Sittings · Document
On continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia’s war of aggression
on behalf of the ESN Group · Rapporteur: Hans Neuhoff, Petr Bystron
B100165/2025
European Parliament resolution on continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia’s war of aggression
(2025/2528(RSP))
The European Parliament,
– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations,
– having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty,
– having regard to the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe of 1975,
– having regard to the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation of 1997,
– having regard to the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security of 1994,
– having regard to the Charter for European Security of 1999,
– having regard to the draft proposal for an agreement on measures to ensure the security of the Russian Federation and the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of 17 December 2021,
– having regard to the response of NATO and the United States to the draft proposal for an agreement on measures to ensure the security of the Russian Federation and the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of 17 December 2021,
– having regard to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s full speech at the Munich Security Conference of 19 February 2022,
– having regard to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s address to the nation on the start of the intervention in Ukraine on 24 February 2022,
– having regard to the draft treaty on permanent neutrality and security guarantees for Ukraine, as presented to the President of the Russian Federation on 15 April 2022,
– having regard to US Vice-President JD Vance’s full speech at the Munich Security Conference of 14 February 2025,
– having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2774 (2025) of 24 February 2025,
– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas the global geopolitical landscape has fundamentally shifted towards a multipolar world order, with even the United States, as the leading Western power, acknowledging these new realities and adapting to them;
B. whereas for decades, the EU has followed a foreign and security policy largely aligned with the United States, yet this approach is now proving increasingly outdated and ineffective in the evolving global order;
C. whereas major powers, including the United States and Russia, have consistently sidelined the EU in key geopolitical negotiations, including those directly affecting European security;
D. whereas three years of full-scale war in Ukraine have demonstrated that the strategy of the EU and the United States under the Biden administration has failed to achieve its stated objectives to defeat Russia militarily, to cripple it economically and to isolate it politically;
E. whereas, on the contrary, this strategy has caused political divisions among the Western allies and undermined their economic stability, making a continuation of the current approach untenable;
F. whereas the conflict has inflicted catastrophic demographic, economic and infrastructural damage on Ukraine, with each passing day worsening the country’s long-term viability as an independent state;
G. whereas Ukraine and Russia held negotiations on a treaty on permanent neutrality and security guarantees for Ukraine just one month after the war began, which could have ensured Ukraine’s security in exchange for its neutrality and immediately ended hostilities;
H. whereas the signing of this agreement was stalled due to the intervention of foreign powers, particularly the United Kingdom, which encouraged Ukraine to continue the war instead;
I. whereas US and EU military, economic and political support has failed to secure a decisive breakthrough for Ukraine, and, given the policy shift of the United States under its new administration, the EU alone cannot change the course of the war;
J. whereas each additional day of conflict results in further loss of Ukrainian lives and of territorial control and in the further destruction of infrastructure, and continuing to pursue unrealistic objectives will only deepen the crisis;
1. Recognises the need to adapt to the new geopolitical reality and warns that continuing outdated policies will lead the EU into a strategic deadlock and global irrelevance;
2. Calls for the EU to develop an independent foreign policy strategy that clearly defines its own interests and objectives, in line with its long-term goal of being recognised as a serious geopolitical actor in a multipolar world;
3. Rejects the outdated notion of indefinite military support for Ukraine under the ‘as long as it takes’ framework, highlighting that such an approach is neither sustainable nor beneficial to the EU or Ukraine;
4. Calls for the EU and its institutions to align with ongoing diplomatic efforts between the United States and Russia and actively contribute to the upcoming negotiations;
5. Urges the EU to develop and propose its own diplomatic solutions for resolving the conflict, ensuring that a future settlement takes into account the legitimate security interests of all stakeholders in Europe;
6. Calls strongly for the EU and its Member States devise a post-conflict reconstruction strategy where any EU commitment must be framed within mutually beneficial commercial agreements, ensuring that EU taxpayers’ contributions are balanced by economic opportunities for European businesses, industries and strategic sectors, in line with the pragmatic approach pursued by the new US administration;
7. Calls for direct diplomatic engagement between the EU and Russia, as any lasting peace and security framework in Europe must be negotiated with all relevant actors;
8. Acknowledges that every sovereign state has legitimate national security interests that must be respected under international law; emphasises that no country can enhance its security at the direct expense of another;
9. Calls for a shift away from aggressive rhetoric towards constructive proposals, urging EU institutions to prioritise diplomacy over escalation;
10. Calls on European leaders to take into account the position of, and the decisions taken by, the new US administration, notably the suspension of military aid and intelligence services to Ukraine, which have underscored the necessity of achieving peace in Ukraine as swiftly as possible;
11. Draws attention to the fact that meetings of European heads of state, such as the one held in London on 2 March 2025, where renewed calls for additional military support to Ukraine were made, do not contribute to ending hostilities but, on the contrary, escalate the risk of the Ukraine conflict transforming into a global war;
12. Calls on the Ukrainian authorities to outlaw the non-governmental organisation ‘Myrotvorets’, which cooperates with Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) and Ministry of Internal Affairs, inciting tensions in society and misusing the personal data of hundreds of people, including journalists, politicians and members of minority groups;
13. Calls on the Ukrainian authorities to unequivocally condemn and take action towards prohibiting Banderist symbols and the promotion of the ideology of the Bandera faction (OUN-B) of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which were responsible for the genocide in Volhynia and neighbouring regions between 1943 and 1945; calls on the Member States to introduce a ban on the use of Banderist symbols and the dissemination of this ideology within their territories;
14. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President and Government of Ukraine, the President and Government of the Russian Federation, NATO and the United Nations.