What changed

G. whereas the EU expects China to prove its interest in improving EU-China relations, including a fair trade approach, as well as in preventing decoupling and bloc-based confrontation; whereas the EU’s objective should be to strengthen its strategic autonomy, underpinned neither by dependence nor by confrontation, but by principled engagement from a position of strength, protecting European values, interests, security and prosperity while preserving channels of dialogue and cooperation; whereas engagement does not imply endorsement, convergence, lowering of standards or leniency toward violations of human rights; whereas cooperation should be reversible and combine deeper partnership with greater alignment on rules;

H.I. whereas China is a decisive enabler of Russia’s illegal and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, serving as the largest provider of dual-use goods and helping it circumvent sanctions; whereas without China’s and other countries' support, Russia would not be able to wage its war of aggression against Ukraine to the same extent or with the same force; whereas China’s diplomatic, economic, and material support to Russia’s war of aggression, including the supply of dual use items used in military supply chains, violates the UN Charter and China's own narrative of neutrality, including China’s own Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; whereas China is directly involved in developing ammunition production capabilities in Belarus, including through the provision of key production equipment and production lines, further strengthening the military-industrial capacity available to support Russia’s war effort; whereas the People’s Republic of China continues to deepen its military cooperation with Russia and Belarus, including through joint military exercises, conducted even in the immediate vicinity of the EU, despite both countries engaging in hostile activities against Member States and posing a direct threat to European security;

K.L. whereas the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is the only state that has directly deployed troops in support of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas serious concerns persist regarding potential transfers of nuclear or ballistic missile–related technologies to the DPRK in exchange for arms and military personnel supplied to Russia; whereas, since 2024, Chinese authorities have reportedly forcibly repatriated at least 406 refugees to the DPRK, thus contributing to the serious human rights violations committed under the totalitarian regime of Kim Jong Un;L. whereas the EU’s trade deficit with China stood at EUR 305.8 billion in 2024; whereas the growing asymmetry in EU-China relations in key sectors, including access to markets, technological capabilities, industrial policy and critical raw materials, poses challenges and creates dependencies for the EU, while providing opportunities for Chinese coercion;Un;

M. whereas the EU’s trade deficit with China stood at EUR 305,8 billion in 2024; whereas the growing asymmetry in EU-China relations in key sectors, including access to markets, technological capabilities, industrial policy and critical raw materials, poses challenges and creates dependencies for the EU, while providing opportunities for Chinese coercion;

P.Q. whereas the EU should pursue an autonomous, interest-based approach that safeguards European economic security and strategic sovereignty; whereas the EU has a considerable trade toolbox it could resortproactively toand usingassertively use to address the unbalanced EU-China trade relationship; whereas the EU should also work more closely with like-minded partners, includingsuch withas Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, India, Mexico, South Korea, the Philippines and the United States;

AD.AE. whereas, despite its claims of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states, China has repeatedly violated other states’ sovereignty; whereas in recent years, numerous Confucius Institutes in Europe, America and Australia have been closed over concerns that Beijing is using them to spread propaganda, conduct espionage andespionage, divert key technologies;technologies, and curtail freedom of expression and academic freedom, including through their ambiguous legal status and financial leverage;

AO.AP. whereas the EU’s most recent China strategy dates from 2019; whereas a unified, pragmatic, consistent, comprehensive and principled EU policy towards China is therefore needed to determine the EU’s future in global affairs; whereas suchthe aEU-China policycomprehensive strategic partnership should be based on the current geopolitical situation and therefore have a clear focus on security as well as on the EU’s values, strategic autonomyautonomy, interests and reciprocity;priorities, including security;

e)(e) condemn and react to China’s role as a decisive enabler and dual-use provider of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and increase the cost for this stance; underscore the Chinese diplomatic backing and material assistance that sustains the Russian military-industrial complex; in particular, express deep concern over credible evidence of China’s growing involvement in the supply chain for Russian weapons, and drones, including the provision of dual-use technologies, components, and high-tech equipment that directly bolster Russia’s capacity to strike Ukrainian civilians and infrastructure; further express deep concern over verified reports that the Chinese military has trained Russian military personnel to fight in Ukraine;

k) take action to prevent further security risks arising from Chinese foreign investment by strengthening foreign direct investment (FDI) screening in Member States, particularly in strategic sectors such as media services, critical raw materials, critical infrastructure and technologies; urgently address the monopolistic positions of China in critical and essential chokepoints by prioritising the strengthening of alternative resilient supply chains;

(k) ensure the strict application of customs duties on small non-European parcels valued at EUR 150 or less, in force since the 1 July 2026, and of the EU-wide handling fee on small parcels applicable from 1 November 2026; check the effectiveness of existing measures in curbing the harmful effects of practices such as ‘ultra-fast fashion’; stand ready, where necessary, to urge Member State authorities to adopt any further action required to intensify and tighten controls on non-compliant, dangerous or unsafe goods often sold through Chinese online platforms (such as Temu, Shein or AliExpress);

l) acknowledge that overdependencies on Chinese technologies and resources in the area of climate change prevention and green transition also render the EU vulnerable; therefore, strengthen economic security-related actions in the area of green transition; in the light of the fact that China’s export of clean/green technologies is largely driven by industrial policy objectives and sustained by excessive state subsidies and export-oriented overcapacity, address the issue of unfair competition for European green-technology industries;

(l) take action to prevent further security risks arising from Chinese foreign investment by strengthening foreign direct investment (FDI) screening in Member States, particularly in strategic sectors such as media services, critical raw materials, critical infrastructure and technologies; urgently address the monopolistic positions of China in critical and essential chokepoints by prioritising the strengthening of alternative resilient supply chains;

m) recognise the immense socio-economic challenges currently confronting China, many of which stem from its own policy choices and structural imbalances; underline that the EU cannot accept distortions to global markets or threats to its strategic interests that undermine fair competition and economic sovereignty; reiterate that while prioritising negotiated solutions and open channels of communication, the EU reserves the right to pursue unilateral measures under its economic security strategy wherever engagement with Chinese authorities proves ineffective or insufficient; highlight that any resolution of China's overcapacity must be achieved without imposing disproportionate costs on EU taxpayers or industries;

(m) acknowledge that overdependencies on Chinese technologies and resources in the area of climate change prevention and green transition also render the EU vulnerable; therefore, strengthen economic security-related actions in the area of green transition; in the light of the fact that China’s export of clean/green technologies is largely driven by industrial policy objectives and sustained by excessive state subsidies and export-oriented overcapacity, address the issue of unfair competition for European green-technology industries;

n) knowing that in times of significant economic pressure and increasing geostrategic transactionalism, the economic costs of coercion and economic retaliation should be avoided, find ways to counter the adverse effects of international tensions in the understanding that EU solidarity is essential to withstand international pressure; with that in mind, strengthen EU mechanisms to monitor and quickly target China’s economic coercion against Member States, ensuring that no single EU Member State faces economic coercion alone;

(n) recognise the immense socio-economic challenges currently confronting China, many of which stem from its own policy choices and structural imbalances; underline that the EU cannot accept distortions to global markets or threats to its strategic interests that undermine fair competition and economic sovereignty; reiterate that while prioritising negotiated solutions and open channels of communication, the EU reserves the right to pursue unilateral measures under its economic security strategy wherever engagement with Chinese authorities proves ineffective or insufficient; highlight that any resolution of China's overcapacity must be achieved without imposing disproportionate costs on EU taxpayers or industries;

o) proactively and jointly address the implications of technological and economic competition with China, especially the asymmetry in market access and the lack of legal certainty for European companies in China; stress the need for reciprocity and a level playing field in all trade and investment relations with China; insist that Beijing remove barriers and unfair practices that violate World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments; support proportionate EU actions to defend its interests if China fails to provide reciprocal market openness;

(o) knowing that in times of significant economic pressure and increasing geostrategic transactionalism, the economic costs of coercion and economic retaliation should be avoided, find ways to counter the adverse effects of international tensions in the understanding that EU solidarity is essential to withstand international pressure; with that in mind, strengthen EU mechanisms to monitor and quickly target China’s economic coercion against Member States, ensuring that no single EU Member State faces economic coercion alone; note that, following China’s economic coercion against Lithuania, bilateral relations, including diplomatic and economic relations, have not yet normalised;

p) underscore the geopolitical ramifications of the US-China trade conflict and its potential spillover effects on the EU economy; actively shape the EU’s Indo-Pacific and Asian partnerships by coordinating with like-minded actors, and seek closer alignment with them on trade, technology standards and supply chain resilience to work around China's monopoly in critical areas; seize the opportunity for the EU to present itself as a reliable and desirable partner in the Indo-Pacific and emphasise that increased cooperation with like-minded partners is essential in the light of the instrumentalisation by China of rare earth minerals and the need for the EU to diversify its suppliers of critical raw materials to ensure resilient supply chains; in this regard, welcome the signing between the EU and Australia of the Strategic Partnership on sustainable critical and strategic minerals; stress the need for the EU to invest in the R&D and innovation ecosystem to avoid technological dependency;

(p) proactively and jointly address the implications of technological and economic competition with China, especially the asymmetry in market access and the lack of legal certainty for European companies in China; stress the need for reciprocity and a level playing field in all trade and investment relations with China; insist that Beijing remove barriers and unfair practices that violate World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments; support proportionate EU actions to defend its interests if China fails to provide reciprocal market openness;

q) recognise the strategic importance of enhancing EU-India relations to counterbalance China’s regional ambitions; consider India a key partner and ask India to take up its responsibility, also towards Russia, in consolidating the global security architecture rooted in the full respect of international norms and principles;

(q) underscore the geopolitical ramifications of the US-China trade conflict and its potential spillover effects on the EU economy; actively shape the EU’s Indo-Pacific and Asian partnerships by coordinating with like-minded actors, and seek closer alignment with them on trade, technology standards and supply chain resilience to work around China's monopoly in critical areas; seize the opportunity for the EU to present itself as a reliable and desirable partner in the Indo-Pacific and emphasise that increased cooperation with like-minded partners is essential in the light of the instrumentalisation by China of rare earth minerals and the need for the EU to diversify its suppliers of critical raw materials to ensure resilient supply chains; in this regard, welcome the signing between the EU and Australia of the Strategic Partnership on sustainable critical and strategic minerals; stress the need for the EU to invest in the R&D and innovation ecosystem to avoid technological dependency;

r) further highlight the positive effect and strategic importance of deepening ties between the EU and Taiwan, which is a valuable partner in trade and technology; in this regard, coordinate with the EU's global partners;

(r) recognise the strategic importance of enhancing EU-India relations to counterbalance China’s regional ambitions; consider India a key partner and ask India to take up its responsibility, also towards Russia, in consolidating the global security architecture rooted in the full respect of international norms and principles;

s) appoint an EU Special Envoy for the Korean Peninsula to closely monitor the situation and to coordinate the necessary measures with the international community, including engaging with China to confirm its opposition to the North Korean nuclear programme and use its influence to stop it;

(s) further highlight the positive effect and strategic importance of deepening ties between the EU and Taiwan, which is a valuable partner in trade and technology; in this regard, coordinate with the EU's global partners;

t) strengthen EU engagement in the Western Balkans to counter growing Chinese economic influence, particularly through the infrastructure investments and preferential loans China has provided that have created dependencies in some of these countries;

(t) appoint an EU Special Envoy for the Korean Peninsula to closely monitor the situation and to coordinate the necessary measures with the international community, including engaging with China to confirm its opposition to the North Korean nuclear programme and use its influence to stop it;

u) recognise the strategic importance of the Arctic and the High North for European and transatlantic security; ensure that EU policy on China must reflect the strategic vulnerabilities in this region, and include robust monitoring of Chinese scientific, economic and infrastructural activities in the Arctic, especially their dual-use nature and their interaction with Russian military presence in the region;

(u) strengthen EU engagement in the Western Balkans to counter growing Chinese economic influence, particularly through the infrastructure investments and preferential loans China has provided that have created dependencies in some of these countries;

v) further develop the Global Gateway in order to offer a model of trusted connectivity that is based on equality, sustainability and transparency, providing a credible alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative fully based on sustainable development, while fully respecting international and EU norms and standards, including the Paris Agreement, the Kunming-Montreal Biodiversity Framework, and International Labour Organization (ILO) core conventions;

(v) recognise the strategic importance of the Arctic and the High North for European and transatlantic security; ensure that EU policy on China must reflect the strategic vulnerabilities in this region, and include robust monitoring of Chinese scientific, economic and infrastructural activities in the Arctic, especially their dual-use nature and their interaction with Russian military presence in the region;

w) recognise that the EU has to be more efficient in its Global Gateway projects and that this is possible without compromising EU norms and standards regarding transparency, environmental sustainability, labour rights and economic viability; insist that Global Gateway projects should support fair, mutually beneficial, climate-resilient and transparent development partnerships with countries that align themselves with the EU rather than with China or other authoritarian powers; recognise that Africa is a priority partner for the Global Gateway in this effort and enhance the EU’s overall engagement with the continent, while also acknowledging Latin America as a priority partner;

(w) further develop the Global Gateway in order to offer a model of trusted connectivity that is based on equality, sustainability and transparency, providing a credible alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative fully based on sustainable development, while fully respecting international and EU norms and standards, including the Paris Agreement, the Kunming-Montreal Biodiversity Framework, and International Labour Organization (ILO) core conventions;

x) counter China’s expanding political and economic footprint and address the risks stemming from China’s growing political and financial leverage over several African countries; engage with China to reduce and alleviate the debt burden on developing countries, including by transforming China’s loans into grants; call attention to China’s growing economic, political and security influence in Latin America and the Caribbean, including through the Belt and Road Initiative, large-scale infrastructure and port investments, military engagement and technological cooperation with authoritarian regimes such as those in Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela; warn that these activities strengthen China’s global strategic reach and increase economic dependencies;

(x) recognise that the EU has to be more efficient in its Global Gateway projects and that this is possible without compromising EU norms and standards regarding transparency, environmental sustainability, labour rights and economic viability; insist that Global Gateway projects should support fair, mutually beneficial, climate-resilient and transparent development partnerships with countries that align themselves with the EU rather than with China or other authoritarian powers; recognise that Africa is a priority partner for the Global Gateway in this effort and enhance the EU’s overall engagement with the continent, while also acknowledging Latin America as a priority partner;

y) reinforce financial due-diligence and procurement safeguards under the Global Gateway to prevent EU-funded infrastructure projects from creating or deepening strategic dependencies on China; stresses the need for transparent procurement, risk mitigation and consistent application of EU standards;

(y) counter China’s expanding political and economic footprint by offering a better alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative through the Global Gateway and similar EU initiatives to increase the EU’s presence and engagement with partners in the Global South, particularly African and Latin American countries; strengthen efforts to counter anti-EU narratives in these countries; engage with China to reduce and alleviate the debt burden on developing countries, also by transforming its loans into grants; call attention to China’s growing economic, political and security influence in Latin America and the Caribbean, large-scale infrastructure and port investments, military engagement and technological cooperation with authoritarian regimes such as those in Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela; warn that these activities strengthen China’s global strategic reach and increase economic dependencies;

z) strengthen due-diligence and anti-corruption screening in all EU external funding and investment instruments involving China; ensure that no entity involved in systemic corruption can participate in EU-financed projects; introduce anti-corruption standards and stricter transparency requirements for supply chains, ownership structures and subcontracting, and establish mechanisms for continuous monitoring of corruption risks in projects involving Chinese partners;

(z) reinforce financial due-diligence and procurement safeguards under the Global Gateway to prevent EU-funded infrastructure projects from creating or deepening strategic dependencies on China; stresses the need for transparent procurement, risk mitigation and consistent application of EU standards;

aa) recognising that China’s military-civil fusion strategy is a state-driven effort to integrate civilian and military sectors in order to enhance Chinese government control and the People’s Liberation Army’s capabilities by acquiring advanced global technologies, express concern about Chinese private companies aligning with state interests, thus advancing China’s geopolitical influence; highlighting that the military-civil fusion seeks global technological, economic and military dominance, urges the Commission and the Member States to reduce EU dependency on Chinese-controlled resources and infrastructure that pose security, intelligence and economic risks to Europe’s autonomy and strategic resilience;

(aa) strengthen due-diligence and anti-corruption screening in all EU external funding and investment instruments involving China; ensure that no entity involved in systemic corruption can participate in EU-financed projects; introduce anti-corruption standards and stricter transparency requirements for supply chains, ownership structures and subcontracting, and establish mechanisms for continuous monitoring of corruption risks in projects involving Chinese partners;

ab) confirm that the EU’s One China policy is the guiding framework for the EU’s foreign policy decisions as regards Taiwan and that the EU has never endorsed the One China Principle and opposes any provocation or unilateral attempt to violate the status quo by force or coercion, or against the will of the Taiwanese people; work with Member States and other democratic partners in the region on closer security coordination, including a continuous naval presence and joint exercises, to reinforce stability in the region; fulfil the pledge made by the Commission before Parliament to work towards deterring China from provoking or escalating tensions with Taiwan; make clear that the EU will continue to develop its relations with the island in a number of areas, while adhering to the EU’s long-standing One China policy and encouraging dialogue and constructive engagement across the Taiwan Strait; in this context, call on the United Nations to reject Chinese demands and grant Taiwanese passport holders – including tourists, journalists, NGO workers and political activists – access to tours and events in the United Nations;

(ab) recognising that China’s military-civil fusion strategy is a state-driven effort to integrate civilian and military sectors in order to enhance Chinese government control and the People’s Liberation Army’s capabilities by acquiring advanced global technologies, express concern about Chinese private companies aligning with state interests, thus advancing China’s geopolitical influence; highlighting that the military-civil fusion seeks global technological, economic and military dominance, urges the Commission and the Member States to reduce EU dependency on Chinese-controlled resources and infrastructure that pose security, intelligence and economic risks to Europe’s autonomy and strategic resilience; condemns China's revised National Defence Mobilisation Law, which came into effect on 1 October 2026 and brings all Chinese technology, data and software under direct authority of China's military leadership in the event of mobilisation; highlights the urgent need to de-risk critical ICT supply chains;

ac) actively engage in diplomatic efforts to push back against China’s escalation in the Taiwan Strait, the South and East China Sea; reaffirm unwavering support for freedom of navigation and overflight in the Indo-Pacific, in line with international law including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); strengthen maritime security cooperation with India and other Indo-Pacific partners in response to China's expanding naval presence in the region and systematic attempts to severely undermine freedom of navigation; intensify dialogue with China with a view to strengthening the fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, and increasing transparency on the scope and activities of its fleet;

(ac) confirm that the EU’s One China policy is the guiding framework for the EU’s foreign policy decisions as regards Taiwan and that the EU has never endorsed the One China Principle and opposes any provocation or unilateral attempt to violate the status quo by force or coercion, or against the will of the Taiwanese people; work with Member States and other democratic partners in the region on closer security coordination, including a continuous naval presence and joint exercises, to reinforce stability in the region; fulfil the pledge made by the Commission before Parliament to work towards deterring China from provoking or escalating tensions with Taiwan; make clear that the EU will continue to develop its relations with the island in a number of areas, while adhering to the EU’s long-standing One China policy and encouraging dialogue and constructive engagement across the Taiwan Strait; in this context, call on the United Nations to reject Chinese demands and grant Taiwanese passport holders – including tourists, journalists, NGO workers and political activists – access to tours and events in the United Nations;

ad) put forward concrete contingency measures, including scenario planning, designed to deter Beijing's disruptive unilateral actions in the region; keep defending the principle of the prohibition of the use of force codified in the UN Charter which applies regardless of sovereignty disputes; oppose the distortion of UN Resolution 2758 by China to support its claims over Taiwan’s territory and sovereignty;

(ad) reject China’s attempts to coerce international organisations, third countries and other actors into restricting Taiwan’s international participation and contacts, as recently demonstrated by the pressure exerted by Beijing over the participation of Taiwan’s Vice-President Hsiao Bi-khim in the Ventotene European Conference for Freedom and Democracy organised by the European Parliament;

ae) highlight the importance of deepening economic and technological cooperation with Taiwan in fields such as semiconductors and cybersecurity, as a way to strengthen Europe’s resilience and safeguard critical supply chains; launch, without delay, preparatory measures for negotiations on a bilateral investment agreement, or other kinds of agreement, such as a memorandum of understanding on critical supply chains, with Taiwan; stress the potential for cooperation on policy regarding FDI screening and on tackling economic coercion and retaliation;

(ae) actively engage in diplomatic efforts to push back against China’s escalation in the Taiwan Strait, the South and East China Sea; reaffirm unwavering support for freedom of navigation and overflight in the Indo-Pacific, in line with international law including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); strengthen maritime security cooperation with India and other Indo-Pacific partners in response to China's expanding naval presence in the region and systematic attempts to severely undermine freedom of navigation; intensify dialogue with China with a view to strengthening the fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, and increasing transparency on the scope and activities of its fleet;

af) bolster EU preparedness and democratic resilience to counter the growing risks from Chinese proliferated technologies and hybrid threats, including in areas such as data storage, connected vehicles and electricity grids, and from foreign information manipulation and political interference, and espionage, particularly when they occur on China-linked social media platforms, such as TikTok, Wechat and Xiaohongshu, and other platforms, such as Chinese online shops that gather personal data;

(af) put forward concrete contingency measures, including scenario planning, designed to deter Beijing's disruptive unilateral actions in the region; keep defending the principle of the prohibition of the use of force codified in the UN Charter which applies regardless of sovereignty disputes; oppose the distortion of UN Resolution 2758 by China to support its claims over Taiwan’s territory and sovereignty;

ag) underline that Chinese influence operations are documented in EEAS Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) threat reports and European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) assessments, and aim to influence European public debate, exfiltrate sensitive data, spread conspiracy theories and undermine democratic processes; in addition, they pose risks to privacy, data protection and freedom of expression;

(ag) highlight the importance of deepening economic and technological cooperation with Taiwan in fields such as semiconductors and cybersecurity, as a way to strengthen Europe’s resilience and safeguard critical supply chains; launch, without delay, preparatory measures for negotiations on a bilateral investment agreement, or other kinds of agreement, such as a memorandum of understanding on critical supply chains, with Taiwan; stress the potential for cooperation on policy regarding FDI screening and on tackling economic coercion and retaliation;

ah) acknowledging that these influence activities use opaque algorithms, demand transparency on algorithms, data flows to China, and potential influence by Chinese state organs; in parallel, adopt an integrated response encompassing cyber, political, informational and technological dimensions and all necessary measures to prevent illegal digital activities, counter Chinese disinformation campaigns and other types of hybrid operations;

(ah) bolster EU preparedness and democratic resilience to counter the growing risks from Chinese proliferated technologies and hybrid threats, including in areas such as data storage, connected vehicles and electricity grids, and from foreign information manipulation and political interference, and espionage, particularly when they occur on China-linked social media platforms, such as TikTok, Wechat and Xiaohongshu, and other platforms, such as Chinese online shops that gather personal data;

ai) strengthen EU cybersecurity frameworks, being mindful of the growing use of generative artificial intelligence for the automated dissemination of disinformation and for the influencing of democratic processes, and of the risks in the area of the Internet of Things (IoT); fortify, moreover, server defences against cyberattacks and apply the Digital Services Act, the Data Act and other EU digital legislation to mitigate systemic risks posed by platforms linked to Chinese state influence;

(ai) underline that Chinese influence operations are documented in EEAS Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) threat reports and European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) assessments, and aim to influence European public debate, exfiltrate sensitive data, spread conspiracy theories and undermine democratic processes; in addition, they pose risks to privacy, data protection and freedom of expression;

aj) urge Member States to rigorously implement the EU’s FDI Screening Regulation to shield critical assets, such as ports, energy grids and telecommunications, including 5G networks, from strategic threats;

(aj) acknowledging that these influence activities use opaque algorithms, demand transparency on algorithms, data flows to China, and potential influence by Chinese state organs; in parallel, adopt an integrated response encompassing cyber, political, informational and technological dimensions and all necessary measures to prevent illegal digital activities, counter Chinese disinformation campaigns and other types of hybrid operations;

ak) strongly intensify the structured exchange between the EU, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in the area of disinformation, early warning and information exchange, and strengthen coordination with these like-minded partners to reinforce societal and institutional resilience against hybrid threats;

(ak) strengthen EU cybersecurity frameworks, being mindful of the growing use of generative artificial intelligence for the automated dissemination of disinformation and for the influencing of democratic processes, and of the risks in the area of the Internet of Things (IoT); fortify, moreover, server defences against cyberattacks and apply the Digital Services Act, the Data Act and other EU digital legislation to mitigate systemic risks posed by platforms linked to Chinese state influence;

al) engage with China to reinforce and make more effective the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue in order to keep the pressure firmly on China with regard to the defence of human rights and to not ignore human rights in EU-China relations;

(al) urge Member States to rigorously implement the EU’s FDI Screening Regulation to shield critical assets, such as ports, energy grids and telecommunications, including 5G networks, from strategic threats;

am) condemn China’s systemic repression of ethnic and religious minorities, including through forced labour and mass surveillance, at every political meeting with Chinese counterparts; in particular, express deep concern regarding China's systemic repression and forced assimilation policies in Tibet and Xinjiang, including attempts at forced Sinicisation and destruction of cultural heritage, such as interference in the processes of monitoring the election of Tibetan Buddhist spiritual leaders, and demand the immediate abolition of the state-run residential boarding school system for Tibetan children; further strengthen EU pressure regarding China’s ongoing atrocities against Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims, emphasising that mass arbitrary detention, forced labour, and severe violations of freedom of religion continue despite the nominal closure of the internment camps; insist that the EU integrate the widespread and systematic repression of Uyghurs as a priority issue across all dimensions of EU-China relations; condemn China’s continued denial of freedom of religion or belief, including the systematic persecution of Christians, Muslims, Buddhists and others outside state-controlled religious organisations, through harassment, detention, demolition of sacred symbols and places of worship and other repressive measures;

(am) strongly intensify the structured exchange between the EU, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in the area of disinformation, early warning and information exchange, and strengthen coordination with these like-minded partners to reinforce societal and institutional resilience against hybrid threats;

an) engage with and urge China to respect and ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and ratify all fundamental ILO conventions; guarantee actively that due diligence is ensured along global supply chains and that EU business operating with China as well as Chinese business operating with the EU respect the relevant ILO conventions on forced labour and workers’ rights; strengthen and fully enforce import-ban instruments, including vigorous implementation of the Forced Labour Regulation and customs-led controls, and swiftly implement an import ban on all goods made with state-imposed forced labour;

(an) engage with China to reinforce and make more effective the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue in order to keep the pressure firmly on China with regard to the defence of human rights and to not ignore human rights in EU-China relations;

ao) ask for the whereabouts of the Panchen Lama and demand the unconditional release of political prisoners, including the 2019 Sakharov Prize laureate Ilham Tohti, EU-citizen Gui Minhai, Gulshan Abbas, Gao Zhisheng, Yu Wensheng and Xu Yan, Xu Zhiyong, Huang Xueqin and Zhang Zhan, and ethnic Mongol activist Hada, detained Uyghur scholars and cultural figures, including the unlawfully imprisoned brothers of EU citizen Professor Yalkun Isa, Hushtar Isa and others; call for the termination of the practice of residential surveillance at a designated location, call for freedom of movement for 2008 Sakharov Prize laureate Hu Jia and ask for news on his current status; insist that China frees the laureate of the 2023 Franco-German Prize for Human Rights and the Rule of Law Chow Hang-tung as well as Jimmy Lai, Benny Tai, Joshua Wong, Leung Kwok-hung, Owen Chow and individuals of the Hong Kong 47 group who remain imprisoned under the national security law; condemn the use of the death penalty in China, and note that the total estimated number of executions in China exceeds all other countries that apply capital punishment; support independent Chinese, Hong Kong, and diasporic civil-society actors, environmental defenders, labour rights advocates and human rights defenders; call for an EU-China Civil-Society Dialogue Facility that protects participants from retaliation and strengthens academic freedom and cross-border cooperation grounded in universal human rights;

(ao) condemn China’s systemic repression of ethnic and religious minorities, including through forced labour and mass surveillance, at every political meeting with Chinese counterparts; express deep concern over the adoption of the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress and its potential to further institutionalise assimilationist policies and undermine the linguistic, cultural and religious rights of ethnic minorities; in particular, express deep concern regarding China's systemic repression and forced assimilation policies in Tibet and Xinjiang, including attempts at forced Sinicisation and destruction of cultural heritage, such as interference in the processes for monitoring the election of Tibetan Buddhist spiritual leaders, and demand the immediate abolition of the state-run residential boarding school system for Tibetan children; further strengthen EU pressure regarding China’s ongoing atrocities against Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims, emphasising that mass arbitrary detention, forced labour, and severe violations of freedom of religion continue despite the nominal closure of the internment camps; insist that the EU integrate the widespread and systematic repression of Uyghurs as a priority issue across all dimensions of EU-China relations; condemn China’s continued denial of freedom of religion or belief, including the systematic persecution of Christians, Muslims, Buddhists and others outside state-controlled religious organisations, through harassment, detention, demolition of sacred symbols and places of worship and other repressive measures;

ap) identify and close down any avenues that currently facilitate transnational repression, including through digital means, and call on China to close down all so-called Chinese overseas police service stations in the EU;

(ap) recall that the flash floods that struck the Nepal-Tibet border on 26 August 2026 caused mass casualties and destruction on both sides of the border; express regret that Chinese state media have reported casualty and missing-person figures for the Tibetan side that are markedly lower than those cited by international human rights organisations; deplore the fact that eyewitness footage and survivor accounts from Tibet have been removed from Chinese social media platforms, foreign journalists have been permitted only government-supervised access, and China’s Ministry of Public Security has confirmed that individuals were penalised for sharing information about the disaster; stress that this pattern of information control obstructs accountability to the disaster’s victims and their families; call on the Chinese authorities to grant immediate, unimpeded access to independent observers, journalists and humanitarian organisations to the Tibetan areas affected by the August 2026 Nepal-Tibet border floods, and to publish full and verifiable casualty data; call for accountability to the victims and their families;

aq) express the EU’s strong disapproval of China’s transnational repression activities as well as the cross-border application of Chinese law, such as the launching of an investigation of Taiwanese legislator Puma Shen Pao-Yang under a 2024 judiciary guideline accusing him of launching a ‘pro-Taiwanese independence separatist organisation’; call on China to stop returning refugees to North Korea and to instead ensure their protection in line with international refugee law;

(aq) engage with and urge China to respect and ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and ratify all fundamental ILO conventions; guarantee actively that due diligence is ensured along global supply chains and that EU business operating with China as well as Chinese business operating with the EU respect the relevant ILO conventions on forced labour and workers’ rights; strengthen and fully enforce import-ban instruments, including vigorous implementation of the Forced Labour Regulation and customs-led controls, and swiftly implement an import ban on all goods made with state-imposed forced labour;

ar) strongly condemn all forms of gender-based violence, including the trafficking of women and girls; demand immediate, unhindered access for independent UN and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights mechanisms to China;

(ar) ask for the whereabouts of the Panchen Lama and demand the unconditional release of political prisoners, including the 2019 Sakharov laureate Ilham Tohti, EU-citizen Gui Minhai, Gulshan Abbas, Gao Zhisheng, Yu Wensheng and Xu Yan, Xu Zhiyong, Huang Xueqin and Zhang Zhan, and ethnic Mongol activist Hada, detained Uyghur scholars and cultural figures, including the unlawfully imprisoned brothers of EU citizen Dolkun Isa, Professor Yalkun Isa and Hushtar Isa and others; call for the termination of the practice of residential surveillance at a designated location, call for freedom of movement for 2008 Sakharov laureate Hu Jia and ask news on his current status; insist that China frees the laureate of the 2023 Franco-German Prize for Human Rights and the Rule of Law Chow Hang-tung as well as Jimmy Lai, Benny Tai, Joshua Wong, Leung Kwok hung, Owen Chow and individuals of Hong Kong 47 group who remain imprisoned under the national security law; condemn the prosecution of former pro-democracy lawmaker Au Kam San under Macao’s national security law and call for his immediate and unconditional release; condemn the use of the death penalty in China, and recall that the total estimated number of executions in China exceeds all other countries that apply capital punishment; support independent Chinese, Hong Kong, and diasporic civil-society actors, environmental defenders, and labour rights advocates and human rights defenders; call for an EU-China Civil-Society Dialogue Facility that protects participants from retaliation and strengthens academic freedom and cross-border cooperation grounded in universal human rights;

as) support and reinforce the role of the International Criminal Court in the investigation and prosecution of international crimes against humanity and explore the use of international accountability mechanisms;

(as) firmly call on the Chinese authorities to repeal Article 63 of the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress, which purports to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction over individuals residing in third countries and constitutes a direct violation of international law and the sovereign jurisdiction of the EU Member States; develop an EU-wide framework for identifying and countering transnational repression on European soil;

at) identify and close down any avenues that currently facilitate transnational repression by China in the EU, including through digital means, and, in particular, those targeting diaspora communities through so-called Chinese overseas police service stations, in cooperation and coordination with like-minded partners; address China’s practice of arbitrary exit bans against European citizens in China;

(at) reiterate that human rights are universal, indivisible and inalienable, and cannot be characterised as internal affairs; call on China to ratify the ICCPR without further delay and to comply fully with its provisions in the meantime, including in Hong Kong where the covenant is legally binding pursuant to the Sino-British Joint Declaration and takes precedence over national security legislation; suspend all extradition arrangements to Hong Kong pending the full restoration of judicial independence and freedom of expression guarantees; agree, with China, on a concrete and time-bound roadmap for tangible and verifiable progress in the EU–China Human Rights Dialogue, moving beyond procedural exchanges to substantive outcomes;

au) recognise that Europe’s security and prosperity cannot be guaranteed by replacing one dependency with another and should instead be fostered by strengthening itself from within, in line with the Letta and Draghi reports, by eliminating internal market barriers, building genuine open strategic autonomy and completing the European defence union, implementing institutional reform through an ‘urgency convention’ , while diversifying the EU's economic and trade relations; draw up and present a robust and effective EU economic security strategy that clearly maps Europe’s vulnerabilities and identifies areas where the EU holds real leverage;

(au) strongly condemn China’s forced return of North Korean refugees – in particular women – in violation of the principle of non-refoulement and international refugee law, and which places their lives in grave and imminent danger; call on China to uphold its obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention and to allow the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees access to North Korean nationals on its territory;

av) remain mindful of the importance of keeping democracies united in response to attempts to divide them and of the strategic interests of China and Russia; work collaboratively mainly with the United States and other like-minded countries to formulate strategies concerning China's increasingly assertive stance on the global stage; strengthen the European pillar of defence within the transatlantic alliance while consolidating the transatlantic bond and reinforcing NATO;

(av) identify and close down any avenues that currently facilitate transnational repression, including through digital means, and call on China to close down all so-called Chinese overseas police service stations in the EU;

aw) note that European resilience must be rooted in democratic values, strong social cohesion and sustainable industrial leadership; reinforce the EU’s civilian crisis-management, conflict-prevention and peacebuilding capacities;

(aw) express the EU’s strong disapproval of China’s transnational repression activities as well as the cross-border application of Chinese law, such as the launching of an investigation of Taiwanese legislator Puma Shen Pao-Yang under a 2024 judiciary guideline accusing him of launching a ‘pro-Taiwanese independence separatist organisation’; call on China to stop returning refugees to North Korea and to instead ensure their protection in line with international refugee law;

ax) express deep concern over the massive expansion of China's nuclear arsenal; work diplomatically to prevent a new nuclear arms race and the risk of nuclear escalation; exert influence on China to participate in future arms control and disarmament processes and use diplomatic means to ensure that China uses its leverage on Russia, North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran to advance nuclear disarmament and strengthen the global non-proliferation regime;

(ax) preserve and honour the memory of the victims of the Tiananmen Square massacre and actively counter the Chinese authorities’ attempts to erase this crime from public memory; task the EU Delegation in Beijing with commemorating the victims every year on 4 June, including by lowering the EU flag to half mast, displaying candles in the windows of the EU Delegation or undertaking other appropriate symbolic acts of remembrance; initiate and support activities aimed at preserving the historical record of the massacre and ensuring that its memory is passed on to future generations; recognise the Tiananmen Square massacre as a defining moment in China’s modern history and as a stark warning of the totalitarian direction subsequently pursued by the Chinese Communist Party;

ay) increase public diplomacy efforts in China to provide authentic information about the EU’s policies and actions, and work to strengthen knowledge of China in all EU institutions; emphasise, while exchanges between European and Chinese universities are in place, the importance of clear guidance for engagement between EU universities and Chinese entities; strengthen the coordination and coherence of policies across EU Member States and institutions in order to develop a common and coherent strategy towards China; ensure that such a strategy includes enhanced coordination among Member States on their main political leaders' visits to China and the main messages addressed to the Chinese leadership so as to avoid political fragmentation; adopt a unitary and coordinated strategy to diplomatically engage with China, firmly protect the EU geopolitical and economic interests, improve bilateral relations and pursue mutually beneficial cooperation;

(ay) strongly condemn all forms of gender-based violence, including the trafficking of women and girls; demand immediate, unhindered access for independent UN and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights mechanisms to China;

(az) support and reinforce the role of the International Criminal Court in the investigation and prosecution of international crimes against humanity and explore the use of international accountability mechanisms;

(ba) identify and close down any avenues that currently facilitate transnational repression by China in the EU, including through digital means, and, in particular, those targeting diaspora communities through so-called Chinese overseas police service stations, in cooperation and coordination with like-minded partners; address China’s practice of arbitrary exit bans against European citizens in China;

(bb) recognise that Europe’s security and prosperity cannot be guaranteed by replacing one dependency with another and should instead be fostered by strengthening itself from within, in line with the Letta and Draghi reports, by eliminating internal market barriers, building genuine open strategic autonomy and completing the European defence union, implementing institutional reform through an ‘urgency convention’ , while diversifying the EU's economic and trade relations; draw up and present a robust and effective EU economic security strategy that clearly maps Europe’s vulnerabilities and identifies areas where the EU holds real leverage;

(bc) remain mindful of the importance of keeping democracies united in response to attempts to divide them and of the strategic interests of China and Russia; work collaboratively mainly with the United States and other like-minded countries to formulate strategies concerning China's increasingly assertive stance on the global stage; strengthen the European pillar of defence within the transatlantic alliance while consolidating the transatlantic bond and reinforcing NATO;

(bd) note that European resilience must be rooted in democratic values, strong social cohesion and sustainable industrial leadership; reinforce the EU’s civilian crisis-management, conflict-prevention and peacebuilding capacities;

(be) express deep concern over the massive expansion of China's nuclear arsenal; work diplomatically to prevent a new nuclear arms race and the risk of nuclear escalation; exert influence on China to participate in future arms control and disarmament processes and use diplomatic means to ensure that China uses its leverage on Russia, North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran to advance nuclear disarmament and strengthen the global non-proliferation regime;

(bf) increase public diplomacy efforts in China to provide authentic information about the EU’s policies and actions, and work to strengthen knowledge of China in all EU institutions; emphasise, while exchanges between European and Chinese universities are in place, the importance of clear guidance for engagement between EU universities and Chinese entities; strengthen the coordination and coherence of policies across EU Member States and institutions in order to develop a common and coherent strategy towards China; ensure that such a strategy includes enhanced coordination among Member States on their main political leaders' visits to China and the main messages addressed to the Chinese leadership so as to avoid political fragmentation; adopt a unitary and coordinated strategy to diplomatically engage with China, firmly protect the EU geopolitical and economic interests, improve bilateral relations and pursue mutually beneficial cooperation; encourage fair and responsible people-to-people exchanges;