On continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia’s war of aggression

B100168/2025

European Parliament resolution on continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia’s war of aggression

(2025/2528(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and Russia since 1 March 2022,

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols thereto, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,

– having regard to the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe of 1975,

– having regard to the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of 19-21 November 1990,

– having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/792 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Ukraine Facility,

– having regard to the joint security commitments between the European Union and Ukraine of 27 June 2024,

– having regard to NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept,

– having regard to the conclusions of the special meeting of the European Council of 6 March 2025,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas 24 February 2025 marked three years of resilience and unwavering determination, courage and sacrifice by Ukrainian soldiers and citizens in defending their country against Russia’s war of aggression, despite Russia’s barbaric crimes causing immense civilian and military losses;

B. whereas Russia’s aggression against Ukraine began in 2014, yet it was met with insufficient and fragmented responses from many western European capitals, which failed to deter further escalation and encouraged Moscow to pursue a full-scale invasion in 2022; whereas, despite the illegal annexation of Crimea and occupation of Donbas, some Member States continued purchasing Russian fossil fuels, directly funding the Kremlin’s war machine;

C. whereas for three years Russia’s forces have systematically and indiscriminately attacked residential areas and civilian infrastructure, causing the deaths of thousands of Ukrainian civilians and the destruction of public and private property; whereas Russian forces are responsible for forced deportations, disappearances, including of children, illegal imprisonments, torture, executions of civilians, soldiers and prisoners of war, and acts of terror, including the use of sexual violence and mass rape as weapons of war, and they continue to alter the ethnic composition of the occupied territories of Ukraine, all of which constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity and meet the criteria for genocide;

D. whereas millions of Ukrainians remain displaced both inside and outside their country, having fled the violence and destruction caused by Russia’s aggression;

E. whereas Russia has increased the number of its military personnel deployed in Ukraine, with approximately 620 000 Russian soldiers directly involved in combat operations, indicating the Kremlin’s intent to wage a long war of attrition that aims to exhaust Ukraine and its partners;

E. whereas, since the full-scale invasion, Ukraine has been able to liberate approximately 63 % of the territories occupied by Russia; whereas in recent months, despite Russia’s continued offensive – bolstered by North Korean soldiers and military support from its backers – it has recorded only modest territorial gains and failed to evict Ukrainian forces from the Kursk region; whereas, from a strategic perspective, the Kremlin has failed in its attempt to achieve a quick victory and other objectives, as Putin has openly attempted to blackmail Ukraine and the West; whereas the war has devolved into a protracted conflict, with neither side making significant breakthroughs on the battlefield;

F. whereas since the election of Donald Trump as US President, Washington has entered into direct talks with the Russian regime with the aim of negotiating a ceasefire, to be followed by a peace treaty; whereas a bilateral deal between the United States and Ukraine on critical minerals and other valuable resources, agreement on which has been provisionally reached, so far has not been signed after a serious diplomatic disagreement between the Ukrainian and US Presidents;

G. whereas the United States has been the largest provider of aid to Ukraine since the beginning of the war; whereas its financial aid and intelligence sharing were recently suspended by the Trump administration; whereas, within the EU, the largest government allocations measured as the percentage of gross domestic product have come from Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Finland and Sweden, while large economies such as Germany and France are falling behind;

H. whereas President Trump has reiterated his long-standing call for the European countries to step up their investment in defence and military preparedness; whereas the Commission unveiled plans to increase defence spending which could potentially mobilise as much as EUR 800 billion; whereas NATO allies such as the UK also plan to increase their defence budgets;

I. whereas in May 2024, the EU Member States approved the use of financial proceeds generated by immobilised Russian sovereign assets held within the EU, estimated at around EUR 210 billion, to support Ukraine, with the aim of providing up to EUR 3 billion per year in support of Ukraine’s reconstruction and resilience efforts; whereas Russia is spending over 40 % of its total expenditure on its military; whereas Russia’s budget revenues are still primarily derived from oil, gas and other hydrocarbon-related products, as well as minerals and raw materials exports and from gas-derived fertilisers, an issue that has not been properly addressed by the EU or the G7;

J. whereas the Member States continue to purchase fossil fuels, including liquefied natural gas (LNG), imports of which are rising, and uranium from Russia, contributing to the Russian economy and bolstering its war chest; whereas sales of Russian fossil fuels to the EU since the outbreak of the full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine have exceeded EUR 200 billion, which is double that of the total funding provided to Ukraine over the same period; whereas the EU has granted an exemption for Russian crude oil imported through the Druzhba pipeline to Hungary, Slovakia and Czechia; whereas a shadow fleet of environmentally hazardous and uninsured Russian oil tankers is still operating, including in the Baltic Sea, circumventing the sanctions regime and posing serious environmental threats;

K. whereas Russia signed a strategic partnership treaty in June 2024 with North Korea, the most notorious totalitarian regime on the planet, which establishes a military alliance between the countries; whereas Pyongyang has entered the war on the Russian side, sending military personnel and officers;

L. whereas, since 2012, Russia has been implementing a ‘besieged fortress’ strategy, isolating itself from the outside world, curtailing democracy, inciting anti-Western sentiment, militarising society, and shifting from the relatively mild authoritarianism of ‘sovereign democracy’ to the Russian analogue of North Korean Juche ideology;

1. Reiterates its strongest condemnation of Russia’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine, and the involvement of Belarus and North Korea in this war, and demands that Russia immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and compensate Ukraine for the damage caused to its people, land, nature and infrastructure;

2. Expresses its undivided solidarity with the people of Ukraine, along with its full support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders, and underlines that this war of aggression constitutes a blatant and flagrant violation of the UN Charter and the fundamental principles of international law; reiterates its support for the commitments of the international community to provide humanitarian assistance, military support, economic and financial aid, and political support in every possible way to help Ukraine repel Russian aggression;

3. Underlines that the EU and its Member States must learn from the strategic failures of the Minsk agreements, which neither secured Ukraine’s sovereignty nor held Russia accountable; underlines that the EU and its Member States should reaffirm support for Ukraine’s sovereign decision to enter negotiations on a ceasefire and a possible future peace treaty with Russia and support Kyiv at every stage of the diplomatic process; calls on the international community to be ready to provide security guarantees to Ukraine if such a deal is reached or, if the Ukrainian leadership decide to continue defending against Russia, to respect this decision and provide all necessary support;

4. Urges the EU and its Member States to provide Ukraine with more long-range weapons, including Taurus systems promised by the new German leadership, advanced air defence systems, including Patriots and SAMP/T, ammunition, as well as MANPADS, artillery systems and shells, electronic warfare systems in sufficient volumes, engineering equipment, drones and anti-drone capabilities, to enable Ukraine to repel the ongoing aggression and deter Russia from any future acts of aggression;

5. Underlines the continued need for enhanced air defence cooperation, including the deployment of modern air defence systems to intercept Russian missiles and drones targeting Ukraine, ensuring protection from threats that extend into EU and NATO airspace and territory; welcomes the commitment by a consortium of European countries, including Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway, to supply F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine and to train Ukrainian pilots, which marks a significant shift in military support for Ukraine and offers the Ukrainian Air Force a robust platform capable of performing various roles, including air superiority, ground attack and reconnaissance;

6. Urges the Member States to immediately provide Ukraine with other advanced fourth-generation aircraft, or better, as well as missiles with long-range strike capabilities such as Taurus, including means for their maintenance, in sufficient volume and without restrictions, to bolster Ukraine’s defensive efforts, strategic and operational interests, and long-term deterrence capabilities against Russian aggression;

7. Welcomes the conclusions of the European Council of 6 March 2025, which are consistent with the ‘peace through strength’ approach;

8. Strongly condemns Russia’s use of sexual violence, mass deportations, forced disappearances, torture and summary executions as weapons of terror, including the illegal deportation and imprisonment of Ukrainian children, and calls for those responsible to be held accountable through international mechanisms;

9. Reiterates the EU’s commitment to Ukraine’s European integration, emphasising that Ukraine’s resilience in defending its sovereignty and values aligns with the principles of democracy, the rule of law and human rights, which are central to the EU;

10. Recalls that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is part of a broader set of objectives against the West, the rules-based international order and its democracy, security, interests and values, as openly declared by Putin in the weeks preceding the full-scale invasion; reiterates its belief that Ukraine is on an irreversible path to EU and NATO membership; underlines that a lack of more decisive and substantial military aid from the West will only encourage Russia to continue its aggression; notes that Russia’s aggression has clearly shown that NATO has the role of primary guarantor of European security; underlines that, following Sweden’s and Finland’s accession, only four EU Members are not NATO allies, namely Ireland, Cyprus, Malta and Austria;

11. Commends Member States such as Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Greece for their investments in defence, as well as their decisive actions – together with leaders from Czechia and Slovenia – during the very first weeks of the war, which were crucial for Ukraine’s survival and also helped to save the EU’s reputation, considering the stance of certain other Member States; underlines that all EU initiatives should fully complement and be compatible with the work of NATO;

12. Underlines that credible deterrence against future Russian aggression requires substantial investments in national defence capabilities, stronger European contributions to NATO and the development of a shared threat perception across the EU; stresses that regardless of any future ceasefire, there can be no return to business-as-usual with Moscow; stresses the importance of building the will among leaders and societies to bear the costs of defending international rules and values, which form the foundation of the EU;

13. Expresses its concern with the decision by the US administration to temporarily suspend military aid to, and intelligence sharing with, Ukraine; underlines that the intelligence data and air defence missiles were crucial in the defensive war effort and that withholding them will cause additional civilian casualties, who should not become hostages of the ongoing negotiations;

14. Reiterates its firm conviction that Russia must provide financial compensation for the massive damage it has caused in Ukraine; welcomes, the Council’s decision to direct extraordinary revenues stemming from immobilised Russian assets to support the Ukrainian war effort; believes, however, that it is not enough; reiterates its call for the EU, together with like-minded partners, to establish a sound legal regime for the confiscation of Russian state-owned assets frozen by the EU and use them to support Ukraine; calls, likewise, for a mechanism to be established to compel Russia to pay long-term reparations to Ukraine;

15. Calls on the Council to maintain and extend its sanctions policy against Russia and Belarus, while monitoring, reviewing and enhancing its effectiveness and impact; calls on the Council to systematically tackle the issue of sanctions circumvention by EU-based companies, third parties and non-EU countries, and to adopt and strictly implement restrictive measures against all entities facilitating the circumvention of sanctions and providing the Russian military complex with military and dual-use technologies and equipment; underlines the need to prevent critical components produced in EU countries from reaching the Russian military industry; considers it essential to strengthen controls on the export and maintenance of high-tech equipment produced in the EU, as well as to increase law enforcement measures and cooperation to prevent sanctions circumvention; invites the Council and the Member States to address, in particular, the issue of western-designed components being used in Russian weapons; calls for further limitations on Russian citizens accessing the EU, especially through more stringent security screenings, including the submission of military service records during the Schengen visa application process;

16. Calls for further sanctions against sectors of special economic importance for Russia (the metallurgical, nuclear, chemical and agricultural sectors), including against Russian steel products and raw materials such as aluminium, uranium, titanium and nickel, as well as a full LNG embargo and sanctions against Gazprom and Russian oil companies; underlines the need to cease any cooperation with Russia in the nuclear energy sector; highlights that Russia is shifting from reliance on gas exports to gas-derived fertilisers, which provide a major source of revenue and foreign currency earnings for the Russian state, directly fuelling its war machine, while simultaneously compromising EU economies and threatening food security; calls for the EU to address this challenge properly and urgently, with strong, decisive actions;

17. Is concerned that Russia managed to exceed its recruitment quotas in 2024 and January 2025, mainly as a result of doubling the financial incentives for signing contracts with the Ministry of Defence; underlines that in January 2025 Russian income from fossil fuel exports averaged EUR 687 million a day, which includes shadow fleet activity, but also sales of LNG, including to Europe, where some EU countries increased their month-to-month imports by as much as 25 %;

18. Underlines that there can be no impunity for the crime of aggression and that the instigators and perpetrators of the war of aggression against Ukraine – the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, the President of Belarus, Aliaksandr Lukashenka, the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Sergey Lavrov, the former Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, Sergei Shoigu, and the current Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, Andrey Belousov – as well as all those involved in the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of the war against Ukraine, should be brought to international justice and are not entitled to personal immunity; calls for sanctions also to be applied to those countries that willingly fuel the Russian war machine, supply equipment and ammunition to the aggressor or facilitate the circumvention of sanctions;

19. Calls on the EU to strengthen its visa policies to prevent Russian war criminals from entering EU territory by introducing necessary amendments to the Schengen Visa Code, such as requiring the obligatory Russian military service booklet to be presented and putting in place mandatory checks on military service records, to ensure that individuals complicit in war crimes in Ukraine, Syria, and Africa are identified and barred from entering EU territory, both now and in the future;

20. Condemns the continuous military support provided to Russia by Iran, including transfers of ballistic missiles, and calls for strengthening restrictive measures against Iran and all those involved in the Iranian missile programme;

21. Strongly condemns the increasing military collaboration between North Korea and Russia, and considers the deployment of North Korean troops, along with millions of artillery shells, KN-23 ballistic missiles, and thousands of special forces troops from the 11th Corps of the Korean People’s Army to the Ukrainian front, to be a violation of several UN Security Council resolutions, all contributing to Russia’s aggression;

22. Highlights that the deepening of military-technical cooperation between Russia, North Korea and Iran poses grave security threats, not only for Ukraine and Europe, but also for the Korean Peninsula and the Middle East;

23. Calls for closer cooperation with allies and partners, particularly Japan, Australia, Taiwan and South Korea, and emphasises the need for greater dialogue with like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific;

24. Urges China to put pressure on North Korea to pull back its troops, given North Korea’s dependency on China;

25. Notes with concern that Russia is actively recruiting individuals from distant regions, including Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, using deception or coercion, in order to send them to its imperial and neocolonial war against the people of Ukraine; calls on the UN and the African Union, as well as countries whose populations are targeted by Moscow, to take active measures to counter this recruitment;

26. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the United Nations, the US Government and Congress, NATO, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the African Union and the Chinese authorities.