What changed

B100164/2025

B100154/2025

European Parliament resolution on the need for EU support towards a just transition and reconstruction in Syria

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Syria,

– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to other UN human rights treaties and instruments,

– having regard to the decisions of previous UN Security Council sanctions committees,

– having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015) of 18 December 2015,

– having regard to the ordersUN ofCharter, the Paris Judicial Court of 14 NovemberHague 2023conventions and 21 January 2025 issuing international arrest warrantsthe forRome BasharStatute al-Assadof andthe membersInternational ofCriminal hisCourt regime,(ICC),

– having regard to the European Parliament recommendation of 28 February 2024 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the situation in Syria,

– having regard to the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 and the additional protocols thereto,

– having regard to the CouncilUN conclusionsConvention on the Elimination of 19All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 18 December 2024,1979,

– having regard to the joint statement by the Governments of France, Syria, Bahrain, Canada, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom, the European Union, the United Nations Special Envoy for Syria, the Secretary General of the League of Arab States and the Secretary General of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf of 13 February 2025,

– having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989,

– having regard to the Council declaration of 19 February 2025 on the Council Decision, Regulation and Implementing Regulation concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria,

– having regard to the statement issued following Syria’s National Dialogue conference, held in Damascus on 25 February 2025,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the historic collapse of Syria’s rule by the Assad family on 8 December 2024 marked the end of half a century of suffering for the Syrian people, with unprecedented tyranny and chaos unfolding after Assad brutally repressed the 2011 uprising and led the country into civil war; whereas war crimes and crimes against humanity such as mass detention and torture, as well as the actions of terrorist groups, have caused the deaths of half a million Syrians;

A. whereas on 8 December 2024 then Syrian President Bashar al-Assad fled his country following the fall of Damascus to the rebels of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS); whereas he was granted asylum by Russia;

B. whereas Russia and Iran were both enablers and active players in the war waged by the bloody Assad regime against its own people and used Syria as a playground for destabilising the region; whereas the power of Assad’s regime relied on Russia and Iran’s continued support and supply of manpower and weapons; whereas his sudden fall is a clear geostrategic defeat for both countries;

B. whereas although the HTS succeeded in toppling the Assad regime, it controls only a fraction of Syrian territory;

C. whereas after assuming a leading role in overthrowing the regime, designated interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa launched a political transition process; whereas a caretaker government was appointed and talks are under way regarding the establishment of a new government;

C. whereas bombings and strikes continue, in particular Israeli strikes in southern Syria and at the Lebanese-Syrian border;

D. whereas the caretaker government authorities control most but not all of Syria’s territory, with the north-eastern region administered militarily by the Syrian Democratic Forces; whereas since December 2024 Türkiye has intensified its attacks and incursions within Syrian territory; whereas some pro-Assad armed groups remain active and have recently been conducting attacks;

D. whereas HTS is an offshoot of the former branch of al-Qaeda in Syria, known as the Al-Nusrah Front, listed by the UN Security Council as engaged in terrorist activities; whereas HTS and its leader are subject to EU and international sanctions;

E. whereas Israel is repeatedly striking military targets in Syria, has substantially extended its occupation of Syrian territory and demands a far-reaching demilitarised zone;

E. whereas the UN Security Council sanctions committees have imposed sanctions on al-Qaeda, the Al-Nusrah Front and associates pursuant to UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) for having carried out terrorist operations;

F. whereas the humanitarian situation remains acutely dire, with 90 % of the population below the poverty line, widespread food insecurity and a lack of basic infrastructure and public services; whereas the number of people in need of life-saving humanitarian assistance in Syria has continued to rise since 2020, reaching 16.7 million people in 2024; whereas a colossal reconstruction effort must be undertaken while navigating the shift to an open market economy and accommodating large-scale population movements; whereas the EU launched a humanitarian air bridge in December 2024 to deliver emergency healthcare and other essential supplies;

F. whereas the leader of HTS, Ahmed al-Sharaa (also known as Abu Mohammed al-Joulani), tries to depict himself as a ‘moderate’ Islamist, capable of respecting minorities, including freedom of religious minorities to worship; whereas in Idlib and other Syrian territories controlled by HTS, he repeatedly carried out attacks against religious minorities and has stated that his intention is to establish an Islamic regime in Syria;

G. whereas the executive order issued by US President Donald Trump’s administration on 20 January 2025, enacting a 90-day suspension of all foreign assistance programmes, including those administered by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), has and will have an impact on the humanitarian programmes and NGOs that operate on the ground in Syria; whereas other countries such as the UK and several EU Member States have also announced significant cuts to their global aid budgets;

G. whereas the risk of the re-emergence of certain jihadist groups, in particular Daesh, and of increased regional instability remains;

H. whereas the EU rightly refused to normalise its ties with the Assad regime right through to its demise and played a significant role as a major humanitarian donor to Syrian civilians and as host to one million refugees fleeing the conflicts;

H. whereas as Syria’s interim president, al-Sharaa has pledged to guarantee that the state would have a ‘monopoly’ on arms;

1. Praises the bravery, dignity and resilience of the Syrian people, who finally succeeded in overthrowing the cruel Assad dictatorship; pays tribute to the countless victims of the regime;

I. whereas a number of foreign actors directly or indirectly involved in Syria endanger Syrian sovereignty and its prospects for peace, democracy and prosperity;

2. Welcomes the fresh start in EU-Syria relations, manifested by the appointment of an EU Chargé d’affaires in Damascus, a partial lifting of sanctions and the organisation of the Ninth Brussels Conference, entitled ‘Standing with Syria: Meeting the Needs for a Successful Transition’, set to take place on 17 March 2025;

J. whereas Syria and its people have faced a brutal operation of subversion, aggression and military occupation by foreign powers;

3. Calls for the EU to seize this historic opportunity to assist Syria in implementing its reconstruction and achieving a just, peaceful and inclusive political transition; underlines that a stable and peaceful Syria is in the interests of the Middle East, the EU’s southern neighbourhood and the EU itself; emphasises, moreover, that only on these grounds can conditions for the safe, voluntary and dignified return of refugees be met;

K. whereas around 2 000 US troops are still deployed in Syria;

4. Calls on the EU to continue to support Syrians via increased humanitarian and development aid; encourages the EU and its Member States to support reconstruction efforts in key sectors such as transport, electricity, healthcare and education;

L. whereas the Syrian Golan Heights, in south-western Syria, have been occupied by Israel since 1967 and were illegally annexed in 1981; whereas Israel, after illegally occupying the slopes of Mount Hermon, has now entered the UN buffer zone; whereas the Israeli army has not operated in this zone since 1974; whereas the UN Disengagement Observer Force, in charge of ensuring security in the region, confirmed on 9 December 2024 that Israeli armed forces had entered the area of separation, had moved into the area and remained present in at least three locations;

5. Encourages the EU and its Member States to cooperate with Syria’s interim authorities in a transparent, coordinated and responsible manner, and to convey readiness to provide state-building assistance if and as needed; welcomes dialogue held alongside regional partners in the Aqaba format – which follows the same format as the Aqaba Summit, held in Jordan in December 2024;

M. whereas the Israeli Government has illegally reaffirmed its sovereignty over the Syrian Golan Heights and is carrying out massive attacks on military installations in Syria; whereas on 9 December 2024, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu went so far as to claim that the annexed Golan Heights belonged to Israel ‘for eternity’;

6. Strongly believes that stability in Syria will come from a pluralistic political transition that includes credible representatives of all components of Syrian society, that is to say women, civil society and all religious and ethnic communities; underlines the importance of the future government reflecting this plurality and for a constitutional framework guaranteeing equal rights and access to opportunities for all Syrians, as well as clear and concrete evidence that these rights are respected in national and local decisions;

N. whereas on 15 December 2024 the Israeli Government approved a plan to double the Israeli population of the Syrian Golan Heights;

7. Notes with concern the violent past of factions that toppled the Assad regime and are now participating in government; encourages the interim authorities to organise paramilitary and civilian disarmament; takes good note of the interim President’s promising declarations of intent, and pledges to monitor the actions of national and local authorities when evaluating further engagement with them;

O. whereas the Kurds in north-eastern Syria are still caught between radical Islamist fundamentalist armed groups and Turkish extraterritorial ambitions;

8. Praises the invaluable contribution of civil society, in Syria and abroad, as the legitimate repository and defender of the aspirations of the Syrian people during years of brutal oppression by the Assad regime; pays particular tribute to the White Helmets, target of a regime-orchestrated and Russia-backed smear campaign; calls for the EU to increase support for Syria’s civil society organisations as they adapt to shifting operating conditions, with a focus on promoting civic dialogue, notably between ethnic and religious communities, to foster pluralism and trust within Syrian society;

P. whereas the new de facto Syrian authorities announced an agreement to disband all armed groups, with a plan to integrate them into the Syrian Ministry of Defence; whereas the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-led coalition headed by Commander Mazloum Abdi, did not immediately join the agreement, considering their concerns about preserving their autonomy and the political and cultural gains made in north-eastern Syria;

9. Is concerned by the exponential rise of disinformation originating both within Syria and from abroad; warns of the risk of instrumentalisation of communities by both domestic and foreign actors; stresses the need for a pluralistic media landscape to emerge and consolidate;

Q. whereas the HTS intends to draft a new Syrian constitution; whereas certain groups, including Kurdish factions, are so far excluded from this dialogue;

10. Notes that Syria’s Christian population has steeply declined since 2011 due to its targeting by both the Assad regime and Daesh; expresses cautious optimism regarding the behaviour of the caretaker authorities and encourages them to implement further confidence-building measures, in this regard;

R. whereas in places such as Homs, Alawite communities express concerns over potential reprisals in the post-Assad era;

11. Strongly believes that the success of the Syrian political transition hinges on transitional justice as a path to fighting impunity and building trust in state institutions; calls for judicial reform to be treated as an urgent political priority; firmly condemns reported spontaneous retaliatory targeting of the Alawite community based on perceived association with the Assad regime;

S. whereas Rojava, also known as the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, is an autonomous administration protected by Kurdish-led forces in north-eastern Syria and stands as a model of democratic self-governance, inclusivity and resilience in a region marked by conflict; whereas rooted in principles of ethnic and religious pluralism, gender equality and grassroots democracy, Rojava has fostered a governance system that empowers local communities and promotes stability;

12. Recognises the irreplaceable contribution of Fareed al-Madhhan (‘Caesar’) to documenting the crimes of the Assad regime, as well as the work of the Syrian Network of Human Rights in tracking disappearances; stresses the importance of these processes now being completed; calls on the interim authorities to fully cooperate with the competent international bodies, including UN mechanisms established specifically for investigating serious crimes in Syria such as the UN International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM), and facilitate their on-site operations; encourages Syria to ratify the Rome Statute;

T. whereas crucial to Rojava’s defence and security efforts are the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a coalition of Kurdish, Arab, Assyrian and other ethnic groups committed to protecting the region from extremist threats; whereas the SDF played a pivotal role in the fight against Daesh;

13. Commends the steps taken to fight impunity through the criminal prosecution in Germany and France of individuals linked to the Assad regime and to Daesh; expects newfound evidence and fruitful cooperation with Syrian authorities to lead to significant increases in investigations and convictions;

U. whereas beyond their military efforts, the SDF and the Rojava authorities have worked to rebuild communities, provide humanitarian aid and establish governance structures that prioritise justice and coexistence; whereas their emphasis on women’s leadership, particularly through the Women’s Protection Units, has set an example for gender equality in the region;

14. Stresses the need for Syria’s transitional authorities to urgently take all steps to secure and preserve physical evidence of serious international crimes across the country – including through cooperation and engagement with international experts and existing international mechanisms; encourages the EU to provide support for timely evidence collection on the ground, including the provision of forensic equipment and expertise to identify and analyse mass graves, as well as the collection of survivors’ testimonies;

V. whereas despite ongoing challenges, Rojava and the SDF continue to advocate for peace, dialogue and a democratic solution for Syria, demonstrating a commitment to human rights, freedom and stability;

15. Highlights that Syria is among the most heavily mine-contaminated countries in the world; is worried about the rising number of mine casualties being exacerbated by internal and external returns; calls for the EU to urgently support demining efforts jointly with specialised actors and Syrian authorities;

W. whereas several factions, including the Syrian National Army, are backed by Türkiye; whereas negotiations are still ongoing regarding the two Russian military bases at Tartous and Hmeimim;

16. Reiterates its strongest condemnation of the appalling use of chemical weapons against Syrian civilians by the Assad regime; urges the caretaker government to fully cooperate with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to oversee the verified destruction of all chemical weapons;

X. whereas Hezbollah was equipped by Iran through Syria;

17. Appreciates the determination demonstrated by the caretaker authorities in discontinuing the production and traffic of Captagon; encourages international cooperation against the trafficking of drugs, arms, artefacts and human beings;

Y. whereas Qatar was the first country to reopen its embassy in Damascus, in order to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid; whereas on 12 January 2025 Saudi Arabia hosted the Riyadh Meetings on Syria to deliberate on Syria’s post-conflict reconstruction, refugee repatriation and regional security;

18. Acknowledges that the Syrian economy is shattered, with considerable investment gaps that need to be closed to achieve price stability and sustained job creation; encourages economic disentanglement from Russia and Iran; calls for the EU to strategically extend its focus from humanitarian aid to accelerated economic recovery and reconstruction, in order to achieve tangible results; applauds the deployment of the ‘Grain from Ukraine’ initiative after the suspension of Russian food exports to Syria;

Z. whereas US sanctions, reinforced in 2020 under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, continue to seriously damage the Syrian economy, complicating the capacity to rebuild a stable country;

19. Welcomes the suspension of sanctions on a range of economic sectors and the indefinite extension of humanitarian exemptions; supports a full yet reversible lifting of all sanctions unlinked to the Assad regime, with a focus on the financial sector, so as to provide the Syrian economy with a much-needed lifeline, while closely monitoring the political transition process; expects over-compliance to remain an issue as long as US and UK sanctions remain in place;

AA. whereas following the fall of the dictator Assad, several of the Member States swiftly announced that they were suspending the examination of asylum applications from Syria, though the situation in the country is far from stabilised;

20. Welcomes decisions by several Member States that allow refugees to return to Syria and participate in its reconstruction without automatically losing their status, including for ‘go-and-see’ visits to Syria; calls for a coordinated EU approach to that end; underlines the need for inclusive policies that allow for fair reconstruction and resettlement that address housing, land and property rights, and allow displaced Syrians to reclaim and rebuild their homes; stresses the importance of a reconstruction process that ensures a balanced participation between the Syrian diaspora and those who have remained in Syria;

AB. whereas Assad stands accused of war crimes, including chemical attacks, mass executions and torture;

21. Recalls the presence of a sizeable Palestinian refugee population in Syria, some of them displaced multiple times, and the role of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) in assisting its needs; remembers the siege of the Yarmouk camp by Assadist factions between 2013 and 2015;

AC. whereas the HTS and other groups engaged in terrorist activities are accused of war crimes, mass executions and torture;

22. Calls on the interim Syrian authorities to bring the Russian military presence in Syria to an end, in view of the active participation of the Russian military and Russian mercenaries in the massacres perpetrated against Syrian civilians, and the destabilising role of Russia in the Middle East and beyond; condemns Russia for hosting Assad and his family and shielding them from justice;

AD. whereas some of the Member States have issued arrest warrants for Assad and senior officials from his former regime, expanding their inquiry into crimes against humanity;

23. Stresses the importance of the fight led by the international coalition against Daesh, with the invaluable support of Kurdish fighters; expresses deep concerns as attacks led or supported by Türkiye in north-eastern Syria not only cause civilian casualties and increase the number of internally displaced persons, but also threaten the efficiency and continuity of the fight against Daesh; takes note of the positive recent negotiations between Kurdish armed groups in Türkiye and the Turkish Government towards disarmament;

AE. whereas on 17 January 2025, Prosecutor of the ICC Karim Khan met al-Sharaa in Damascus to discuss how to support the efforts of the new authorities in bringing the Assad regime to justice for the crimes allegedly committed under its rule;

24. Urges the caretaker authorities to demonstrate a clear commitment to the fight against terrorism and to cooperate with international partners both to fight remaining active terrorist cells in Syria and to investigate past crimes, notably against the Yazidi community;

1. Welcomes the fall of Assad’s dictatorship, which marks the start of a new era for Syria; notes the opportunity for the Syrian people to restore a genuine democracy; remains concerned, however, by the high degree of instability in the secular, multi-ethnic and multi-religious Syria and in the surrounding region;

25. Reiterates its call to the Member States to repatriate all their nationals, especially children, from the Al-Hol and Roj detention camps and to bring adults to justice in fair trials; urgently calls for a lasting solution to be found among all the parties concerned as these camps continue to be breeding grounds for radicalisation and constitute a dormant threat to both Syrian and European security; warns against the serious international security risk a sudden disengagement of the United States in the region would cause in this uncertain context;

2. Calls for an immediate ceasefire throughout the region by all parties; joins the UN Special Envoy for Syria in calling for a halt to Israeli bombing and troop movements in Syria;

26. Expresses concern regarding the presence of foreign extremist fighters, including EU citizens, among the forces that overthrew the Assad regime, and cautions against integrating them permanently into the Syrian security apparatus;

3. Recalls that UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015) states that all parties to the conflict, both Syrian and regional, must be involved in the political transition process; calls for the EU and its Member States to request a meeting of the UN Security Council to relaunch the process provided for in Resolution 2254 (2015) and establish the conditions for disarming the various armed groups present in Syria, and for maintaining peace throughout the political process;

27. Calls on Türkiye and Israel to respect Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and to immediately cease all attacks and incursions on Syrian territory; condemns Israel’s provocative requests and military actions putting the state-building process and the 1974 agreement at risk;

4. Underlines, in that regard, that Syria’s democratic future depends in particular on the ability of the new government to respect all components of Syrian society, in particular numerous ethnic and religious minorities and other communities that aspire to peaceful coexistence;

28. Welcomes interim President al-Sharaa’s pledge to seek peaceful relations with all of Syria’s neighbours; calls on the interim Syrian authorities to ensure this commitment is turned into concrete action to prevent and refrain from establishing any security threats towards neighbouring countries and beyond;

5. Deplores the fact that some political parties and social forces have been denied freedom of assembly and expression and have had their assets confiscated;

29. Condemns those European politicians, including current and former MEPs, who have repeatedly spread pro-Assad narratives and actively engaged in whitewashing the bloody dictatorship; expresses deep concern regarding the recent invitation by Parliament’s Intergroup on Christians in the Middle East of organisations closely linked to EU-sanctioned Assadists;

6. Welcomes the lifting of EU sanctions on Syria in several sectors, conditional on the respect of human rights by the new authorities; highlights that UN Special Rapporteurs on Human Rights have many times underlined the devastating impact of sanctions on populations, in particular their worsening of humanitarian crises and limiting of access to food, medicine and essential services; calls for the EU and the Commission, during its official relations with the HTS-led government, to remind it of the importance of the strict application of international human rights law;

30. Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the relevant EU institutions, the governments and parliaments of Member States and the interim Syrian government, and to have it translated and published in Arabic.

7. Believes some specific efforts are needed when it comes to the exportation from Syria of drugs such as Captagon, which represents a major source of foreign currency for Syria, as the stakes are both security-related (financing of militias and regional instability) and health-related; encourages the new authorities to rapidly identify alternative economic pathways to encourage Syrians to participate in the licit formal economy, prevent a regional overspill of drug production and reduce demand for the drugs;

8. Is extremely concerned about the fact that the Kurdish autonomous administration, which controls a large part of north-eastern Syria, and its armed wing, the SDF, were not invited to take part in the first national dialogue conference, held on 25 February 2025, on Syria’s future;

9. Encourages discussions between the SDF and the Damascus interim government, in particular regarding the reactivation of civil institutions and state public services in north-eastern Syria and the facilitation of the return of displaced persons and refugees to their towns and villages, providing them with the conditions necessary to enable them to live there;

10. Is extremely concerned about the announcement of state reforms that include plans to privatise state-owned enterprises and reduce the number of public sector employees by one third; stands with the protesters among Syria’s government workers, who are concerned about potential sectarian-based job purges and widespread job losses;

11. Highlights the fact that that the protection of all populations also requires the territorial integrity of Syria to be guaranteed, and implies therefore respect for international law by the various actors in the region;

12. Further underlines that the Rojava government in north-eastern Syria, spearheaded by the Syrian Kurdish forces and involving Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians and other minorities, offers a model that must be protected from Türkiye’s repeated threats and attacks;

13. Warns of the continuing serious military and paramilitary attacks on Rojava, with the Kurds being the target of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s regime and its mercenary networks; calls for the war crimes committed by Türkiye and its affiliates in Rojava to stop;

14. Firmly condemns the territorial incursions and expansionist ambitions of Israel and Türkiye; underlines that Syria’s stability begins with respect for its internationally recognised borders; stresses further that Israel is violating the 1974 mutual agreement on disengagement from the Golan Heights; is highly concerned about the Israeli Government’s plan to double the Israeli population in the Golan Heights region, a project fuelling extreme-right partisans of the ‘Great Israel’; warns against the risk of ethnic cleansing in the Golan Heights;

15. Recalls that the EU does not recognise Israel’s sovereignty over the occupied Golan Heights, in accordance with international law and UN Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 497 (1981) of 18 December 1981; demands that actions be taken by the EU towards Israel, namely the immediate suspension of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, as well as an arms embargo;

16. Urges the Member States and the Commission to prevent any external military intervention in Syria, starting with Türkiye and Israel; highlights the fact that that the faster the Rojava authorities obtain a guarantee of its peaceful coexistence with the interim government in Damascus, the faster the US troops stationed in the region will have to leave the country;

17. Stresses that the future of Syria must be determined by the will of its people, free of external pressure or interference; emphasises that Syria’s sovereignty and political trajectory should reflect the aspirations of its citizens; condemns any attempts, whether foreign or domestic, to undermine Syria’s democratic institutions;

18. Believes justice and accountability are crucial for the future of Syria; welcomes the visit of Prosecutor of the ICC Karim Khan to Damascus to meet with Syria’s de facto leader al-Sharaa in January 2025; calls on Syria’s new authorities to sign the Rome Statute and, consequently, on the Member States to refer the Assad regime to the ICC for investigation; regrets that Russia is not a signatory to the Rome Statute;

19. Reaffirms its full support for the ICC as an independent institution indispensable to international justice; urges the EU and its Member States to take concrete measures to ensure the protection and adequate funding of the ICC, in particular by strengthening international judicial cooperation; calls on the Member States to actively oppose any attempt to intimidate the ICC and to promote, more than ever, its universality by encouraging non-signatory states to accede to the Rome Statute;

20. Condemns the decision taken by many of the Member States to pause the processing of asylum applications lodged by Syrians immediately after the fall of the Assad regime, and the pressure applied to Syrian asylum seekers to sign papers accepting their ‘voluntary return’; condemns also the intention of some of the Member States to re-examine the protection status granted to Syrian refugees; considers that premature returns would expose refugees to grave risks, including persecution, arbitrary detention and violence and that such actions disregard international refugee and human rights obligations, particularly the principle of non-refoulement;

21. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and the interim government of Syria.