On the institutional consequences of the EU enlargement negotiations

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the institutional consequences of the EU enlargement negotiations

(2025/2041(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 31(3), 48 and 49 thereof,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular Articles 81(3), 83, 136, 153(2), 192(2), 312(2) and 333 thereof,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 23-24 June 2022, 29-30 June 2023, 26-27 October 2023, 14-15 December 2023 and 27 June 2024,

– having regard to the Council Presidency Progress Report on the future of Europe of 10 June 2024,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 23 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

– having regard to its resolutions of 16 February 2017 on improving the functioning of the European Union building on the potential of the Lisbon Treaty, and of 11 July 2023 on the implementation of the passerelle clauses in the EU Treaties,

– having regard to the report of 9 May 2022 on the final outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe and to its resolution of 4 May 2022 on the follow-up to the conclusions of the Conference on the Future of Europe,

– having regard to its resolutions of 9 June 2022 on the call for a Convention for the revision of the Treaties, and of 22 November 2023 on proposals of the European Parliament for the amendment of the Treaties, including through the activation of Article 48 TEU asking the European Council to agree to call a Convention to reform the Treaties,

– having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement,

– having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’, the report of 17 April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market’, and the report of 30 October 2024 by Sauli Niinistö entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

– having regard to the report of the Franco-German Working Group on EU Institutional Reform of 18 September 2023 entitled ‘Sailing on High Seas: Reforming and Enlarging the EU for the 21st century’,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A10-0000/2025),

A. whereas 9 of the 10 countries currently aspiring to join the EU have candidate status, some of which have held this status for many years; whereas the candidate countries are at various stages of the accession process and negotiations; whereas Georgia unilaterally suspended EU accession negotiations on 28 November 2024;

B. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and other ongoing geopolitical challenges, including a worrying shift in transatlantic relations, have given new geostrategic meaning and impetus to European unification;

C. whereas enlargement is a historic commitment and a strategic geopolitical priority, representing an investment in the future of the European continent;

D. whereas the EU’s institutional framework, and in particular its decision-making process, is barely adequate for a Union of 27 Member States; whereas the prospect of future enlargements makes the reform of EU institutions, policies and decision-making procedures more indispensable and urgent than ever;

E. whereas all previous enlargements have been preceded or accompanied by internal institutional reforms;

F. whereas the perspective of an upcoming enlargement exposes the EU to a threefold challenge of ensuring efficient decision-making procedures (the efficiency challenge), gathering sufficient resources to deliver on its strategic objectives (the power and resource challenge) and safeguarding the democratic legitimacy and accountability of its actions (the democracy challenge);

G. whereas pre-enlargement reforms of the EU’s institutional framework imply a possible advancement of differentiated integration solutions whenever the Treaties allow; whereas procedures pursuant to Articles 20, 42 and 46 TEU on enhanced cooperation and on permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) allow willing Member States to deepen their integration and enhance their cooperation within the framework of the EU’s non-exclusive competences;

H. whereas passerelle clauses could be used immediately to switch from the requirement for unanimity to qualified majority voting (QMV) in specific policy areas; whereas the TEU establishes that the ultimate objective of the progressive framing of a common EU defence policy is the establishment of a common defence by unanimous decision of the European Council, which must be compatible with NATO;

I. whereas, due to the limited flexibility of the Treaties, a more in-depth reform by means of targeted Treaty changes should be envisaged; whereas Parliament has activated the Treaty revision procedure and has submitted proposals for the amendment of the Treaties to the Council in accordance with Article 48(2) TEU;

J. whereas Member States have on several occasions resorted to intergovernmental cooperation outside the framework of the Treaties where unanimity prevented the widening of EU competences in key policy areas and have at a later stage enshrined this cooperation in the Treaties;

The cost of not reforming the enlarged EU

1. Argues that the EU and candidate countries have always used enlargement as a policy and geopolitical tool to promote democracy, stability, security, the fight against climate change, and prosperity across the continent; is of the view that EU enlargement represents a long-term geostrategic investment;

2. Recognises that an enlarged EU would gain higher economic power and leverage on the global stage, since a larger single market makes the EU an even more competitive economic player and an attractive trading partner; expresses concern that the failure to make progress in terms of EU enlargement could ultimately push non-EU countries on the European continent to align economically and politically with other blocs (e.g. Russia and China), potentially creating rival economic zones and reducing the EU’s global economic influence, while creating opportunities for destabilisation efforts to be conducted from the immediate EU neighbourhood;

3. Stresses that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and other geopolitical challenges accentuate the urgency of advancing the enlargement process; maintains that a successful and sustainable enlargement requires long-term political vision and bold decisions, aiming at promoting an efficient, powerful and democratic Europe;

4. Underscores that the European Political Community represents an ideal forum to promote European unification and pursue policy coordination and the alignment of candidate and other non-EU countries, notably in terms of EU foreign, defence and security policy;

5. Underlines that the countries that joined the EU in 2004 have experienced substantial economic growth and higher standards in several areas; highlights that over the past 20 years, the EU’s economy has grown by 27 %; underlines, furthermore, that the countries that were already part of the EU at the time of the 2004 enlargement have also experienced growth and prosperity;

6. Recalls that GDP per capita of the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia remains around or below 50 % of that of the EU, and that the pace of achieving convergence is slow, but highlights that the experience of EU enlargement in 2004 demonstrates the positive impact that membership of the EU single market and access to structural funds have on economic convergence;

7. Recognises that some countries outside the European Union are dealing with varying levels of political instability and that bringing those countries into the EU will bring stability to the region and help protect the EU’s external borders, in particular as regards organised and cross-border crime, drug trafficking, the prevention of irregular migration and the smuggling of migrants, trafficking in human beings, cybercrime, interference in democratic and electoral processes, and money laundering; stresses that the EU has at its disposal an extensive set of tools to enforce compliance with fundamental values in the Member States and safeguard the political stability of the European project as a whole; points out, however, that this set of tools must still be strengthened;

8. Notes that experience shows that each new wave of enlargement brings new challenges of an institutional and political nature that have to be addressed before the candidate countries become Member States, or else the EU risks institutional gridlock and its functioning becoming unwieldy and ineffective; points out that every enlargement in the history of the European project was preceded or accompanied by the necessary internal institutional reforms;

9. Acknowledges that an enlarged EU will be more cumbersome to manage and more prone to paralysis with regard to the challenges faced in the current enlargement process: the use of unanimity in the Council for foreign affairs issues and for the enlargement policy, which could slow down accession of new members due to bilateral issues, the composition of the Commission and of Parliament, the cumbersome and outdated structure and governance of the EU budget, and the redistribution shocks in the allocation of agricultural and cohesion funds;

10. Reiterates its position that the deepening of the Union and European unification should proceed hand in hand; stresses that EU institutional and financial reforms are needed to face those challenges and to ensure the EU’s capacity to absorb new members and to promote their successful integration without destabilising the other Member States’ economies or exacerbating social tensions;

11. Recognises that ad hoc solutions could serve as temporary fixes, but they lack the predictability, democratic transparency and accountability, and long-term sustainability that only structural reforms can bring about;

12. Encourages the Commission to develop an ambitious and comprehensive pre-enlargement policy and funding review in line with the below recommendations;

Objectives of the institutional pre-enlargement reforms: efficiency, power and democracy

13. Firmly believes that the EU institutional reforms, regardless of the decision-making procedure for their adoption, should increase the EU’s ability to act in an efficient and timely manner; points out that the pre-enlargement reforms of the EU institutional framework should meet the objectives of improving the EU’s efficiency, making the EU more powerful on the global stage and making the EU more democratic, legitimate and accountable;

The efficiency challenge

14. Underlines that, in order to improve the enlarged EU’s efficiency, the composition of the EU institutions must be changed and their functioning enhanced; suggests that the enlargement process should be supported by the early and close involvement of candidate countries in the functioning of the EU institutions, e.g. through observer status;

15. Notes that institutional pre-enlargement reforms must address the implications of enlargement for the composition of Parliament; underlines that, while ensuring appropriate democratic representativeness, Parliament should remain a workable size; highlights the need to prioritise internal and interinstitutional work on the identification of a permanent seat allocation mechanism, capable of ensuring fair, transparent and durable demographic and geographical representation; recalls its position that Parliament’s composition should be the exclusive prerogative of Parliament and should be reconsidered together with the voting system in the Council;

16. Notes that the composition of the Commission must take enlargement into account; recalls, in this regard, the flexibility provided for in the Treaty of Lisbon; highlights that the inevitable reduction in the size of the College of Commissioners must ensure a geographically and demographically balanced composition of the Commission as established by the Treaties;

17. Stresses the need for a swift revision of the Council’s functioning and decision-making process in view of enlargement; proposes a review of the system of rotating presidencies of the Council; notes that qualified majority must be redefined to improve the balance between larger and smaller states and to retain higher thresholds for the most important and politically delicate decisions; calls for the utmost transparency and integrity of the Council’s decision-making process in the context of enlargement;

18. Is of the opinion that this can be achieved by simplified and more effective decision-making procedures, moving away from unanimity; reiterates that QMV should be implemented in areas such as the protection of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the multiannual financial framework (MFF), sanctions and other relevant foreign policy decisions, such the opening and closing of individual negotiation clusters and the sanctioning of backtracking during enlargement negotiations, but with the exception, for instance, of decisions authorising military missions or operations with an executive mandate, and the decisions to launch and to close the enlargement negotiations;

19. Proposes that the procedure in Article 7 TEU be reformed by ending unanimity in European Council decisions, by introducing a clear time frame and by making the Court of Justice of the European Union the arbiter of violations;

The power and resources challenge

20. Reiterates its call to revise the governance of the MFF, namely by attributing full co-legislative powers over both the expenditure and revenue sides of the EU budget, including the adoption of the MFF and the system of own resources;

21. Urges the Commission and the Member States to abandon the self-imposed and outdated principle according to which the size of the EU’s long-term budget must not exceed 1 % of aggregated gross national income in its 2028-2034 MFF proposal;

22. Stresses that the MFF should be adequately financed to deliver on the basic principles and strategic objectives that the EU is based on, including completing the upcoming rounds of enlargement and meeting the EU’s competitiveness objectives; calls on the Commission to propose a roadmap for the introduction of new own resources in the context of the 2028-2034 MFF, while ensuring sound financial management;

The democracy challenge

23. Stresses the importance of bolstering the democratic legitimacy of EU policies by reinforcing the decision-making and scrutiny rights of the European Parliament, which is the only directly elected institution representing EU citizens;

24. Stresses that reforming the EU decision-making processes requires the empowerment of Parliament by placing it on an equal footing with the Council; reiterates its call for Parliament to gain the full right of legislative initiative – the power to introduce, amend or repeal Union law;

25. Considers it essential to improve the transparency and democratic accountability of Parliament, by strengthening the European dimension of the elections and by laying down uniform electoral rules across the EU; calls on the Council to work on the suggestions put forward in Parliament’s position of 3 May 2022; reiterates its call for Parliament and the Council to make progress in discussions on the introduction of a permanent mechanism for the allocation of seats of the European Parliament;

26. Reiterates its call for the strengthening of the instruments for citizens’ participation in EU decision-making processes;

Means of implementing institutional pre-enlargement reforms

27. Considers that the above objectives of the institutional pre-enlargement reforms can be implemented by different means, including by activating the flexibilities offered by the current Treaties, through one or more targeted Treaty amendments or through accession Treaties and intergovernmental cooperation outside of the Treaty framework;

28. Recalls that a number of flexibility instruments, such as passerelle clauses, enhanced cooperation, constructive abstentions, PESCO and opt-out mechanisms, are already possible under the current EU legal framework, as evidenced by the experiences of the Schengen area, one of the greatest achievements of the EU, and the single currency; recalls that phasing-in solutions, temporary derogations and transition periods can be negotiated for certain policy fields in the context of accession procedures;

29. Argues that enhanced cooperation is part of the solution for an efficient and deepened enlarged EU; notes that Member States willing to move forward with European integration in a wider array of policy areas should be allowed to do so; underlines that under such a system of differentiated integration, while all Member States would take part in decisions about issues in the area of common ground, only Member States willing to participate in areas of deepened integration would take part in the decisions concerned; notes that differentiated integration also implies differentiated financial arrangements;

30. Highlights that flexibilities provided by the current Treaties are essential for the creation of a defence union;

31. Stresses that, in the field of defence, PESCO (ex Article 46 TEU) allows a group of Member States to move forward towards the creation of the European defence system; notes that, despite the fact that PESCO has mainly been used for industrial defence projects, it has the broader potential to allow willing Member States to institutionalise common defence without delay, even in the absence of unanimity within the European Council;

32. Underscores that, pursuant to existing Treaty provisions, a decision taken by qualified majority would allow the creation of a European defence system under Article 42(6) TEU and Article 1(b) of Protocol 10, while leaving the door open for other Member States to join at a later stage, as was the case with the economic and monetary union; calls, in this respect, on the Commission and on willing Member States to activate PESCO provisions to this end without delay;

33. Insists, that, in order to effectively reform the EU institutional framework in view of European unification, some targeted key Treaty changes are indispensable; recalls in this respect its suggestions from its resolution of 22 November 2023 on proposals of the European Parliament for the amendment of the Treaties, in particular with regard to the reform of decision-making in the EU, increasing the use of QMV and the ordinary legislative procedure, changes in the composition of the Commission, and further empowering the European Parliament;

34. Calls on the Member States to consider intergovernmental cooperation outside the framework of the Treaties through an additional Treaty among willing Member States, without prejudice to existing treaty law, and paving the way for differentiated integration within the EU as a last resort only; notes that differentiated integration of this kind, based on recent experiences, should subsequently be rapidly enshrined in the EU Treaties;

35. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

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