On continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia’s war of aggression

B100163/2025

European Parliament resolution on continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia’s war of aggression

(2025/2528(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and Russia,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/792 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Ukraine Facility, and to other forms of EU support for Ukraine,

– having regard to the joint statement by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the President of the European Parliament of 24 February 2025 on the third anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,

– having regard to the UN Charter, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols thereto, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,

– having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/7 adopted on 24 February 2025 entitled ‘Advancing a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine’,

– having regard to the Helsinki Final Act of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) of 1 August 1975, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of the OSCE of 21 November 1990 and the UN Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 5 December 1994 (the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances),

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas Russia has been waging an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022, continuing its 2014 annexation of Crimea and occupation of parts of Donetsk and Luhansk; whereas more than 10 years on from the 2014 invasion, Russia continues to openly violate Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, causing severe humanitarian, economic and ecological consequences and regional instability;

B. whereas Russian forces have systematically targeted residential areas and civilian infrastructure, killing thousands of Ukrainian civilians, destroying public and private property and committing ecocide; whereas Russian forces are responsible for illegal detentions, torture, the execution of civilians and prisoners of war, forced disappearances and deportations, including the deportation of children and their forced adoption by Russians, and other acts of terror, including sexual violence; whereas Russia continues to alter the ethnic composition of occupied Ukrainian territories;

C. whereas on 2 March 2022, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) opened an investigation into the situation in Ukraine, focusing on war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide committed on Ukrainian territory from 21 November 2013 onwards;

D. whereas Russia’s war has devastated Ukrainian children’s lives, with over 1 800 killed or injured and millions displaced; whereas over 65 % of Ukrainian children are living in poverty, and up to 100 000 remain in institutional care; whereas the education of children has been severely disrupted, with many reliant on remote learning amid power and internet shortages; whereas over 1.5 million Ukrainian children are at risk of post-traumatic stress disorder, and nearly half experience distress and isolation;

E. whereas Ukraine and international bodies have documented hundreds of executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war by Russian forces since February 2022; whereas such executions constitute serious violations of international law and human rights and are explicitly recognised as war crimes under the Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute of the ICC;

F. whereas the UN General Assembly, in its resolution adopted on 2 March 2022, deplored in the strongest terms Russia’s war against Ukraine as an act of aggression in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and, in its resolution adopted on 14 November 2022, recognised the need to hold Russia accountable and liable for reparations for its internationally wrongful acts;

G. whereas a number of non-EU countries, notably Iran, North Korea, China and Belarus, have provided Russia with significant military support; whereas North Korea has been providing Russia with weapons and combat troops, and Belarus has allowed Russia to use its territory to attack Ukraine, which amount to acts of aggression under international law; whereas Russia and China signed a ‘no-limits partnership’ on 4 February 2022, and subsequently, China has become a key enabler of the Russian war effort through its massive support for Russia’s economy, its defence industrial base and its supply of dual-use equipment;

H. whereas the EU and its Member States stand in solidarity with Ukraine, providing significant humanitarian, financial, political and military support; whereas the EU is the largest donor to Ukraine, with assistance amounting to EUR 135 billion;

I. whereas the EU has recently adopted its 16th sanctions package against Russia to weaken its economic base, deprive it of critical technologies and limit its ability to wage war; whereas the new sanctions target additional individuals and entities, including military firms, sanctions evaders, non-EU country supporters, Kremlin propagandists, shadow fleet networks, and individuals involved in the deportation of Ukrainian children; whereas the EU sanctions now apply to over 2 400 individuals and entities, subjecting them to asset freezes, funding bans and travel restrictions;

J. whereas, under the administration of US President Donald Trump, the United States has significantly changed its stance on Russia’s war against Ukraine; whereas the US Secretary of Defense marked this shift by declaring NATO membership for Ukraine and the return to pre-2014 borders as unrealistic, before negotiations with Russia even began; whereas recent events and statements by the Trump administration in Washington, D.C., during the 28 February 2025 visit of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, are inappropriate and blatantly false, not conducive to stability in bilateral relations or to providing the much-needed support for Ukraine; whereas, according to widely recognised democratic principles, elections cannot be conducted during wartime and under martial law, especially when millions of Ukrainians have been displaced;

K. whereas recent US-Russia talks in Riyadh excluded Ukraine and the EU, and the United States did not consult its European allies before ending its part in the effort to isolate Russia; whereas the new US administration has downplayed Russia’s responsibility for starting the war and, alongside Russia and its allies, voted against the UN General Assembly Resolution (ES-11/7) adopted on 24 February 2025 deploring Russia’s aggression; whereas on 3 March 2025, President Trump temporarily suspended the delivery of all US military aid to Ukraine, including the aid that had been approved by the previous US administration; whereas this unprecedented position threatens Ukraine’s capacity to withstand Russia’s war of aggression, and makes clear that Washington’s commitment to holding Russia accountable is no longer dependable and undermines international efforts to address the crisis;

L. whereas President Trump has ordered a sweeping freeze on the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), halting hundreds of critical projects in Ukraine, including demining activities, military veteran rehabilitation, independent media and anti-corruption initiatives;

M. whereas Ukraine’s defeat would be widely viewed as a strategic defeat for Europe, the United States and the entire NATO alliance and as a reward for the aggressor, the Russian Federation led by Vladimir Putin, with far-reaching security consequences, the extent of which cannot be overstated; whereas depending on the outcome of the war in Ukraine, it will likely have rippling effects in other parts of the world, notably the Indo-Pacific, and could encourage other revisionist powers to pursue their own hegemonic ambitions;

N. whereas since the outbreak of the war, undersea cables in the Baltic Sea and key infrastructure have been targeted, presumably by Russia- and China-linked actors;

1. Reiterates its strongest possible condemnation of Russia’s unprovoked, illegal and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine; demands that Russia immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine, fully withdraw from Ukraine’s internationally recognised territory, end forced deportations, release all detained and deported Ukrainians, especially children and including those forcibly adopted by Russians, and compensate Ukraine for the damage caused; underlines that Russia, its leadership and its allies bear full responsibility for the war and the atrocities committed against Ukrainians, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, ecocide, and possibly genocide, and calls for full accountability in this regard; welcomes progress towards establishing a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine and underlines the necessity that the jurisdiction of this tribunal would cover the entire leadership of Russia and Belarus responsible for the aggression against Ukraine; honours the bravery and resilience of the Ukrainian people in defending their country, democracy and international law; pays tribute to all those who have sacrificed their lives for freedom and reaffirms its commitment to Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity;

2. Emphasises that a sustainable and just peace can be achieved only on the basis of international law, which requires the full restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, full reparation to Ukraine for the aggression, and full accountability of those responsible; underlines that effective and enduring security guarantees for Ukraine must include collective defence obligations, such as those under the North Atlantic Treaty; notes that any other security guarantees, including the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, have proved meaningless;

3. Expresses deep concern over the apparent shift in the United States’ stance on Russia’s war of aggression, which has included openly blaming Ukraine for the ongoing war, suspending US military aid, and attempting to coerce Ukraine into relinquishing its legitimate right to self-defence and to making territorial concessions; stresses that, in light of this change, the EU with its Member States is now Ukraine’s primary strategic ally and must first and foremost maintain its role as the largest donor to Ukraine, and significantly increase its assistance and support, particularly regarding the defence equipment, training and strategic assistance necessary to uphold Ukraine’s right to self-defence and contribute, insofar as is possible, to replacing the suspended USAID funding for critical programmes and projects, while ensuring long-term aid for reconstruction and recovery;

4. Calls for the EU and its Member States to take the latest developments in US-Ukraine relations as the final wake-up call for stepping in as Ukraine’s leading partner, and actively work towards maintaining the broadest possible international support for Ukraine, including through building a ‘coalition of the able and willing’ with like-minded non-EU partners;

5. Reaffirms the EU’s commitment to a just and lasting peace in Ukraine, based on its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and supports Ukraine’s Peace Formula as a framework for international engagement; insists that no negotiations on Ukraine or European security can take place without the presence of Ukraine and the EU; stresses that any peace agreement must uphold Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and prevent Russia from rearming for future aggression; believes that the EU must contribute to robust security guarantees for Ukraine to deter further Russian hostilities; continues to recognise President Zelenskyy as the legitimate leader of Ukraine until democratic elections can be held;

6. Highlights the decisive role of the EU in defining the contours of Europe’s future security architecture; calls on the EU and its Member States to assume responsibility for security of the continent, considering the changing geopolitical landscape and increased security threats; calls on all EU Member States to significantly increase defence spending beyond the 2 % NATO target; highlights the urgent need to strengthen the European defence industry, as well as that of Ukraine, and increase military aid to Ukraine, while enhancing the EU’s own defence readiness and sovereignty; calls for expanded EU military support to Ukraine, including aircraft, long-range missiles, modern air-defence systems and ammunition and training, as well as accelerated deliveries of equipment; reiterates its position that all EU Member States commit at least 0.25 % of their GDP annually to providing military support to Ukraine;

7. Calls for the EU to continue strengthening its strategic cooperation and coordination with like-minded partners worldwide, such as the G7, the United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, as well as its constructive engagement with partners in the Global South in order to uphold the multilateral system based on the UN Charter;

8. Welcomes the recent adoption of the 16th EU sanctions package against Russia; calls for further sanctions on key Russian industrial sectors (metallurgical, nuclear, chemical, agricultural and banking) and raw materials (steel, uranium, titanium and nickel); calls for a full embargo on Russian fossil fuels, including liquefied natural gas (LNG), and further reductions in the price cap on Russian petroleum products, in coordination with G7 partners; calls for further sanctions against Russia’s shadow fleet and an end to cooperation with Russia’s nuclear energy sector; urges the Member States to systematically tackle the issue of sanctions circumvention; calls for a clear pledge that the EU will uphold its sanctions against Russia as long as needed to secure a just victory for Ukraine; calls for the EU and its Member States to consider measures for the confiscation of frozen Russian assets;

9. Welcomes the EU’s Ukraine Facility, which has a budget of almost EUR 50 billion, and the EU’s Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism, which, in cooperation with the G7, offers loans to Ukraine of up to EUR 45 billion; nevertheless, urges the preparation for Ukraine’s reconstruction by dedicating and securing new resources; reiterates the need and the urgency for legal and financial mechanisms to confiscate, as soon as possible, frozen Russian state assets and use them to support Ukraine’s defence and reconstruction, to compensate victims of Russia’s aggression, and to contribute to the funding of the legitimate war reparations due from Russia to Ukraine;

10. Reaffirms that Ukraine’s future lies in the EU; welcomes progress on accession-related reforms despite wartime conditions; calls for the acceleration of accession talks, recognising Ukraine’s EU integration as a strategic priority; reaffirms the EU’s commitment to Ukraine’s future NATO membership, highlighting its importance for regional and global security; recalls NATO’s commitments to admitting Ukraine into the Alliance; notes in this regard NATO’s consistent open door policy, in accordance with which NATO remains open to all European democracies that share the values of the Alliance, and in accordance with which decisions on membership have to be taken only by NATO allies, with no third party having a say in this process;

11. Strongly condemns the execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war by Russian forces; calls for the EU, its Member States and international partners to increase pressure on Russia to comply with its international obligations, particularly the Geneva Convention, and allow international organisations access to prisoners;

12. Condemns the devastating impact of Russia’s war on children; calls for increased EU support for children’s education, healthcare, mental health services, and for child protection, including trauma recovery and safe learning environments; urges the EU and Ukraine to prioritise children’s needs in aid and reconstruction efforts, in clearing landmines, and in integrating child welfare into the EU accession process;

13. Commends Ukrainian and international civil society organisations for supporting families of abducted Ukrainian children, prisoners of war and illegally detained civilians; calls for the EU, its Member States and the international community to assist their efforts and intensify pressure on Russia to return all abducted and detained Ukrainians;

14. Reiterates its condemnation of military support for Russia from non-EU countries, including North Korea, Iran and Belarus, and of the supply of dual-use goods and military items to Russia by China; reiterates its call on the Member States to further expand sanctions against North Korea, Belarus and Iran in light of these countries’ military support for Russia’s war of aggression, and to sanction the key Chinese entities and individuals directly supporting Russia’s war effort and defence sector and enabling Russia to evade sanctions, including entities based in Hong Kong;

15. Calls on the EU and its Member States to strengthen EU strategic communication, particularly to publicly set the record straight about the EU’s leading support to Ukraine, especially in light of claims that seek to diminish its contribution, to counter hybrid threats and grey zone activities, and to prevent Russian interference in political, electoral, and other democratic processes in Ukraine and Europe; urges proactive communication on EU enlargement benefits to enhance public understanding and support for Ukraine’s accession in both Ukraine and the Member States; underlines that Ukraine’s EU integration is an opportunity for the development of both bordering regions and the Member States;

16. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the relevant EU institutions, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Parliament of Ukraine, the United Nations and the Russian authorities.