What changed

B100168/2025

B100163/2025

European Parliament resolution on continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia’s war of aggression

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and Russia since 1 March 2022,Russia,

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols thereto, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/792 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Ukraine Facility, and to other forms of EU support for Ukraine,

– having regard to the Helsinkijoint Finalstatement Actby the President of the ConferenceEuropean onCouncil, Securitythe President of the European Commission and Co-operationthe inPresident Europeof the European Parliament of 1975,24 February 2025 on the third anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,

– having regard to the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of 19-21 November 1990,

– having regard to the UN Charter, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols thereto, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,

– having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part,

– having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/7 adopted on 24 February 2025 entitled ‘Advancing a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine’,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/792 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Ukraine Facility,

– having regard to the Helsinki Final Act of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) of 1 August 1975, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of the OSCE of 21 November 1990 and the UN Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 5 December 1994 (the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances),

– having regard to the joint security commitments between the European Union and Ukraine of 27 June 2024,

– having regard to NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept,

– having regard to the conclusions of the special meeting of the European Council of 6 March 2025,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas 24 February 2025 marked three years of resilience and unwavering determination, courage and sacrifice by Ukrainian soldiers and citizens in defending their country against Russia’s war of aggression, despite Russia’s barbaric crimes causing immense civilian and military losses;

A. whereas Russia has been waging an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022, continuing its 2014 annexation of Crimea and occupation of parts of Donetsk and Luhansk; whereas more than 10 years on from the 2014 invasion, Russia continues to openly violate Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, causing severe humanitarian, economic and ecological consequences and regional instability;

B. whereas Russia’s aggression against Ukraine began in 2014, yet it was met with insufficient and fragmented responses from many western European capitals, which failed to deter further escalation and encouraged Moscow to pursue a full-scale invasion in 2022; whereas, despite the illegal annexation of Crimea and occupation of Donbas, some Member States continued purchasing Russian fossil fuels, directly funding the Kremlin’s war machine;

B. whereas Russian forces have systematically targeted residential areas and civilian infrastructure, killing thousands of Ukrainian civilians, destroying public and private property and committing ecocide; whereas Russian forces are responsible for illegal detentions, torture, the execution of civilians and prisoners of war, forced disappearances and deportations, including the deportation of children and their forced adoption by Russians, and other acts of terror, including sexual violence; whereas Russia continues to alter the ethnic composition of occupied Ukrainian territories;

C. whereas for three years Russia’s forces have systematically and indiscriminately attacked residential areas and civilian infrastructure, causing the deaths of thousands of Ukrainian civilians and the destruction of public and private property; whereas Russian forces are responsible for forced deportations, disappearances, including of children, illegal imprisonments, torture, executions of civilians, soldiers and prisoners of war, and acts of terror, including the use of sexual violence and mass rape as weapons of war, and they continue to alter the ethnic composition of the occupied territories of Ukraine, all of which constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity and meet the criteria for genocide;

C. whereas on 2 March 2022, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) opened an investigation into the situation in Ukraine, focusing on war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide committed on Ukrainian territory from 21 November 2013 onwards;

D. whereas millions of Ukrainians remain displaced both inside and outside their country, having fled the violence and destruction caused by Russia’s aggression;

D. whereas Russia’s war has devastated Ukrainian children’s lives, with over 1 800 killed or injured and millions displaced; whereas over 65 % of Ukrainian children are living in poverty, and up to 100 000 remain in institutional care; whereas the education of children has been severely disrupted, with many reliant on remote learning amid power and internet shortages; whereas over 1.5 million Ukrainian children are at risk of post-traumatic stress disorder, and nearly half experience distress and isolation;

E. whereas Russia has increased the number of its military personnel deployed in Ukraine, with approximately 620 000 Russian soldiers directly involved in combat operations, indicating the Kremlin’s intent to wage a long war of attrition that aims to exhaust Ukraine and its partners;

E. whereas Ukraine and international bodies have documented hundreds of executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war by Russian forces since February 2022; whereas such executions constitute serious violations of international law and human rights and are explicitly recognised as war crimes under the Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute of the ICC;

E. whereas, since the full-scale invasion, Ukraine has been able to liberate approximately 63 % of the territories occupied by Russia; whereas in recent months, despite Russia’s continued offensive – bolstered by North Korean soldiers and military support from its backers – it has recorded only modest territorial gains and failed to evict Ukrainian forces from the Kursk region; whereas, from a strategic perspective, the Kremlin has failed in its attempt to achieve a quick victory and other objectives, as Putin has openly attempted to blackmail Ukraine and the West; whereas the war has devolved into a protracted conflict, with neither side making significant breakthroughs on the battlefield;

F. whereas the UN General Assembly, in its resolution adopted on 2 March 2022, deplored in the strongest terms Russia’s war against Ukraine as an act of aggression in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and, in its resolution adopted on 14 November 2022, recognised the need to hold Russia accountable and liable for reparations for its internationally wrongful acts;

F. whereas since the election of Donald Trump as US President, Washington has entered into direct talks with the Russian regime with the aim of negotiating a ceasefire, to be followed by a peace treaty; whereas a bilateral deal between the United States and Ukraine on critical minerals and other valuable resources, agreement on which has been provisionally reached, so far has not been signed after a serious diplomatic disagreement between the Ukrainian and US Presidents;

G. whereas a number of non-EU countries, notably Iran, North Korea, China and Belarus, have provided Russia with significant military support; whereas North Korea has been providing Russia with weapons and combat troops, and Belarus has allowed Russia to use its territory to attack Ukraine, which amount to acts of aggression under international law; whereas Russia and China signed a ‘no-limits partnership’ on 4 February 2022, and subsequently, China has become a key enabler of the Russian war effort through its massive support for Russia’s economy, its defence industrial base and its supply of dual-use equipment;

G. whereas the United States has been the largest provider of aid to Ukraine since the beginning of the war; whereas its financial aid and intelligence sharing were recently suspended by the Trump administration; whereas, within the EU, the largest government allocations measured as the percentage of gross domestic product have come from Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Finland and Sweden, while large economies such as Germany and France are falling behind;

H. whereas the EU and its Member States stand in solidarity with Ukraine, providing significant humanitarian, financial, political and military support; whereas the EU is the largest donor to Ukraine, with assistance amounting to EUR 135 billion;

H. whereas President Trump has reiterated his long-standing call for the European countries to step up their investment in defence and military preparedness; whereas the Commission unveiled plans to increase defence spending which could potentially mobilise as much as EUR 800 billion; whereas NATO allies such as the UK also plan to increase their defence budgets;

I. whereas the EU has recently adopted its 16th sanctions package against Russia to weaken its economic base, deprive it of critical technologies and limit its ability to wage war; whereas the new sanctions target additional individuals and entities, including military firms, sanctions evaders, non-EU country supporters, Kremlin propagandists, shadow fleet networks, and individuals involved in the deportation of Ukrainian children; whereas the EU sanctions now apply to over 2 400 individuals and entities, subjecting them to asset freezes, funding bans and travel restrictions;

I. whereas in May 2024, the EU Member States approved the use of financial proceeds generated by immobilised Russian sovereign assets held within the EU, estimated at around EUR 210 billion, to support Ukraine, with the aim of providing up to EUR 3 billion per year in support of Ukraine’s reconstruction and resilience efforts; whereas Russia is spending over 40 % of its total expenditure on its military; whereas Russia’s budget revenues are still primarily derived from oil, gas and other hydrocarbon-related products, as well as minerals and raw materials exports and from gas-derived fertilisers, an issue that has not been properly addressed by the EU or the G7;

J. whereas, under the administration of US President Donald Trump, the United States has significantly changed its stance on Russia’s war against Ukraine; whereas the US Secretary of Defense marked this shift by declaring NATO membership for Ukraine and the return to pre-2014 borders as unrealistic, before negotiations with Russia even began; whereas recent events and statements by the Trump administration in Washington, D.C., during the 28 February 2025 visit of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, are inappropriate and blatantly false, not conducive to stability in bilateral relations or to providing the much-needed support for Ukraine; whereas, according to widely recognised democratic principles, elections cannot be conducted during wartime and under martial law, especially when millions of Ukrainians have been displaced;

J. whereas the Member States continue to purchase fossil fuels, including liquefied natural gas (LNG), imports of which are rising, and uranium from Russia, contributing to the Russian economy and bolstering its war chest; whereas sales of Russian fossil fuels to the EU since the outbreak of the full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine have exceeded EUR 200 billion, which is double that of the total funding provided to Ukraine over the same period; whereas the EU has granted an exemption for Russian crude oil imported through the Druzhba pipeline to Hungary, Slovakia and Czechia; whereas a shadow fleet of environmentally hazardous and uninsured Russian oil tankers is still operating, including in the Baltic Sea, circumventing the sanctions regime and posing serious environmental threats;

K. whereas recent US-Russia talks in Riyadh excluded Ukraine and the EU, and the United States did not consult its European allies before ending its part in the effort to isolate Russia; whereas the new US administration has downplayed Russia’s responsibility for starting the war and, alongside Russia and its allies, voted against the UN General Assembly Resolution (ES-11/7) adopted on 24 February 2025 deploring Russia’s aggression; whereas on 3 March 2025, President Trump temporarily suspended the delivery of all US military aid to Ukraine, including the aid that had been approved by the previous US administration; whereas this unprecedented position threatens Ukraine’s capacity to withstand Russia’s war of aggression, and makes clear that Washington’s commitment to holding Russia accountable is no longer dependable and undermines international efforts to address the crisis;

K. whereas Russia signed a strategic partnership treaty in June 2024 with North Korea, the most notorious totalitarian regime on the planet, which establishes a military alliance between the countries; whereas Pyongyang has entered the war on the Russian side, sending military personnel and officers;

L. whereas President Trump has ordered a sweeping freeze on the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), halting hundreds of critical projects in Ukraine, including demining activities, military veteran rehabilitation, independent media and anti-corruption initiatives;

L. whereas, since 2012, Russia has been implementing a ‘besieged fortress’ strategy, isolating itself from the outside world, curtailing democracy, inciting anti-Western sentiment, militarising society, and shifting from the relatively mild authoritarianism of ‘sovereign democracy’ to the Russian analogue of North Korean Juche ideology;

M. whereas Ukraine’s defeat would be widely viewed as a strategic defeat for Europe, the United States and the entire NATO alliance and as a reward for the aggressor, the Russian Federation led by Vladimir Putin, with far-reaching security consequences, the extent of which cannot be overstated; whereas depending on the outcome of the war in Ukraine, it will likely have rippling effects in other parts of the world, notably the Indo-Pacific, and could encourage other revisionist powers to pursue their own hegemonic ambitions;

1. Reiterates its strongest condemnation of Russia’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine, and the involvement of Belarus and North Korea in this war, and demands that Russia immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and compensate Ukraine for the damage caused to its people, land, nature and infrastructure;

N. whereas since the outbreak of the war, undersea cables in the Baltic Sea and key infrastructure have been targeted, presumably by Russia- and China-linked actors;

2. Expresses its undivided solidarity with the people of Ukraine, along with its full support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders, and underlines that this war of aggression constitutes a blatant and flagrant violation of the UN Charter and the fundamental principles of international law; reiterates its support for the commitments of the international community to provide humanitarian assistance, military support, economic and financial aid, and political support in every possible way to help Ukraine repel Russian aggression;

1. Reiterates its strongest possible condemnation of Russia’s unprovoked, illegal and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine; demands that Russia immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine, fully withdraw from Ukraine’s internationally recognised territory, end forced deportations, release all detained and deported Ukrainians, especially children and including those forcibly adopted by Russians, and compensate Ukraine for the damage caused; underlines that Russia, its leadership and its allies bear full responsibility for the war and the atrocities committed against Ukrainians, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, ecocide, and possibly genocide, and calls for full accountability in this regard; welcomes progress towards establishing a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine and underlines the necessity that the jurisdiction of this tribunal would cover the entire leadership of Russia and Belarus responsible for the aggression against Ukraine; honours the bravery and resilience of the Ukrainian people in defending their country, democracy and international law; pays tribute to all those who have sacrificed their lives for freedom and reaffirms its commitment to Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity;

3. Underlines that the EU and its Member States must learn from the strategic failures of the Minsk agreements, which neither secured Ukraine’s sovereignty nor held Russia accountable; underlines that the EU and its Member States should reaffirm support for Ukraine’s sovereign decision to enter negotiations on a ceasefire and a possible future peace treaty with Russia and support Kyiv at every stage of the diplomatic process; calls on the international community to be ready to provide security guarantees to Ukraine if such a deal is reached or, if the Ukrainian leadership decide to continue defending against Russia, to respect this decision and provide all necessary support;

2. Emphasises that a sustainable and just peace can be achieved only on the basis of international law, which requires the full restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, full reparation to Ukraine for the aggression, and full accountability of those responsible; underlines that effective and enduring security guarantees for Ukraine must include collective defence obligations, such as those under the North Atlantic Treaty; notes that any other security guarantees, including the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, have proved meaningless;

4. Urges the EU and its Member States to provide Ukraine with more long-range weapons, including Taurus systems promised by the new German leadership, advanced air defence systems, including Patriots and SAMP/T, ammunition, as well as MANPADS, artillery systems and shells, electronic warfare systems in sufficient volumes, engineering equipment, drones and anti-drone capabilities, to enable Ukraine to repel the ongoing aggression and deter Russia from any future acts of aggression;

3. Expresses deep concern over the apparent shift in the United States’ stance on Russia’s war of aggression, which has included openly blaming Ukraine for the ongoing war, suspending US military aid, and attempting to coerce Ukraine into relinquishing its legitimate right to self-defence and to making territorial concessions; stresses that, in light of this change, the EU with its Member States is now Ukraine’s primary strategic ally and must first and foremost maintain its role as the largest donor to Ukraine, and significantly increase its assistance and support, particularly regarding the defence equipment, training and strategic assistance necessary to uphold Ukraine’s right to self-defence and contribute, insofar as is possible, to replacing the suspended USAID funding for critical programmes and projects, while ensuring long-term aid for reconstruction and recovery;

5. Underlines the continued need for enhanced air defence cooperation, including the deployment of modern air defence systems to intercept Russian missiles and drones targeting Ukraine, ensuring protection from threats that extend into EU and NATO airspace and territory; welcomes the commitment by a consortium of European countries, including Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway, to supply F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine and to train Ukrainian pilots, which marks a significant shift in military support for Ukraine and offers the Ukrainian Air Force a robust platform capable of performing various roles, including air superiority, ground attack and reconnaissance;

4. Calls for the EU and its Member States to take the latest developments in US-Ukraine relations as the final wake-up call for stepping in as Ukraine’s leading partner, and actively work towards maintaining the broadest possible international support for Ukraine, including through building a ‘coalition of the able and willing’ with like-minded non-EU partners;

6. Urges the Member States to immediately provide Ukraine with other advanced fourth-generation aircraft, or better, as well as missiles with long-range strike capabilities such as Taurus, including means for their maintenance, in sufficient volume and without restrictions, to bolster Ukraine’s defensive efforts, strategic and operational interests, and long-term deterrence capabilities against Russian aggression;

5. Reaffirms the EU’s commitment to a just and lasting peace in Ukraine, based on its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and supports Ukraine’s Peace Formula as a framework for international engagement; insists that no negotiations on Ukraine or European security can take place without the presence of Ukraine and the EU; stresses that any peace agreement must uphold Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and prevent Russia from rearming for future aggression; believes that the EU must contribute to robust security guarantees for Ukraine to deter further Russian hostilities; continues to recognise President Zelenskyy as the legitimate leader of Ukraine until democratic elections can be held;

7. Welcomes the conclusions of the European Council of 6 March 2025, which are consistent with the ‘peace through strength’ approach;

6. Highlights the decisive role of the EU in defining the contours of Europe’s future security architecture; calls on the EU and its Member States to assume responsibility for security of the continent, considering the changing geopolitical landscape and increased security threats; calls on all EU Member States to significantly increase defence spending beyond the 2 % NATO target; highlights the urgent need to strengthen the European defence industry, as well as that of Ukraine, and increase military aid to Ukraine, while enhancing the EU’s own defence readiness and sovereignty; calls for expanded EU military support to Ukraine, including aircraft, long-range missiles, modern air-defence systems and ammunition and training, as well as accelerated deliveries of equipment; reiterates its position that all EU Member States commit at least 0.25 % of their GDP annually to providing military support to Ukraine;

8. Strongly condemns Russia’s use of sexual violence, mass deportations, forced disappearances, torture and summary executions as weapons of terror, including the illegal deportation and imprisonment of Ukrainian children, and calls for those responsible to be held accountable through international mechanisms;

7. Calls for the EU to continue strengthening its strategic cooperation and coordination with like-minded partners worldwide, such as the G7, the United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, as well as its constructive engagement with partners in the Global South in order to uphold the multilateral system based on the UN Charter;

9. Reiterates the EU’s commitment to Ukraine’s European integration, emphasising that Ukraine’s resilience in defending its sovereignty and values aligns with the principles of democracy, the rule of law and human rights, which are central to the EU;

8. Welcomes the recent adoption of the 16th EU sanctions package against Russia; calls for further sanctions on key Russian industrial sectors (metallurgical, nuclear, chemical, agricultural and banking) and raw materials (steel, uranium, titanium and nickel); calls for a full embargo on Russian fossil fuels, including liquefied natural gas (LNG), and further reductions in the price cap on Russian petroleum products, in coordination with G7 partners; calls for further sanctions against Russia’s shadow fleet and an end to cooperation with Russia’s nuclear energy sector; urges the Member States to systematically tackle the issue of sanctions circumvention; calls for a clear pledge that the EU will uphold its sanctions against Russia as long as needed to secure a just victory for Ukraine; calls for the EU and its Member States to consider measures for the confiscation of frozen Russian assets;

10. Recalls that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is part of a broader set of objectives against the West, the rules-based international order and its democracy, security, interests and values, as openly declared by Putin in the weeks preceding the full-scale invasion; reiterates its belief that Ukraine is on an irreversible path to EU and NATO membership; underlines that a lack of more decisive and substantial military aid from the West will only encourage Russia to continue its aggression; notes that Russia’s aggression has clearly shown that NATO has the role of primary guarantor of European security; underlines that, following Sweden’s and Finland’s accession, only four EU Members are not NATO allies, namely Ireland, Cyprus, Malta and Austria;

9. Welcomes the EU’s Ukraine Facility, which has a budget of almost EUR 50 billion, and the EU’s Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism, which, in cooperation with the G7, offers loans to Ukraine of up to EUR 45 billion; nevertheless, urges the preparation for Ukraine’s reconstruction by dedicating and securing new resources; reiterates the need and the urgency for legal and financial mechanisms to confiscate, as soon as possible, frozen Russian state assets and use them to support Ukraine’s defence and reconstruction, to compensate victims of Russia’s aggression, and to contribute to the funding of the legitimate war reparations due from Russia to Ukraine;

11. Commends Member States such as Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Greece for their investments in defence, as well as their decisive actions – together with leaders from Czechia and Slovenia – during the very first weeks of the war, which were crucial for Ukraine’s survival and also helped to save the EU’s reputation, considering the stance of certain other Member States; underlines that all EU initiatives should fully complement and be compatible with the work of NATO;

10. Reaffirms that Ukraine’s future lies in the EU; welcomes progress on accession-related reforms despite wartime conditions; calls for the acceleration of accession talks, recognising Ukraine’s EU integration as a strategic priority; reaffirms the EU’s commitment to Ukraine’s future NATO membership, highlighting its importance for regional and global security; recalls NATO’s commitments to admitting Ukraine into the Alliance; notes in this regard NATO’s consistent open door policy, in accordance with which NATO remains open to all European democracies that share the values of the Alliance, and in accordance with which decisions on membership have to be taken only by NATO allies, with no third party having a say in this process;

12. Underlines that credible deterrence against future Russian aggression requires substantial investments in national defence capabilities, stronger European contributions to NATO and the development of a shared threat perception across the EU; stresses that regardless of any future ceasefire, there can be no return to business-as-usual with Moscow; stresses the importance of building the will among leaders and societies to bear the costs of defending international rules and values, which form the foundation of the EU;

11. Strongly condemns the execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war by Russian forces; calls for the EU, its Member States and international partners to increase pressure on Russia to comply with its international obligations, particularly the Geneva Convention, and allow international organisations access to prisoners;

13. Expresses its concern with the decision by the US administration to temporarily suspend military aid to, and intelligence sharing with, Ukraine; underlines that the intelligence data and air defence missiles were crucial in the defensive war effort and that withholding them will cause additional civilian casualties, who should not become hostages of the ongoing negotiations;

12. Condemns the devastating impact of Russia’s war on children; calls for increased EU support for children’s education, healthcare, mental health services, and for child protection, including trauma recovery and safe learning environments; urges the EU and Ukraine to prioritise children’s needs in aid and reconstruction efforts, in clearing landmines, and in integrating child welfare into the EU accession process;

14. Reiterates its firm conviction that Russia must provide financial compensation for the massive damage it has caused in Ukraine; welcomes, the Council’s decision to direct extraordinary revenues stemming from immobilised Russian assets to support the Ukrainian war effort; believes, however, that it is not enough; reiterates its call for the EU, together with like-minded partners, to establish a sound legal regime for the confiscation of Russian state-owned assets frozen by the EU and use them to support Ukraine; calls, likewise, for a mechanism to be established to compel Russia to pay long-term reparations to Ukraine;

13. Commends Ukrainian and international civil society organisations for supporting families of abducted Ukrainian children, prisoners of war and illegally detained civilians; calls for the EU, its Member States and the international community to assist their efforts and intensify pressure on Russia to return all abducted and detained Ukrainians;

15. Calls on the Council to maintain and extend its sanctions policy against Russia and Belarus, while monitoring, reviewing and enhancing its effectiveness and impact; calls on the Council to systematically tackle the issue of sanctions circumvention by EU-based companies, third parties and non-EU countries, and to adopt and strictly implement restrictive measures against all entities facilitating the circumvention of sanctions and providing the Russian military complex with military and dual-use technologies and equipment; underlines the need to prevent critical components produced in EU countries from reaching the Russian military industry; considers it essential to strengthen controls on the export and maintenance of high-tech equipment produced in the EU, as well as to increase law enforcement measures and cooperation to prevent sanctions circumvention; invites the Council and the Member States to address, in particular, the issue of western-designed components being used in Russian weapons; calls for further limitations on Russian citizens accessing the EU, especially through more stringent security screenings, including the submission of military service records during the Schengen visa application process;

14. Reiterates its condemnation of military support for Russia from non-EU countries, including North Korea, Iran and Belarus, and of the supply of dual-use goods and military items to Russia by China; reiterates its call on the Member States to further expand sanctions against North Korea, Belarus and Iran in light of these countries’ military support for Russia’s war of aggression, and to sanction the key Chinese entities and individuals directly supporting Russia’s war effort and defence sector and enabling Russia to evade sanctions, including entities based in Hong Kong;

16. Calls for further sanctions against sectors of special economic importance for Russia (the metallurgical, nuclear, chemical and agricultural sectors), including against Russian steel products and raw materials such as aluminium, uranium, titanium and nickel, as well as a full LNG embargo and sanctions against Gazprom and Russian oil companies; underlines the need to cease any cooperation with Russia in the nuclear energy sector; highlights that Russia is shifting from reliance on gas exports to gas-derived fertilisers, which provide a major source of revenue and foreign currency earnings for the Russian state, directly fuelling its war machine, while simultaneously compromising EU economies and threatening food security; calls for the EU to address this challenge properly and urgently, with strong, decisive actions;

15. Calls on the EU and its Member States to strengthen EU strategic communication, particularly to publicly set the record straight about the EU’s leading support to Ukraine, especially in light of claims that seek to diminish its contribution, to counter hybrid threats and grey zone activities, and to prevent Russian interference in political, electoral, and other democratic processes in Ukraine and Europe; urges proactive communication on EU enlargement benefits to enhance public understanding and support for Ukraine’s accession in both Ukraine and the Member States; underlines that Ukraine’s EU integration is an opportunity for the development of both bordering regions and the Member States;

17. Is concerned that Russia managed to exceed its recruitment quotas in 2024 and January 2025, mainly as a result of doubling the financial incentives for signing contracts with the Ministry of Defence; underlines that in January 2025 Russian income from fossil fuel exports averaged EUR 687 million a day, which includes shadow fleet activity, but also sales of LNG, including to Europe, where some EU countries increased their month-to-month imports by as much as 25 %;

16. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the relevant EU institutions, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Parliament of Ukraine, the United Nations and the Russian authorities.

18. Underlines that there can be no impunity for the crime of aggression and that the instigators and perpetrators of the war of aggression against Ukraine – the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, the President of Belarus, Aliaksandr Lukashenka, the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Sergey Lavrov, the former Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, Sergei Shoigu, and the current Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, Andrey Belousov – as well as all those involved in the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of the war against Ukraine, should be brought to international justice and are not entitled to personal immunity; calls for sanctions also to be applied to those countries that willingly fuel the Russian war machine, supply equipment and ammunition to the aggressor or facilitate the circumvention of sanctions;

19. Calls on the EU to strengthen its visa policies to prevent Russian war criminals from entering EU territory by introducing necessary amendments to the Schengen Visa Code, such as requiring the obligatory Russian military service booklet to be presented and putting in place mandatory checks on military service records, to ensure that individuals complicit in war crimes in Ukraine, Syria, and Africa are identified and barred from entering EU territory, both now and in the future;

20. Condemns the continuous military support provided to Russia by Iran, including transfers of ballistic missiles, and calls for strengthening restrictive measures against Iran and all those involved in the Iranian missile programme;

21. Strongly condemns the increasing military collaboration between North Korea and Russia, and considers the deployment of North Korean troops, along with millions of artillery shells, KN-23 ballistic missiles, and thousands of special forces troops from the 11th Corps of the Korean People’s Army to the Ukrainian front, to be a violation of several UN Security Council resolutions, all contributing to Russia’s aggression;

22. Highlights that the deepening of military-technical cooperation between Russia, North Korea and Iran poses grave security threats, not only for Ukraine and Europe, but also for the Korean Peninsula and the Middle East;

23. Calls for closer cooperation with allies and partners, particularly Japan, Australia, Taiwan and South Korea, and emphasises the need for greater dialogue with like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific;

24. Urges China to put pressure on North Korea to pull back its troops, given North Korea’s dependency on China;

25. Notes with concern that Russia is actively recruiting individuals from distant regions, including Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, using deception or coercion, in order to send them to its imperial and neocolonial war against the people of Ukraine; calls on the UN and the African Union, as well as countries whose populations are targeted by Moscow, to take active measures to counter this recruitment;

26. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the United Nations, the US Government and Congress, NATO, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the African Union and the Chinese authorities.