional government to restore state institutions and adopt all necessary measures to ensure that they do not evolve into strongholds of specific factions;

3. Takes note of the priorities of Syria’s de facto leadership for the transitional period in the country, namely to establish legal and legitimate governance, uphold the rule of law and ensure a stable transition towards democracy; encourages efforts to rebuild and reform state institutions to enhance their efficiency, transparency and service to the Syrian people, with a particular focus on strengthening the armed forces and security apparatus in order to maintain stability and protect citizens in accordance with the principles of human rights; is of the opinion that a prosperous and peaceful future for Syria depends on political stability, which, in turn, relies on addressing various domestic issues and is hindered by a lack of national cohesion and political agreement among Syria’s various ethnic and religious groups – a problem that should be addressed in the new Syrian constitution;

11. Emphasises the need to continue holding inclusive national dialogues and open political discussions among all sections of Syrian society to ensure a sustainable and representative transition;

4. Takes note of the recent National Dialogue Conference held in Damascus as a first step towards establishing a culture of dialogue for all Syrians; encourages the continuation of the national dialogue in the long term, with the involvement of representatives from all segments of Syrian society without exception; expresses concerns about the announced delay to constitutional reforms; considers that the constitutional vacuum in Syria poses numerous problems for its citizens and represents an obstacle to the restoration of its diplomatic relations;

12. Welcomes, in this regard, the recent national dialogue conference held on 25 February 2025 as a starting point for Syrians to gather and freely discuss challenges and opportunities; stresses that it is imperative to continue such dialogue in order to prevent deepening societal divisions and discord within key sections of Syrian society and a further destabilisation of an already fragile security situation;

5. Is particularly concerned by the increasingly alarming reports from Christians and people of other faiths in Syria about double standards on the part of the de facto Syrian authorities; calls on the transitional authorities to guarantee the right to religious freedom and belief without limitations for all Syrian people without exception;

13 Welcomes the interim President’s announcement of 2 March 2025 on the creation of a committee of experts tasked with drafting a constitutional declaration aimed at regulating the country’s transitional political phase; hopes that this will include all groups, movements, opposition forces, minorities and societal actors;

6. Welcomes the EU’s commitment to supporting a stable transition for Syria and calls for strengthened diplomatic coordination with regional and international partners to ensure the successful execution of the political process;

14. Urges the transitional government to acknowledge and safeguard all ethnic and religious groups, including Christians, Shias, Ismailis, Alawites, Kurds and all others, and to curtail any attempts to stir up sectarian division;

7. Supports the Council’s decision to suspend restrictive measures on key economic sectors in order to improve the dire conditions in the country, in particular the shortages of food, medicine, shelter and energy, and to enable Syria’s economic recovery, which, if not properly addressed, may destabilise the country and potentially the region, while maintaining targeted sanctions against individuals responsible for war crimes, human rights violations and illicit financial activities; urges the new leadership in Syria to guarantee equal distribution of humanitarian aid;

15. Stresses the importance of pursuing reforms and establishing political mechanisms in line with democratic principles, individual freedom and international law;

8. Emphasises that any future suspension of restrictive measures must be part of a gradual approach and follow a careful analysis based on the close monitoring of the situation in the country, and it must be conditional on meaningful steps on, inter alia, the process of inclusive transition, respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Syrians without distinction of any kind, the rule of law and international law, and the commitment of the transitional government to distance itself from its jihadist past;

16. Calls on Syria’s transitional government to recognise the fundamental role of civil society and Syria’s diverse ethnic, religious and tribal communities in shaping the country’s future political framework and contributing to the reconstruction of its social fabric;

9. Reaffirms the EU’s commitment to humanitarian aid and reconstruction, prioritising the restoration of critical infrastructure, including water supply, electricity, healthcare and education;

17. Urges the interim government to take all necessary steps to create the conditions for the operation of a vibrant, free and independent press; calls for all restrictions on the media to be lifted;

10. Calls on the international community to provide coordinated support for Syria’s reconstruction, while ensuring that financial and technical assistance is directed towards legitimate local institutions and communities rather than entities affiliated with the former regime or terrorist organisations;

18. Urges the interim government to create the necessary conditions for women to play a central role in Syria’s political and economic life;

11. Recognises the EU’s decision to fully operationalise its delegation in Damascus and establish contacts with Syria’s new leadership, emphasising the EU’s commitment to supporting Syria’s transition and reconstruction efforts;

19. Underlines the crucial need for the EU to continue providing substantial humanitarian aid in line with the degree of humanitarian, development, economic and stabilisation assistance delivered since 2011;

12. Considers that Syria cannot continue to pose threats to its neighbours, notably Israel and Türkiye, as it requires support and cooperation in fighting terrorism, preventing the re-emergence of extremist groups and countering the risk of terrorist groups establishing a de facto safe haven in post-Assad Syria and Syria’s remaining chemical weapons stockpiles being destroyed, as priorities for international security and stability; affirms that progress in relations with the EU must be conditional on cooperation with the transitional government in Syria to track down jihadists with European nationalities or those involved in planning attacks in Europe;

20. Supports the implementation of policies that foster equitable development across all regions, contribute to a unified national identity and balance development across urban and rural areas to reduce regional disparities; stresses, furthermore, the key importance of empowering local communities;

13. Condemns the crimes against humanity committed by the Assad regime, including mass killings, the use of chemical weapons, the forced displacement of populations and the systematic targeting of civilians; highlights the importance of safeguarding civil peace through the implementation of a comprehensive transitional justice system that promotes accountability, reconciliation and national unity, while preventing individual reprisals; affirms that justice for these crimes should primarily be pursued within Syria, ensuring that the Syrian people will have ultimate ownership over the accountability process against their former oppressors and the right to prosecute those responsible and dismantle the remnants of the repressive Assad regime, including ‘terror courts’ and judges responsible for executions and repression; underlines the importance of seeking justice rather than revenge, ensuring proper vetting processes and focusing on victims and their families throughout the transition process; acknowledges the ongoing investigations in European courts under universal jurisdiction, but emphasises that such mechanisms should complement rather than replace efforts to obtain justice within Syria; calls on the international community to provide the necessary assistance to ensure fair and effective trials within the country;

21. Stresses the need for wide-reaching economic reforms, in particular within the energy and agricultural sectors;

14. Supports the work of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (CoI), the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) and the Independent Institution on Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab Republic (IIMP) in their efforts to document human rights violations, ensure justice and provide accountability;

22. Stresses that the reconstruction of Syria’s energy infrastructure through the restoration of full control over the oil fields in north-east Syria and strengthening production facilities is key to the country’s economic recovery;

15. Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States to take immediate steps to prevent any re-establishment or reinforcement of Russian and Iranian forces, paramilitaries or intelligence in the country;

23. Calls for the EU to play a central role in these efforts and welcomes the gradual and conditional lifting of specific sanctions, in particular those that hinder humanitarian assistance and that impose restrictions on infrastructure projects, the financial sector and financial support for trade, and the transport sector; calls on all international actors, especially the United States, to do likewise and consider a gradual lifting of sanctions;

16. Calls for the immediate withdrawal of all destabilising foreign military forces, including remaining Russian and Iranian troops and militias, in order to ensure Syria’s full sovereignty and to prevent continued external interference in the country’s internal affairs;

24. Calls, nevertheless, for individual sanctions against military personnel, officials, business entities and individuals associated with the Assad family to be maintained;

17. Urges neighbouring countries to respect Syria’s territorial integrity and cease all military operations that could jeopardise the fragile political transition;

25. Calls on the interim government to eliminate the entire stock of chemical weapons present within Syria in close coordination with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons;

18. Is worried about the security situation in north-eastern Syria; calls for a concerted international effort to prevent the resurgence of ISIS and other terrorist organisations in Syria, ensuring that local security forces receive the necessary support to counter extremist threats;

26. Calls on the transitional government to adopt all necessary measures to counter drug trafficking networks, especially those relating to the smuggling of Captagon;

19. Highlights the importance of protecting Syria’s cultural heritage and calls for international collaboration to restore historical sites and religious landmarks and to prevent the illicit trade in looted artefacts;

27. Calls for all necessary steps to be taken to incentivise and facilitate foreign direct investment in Syria in accordance with international standards;

20. Condemns the irreparable damage caused to cultural sites by both the Syrian regime and jihadist groups operating in Syria; remains concerned that the instability will lead to an increase in international smuggling and theft of cultural heritage that could be used to finance enhanced activity by terrorist organisations in the region; urges that Syrian cultural artefacts be digitised in Europe to support the detection of smuggled goods and calls for a temporary, comprehensive ban on the import of cultural goods from Syria to deprive the regime and its affiliates of the potential to profit from cultural smuggling;

28. Calls on the Commission to support reconstruction efforts focusing on sectors that are key to improving Syrians’ economic prospects, including transport, electricity, health and education, and to ensure that funding programmes are accompanied by due diligence and independent monitoring;

21. Welcomes the voluntary return of Syrians from neighbouring countries and supports the safe and dignified return of all refugees; calls for the full protection of returnees from persecution, discrimination or forced conscription;

29. Advises that the European Investment Bank play a key role in strengthening Syria’s banking sector, which continues to be almost entirely reliant on Lebanese banks for commercial and personal transactions, and calls for Syria’s banking sector to be connected to the SWIFT system in order to improve traceability;

22. Calls for urgent measures to combat the illicit drug trade originating from Syria, particularly the production and trafficking of Captagon, which has destabilised the region and fuelled corruption and violence;

30. Advises the EU Member States to ensure that Syrians residing in Europe and enjoying international protection are allowed to undertake exploratory ‘go and see’ visits to Syria without losing their current status; urges the Commission to provide guidance in this regard;

23. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Member States, the United Nations Secretary-General, the United Nations Special Envoy for Syria, the League of Arab States, representatives of Syrian civil society, and the de facto authorities in Syria.

31. Expresses deep concern over the withdrawal of the US Agency for International Development assistance from north-east Syria, exacerbating the already critical humanitarian situation and further straining the SDF’s capacity to manage ISIS detention facilities; acknowledges that the continued presence of thousands of detained ISIS fighters and their families poses a severe security risk to the region, necessitating increased international responsibility-sharing and sustainable solutions for their prosecution, rehabilitation or repatriation;

32. Urges the interim government to ensure that Syria’s rich cultural heritage is adequately protected;

33. Calls on all foreign actors to refrain from interfering politically, economically and militarily in Syria’s internal and external affairs;

34. Urges Syria’s neighbours to respect its sovereignty and territorial integrity in accordance with international law;

35. Calls on the Russian Federation to desist from undertaking any attempts to influence, alter or curtail the reconstruction process; urges the Russian Federation, moreover, to cease all operations from the Khmeimim Air Base and the Tartus naval base; calls on Syria’s interim government and on the governments of all other countries to refrain from providing assistance to Russia in this regard;

36. Calls on Türkiye to refrain from exerting pressure on Kurdish forces through military action across north-west Syria and from weaponising 3.5 million Syrian refugees in Türkiye;

37. Calls on the Islamic Republic of Iran to cease all activities aimed at torpedoing the political and economic efforts of Syria’s interim government and at altering the status quo by means of force;

38. Issues a strong call for the interim government to refrain from any hostile political, economic and military action towards neighbouring countries;

39. Expresses concern over the appointment of foreign nationals with jihadist affiliations to senior positions within the ministry of defence, including Brigadiers General Abdul Rahman Hussein al-Khatib (Abu Hussein al-Urduni), Omar Mohammed Jaftashi (Mukhtar al-Turki) and Abu Amsha (Mohammed al-Jassem), and stresses that such appointments could undermine efforts to establish a stable and inclusive security structure in Syria;

40. Urges Syria’s interim government to ensure that all military and security appointments are based strictly on professional qualifications, respect for international human rights and humanitarian law, and a commitment to combating terrorism, and to emphasise that individuals with extremist affiliations must not be allowed to hold positions of authority within state institutions;

41. Stresses the importance of taking concrete steps to address the highly fragile situation in several ISIS detention centres in north-east Syria; expresses concern about the humanitarian situation on the ground and the burden currently being shouldered exclusively by the SDF; calls on all parties to work together to establish an effective and sustainable framework for addressing rising tensions;

42. Urges Syria’s interim government to formulate a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy in accordance with international law, including international humanitarian and human rights law;

43. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the transitional government of Syria.