What changed

B100165/2025

B100168/2025

European Parliament resolution on continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia’s war of aggression

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and Russia since 1 March 2022,

– having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty,

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols thereto, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,

– having regard to the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe of 1975,

– having regard to the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, CooperationCharter andof SecurityParis betweenfor NATOa andNew theEurope Russianof Federation19-21 ofNovember 1997,1990,

– having regard to the CodeAssociation ofAgreement Conductbetween onthe Politico-MilitaryEuropean AspectsUnion and its Member States, of Securitythe one part, and Ukraine, of 1994,the other part,

– having regard to theRegulation Charter(EU) for2024/792 of the European SecurityParliament and of 1999,the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Ukraine Facility,

– having regard to the draft proposal for an agreement on measures to ensure the security of the Russian Federation and the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of 17 December 2021,

– having regard to the joint security commitments between the European Union and Ukraine of 27 June 2024,

– having regard to the response of NATO and the United States to the draft proposal for an agreement on measures to ensure the security of the Russian Federation and the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of 17 December 2021,

– having regard to NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept,

– having regard to Ukrainianthe Presidentconclusions Volodymyrof Zelenskyy’sthe fullspecial speechmeeting atof the Munich SecurityEuropean ConferenceCouncil of 196 FebruaryMarch 2022,2025,

– having regard to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s address to the nation on the start of the intervention in Ukraine on 24 February 2022,

– having regard to the draft treaty on permanent neutrality and security guarantees for Ukraine, as presented to the President of the Russian Federation on 15 April 2022,

– having regard to US Vice-President JD Vance’s full speech at the Munich Security Conference of 14 February 2025,

– having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2774 (2025) of 24 February 2025,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the global geopolitical landscape has fundamentally shifted towards a multipolar world order, with even the United States, as the leading Western power, acknowledging these new realities and adapting to them;

A. whereas 24 February 2025 marked three years of resilience and unwavering determination, courage and sacrifice by Ukrainian soldiers and citizens in defending their country against Russia’s war of aggression, despite Russia’s barbaric crimes causing immense civilian and military losses;

B. whereas for decades, the EU has followed a foreign and security policy largely aligned with the United States, yet this approach is now proving increasingly outdated and ineffective in the evolving global order;

B. whereas Russia’s aggression against Ukraine began in 2014, yet it was met with insufficient and fragmented responses from many western European capitals, which failed to deter further escalation and encouraged Moscow to pursue a full-scale invasion in 2022; whereas, despite the illegal annexation of Crimea and occupation of Donbas, some Member States continued purchasing Russian fossil fuels, directly funding the Kremlin’s war machine;

C. whereas major powers, including the United States and Russia, have consistently sidelined the EU in key geopolitical negotiations, including those directly affecting European security;

C. whereas for three years Russia’s forces have systematically and indiscriminately attacked residential areas and civilian infrastructure, causing the deaths of thousands of Ukrainian civilians and the destruction of public and private property; whereas Russian forces are responsible for forced deportations, disappearances, including of children, illegal imprisonments, torture, executions of civilians, soldiers and prisoners of war, and acts of terror, including the use of sexual violence and mass rape as weapons of war, and they continue to alter the ethnic composition of the occupied territories of Ukraine, all of which constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity and meet the criteria for genocide;

D. whereas three years of full-scale war in Ukraine have demonstrated that the strategy of the EU and the United States under the Biden administration has failed to achieve its stated objectives to defeat Russia militarily, to cripple it economically and to isolate it politically;

D. whereas millions of Ukrainians remain displaced both inside and outside their country, having fled the violence and destruction caused by Russia’s aggression;

E. whereas, on the contrary, this strategy has caused political divisions among the Western allies and undermined their economic stability, making a continuation of the current approach untenable;

E. whereas Russia has increased the number of its military personnel deployed in Ukraine, with approximately 620 000 Russian soldiers directly involved in combat operations, indicating the Kremlin’s intent to wage a long war of attrition that aims to exhaust Ukraine and its partners;

F. whereas the conflict has inflicted catastrophic demographic, economic and infrastructural damage on Ukraine, with each passing day worsening the country’s long-term viability as an independent state;

E. whereas, since the full-scale invasion, Ukraine has been able to liberate approximately 63 % of the territories occupied by Russia; whereas in recent months, despite Russia’s continued offensive – bolstered by North Korean soldiers and military support from its backers – it has recorded only modest territorial gains and failed to evict Ukrainian forces from the Kursk region; whereas, from a strategic perspective, the Kremlin has failed in its attempt to achieve a quick victory and other objectives, as Putin has openly attempted to blackmail Ukraine and the West; whereas the war has devolved into a protracted conflict, with neither side making significant breakthroughs on the battlefield;

G. whereas Ukraine and Russia held negotiations on a treaty on permanent neutrality and security guarantees for Ukraine just one month after the war began, which could have ensured Ukraine’s security in exchange for its neutrality and immediately ended hostilities;

F. whereas since the election of Donald Trump as US President, Washington has entered into direct talks with the Russian regime with the aim of negotiating a ceasefire, to be followed by a peace treaty; whereas a bilateral deal between the United States and Ukraine on critical minerals and other valuable resources, agreement on which has been provisionally reached, so far has not been signed after a serious diplomatic disagreement between the Ukrainian and US Presidents;

H. whereas the signing of this agreement was stalled due to the intervention of foreign powers, particularly the United Kingdom, which encouraged Ukraine to continue the war instead;

G. whereas the United States has been the largest provider of aid to Ukraine since the beginning of the war; whereas its financial aid and intelligence sharing were recently suspended by the Trump administration; whereas, within the EU, the largest government allocations measured as the percentage of gross domestic product have come from Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Finland and Sweden, while large economies such as Germany and France are falling behind;

I. whereas US and EU military, economic and political support has failed to secure a decisive breakthrough for Ukraine, and, given the policy shift of the United States under its new administration, the EU alone cannot change the course of the war;

H. whereas President Trump has reiterated his long-standing call for the European countries to step up their investment in defence and military preparedness; whereas the Commission unveiled plans to increase defence spending which could potentially mobilise as much as EUR 800 billion; whereas NATO allies such as the UK also plan to increase their defence budgets;

J. whereas each additional day of conflict results in further loss of Ukrainian lives and of territorial control and in the further destruction of infrastructure, and continuing to pursue unrealistic objectives will only deepen the crisis;

I. whereas in May 2024, the EU Member States approved the use of financial proceeds generated by immobilised Russian sovereign assets held within the EU, estimated at around EUR 210 billion, to support Ukraine, with the aim of providing up to EUR 3 billion per year in support of Ukraine’s reconstruction and resilience efforts; whereas Russia is spending over 40 % of its total expenditure on its military; whereas Russia’s budget revenues are still primarily derived from oil, gas and other hydrocarbon-related products, as well as minerals and raw materials exports and from gas-derived fertilisers, an issue that has not been properly addressed by the EU or the G7;

1. Recognises the need to adapt to the new geopolitical reality and warns that continuing outdated policies will lead the EU into a strategic deadlock and global irrelevance;

J. whereas the Member States continue to purchase fossil fuels, including liquefied natural gas (LNG), imports of which are rising, and uranium from Russia, contributing to the Russian economy and bolstering its war chest; whereas sales of Russian fossil fuels to the EU since the outbreak of the full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine have exceeded EUR 200 billion, which is double that of the total funding provided to Ukraine over the same period; whereas the EU has granted an exemption for Russian crude oil imported through the Druzhba pipeline to Hungary, Slovakia and Czechia; whereas a shadow fleet of environmentally hazardous and uninsured Russian oil tankers is still operating, including in the Baltic Sea, circumventing the sanctions regime and posing serious environmental threats;

2. Calls for the EU to develop an independent foreign policy strategy that clearly defines its own interests and objectives, in line with its long-term goal of being recognised as a serious geopolitical actor in a multipolar world;

K. whereas Russia signed a strategic partnership treaty in June 2024 with North Korea, the most notorious totalitarian regime on the planet, which establishes a military alliance between the countries; whereas Pyongyang has entered the war on the Russian side, sending military personnel and officers;

3. Rejects the outdated notion of indefinite military support for Ukraine under the ‘as long as it takes’ framework, highlighting that such an approach is neither sustainable nor beneficial to the EU or Ukraine;

L. whereas, since 2012, Russia has been implementing a ‘besieged fortress’ strategy, isolating itself from the outside world, curtailing democracy, inciting anti-Western sentiment, militarising society, and shifting from the relatively mild authoritarianism of ‘sovereign democracy’ to the Russian analogue of North Korean Juche ideology;

4. Calls for the EU and its institutions to align with ongoing diplomatic efforts between the United States and Russia and actively contribute to the upcoming negotiations;

1. Reiterates its strongest condemnation of Russia’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine, and the involvement of Belarus and North Korea in this war, and demands that Russia immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and compensate Ukraine for the damage caused to its people, land, nature and infrastructure;

5. Urges the EU to develop and propose its own diplomatic solutions for resolving the conflict, ensuring that a future settlement takes into account the legitimate security interests of all stakeholders in Europe;

2. Expresses its undivided solidarity with the people of Ukraine, along with its full support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders, and underlines that this war of aggression constitutes a blatant and flagrant violation of the UN Charter and the fundamental principles of international law; reiterates its support for the commitments of the international community to provide humanitarian assistance, military support, economic and financial aid, and political support in every possible way to help Ukraine repel Russian aggression;

6. Calls strongly for the EU and its Member States devise a post-conflict reconstruction strategy where any EU commitment must be framed within mutually beneficial commercial agreements, ensuring that EU taxpayers’ contributions are balanced by economic opportunities for European businesses, industries and strategic sectors, in line with the pragmatic approach pursued by the new US administration;

3. Underlines that the EU and its Member States must learn from the strategic failures of the Minsk agreements, which neither secured Ukraine’s sovereignty nor held Russia accountable; underlines that the EU and its Member States should reaffirm support for Ukraine’s sovereign decision to enter negotiations on a ceasefire and a possible future peace treaty with Russia and support Kyiv at every stage of the diplomatic process; calls on the international community to be ready to provide security guarantees to Ukraine if such a deal is reached or, if the Ukrainian leadership decide to continue defending against Russia, to respect this decision and provide all necessary support;

7. Calls for direct diplomatic engagement between the EU and Russia, as any lasting peace and security framework in Europe must be negotiated with all relevant actors;

4. Urges the EU and its Member States to provide Ukraine with more long-range weapons, including Taurus systems promised by the new German leadership, advanced air defence systems, including Patriots and SAMP/T, ammunition, as well as MANPADS, artillery systems and shells, electronic warfare systems in sufficient volumes, engineering equipment, drones and anti-drone capabilities, to enable Ukraine to repel the ongoing aggression and deter Russia from any future acts of aggression;

8. Acknowledges that every sovereign state has legitimate national security interests that must be respected under international law; emphasises that no country can enhance its security at the direct expense of another;

5. Underlines the continued need for enhanced air defence cooperation, including the deployment of modern air defence systems to intercept Russian missiles and drones targeting Ukraine, ensuring protection from threats that extend into EU and NATO airspace and territory; welcomes the commitment by a consortium of European countries, including Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway, to supply F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine and to train Ukrainian pilots, which marks a significant shift in military support for Ukraine and offers the Ukrainian Air Force a robust platform capable of performing various roles, including air superiority, ground attack and reconnaissance;

9. Calls for a shift away from aggressive rhetoric towards constructive proposals, urging EU institutions to prioritise diplomacy over escalation;

6. Urges the Member States to immediately provide Ukraine with other advanced fourth-generation aircraft, or better, as well as missiles with long-range strike capabilities such as Taurus, including means for their maintenance, in sufficient volume and without restrictions, to bolster Ukraine’s defensive efforts, strategic and operational interests, and long-term deterrence capabilities against Russian aggression;

10. Calls on European leaders to take into account the position of, and the decisions taken by, the new US administration, notably the suspension of military aid and intelligence services to Ukraine, which have underscored the necessity of achieving peace in Ukraine as swiftly as possible;

7. Welcomes the conclusions of the European Council of 6 March 2025, which are consistent with the ‘peace through strength’ approach;

11. Draws attention to the fact that meetings of European heads of state, such as the one held in London on 2 March 2025, where renewed calls for additional military support to Ukraine were made, do not contribute to ending hostilities but, on the contrary, escalate the risk of the Ukraine conflict transforming into a global war;

8. Strongly condemns Russia’s use of sexual violence, mass deportations, forced disappearances, torture and summary executions as weapons of terror, including the illegal deportation and imprisonment of Ukrainian children, and calls for those responsible to be held accountable through international mechanisms;

12. Calls on the Ukrainian authorities to outlaw the non-governmental organisation ‘Myrotvorets’, which cooperates with Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) and Ministry of Internal Affairs, inciting tensions in society and misusing the personal data of hundreds of people, including journalists, politicians and members of minority groups;

9. Reiterates the EU’s commitment to Ukraine’s European integration, emphasising that Ukraine’s resilience in defending its sovereignty and values aligns with the principles of democracy, the rule of law and human rights, which are central to the EU;

13. Calls on the Ukrainian authorities to unequivocally condemn and take action towards prohibiting Banderist symbols and the promotion of the ideology of the Bandera faction (OUN-B) of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which were responsible for the genocide in Volhynia and neighbouring regions between 1943 and 1945; calls on the Member States to introduce a ban on the use of Banderist symbols and the dissemination of this ideology within their territories;

10. Recalls that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is part of a broader set of objectives against the West, the rules-based international order and its democracy, security, interests and values, as openly declared by Putin in the weeks preceding the full-scale invasion; reiterates its belief that Ukraine is on an irreversible path to EU and NATO membership; underlines that a lack of more decisive and substantial military aid from the West will only encourage Russia to continue its aggression; notes that Russia’s aggression has clearly shown that NATO has the role of primary guarantor of European security; underlines that, following Sweden’s and Finland’s accession, only four EU Members are not NATO allies, namely Ireland, Cyprus, Malta and Austria;

14. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President and Government of Ukraine, the President and Government of the Russian Federation, NATO and the United Nations.

11. Commends Member States such as Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Greece for their investments in defence, as well as their decisive actions – together with leaders from Czechia and Slovenia – during the very first weeks of the war, which were crucial for Ukraine’s survival and also helped to save the EU’s reputation, considering the stance of certain other Member States; underlines that all EU initiatives should fully complement and be compatible with the work of NATO;

12. Underlines that credible deterrence against future Russian aggression requires substantial investments in national defence capabilities, stronger European contributions to NATO and the development of a shared threat perception across the EU; stresses that regardless of any future ceasefire, there can be no return to business-as-usual with Moscow; stresses the importance of building the will among leaders and societies to bear the costs of defending international rules and values, which form the foundation of the EU;

13. Expresses its concern with the decision by the US administration to temporarily suspend military aid to, and intelligence sharing with, Ukraine; underlines that the intelligence data and air defence missiles were crucial in the defensive war effort and that withholding them will cause additional civilian casualties, who should not become hostages of the ongoing negotiations;

14. Reiterates its firm conviction that Russia must provide financial compensation for the massive damage it has caused in Ukraine; welcomes, the Council’s decision to direct extraordinary revenues stemming from immobilised Russian assets to support the Ukrainian war effort; believes, however, that it is not enough; reiterates its call for the EU, together with like-minded partners, to establish a sound legal regime for the confiscation of Russian state-owned assets frozen by the EU and use them to support Ukraine; calls, likewise, for a mechanism to be established to compel Russia to pay long-term reparations to Ukraine;

15. Calls on the Council to maintain and extend its sanctions policy against Russia and Belarus, while monitoring, reviewing and enhancing its effectiveness and impact; calls on the Council to systematically tackle the issue of sanctions circumvention by EU-based companies, third parties and non-EU countries, and to adopt and strictly implement restrictive measures against all entities facilitating the circumvention of sanctions and providing the Russian military complex with military and dual-use technologies and equipment; underlines the need to prevent critical components produced in EU countries from reaching the Russian military industry; considers it essential to strengthen controls on the export and maintenance of high-tech equipment produced in the EU, as well as to increase law enforcement measures and cooperation to prevent sanctions circumvention; invites the Council and the Member States to address, in particular, the issue of western-designed components being used in Russian weapons; calls for further limitations on Russian citizens accessing the EU, especially through more stringent security screenings, including the submission of military service records during the Schengen visa application process;

16. Calls for further sanctions against sectors of special economic importance for Russia (the metallurgical, nuclear, chemical and agricultural sectors), including against Russian steel products and raw materials such as aluminium, uranium, titanium and nickel, as well as a full LNG embargo and sanctions against Gazprom and Russian oil companies; underlines the need to cease any cooperation with Russia in the nuclear energy sector; highlights that Russia is shifting from reliance on gas exports to gas-derived fertilisers, which provide a major source of revenue and foreign currency earnings for the Russian state, directly fuelling its war machine, while simultaneously compromising EU economies and threatening food security; calls for the EU to address this challenge properly and urgently, with strong, decisive actions;

17. Is concerned that Russia managed to exceed its recruitment quotas in 2024 and January 2025, mainly as a result of doubling the financial incentives for signing contracts with the Ministry of Defence; underlines that in January 2025 Russian income from fossil fuel exports averaged EUR 687 million a day, which includes shadow fleet activity, but also sales of LNG, including to Europe, where some EU countries increased their month-to-month imports by as much as 25 %;

18. Underlines that there can be no impunity for the crime of aggression and that the instigators and perpetrators of the war of aggression against Ukraine – the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, the President of Belarus, Aliaksandr Lukashenka, the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Sergey Lavrov, the former Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, Sergei Shoigu, and the current Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, Andrey Belousov – as well as all those involved in the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of the war against Ukraine, should be brought to international justice and are not entitled to personal immunity; calls for sanctions also to be applied to those countries that willingly fuel the Russian war machine, supply equipment and ammunition to the aggressor or facilitate the circumvention of sanctions;

19. Calls on the EU to strengthen its visa policies to prevent Russian war criminals from entering EU territory by introducing necessary amendments to the Schengen Visa Code, such as requiring the obligatory Russian military service booklet to be presented and putting in place mandatory checks on military service records, to ensure that individuals complicit in war crimes in Ukraine, Syria, and Africa are identified and barred from entering EU territory, both now and in the future;

20. Condemns the continuous military support provided to Russia by Iran, including transfers of ballistic missiles, and calls for strengthening restrictive measures against Iran and all those involved in the Iranian missile programme;

21. Strongly condemns the increasing military collaboration between North Korea and Russia, and considers the deployment of North Korean troops, along with millions of artillery shells, KN-23 ballistic missiles, and thousands of special forces troops from the 11th Corps of the Korean People’s Army to the Ukrainian front, to be a violation of several UN Security Council resolutions, all contributing to Russia’s aggression;

22. Highlights that the deepening of military-technical cooperation between Russia, North Korea and Iran poses grave security threats, not only for Ukraine and Europe, but also for the Korean Peninsula and the Middle East;

23. Calls for closer cooperation with allies and partners, particularly Japan, Australia, Taiwan and South Korea, and emphasises the need for greater dialogue with like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific;

24. Urges China to put pressure on North Korea to pull back its troops, given North Korea’s dependency on China;

25. Notes with concern that Russia is actively recruiting individuals from distant regions, including Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, using deception or coercion, in order to send them to its imperial and neocolonial war against the people of Ukraine; calls on the UN and the African Union, as well as countries whose populations are targeted by Moscow, to take active measures to counter this recruitment;

26. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the United Nations, the US Government and Congress, NATO, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the African Union and the Chinese authorities.