What changed

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 23-24 June 2022, 29-30 June 2023, 26-27 October 2023, 14-15 December 2023 and 27 June 2024,

– having regard to the Granada declaration of the European Council of 6 October 2023,

– having regard to the Council Presidency Progress Report on the future of Europe of 10 June 2024,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A10-0000/2025),(A10-0177/2025),

A. whereas 9 of the 10 countries currently aspiring to join the EU have candidate status, some of which have held this status for many years; whereas the candidate countries are at various stages of the accession process and negotiations; whereas Georgia unilaterally suspended EU accession negotiations on 28 November 2024;

B. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and other ongoing geopolitical challenges, including a worrying shift in transatlantic relations, have given new geostrategic meaning and impetus to the EU accession process and European unification;

C. whereas enlargement is a historic commitment and a strategic geopolitical priority, representing an investment in the future of the European continent;

C. whereas accession to the European Union must remain a merit-based process, based on an assessment of each applicant’s fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria and the implementation of the necessary reforms, in particular in the areas of ‘fundamentals’, adherence to the principles of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and good governance, as well as alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy, in order to ensure that enlargement strengthens rather than undermines the EU and its single market;

D. whereas the EU’s institutional framework, and in particular its decision-making process,enlargement is barelya adequatehistoric forcommitment, a Unionkey ofEU 27foreign Memberpolicy States;tool, whereasa thestrategic prospectgeopolitical ofpriority futureand enlargementsone makesof the reformEU’s ofmost EUsuccessful institutions,policies, policiesrepresenting andan decision-makinginvestment proceduresin morethe indispensablefuture andof urgentthe thanEuropean ever;continent;

E. whereas all previous enlargements have been preceded or accompanied by internal institutional reforms;

E. whereas accession countries should implement decisively the required reforms and achieve concrete and irreversible progress in core elements of the enlargement process; whereas the EU and the Member States should support the candidate countries with financial and technical assistance to achieve these criteria; whereas there cannot be shortcuts with EU values and fundamental principles;

F. whereas the perspective of an upcoming enlargement exposes the EU to a threefold challenge of ensuring efficient decision-making procedures (the efficiency challenge), gathering sufficient resources to deliver on its strategic objectives (the power and resource challenge) and safeguarding the democratic legitimacy and accountability of its actions (the democracy challenge);

F. whereas an enlarged EU would gain greater political, economic and military power and leverage on the global stage while empowering shared democratic values across the EU enlargement region; whereas an enlarged single market is important to both the EU and the accession countries while making the EU an even more competitive economic player and attractive trading partner; whereas any failure to make progress in EU enlargement would undermine the EU’s economic and security interests and could ultimately push non-EU countries on the European continent to align economically and politically with other blocs (e.g. Russia and China), potentially creating rival economic areas and reducing the EU’s global economic influence, while creating opportunities for destabilisation efforts to be conducted from the immediate EU neighbourhood;

G. whereas pre-enlargement reforms of the EU’s institutional framework imply a possible advancement of differentiated integration solutions whenever the Treaties allow; whereas procedures pursuant to Articles 20, 42 and 46 TEU on enhanced cooperation and on permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) allow willing Member States to deepen their integration and enhance their cooperation within the framework of the EU’s non-exclusive competences;

G. whereas the countries that joined the EU in 2004 – and the EU as a whole – have experienced substantial economic growth and higher standards in several areas, including an increase in GDP per capita of 30 % on average; whereas, on average, all new Member States have experienced an additional 12 % of GDP growth compared to their projected growth if they had not joined the EU, and that this growth was discernible within five years of their accession; whereas, over the past 20 years, the EU’s economy has grown by 27 %; whereas the countries that were already part of the EU at the time of the 2004 enlargement have also experienced growth and prosperity, with a clear causal relationship with expanded markets, connectivity and investment resulting from the enlargement; whereas every region experiences economic growth through enlargement, but the poorest regions experience the highest relative economic growth;

H. whereas passerelle clauses could be used immediately to switch from the requirement for unanimity to qualified majority voting (QMV) in specific policy areas; whereas the TEU establishes that the ultimate objective of the progressive framing of a common EU defence policy is the establishment of a common defence by unanimous decision of the European Council, which must be compatible with NATO;

H. whereas the GDP per capita of the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia remains around or below 50 % of that of the EU, although some candidate countries have demonstrated steady economic growth over recent years, which enables a merit-based and forward-looking approach; whereas the experience following all EU enlargements demonstrates the positive impact that EU membership and membership of the EU single market and access to structural funds have on economic and social convergence; whereas studies show that the addition of 10 new Member States would shrink the GDP per capita gap between the EU and the United States by 10 %; whereas expanded access to, among other things, labour markets, industrial capacity, digital technologies, in particular AI, and critical rare earth minerals would enable the EU to accelerate the green, digital and just transitions while decreasing its costs, at the same time becoming more strategically autonomous from Russia, China and other systemic competitors; whereas scenarios combining substantial enlargement with strong convergence could add up to an estimated USD 10 trillion to the EU’s GDP by 2035;

I. whereas, due to the limited flexibility of the Treaties, a more in-depth reform by means of targeted Treaty changes should be envisaged; whereas Parliament has activated the Treaty revision procedure and has submitted proposals for the amendment of the Treaties to the Council in accordance with Article 48(2) TEU;

I. whereas the pre-accession instruments play an important role as they provide valuable experience for designing modernised support tools tailored to specific country needs, as was the case with Phare (the Programme of Community aid to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe), SAPARD (pre-accession agricultural instrument) and ISPA (Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession);

J. whereas Member States have on several occasions resorted to intergovernmental cooperation outside the framework of the Treaties where unanimity prevented the widening of EU competences in key policy areas and have at a later stage enshrined this cooperation in the Treaties;

J. whereas some countries outside the EU are dealing with varying levels of political instability and whereas the implementation of EU membership-related reforms in these countries, as demonstrated in previous enlargements, should contribute to stability and the rule of law in the region; whereas the EU has at its disposal an extensive set of tools to enforce compliance with fundamental values in the Member States and safeguard the political stability of the European project as a whole; whereas this set of tools must still be reformed and strengthened, in particular through the consistent implementation of the rule of law mechanism and effective protection of the EU’s fundamental values as enshrined in Article 2 TEU, including through setting out conditions in the current and next multiannual financial framework (MFF);

K. whereas the Commission and Parliament should develop awareness-raising campaigns in Member States and candidate countries in order for citizens to be properly informed about the opportunities enlargement provides, while countering foreign information manipulation and interference from Russia and other countries designed to undermine public support for enlargement;

L. whereas the EU’s institutional framework, and in particular its decision-making processes, need to be strengthened and improved for the current European Union of 27 Member States; whereas preparing for enlargement requires internal reforms within the EU and whereas the enlargement process should be pursued in parallel with the institutional and decision-making reforms necessary to safeguard the EU’s integration capacity; whereas the prospect of future enlargements makes the reform of the EU institutions, policies and decision-making procedures more necessary and urgent than ever;

M. whereas previous enlargements were often preceded or accompanied by internal institutional reforms concerning the governance of the EU and whereas those enlargement processes have usually provided a powerful spur for the development and the economic and democratic progress of the candidate countries;

N. whereas, in its Granada declaration of 6 October 2023, the European Council acknowledged that the necessary acceleration of reform efforts in candidate countries should be matched by a parallel process of groundwork and reforms within the EU;

O. whereas, in its conclusions of 27 June 2024, the European Council set out a roadmap for future work on internal reforms; whereas the European Council recognises that strengthening the EU and European sovereignty requires reforms enabling the EU to meet its long-term ambitions, achieve its policies and priorities, and respond to new geopolitical realities and challenges;

P. whereas, according to those conclusions, internal reforms should advance in parallel with the enlargement process, so that policies are fit for the future and financed in a suitable manner and so that that EU institutions continue to function and act effectively; whereas the European Council has invited the Commission to present an in-depth policy review in 2025 focusing on four strands, namely values and the rule of law, policies, budget and governance;

Q. whereas the perspective of an upcoming enlargement exposes the EU to a threefold challenge of ensuring efficient decision-making procedures (the efficiency challenge), gathering sufficient resources to deliver on its strategic objectives (the power and resource challenge) and safeguarding the democratic legitimacy and accountability of its actions (the democracy challenge);

R. whereas pre-enlargement reforms of the EU’s institutional framework imply a possible advancement of differentiated integration solutions whenever the Treaties allow; whereas procedures pursuant to Articles 20, 42 and 46 TEU on enhanced cooperation and on permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) allow willing Member States to deepen their integration and enhance their cooperation within the framework of the EU’s non-exclusive competences;

S. whereas passerelle clauses could be used immediately to switch from the requirement for unanimity to qualified majority voting (QMV) in specific policy areas; whereas the TEU establishes that the ultimate objective of the progressive framing of a common EU defence policy is the establishment of a common defence by unanimous decision of the European Council, which must be compatible with NATO;

T. whereas, due to the limited flexibility of the Treaties, a more in-depth reform by means of targeted Treaty changes should be envisaged; whereas Parliament has activated the Treaty revision procedure and has submitted proposals for the amendment of the Treaties to the Council in accordance with Article 48(2) TEU;

The cost of not reforming the enlarged EU

1. Argues that the EU and candidate countries have always used enlargement as a policy and geopolitical tool to promote democracy, stability, security, the fight against climate change,security and prosperity across the continent; is of the view that EU enlargement represents a long-term geostrategic investment;

2. Recognises that an enlarged EU would gain higher economic power and leverage on the global stage, since a larger single market makes the EU an even more competitive economic player and an attractive trading partner; expresses concern that the failure to make progress in terms of EU enlargement could ultimately push non-EU countries on the European continent to align economically and politically with other blocs (e.g. Russia and China), potentially creating rival economic zones and reducing the EU’s global economic influence, while creating opportunities for destabilisation efforts to be conducted from the immediate EU neighbourhood;

2. Stresses that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and other geopolitical challenges accentuate the urgency of advancing the enlargement process; maintains that a successful and sustainable enlargement requires long-term political vision and bold decisions, aiming at promoting an efficient, powerful and democratic Europe;

3. Stresses that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and other geopolitical challenges accentuate the urgency of advancing the enlargement process; maintains that a successful and sustainable enlargement requires long-term political vision and bold decisions, aiming at promoting an efficient, powerful and democratic Europe;

3. Notes that experience shows that each new wave of enlargement brings new institutional and political challenges and opportunities that should be addressed in a timely manner, preferably before the candidate countries become Member States, in order to ensure the effective functioning of the EU and prevent institutional gridlock; points out that every enlargement in the history of the European project has been preceded or accompanied by the necessary internal institutional reforms;

4. Underscores that the European Political Community represents an ideal forum to promote European unification and pursue policy coordination and the alignment of candidate and other non-EU countries, notably in terms of EU foreign, defence and security policy;

4. Acknowledges that the aim of unanimity is to ensure that the legitimate concerns of all Member States are addressed; believes, however, that an enlarged EU will require more sophisticated coordination in addressing the challenges of the current enlargement process; underlines the importance of addressing the difficulties caused by unanimity in the Council, including the use of unanimity for intermediate steps in the enlargement process, which could slow down the EU accession of new members owing to bilateral issues; recalls that Article 49 TEU enables a move to QMV without requiring Treaty changes; takes note of the cumbersome and outdated structure and governance of the EU budget and the possible redistribution in the allocation of agricultural and cohesion funds; recalls that EU enlargement is an opportunity to recalibrate key EU policies in this respect; supports initiatives aimed at making the decision-making process more effective, which is key to enhancing the EU’s competitiveness;

5. Underlines that the countries that joined the EU in 2004 have experienced substantial economic growth and higher standards in several areas; highlights that over the past 20 years, the EU’s economy has grown by 27 %; underlines, furthermore, that the countries that were already part of the EU at the time of the 2004 enlargement have also experienced growth and prosperity;

5. Reiterates its position that the deepening of the Union, its enlargement processes and European unification should proceed hand in hand; stresses that EU institutional and financial reforms are needed to face the challenges of the current enlargement process and to ensure the EU’s capacity to absorb new members and to promote their successful integration without destabilising the other Member States’ economies or exacerbating social tensions;

6. Recalls that GDP per capita of the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia remains around or below 50 % of that of the EU, and that the pace of achieving convergence is slow, but highlights that the experience of EU enlargement in 2004 demonstrates the positive impact that membership of the EU single market and access to structural funds have on economic convergence;

6. Recognises that ad hoc solutions could serve as temporary fixes, but they lack the predictability, democratic transparency and accountability, and long-term sustainability that only structural reforms can bring about;

7. Recognises that some countries outside the European Union are dealing with varying levels of political instability and that bringing those countries into the EU will bring stability to the region and help protect the EU’s external borders, in particular as regards organised and cross-border crime, drug trafficking, the prevention of irregular migration and the smuggling of migrants, trafficking in human beings, cybercrime, interference in democratic and electoral processes, and money laundering; stresses that the EU has at its disposal an extensive set of tools to enforce compliance with fundamental values in the Member States and safeguard the political stability of the European project as a whole; points out, however, that this set of tools must still be strengthened;

8. Notes that experience shows that each new wave of enlargement brings new challenges of an institutional and political nature that have to be addressed before the candidate countries become Member States, or else the EU risks institutional gridlock and its functioning becoming unwieldy and ineffective; points out that every enlargement in the history of the European project was preceded or accompanied by the necessary internal institutional reforms;

9. Acknowledges that an enlarged EU will be more cumbersome to manage and more prone to paralysis with regard to the challenges faced in the current enlargement process: the use of unanimity in the Council for foreign affairs issues and for the enlargement policy, which could slow down accession of new members due to bilateral issues, the composition of the Commission and of Parliament, the cumbersome and outdated structure and governance of the EU budget, and the redistribution shocks in the allocation of agricultural and cohesion funds;

10. Reiterates its position that the deepening of the Union and European unification should proceed hand in hand; stresses that EU institutional and financial reforms are needed to face those challenges and to ensure the EU’s capacity to absorb new members and to promote their successful integration without destabilising the other Member States’ economies or exacerbating social tensions;

11. Recognises that ad hoc solutions could serve as temporary fixes, but they lack the predictability, democratic transparency and accountability, and long-term sustainability that only structural reforms can bring about;

12. Encourages the Commission to develop an ambitious and comprehensive pre-enlargement policy and funding review in line with the below recommendations;

Objectives of the institutional pre-enlargement reforms: efficiency, power and democracy

13.7. Firmly believes that the EU institutional reforms, regardless of the decision-making procedure for their adoption, should increase the EU’s ability to act in an efficient and timely manner; points out that the pre-enlargement reforms of the EU institutional framework should meet the objectives of improving the EU’s efficiency, making the EU more powerful on the global stage and making the EU more democratic, legitimate and accountable;

The efficiency challenge

14.8. Underlines that, in order to improve the enlarged EU’s efficiency, the composition of the EU institutions mustshould be changedadapted, made more efficient and their functioning enhanced; suggests that the enlargement process should be supported by the early and close involvement of candidate countries in the functioning of the EU institutions, e.g. through observer status; notes that this could be successfully achieved in a similar manner as at the time of the 2004 enlargement; notes, as a positive example of such gradual integration, the Commission’s efforts to involve candidate countries in the areas of security and defence, in particular through their being referred to in the white paper on the future of EU defence and in the internal security strategy;

15.9. Notes that institutional pre-enlargement reforms must address the implications of enlargement for the composition of Parliament; underlines that, while ensuring appropriate democratic representativeness, Parliament should remain a workable size; highlights the need to prioritise internal and interinstitutional work on the identification of a permanent seat allocation mechanism, capable of ensuring fair, transparent and durable demographic and geographical representation; recalls itsrepresentation positionrespecting thatthe Parliament’sprinciple compositionof shoulddegressive beproportionality; therecalls exclusiveits prerogativeposition ofthat ParliamentParliament’s andcomposition should be reconsideredconsidered together with the voting system in the Council;

16.10. Notes that the current composition of the Commission must take enlargement into account; recalls, in this regard, the flexibility provided for in the Treaty of Lisbon; highlights that the inevitableany reduction in the size of the College of CommissionersCommissioners, mustas ensureprescribed ain geographicallyArticle and17(5) demographicallyTEU, balancedmust compositioncontinue ofto theensure Commissiona asgeographically, establisheddemographically byand gender-balanced composition of the Treaties;Commission;

17.11. StressesRecognises the need for areflection swifton the revision of the Council’s functioning and decision-making process in view of enlargement; proposes a review of the system of rotating presidencies of the Council; notes that qualified majority must be redefined to improve the balance between larger and smaller statescountries and to retain higher thresholds for the most important and politically delicate decisions; recalls, in this regard, its resolution of 22 November 2023 on proposals of the European Parliament for the amendment of the Treaties, in particular on voting majorities in the Council; calls for the utmost transparency and integrity of the Council’s decision-making process in the context of enlargement;

18. Is of the opinion that this can be achieved by simplified and more effective decision-making procedures, moving away from unanimity; reiterates that QMV should be implemented in areas such as the protection of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the multiannual financial framework (MFF), sanctions and other relevant foreign policy decisions, such the opening and closing of individual negotiation clusters and the sanctioning of backtracking during enlargement negotiations, but with the exception, for instance, of decisions authorising military missions or operations with an executive mandate, and the decisions to launch and to close the enlargement negotiations;

12. Proposes strengthening and reforming the procedure in Article 7 TEU by ending unanimity in European Council decisions, by introducing a clear time frame and by making the Court of Justice of the European Union the arbiter of violations;

19. Proposes that the procedure in Article 7 TEU be reformed by ending unanimity in European Council decisions, by introducing a clear time frame and by making the Court of Justice of the European Union the arbiter of violations;

The power and resources challenge

20.13. Reiterates its call to revise the governance of the MFF, namely by attributing full co-legislative powers over both the expenditure and revenue sidesside of the EU budget, including the adoption of the MFF and the system of own resources;MFF;

21. Urges the Commission and the Member States to abandon the self-imposed and outdated principle according to which the size of the EU’s long-term budget must not exceed 1 % of aggregated gross national income in its 2028-2034 MFF proposal;

14. Is convinced that the current mandatory revision clause in the event of enlargement should be maintained in the next MFF and that national envelopes should not be affected; underlines that the next MFF will also have to put in place appropriate transitional and phasing-in measures for key spending areas, such as cohesion and agriculture, based on a careful assessment of the impacts on various sectors;

22. Stresses that the MFF should be adequately financed to deliver on the basic principles and strategic objectives that the EU is based on, including completing the upcoming rounds of enlargement and meeting the EU’s competitiveness objectives; calls on the Commission to propose a roadmap for the introduction of new own resources in the context of the 2028-2034 MFF, while ensuring sound financial management;

15. Considers that the next MFF will be crucial for preparing the EU for enlargement and the candidate countries for accession;

16. Recalls the Parliament position expressed in its resolution of 7 May 2025 on a revamped long-term budget for the Union in a changing world that the EU’s long-term budget must move away from the historically restrictive, self-imposed level of 1 % of aggregated gross national income; stresses that the Draghi and Letta reports have shown that significant additional own resources are required for the EU to become more competitive, complete the just and green transition and be in a position to defend itself autonomously from Russian aggression by 2030;

17. Stresses that the post 2027 MFF and a more effective budget, including the new own resources package, should enable the EU to move decisively towards enlarging while safeguarding current policies, programmes and priorities;

The democracy challenge

23.18. Stresses the importance of bolstering the democratic legitimacy of EU policies by reinforcing the decision-making and scrutiny rightsrights, including a strong right of inquiry, of the European Parliament, which is the only directly elected institution representing EU citizens;

24. Stresses that reforming the EU decision-making processes requires the empowerment of Parliament by placing it on an equal footing with the Council; reiterates its call for Parliament to gain the full right of legislative initiative – the power to introduce, amend or repeal Union law;

19. Underlines the key role that EU accession countries’ parliaments play in the EU accession process, in particular by passing accession-related legislation, and emphasises the importance of parliamentary cooperation and consensus-building on EU accession matters in this regard; reiterates the European Parliament’s readiness to use its political and technical resources to help parliaments in accession countries make progress on the EU-related reform agenda, including through democracy support activities; welcomes the progress made in a number of candidate countries, including through mediation activities and the Jean Monnet Dialogue process;

25. Considers it essential to improve the transparency and democratic accountability of Parliament, by strengthening the European dimension of the elections and by laying down uniform electoral rules across the EU; calls on the Council to work on the suggestions put forward in Parliament’s position of 3 May 2022; reiterates its call for Parliament and the Council to make progress in discussions on the introduction of a permanent mechanism for the allocation of seats of the European Parliament;

20. Stresses that reforming the EU decision-making processes requires the empowerment of Parliament by placing it on an equal footing with the Council; reiterates its call for Parliament to gain the full right of legislative initiative – the power to introduce, amend or repeal Union law; is convinced that a general and direct right of initiative would further strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the EU and empower EU citizens;

26. Reiterates its call for the strengthening of the instruments for citizens’ participation in EU decision-making processes;

21. Recognises that Parliament’s direct rights of initiative are far from sufficient to allow it to represent EU citizens, civil society and social partners within the European institutions, effectively leaving the Commission with a monopoly on legislative initiative;

22. Underlines that the Treaty of Lisbon already bestows direct rights of initiative on Parliament, acknowledging its competence to self-organise, its scrutiny function and its democratic legitimacy as the only directly elected EU institution;

23. Considers it essential to improve the transparency and democratic accountability of Parliament, by strengthening the European dimension of the elections and by laying down uniform electoral rules across the EU; calls on the remaining Member State to ratify Council Decision 2018/994; calls on the Council to work on the suggestions put forward in Parliament’s position of 3 May 2022; reiterates its call for Parliament and the Council to make progress in discussions on the introduction of a permanent mechanism for the allocation of seats of the European Parliament;

Means of implementing institutional pre-enlargement reforms

27.24. Considers that the above objectives of the institutional pre-enlargement reforms can be implemented by differentvarious means, including by activating the flexibilities offered by the current Treaties,Treaties through one or more targeted Treaty amendments or through accession Treaties and intergovernmental cooperation outside of the Treaty framework;amendments;

28.25. Recalls that a number of flexibility instruments, such as passerelle clauses, enhanced cooperation, constructive abstentions, PESCO and opt-out mechanisms, are already possible under the current EU legal framework, as evidenced by the experiences of the Schengen area, one of the greatest achievements of the EU, and the single currency; recalls that phasing-in solutions, temporary derogations and transition periods can be negotiated for certain policy fields in the context of accession procedures;

29. Argues that enhanced cooperation is part of the solution for an efficient and deepened enlarged EU; notes that Member States willing to move forward with European integration in a wider array of policy areas should be allowed to do so; underlines that under such a system of differentiated integration, while all Member States would take part in decisions about issues in the area of common ground, only Member States willing to participate in areas of deepened integration would take part in the decisions concerned; notes that differentiated integration also implies differentiated financial arrangements;

26. Reiterates its position that differentiated integration should always take place within the Treaty framework, should maintain the unity of the EU institutions and should not lead to the creation of parallel institutional arrangements or arrangements that indirectly contravene the spirit and the fundamental principles of EU law, but should instead enable specific bodies to be established where appropriate, without prejudice to the competences and role of the EU institutions;

30. Highlights that flexibilities provided by the current Treaties are essential for the creation of a defence union;

27. Highlights that flexibilities provided for by the current Treaties allow for more to be done to advance towards a European defence union, without requiring a comprehensive Treaty reform process; underlines that the establishment of a permanent European defence union will ultimately require a unanimous decision in line with Article 42(2);

31.28. Stresses that, in the field of defence, PESCO (ex Article 46 TEU) allowsenables a group of Member States to move forward towards the creation of thea European defence system; notes that, despite the fact that PESCO has mainly been used for industrial defence projects, it has the broader potential to allowenable willing Member States to institutionalise common defence without delay, even in the absence of unanimity within the European Council;

32.29. Underscores that, pursuant to existing Treaty provisions, a decision taken by qualified majority would allow the creation of a European defence system under Article 42(6) TEU and Article 1(b) of Protocol 10, while leaving the door open for other Member States to join at a later stage, as was the case with the economic and monetary union; calls, in this respect, on the Commission and on willing Member States to activate PESCO provisions to this end without delay;

33.30. Insists, that, in order to effectively reform the EUEU’s institutional framework in view of European unification, some targeted key Treaty changes are indispensable; recallsrecalls, in this respectrespect, its suggestions from its resolution of 22 November 2023 on proposals of the European Parliament for the amendment of the Treaties, in particular with regard to the reform of decision-making in the EU, increasing the use of QMV and the ordinary legislative procedure, changes in the composition of the Commission, and further empowering the European Parliament; reminds the European Council of its Treaty obligation to follow-up on Parliament’s activation of the ordinary Treaty reform procedure under Article 48 TEU;

34. Calls on the Member States to consider intergovernmental cooperation outside the framework of the Treaties through an additional Treaty among willing Member States, without prejudice to existing treaty law, and paving the way for differentiated integration within the EU as a last resort only; notes that differentiated integration of this kind, based on recent experiences, should subsequently be rapidly enshrined in the EU Treaties;

31. Calls on the Commission and the Council to clearly communicate the findings of the policy reviews and to develop, in cooperation with Parliament, a realistic, sequenced roadmap for implementing the necessary institutional reforms in conjunction with the enlargement process;

35. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

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ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

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Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that he received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the draft report:

32. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that he has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

The report sets forward Parliament’s position on the reforms of the institutional framework of the Union and a pathway towards the future functioning of an enlarged EU.

The point of departure of the report is to create a more powerful, efficient, competitive and democratic Union based on the principle of FREE POLITICAL choice, deepening EU’s integration in order to benefit for the challenges of the 21st century. The institutional framework of the Union requires modification to be fit to response to challenges of institutional and political nature, and the future enlargements are the catalyst for this change.

The first part of the report shows how the cost of “no reforms” – in the institutional architecture and decision-making for the enlarged Union of more than 30 Member States – is too high and risky. Therefore, the question is not whether to enlarge or not, but rather how to make the Union and its Member States benefit the most from the next enlargement. The challenges are known and well documented, the need for reform rather consensual, which makes this imperative all the more urgent.

The second part of the report explores ways – within and outside the Treaty framework – to help the enlarged Union:

• be more efficient (by reforming the composition and functioning of the main EU institutions: the Parliament, the Council and the Commission)

• act faster in its decision-making (due to lifting of vetoes)

• be more powerful (by creating a European defence system and boost investments)

• and be more democratic and accountable (by further empowering the Parliament as the only directly elected EU institutions, as well as by reforming of the European electoral law).

The last part of the report offers reflections about the possible ways of implementing the pre-enlargement institutional reforms. These consist of the following:

• flexibilities offered by the current Treaties: passerelle clauses, enhanced cooperation, constructive abstentions, permanent structured cooperation and opt-out mechanisms

• targeted key Treaty amendments, in line with proposals for institutional reforms outlined in the Parliament resolution of 22 November 2023 on proposals of the European Parliament for the amendment of the Treaties.

The report provides a timely contribution to the long-awaited Commission’s pre-enlargement policy reviews, to the Council Presidency progress report on the future of Europe as well as to the conclusions of the European Council on the same subject.

ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT

The rapporteur declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not include in his report input from interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register, or from representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies, to be listed in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

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