On the need for EU support towards a just transition and reconstruction in Syria

B100154/2025

European Parliament resolution on the need for EU support towards a just transition and reconstruction in Syria

(2025/2569(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Syria,

– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to other UN human rights treaties and instruments,

– having regard to the decisions of previous UN Security Council sanctions committees,

– having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015) of 18 December 2015,

– having regard to the UN Charter, the Hague conventions and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),

– having regard to the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 and the additional protocols thereto,

– having regard to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 18 December 1979,

– having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas on 8 December 2024 then Syrian President Bashar al-Assad fled his country following the fall of Damascus to the rebels of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS); whereas he was granted asylum by Russia;

B. whereas although the HTS succeeded in toppling the Assad regime, it controls only a fraction of Syrian territory;

C. whereas bombings and strikes continue, in particular Israeli strikes in southern Syria and at the Lebanese-Syrian border;

D. whereas HTS is an offshoot of the former branch of al-Qaeda in Syria, known as the Al-Nusrah Front, listed by the UN Security Council as engaged in terrorist activities; whereas HTS and its leader are subject to EU and international sanctions;

E. whereas the UN Security Council sanctions committees have imposed sanctions on al-Qaeda, the Al-Nusrah Front and associates pursuant to UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) for having carried out terrorist operations;

F. whereas the leader of HTS, Ahmed al-Sharaa (also known as Abu Mohammed al-Joulani), tries to depict himself as a ‘moderate’ Islamist, capable of respecting minorities, including freedom of religious minorities to worship; whereas in Idlib and other Syrian territories controlled by HTS, he repeatedly carried out attacks against religious minorities and has stated that his intention is to establish an Islamic regime in Syria;

G. whereas the risk of the re-emergence of certain jihadist groups, in particular Daesh, and of increased regional instability remains;

H. whereas as Syria’s interim president, al-Sharaa has pledged to guarantee that the state would have a ‘monopoly’ on arms;

I. whereas a number of foreign actors directly or indirectly involved in Syria endanger Syrian sovereignty and its prospects for peace, democracy and prosperity;

J. whereas Syria and its people have faced a brutal operation of subversion, aggression and military occupation by foreign powers;

K. whereas around 2 000 US troops are still deployed in Syria;

L. whereas the Syrian Golan Heights, in south-western Syria, have been occupied by Israel since 1967 and were illegally annexed in 1981; whereas Israel, after illegally occupying the slopes of Mount Hermon, has now entered the UN buffer zone; whereas the Israeli army has not operated in this zone since 1974; whereas the UN Disengagement Observer Force, in charge of ensuring security in the region, confirmed on 9 December 2024 that Israeli armed forces had entered the area of separation, had moved into the area and remained present in at least three locations;

M. whereas the Israeli Government has illegally reaffirmed its sovereignty over the Syrian Golan Heights and is carrying out massive attacks on military installations in Syria; whereas on 9 December 2024, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu went so far as to claim that the annexed Golan Heights belonged to Israel ‘for eternity’;

N. whereas on 15 December 2024 the Israeli Government approved a plan to double the Israeli population of the Syrian Golan Heights;

O. whereas the Kurds in north-eastern Syria are still caught between radical Islamist fundamentalist armed groups and Turkish extraterritorial ambitions;

P. whereas the new de facto Syrian authorities announced an agreement to disband all armed groups, with a plan to integrate them into the Syrian Ministry of Defence; whereas the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-led coalition headed by Commander Mazloum Abdi, did not immediately join the agreement, considering their concerns about preserving their autonomy and the political and cultural gains made in north-eastern Syria;

Q. whereas the HTS intends to draft a new Syrian constitution; whereas certain groups, including Kurdish factions, are so far excluded from this dialogue;

R. whereas in places such as Homs, Alawite communities express concerns over potential reprisals in the post-Assad era;

S. whereas Rojava, also known as the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, is an autonomous administration protected by Kurdish-led forces in north-eastern Syria and stands as a model of democratic self-governance, inclusivity and resilience in a region marked by conflict; whereas rooted in principles of ethnic and religious pluralism, gender equality and grassroots democracy, Rojava has fostered a governance system that empowers local communities and promotes stability;

T. whereas crucial to Rojava’s defence and security efforts are the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a coalition of Kurdish, Arab, Assyrian and other ethnic groups committed to protecting the region from extremist threats; whereas the SDF played a pivotal role in the fight against Daesh;

U. whereas beyond their military efforts, the SDF and the Rojava authorities have worked to rebuild communities, provide humanitarian aid and establish governance structures that prioritise justice and coexistence; whereas their emphasis on women’s leadership, particularly through the Women’s Protection Units, has set an example for gender equality in the region;

V. whereas despite ongoing challenges, Rojava and the SDF continue to advocate for peace, dialogue and a democratic solution for Syria, demonstrating a commitment to human rights, freedom and stability;

W. whereas several factions, including the Syrian National Army, are backed by Türkiye; whereas negotiations are still ongoing regarding the two Russian military bases at Tartous and Hmeimim;

X. whereas Hezbollah was equipped by Iran through Syria;

Y. whereas Qatar was the first country to reopen its embassy in Damascus, in order to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid; whereas on 12 January 2025 Saudi Arabia hosted the Riyadh Meetings on Syria to deliberate on Syria’s post-conflict reconstruction, refugee repatriation and regional security;

Z. whereas US sanctions, reinforced in 2020 under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, continue to seriously damage the Syrian economy, complicating the capacity to rebuild a stable country;

AA. whereas following the fall of the dictator Assad, several of the Member States swiftly announced that they were suspending the examination of asylum applications from Syria, though the situation in the country is far from stabilised;

AB. whereas Assad stands accused of war crimes, including chemical attacks, mass executions and torture;

AC. whereas the HTS and other groups engaged in terrorist activities are accused of war crimes, mass executions and torture;

AD. whereas some of the Member States have issued arrest warrants for Assad and senior officials from his former regime, expanding their inquiry into crimes against humanity;

AE. whereas on 17 January 2025, Prosecutor of the ICC Karim Khan met al-Sharaa in Damascus to discuss how to support the efforts of the new authorities in bringing the Assad regime to justice for the crimes allegedly committed under its rule;

1. Welcomes the fall of Assad’s dictatorship, which marks the start of a new era for Syria; notes the opportunity for the Syrian people to restore a genuine democracy; remains concerned, however, by the high degree of instability in the secular, multi-ethnic and multi-religious Syria and in the surrounding region;

2. Calls for an immediate ceasefire throughout the region by all parties; joins the UN Special Envoy for Syria in calling for a halt to Israeli bombing and troop movements in Syria;

3. Recalls that UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015) states that all parties to the conflict, both Syrian and regional, must be involved in the political transition process; calls for the EU and its Member States to request a meeting of the UN Security Council to relaunch the process provided for in Resolution 2254 (2015) and establish the conditions for disarming the various armed groups present in Syria, and for maintaining peace throughout the political process;

4. Underlines, in that regard, that Syria’s democratic future depends in particular on the ability of the new government to respect all components of Syrian society, in particular numerous ethnic and religious minorities and other communities that aspire to peaceful coexistence;

5. Deplores the fact that some political parties and social forces have been denied freedom of assembly and expression and have had their assets confiscated;

6. Welcomes the lifting of EU sanctions on Syria in several sectors, conditional on the respect of human rights by the new authorities; highlights that UN Special Rapporteurs on Human Rights have many times underlined the devastating impact of sanctions on populations, in particular their worsening of humanitarian crises and limiting of access to food, medicine and essential services; calls for the EU and the Commission, during its official relations with the HTS-led government, to remind it of the importance of the strict application of international human rights law;

7. Believes some specific efforts are needed when it comes to the exportation from Syria of drugs such as Captagon, which represents a major source of foreign currency for Syria, as the stakes are both security-related (financing of militias and regional instability) and health-related; encourages the new authorities to rapidly identify alternative economic pathways to encourage Syrians to participate in the licit formal economy, prevent a regional overspill of drug production and reduce demand for the drugs;

8. Is extremely concerned about the fact that the Kurdish autonomous administration, which controls a large part of north-eastern Syria, and its armed wing, the SDF, were not invited to take part in the first national dialogue conference, held on 25 February 2025, on Syria’s future;

9. Encourages discussions between the SDF and the Damascus interim government, in particular regarding the reactivation of civil institutions and state public services in north-eastern Syria and the facilitation of the return of displaced persons and refugees to their towns and villages, providing them with the conditions necessary to enable them to live there;

10. Is extremely concerned about the announcement of state reforms that include plans to privatise state-owned enterprises and reduce the number of public sector employees by one third; stands with the protesters among Syria’s government workers, who are concerned about potential sectarian-based job purges and widespread job losses;

11. Highlights the fact that that the protection of all populations also requires the territorial integrity of Syria to be guaranteed, and implies therefore respect for international law by the various actors in the region;

12. Further underlines that the Rojava government in north-eastern Syria, spearheaded by the Syrian Kurdish forces and involving Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians and other minorities, offers a model that must be protected from Türkiye’s repeated threats and attacks;

13. Warns of the continuing serious military and paramilitary attacks on Rojava, with the Kurds being the target of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s regime and its mercenary networks; calls for the war crimes committed by Türkiye and its affiliates in Rojava to stop;

14. Firmly condemns the territorial incursions and expansionist ambitions of Israel and Türkiye; underlines that Syria’s stability begins with respect for its internationally recognised borders; stresses further that Israel is violating the 1974 mutual agreement on disengagement from the Golan Heights; is highly concerned about the Israeli Government’s plan to double the Israeli population in the Golan Heights region, a project fuelling extreme-right partisans of the ‘Great Israel’; warns against the risk of ethnic cleansing in the Golan Heights;

15. Recalls that the EU does not recognise Israel’s sovereignty over the occupied Golan Heights, in accordance with international law and UN Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 497 (1981) of 18 December 1981; demands that actions be taken by the EU towards Israel, namely the immediate suspension of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, as well as an arms embargo;

16. Urges the Member States and the Commission to prevent any external military intervention in Syria, starting with Türkiye and Israel; highlights the fact that that the faster the Rojava authorities obtain a guarantee of its peaceful coexistence with the interim government in Damascus, the faster the US troops stationed in the region will have to leave the country;

17. Stresses that the future of Syria must be determined by the will of its people, free of external pressure or interference; emphasises that Syria’s sovereignty and political trajectory should reflect the aspirations of its citizens; condemns any attempts, whether foreign or domestic, to undermine Syria’s democratic institutions;

18. Believes justice and accountability are crucial for the future of Syria; welcomes the visit of Prosecutor of the ICC Karim Khan to Damascus to meet with Syria’s de facto leader al-Sharaa in January 2025; calls on Syria’s new authorities to sign the Rome Statute and, consequently, on the Member States to refer the Assad regime to the ICC for investigation; regrets that Russia is not a signatory to the Rome Statute;

19. Reaffirms its full support for the ICC as an independent institution indispensable to international justice; urges the EU and its Member States to take concrete measures to ensure the protection and adequate funding of the ICC, in particular by strengthening international judicial cooperation; calls on the Member States to actively oppose any attempt to intimidate the ICC and to promote, more than ever, its universality by encouraging non-signatory states to accede to the Rome Statute;

20. Condemns the decision taken by many of the Member States to pause the processing of asylum applications lodged by Syrians immediately after the fall of the Assad regime, and the pressure applied to Syrian asylum seekers to sign papers accepting their ‘voluntary return’; condemns also the intention of some of the Member States to re-examine the protection status granted to Syrian refugees; considers that premature returns would expose refugees to grave risks, including persecution, arbitrary detention and violence and that such actions disregard international refugee and human rights obligations, particularly the principle of non-refoulement;

21. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and the interim government of Syria.