On the need for EU support towards a just transition and reconstruction in Syria

B100164/2025

European Parliament resolution on the need for EU support towards a just transition and reconstruction in Syria

(2025/2569(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015) of 18 December 2015,

– having regard to the orders of the Paris Judicial Court of 14 November 2023 and 21 January 2025 issuing international arrest warrants for Bashar al-Assad and members of his regime,

– having regard to the European Parliament recommendation of 28 February 2024 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the situation in Syria,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 19 December 2024,

– having regard to the joint statement by the Governments of France, Syria, Bahrain, Canada, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom, the European Union, the United Nations Special Envoy for Syria, the Secretary General of the League of Arab States and the Secretary General of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf of 13 February 2025,

– having regard to the Council declaration of 19 February 2025 on the Council Decision, Regulation and Implementing Regulation concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria,

– having regard to the statement issued following Syria’s National Dialogue conference, held in Damascus on 25 February 2025,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the historic collapse of Syria’s rule by the Assad family on 8 December 2024 marked the end of half a century of suffering for the Syrian people, with unprecedented tyranny and chaos unfolding after Assad brutally repressed the 2011 uprising and led the country into civil war; whereas war crimes and crimes against humanity such as mass detention and torture, as well as the actions of terrorist groups, have caused the deaths of half a million Syrians;

B. whereas Russia and Iran were both enablers and active players in the war waged by the bloody Assad regime against its own people and used Syria as a playground for destabilising the region; whereas the power of Assad’s regime relied on Russia and Iran’s continued support and supply of manpower and weapons; whereas his sudden fall is a clear geostrategic defeat for both countries;

C. whereas after assuming a leading role in overthrowing the regime, designated interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa launched a political transition process; whereas a caretaker government was appointed and talks are under way regarding the establishment of a new government;

D. whereas the caretaker government authorities control most but not all of Syria’s territory, with the north-eastern region administered militarily by the Syrian Democratic Forces; whereas since December 2024 Türkiye has intensified its attacks and incursions within Syrian territory; whereas some pro-Assad armed groups remain active and have recently been conducting attacks;

E. whereas Israel is repeatedly striking military targets in Syria, has substantially extended its occupation of Syrian territory and demands a far-reaching demilitarised zone;

F. whereas the humanitarian situation remains acutely dire, with 90 % of the population below the poverty line, widespread food insecurity and a lack of basic infrastructure and public services; whereas the number of people in need of life-saving humanitarian assistance in Syria has continued to rise since 2020, reaching 16.7 million people in 2024; whereas a colossal reconstruction effort must be undertaken while navigating the shift to an open market economy and accommodating large-scale population movements; whereas the EU launched a humanitarian air bridge in December 2024 to deliver emergency healthcare and other essential supplies;

G. whereas the executive order issued by US President Donald Trump’s administration on 20 January 2025, enacting a 90-day suspension of all foreign assistance programmes, including those administered by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), has and will have an impact on the humanitarian programmes and NGOs that operate on the ground in Syria; whereas other countries such as the UK and several EU Member States have also announced significant cuts to their global aid budgets;

H. whereas the EU rightly refused to normalise its ties with the Assad regime right through to its demise and played a significant role as a major humanitarian donor to Syrian civilians and as host to one million refugees fleeing the conflicts;

1. Praises the bravery, dignity and resilience of the Syrian people, who finally succeeded in overthrowing the cruel Assad dictatorship; pays tribute to the countless victims of the regime;

2. Welcomes the fresh start in EU-Syria relations, manifested by the appointment of an EU Chargé d’affaires in Damascus, a partial lifting of sanctions and the organisation of the Ninth Brussels Conference, entitled ‘Standing with Syria: Meeting the Needs for a Successful Transition’, set to take place on 17 March 2025;

3. Calls for the EU to seize this historic opportunity to assist Syria in implementing its reconstruction and achieving a just, peaceful and inclusive political transition; underlines that a stable and peaceful Syria is in the interests of the Middle East, the EU’s southern neighbourhood and the EU itself; emphasises, moreover, that only on these grounds can conditions for the safe, voluntary and dignified return of refugees be met;

4. Calls on the EU to continue to support Syrians via increased humanitarian and development aid; encourages the EU and its Member States to support reconstruction efforts in key sectors such as transport, electricity, healthcare and education;

5. Encourages the EU and its Member States to cooperate with Syria’s interim authorities in a transparent, coordinated and responsible manner, and to convey readiness to provide state-building assistance if and as needed; welcomes dialogue held alongside regional partners in the Aqaba format – which follows the same format as the Aqaba Summit, held in Jordan in December 2024;

6. Strongly believes that stability in Syria will come from a pluralistic political transition that includes credible representatives of all components of Syrian society, that is to say women, civil society and all religious and ethnic communities; underlines the importance of the future government reflecting this plurality and for a constitutional framework guaranteeing equal rights and access to opportunities for all Syrians, as well as clear and concrete evidence that these rights are respected in national and local decisions;

7. Notes with concern the violent past of factions that toppled the Assad regime and are now participating in government; encourages the interim authorities to organise paramilitary and civilian disarmament; takes good note of the interim President’s promising declarations of intent, and pledges to monitor the actions of national and local authorities when evaluating further engagement with them;

8. Praises the invaluable contribution of civil society, in Syria and abroad, as the legitimate repository and defender of the aspirations of the Syrian people during years of brutal oppression by the Assad regime; pays particular tribute to the White Helmets, target of a regime-orchestrated and Russia-backed smear campaign; calls for the EU to increase support for Syria’s civil society organisations as they adapt to shifting operating conditions, with a focus on promoting civic dialogue, notably between ethnic and religious communities, to foster pluralism and trust within Syrian society;

9. Is concerned by the exponential rise of disinformation originating both within Syria and from abroad; warns of the risk of instrumentalisation of communities by both domestic and foreign actors; stresses the need for a pluralistic media landscape to emerge and consolidate;

10. Notes that Syria’s Christian population has steeply declined since 2011 due to its targeting by both the Assad regime and Daesh; expresses cautious optimism regarding the behaviour of the caretaker authorities and encourages them to implement further confidence-building measures, in this regard;

11. Strongly believes that the success of the Syrian political transition hinges on transitional justice as a path to fighting impunity and building trust in state institutions; calls for judicial reform to be treated as an urgent political priority; firmly condemns reported spontaneous retaliatory targeting of the Alawite community based on perceived association with the Assad regime;

12. Recognises the irreplaceable contribution of Fareed al-Madhhan (‘Caesar’) to documenting the crimes of the Assad regime, as well as the work of the Syrian Network of Human Rights in tracking disappearances; stresses the importance of these processes now being completed; calls on the interim authorities to fully cooperate with the competent international bodies, including UN mechanisms established specifically for investigating serious crimes in Syria such as the UN International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM), and facilitate their on-site operations; encourages Syria to ratify the Rome Statute;

13. Commends the steps taken to fight impunity through the criminal prosecution in Germany and France of individuals linked to the Assad regime and to Daesh; expects newfound evidence and fruitful cooperation with Syrian authorities to lead to significant increases in investigations and convictions;

14. Stresses the need for Syria’s transitional authorities to urgently take all steps to secure and preserve physical evidence of serious international crimes across the country – including through cooperation and engagement with international experts and existing international mechanisms; encourages the EU to provide support for timely evidence collection on the ground, including the provision of forensic equipment and expertise to identify and analyse mass graves, as well as the collection of survivors’ testimonies;

15. Highlights that Syria is among the most heavily mine-contaminated countries in the world; is worried about the rising number of mine casualties being exacerbated by internal and external returns; calls for the EU to urgently support demining efforts jointly with specialised actors and Syrian authorities;

16. Reiterates its strongest condemnation of the appalling use of chemical weapons against Syrian civilians by the Assad regime; urges the caretaker government to fully cooperate with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to oversee the verified destruction of all chemical weapons;

17. Appreciates the determination demonstrated by the caretaker authorities in discontinuing the production and traffic of Captagon; encourages international cooperation against the trafficking of drugs, arms, artefacts and human beings;

18. Acknowledges that the Syrian economy is shattered, with considerable investment gaps that need to be closed to achieve price stability and sustained job creation; encourages economic disentanglement from Russia and Iran; calls for the EU to strategically extend its focus from humanitarian aid to accelerated economic recovery and reconstruction, in order to achieve tangible results; applauds the deployment of the ‘Grain from Ukraine’ initiative after the suspension of Russian food exports to Syria;

19. Welcomes the suspension of sanctions on a range of economic sectors and the indefinite extension of humanitarian exemptions; supports a full yet reversible lifting of all sanctions unlinked to the Assad regime, with a focus on the financial sector, so as to provide the Syrian economy with a much-needed lifeline, while closely monitoring the political transition process; expects over-compliance to remain an issue as long as US and UK sanctions remain in place;

20. Welcomes decisions by several Member States that allow refugees to return to Syria and participate in its reconstruction without automatically losing their status, including for ‘go-and-see’ visits to Syria; calls for a coordinated EU approach to that end; underlines the need for inclusive policies that allow for fair reconstruction and resettlement that address housing, land and property rights, and allow displaced Syrians to reclaim and rebuild their homes; stresses the importance of a reconstruction process that ensures a balanced participation between the Syrian diaspora and those who have remained in Syria;

21. Recalls the presence of a sizeable Palestinian refugee population in Syria, some of them displaced multiple times, and the role of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) in assisting its needs; remembers the siege of the Yarmouk camp by Assadist factions between 2013 and 2015;

22. Calls on the interim Syrian authorities to bring the Russian military presence in Syria to an end, in view of the active participation of the Russian military and Russian mercenaries in the massacres perpetrated against Syrian civilians, and the destabilising role of Russia in the Middle East and beyond; condemns Russia for hosting Assad and his family and shielding them from justice;

23. Stresses the importance of the fight led by the international coalition against Daesh, with the invaluable support of Kurdish fighters; expresses deep concerns as attacks led or supported by Türkiye in north-eastern Syria not only cause civilian casualties and increase the number of internally displaced persons, but also threaten the efficiency and continuity of the fight against Daesh; takes note of the positive recent negotiations between Kurdish armed groups in Türkiye and the Turkish Government towards disarmament;

24. Urges the caretaker authorities to demonstrate a clear commitment to the fight against terrorism and to cooperate with international partners both to fight remaining active terrorist cells in Syria and to investigate past crimes, notably against the Yazidi community;

25. Reiterates its call to the Member States to repatriate all their nationals, especially children, from the Al-Hol and Roj detention camps and to bring adults to justice in fair trials; urgently calls for a lasting solution to be found among all the parties concerned as these camps continue to be breeding grounds for radicalisation and constitute a dormant threat to both Syrian and European security; warns against the serious international security risk a sudden disengagement of the United States in the region would cause in this uncertain context;

26. Expresses concern regarding the presence of foreign extremist fighters, including EU citizens, among the forces that overthrew the Assad regime, and cautions against integrating them permanently into the Syrian security apparatus;

27. Calls on Türkiye and Israel to respect Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and to immediately cease all attacks and incursions on Syrian territory; condemns Israel’s provocative requests and military actions putting the state-building process and the 1974 agreement at risk;

28. Welcomes interim President al-Sharaa’s pledge to seek peaceful relations with all of Syria’s neighbours; calls on the interim Syrian authorities to ensure this commitment is turned into concrete action to prevent and refrain from establishing any security threats towards neighbouring countries and beyond;

29. Condemns those European politicians, including current and former MEPs, who have repeatedly spread pro-Assad narratives and actively engaged in whitewashing the bloody dictatorship; expresses deep concern regarding the recent invitation by Parliament’s Intergroup on Christians in the Middle East of organisations closely linked to EU-sanctioned Assadists;

30. Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the relevant EU institutions, the governments and parliaments of Member States and the interim Syrian government, and to have it translated and published in Arabic.