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DRAFT REPORT (2025/2041(INI))

On the institutional consequences of the EU enlargement negotiations

AFCO-PR-774293

Committee on Constitutional Affairs · Rapporteur: Sandro Gozi

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Written by a language model from the full text only; every figure comes from the text. The paragraph links open the paragraph a statement rests on — check the text itself before relying on it.

This draft report on the institutional consequences of EU enlargement argues that enlargement is a strategic investment and that the EU must reform its institutions to remain efficient, powerful and democratic. It proposes moving away from unanimity to qualified majority voting in specific areas, reforming the composition of Parliament, the Commission and the Council, and revising the EU budget. It calls for Treaty changes and the use of flexibility instruments such as passerelle clauses, enhanced cooperation and PESCO to enable deeper integration.

Committee position. The rapporteur proposes a resolution arguing that enlargement requires institutional reforms to improve efficiency, power and democracy, and recommends using Treaty flexibility, targeted Treaty changes and intergovernmental cooperation as means.

Key points

  1. Enlargement is a geostrategic investment that promotes democracy, stability and prosperity; failure to enlarge could push non-EU countries towards other blocs.
  2. The EU must reform its institutions and decision-making to avoid gridlock and absorb new members without destabilising existing economies.
  3. Calls for a swift revision of the Council's functioning, including a review of rotating presidencies and redefining qualified majority to balance larger and smaller states.
  4. Qualified majority voting should apply to areas like rule of law, the multiannual financial framework, sanctions and enlargement negotiations, but not to decisions on military missions or launching and closing negotiations.
  5. Proposes reforming Article 7 TEU by ending unanimity in European Council decisions, introducing a clear time frame and making the Court of Justice the arbiter of violations.
  6. Calls for revising the multiannual financial framework governance, giving Parliament full co-legislative powers over expenditure and revenue, and abandoning the 1 % of gross national income cap.
  7. Urges the Commission to propose a roadmap for new own resources for the 2028-2034 MFF and to develop a comprehensive pre-enlargement policy and funding review.
  8. Demands that Parliament gain the full right of legislative initiative and be placed on an equal footing with the Council, and calls for uniform electoral rules and a permanent seat allocation mechanism.
  9. Recommends using flexibility instruments like passerelle clauses, enhanced cooperation, constructive abstentions and PESCO to deepen integration without Treaty change.
  10. Calls for activating PESCO provisions to create a European defence system under Article 42(6) TEU, allowing willing member states to move forward without unanimity.
  11. Insists that targeted Treaty changes are indispensable, recalling Parliament's proposals of 22 November 2023 on decision-making, QMV, Commission composition and empowering Parliament.
  12. Suggests that member states consider intergovernmental cooperation outside the Treaties as a last resort, with such cooperation later enshrined in the Treaties.

Who is affected

  • Candidate countries aspiring to join the EU, including Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, would be affected by accession procedures and pre-enlargement reforms.
  • EU institutions – Parliament, Commission and Council – would see changes in composition, decision-making and powers.
  • Member states willing to deepen integration could use enhanced cooperation and PESCO, while others may opt out.

Figures and deadlines

  • 9 of the 10 countries aspiring to join the EU have candidate status.
  • Over the past 20 years, the EU's economy has grown by 27 %.
  • GDP per capita of Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia is around or below 50 % of the EU's.
  • The EU's long-term budget must not exceed 1 % of aggregated gross national income in the 2028-2034 MFF proposal.

Legal basis: Articles 31(3), 48 and 49 TEU; Articles 81(3), 83, 136, 153(2), 192(2), 312(2) and 333 TFEU.