What changed

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

P10_TA(2026)0286

on the findingsFindings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield

(2025/2069(INI))

Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield

PE775.431

European Parliament resolution of 15 September 2026 on the findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield (2025/2069(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Ethical Code of Conduct for Social Media Influencers and Content Creators, published by the Aspen Institute Germany in 2024,

– having regard to the article published by Debunk.org on 4 May 2023 entitled ‘Kremlin spent 1.91,9 billion USD on propaganda last year, the budget exceeded by a quarter’,

– having regard to the statement by the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 28 December 2024 on measures in response to the EU’s 15th sanctions package against Russia, in which it announced the expansion of the list of EU officials and citizens prohibited from entering the country,

AE. whereas the digital advertising ecosystem, while enabling new opportunities for media outreach, has also led to market concentration and unfair competition, with a few large online platforms capturing a disproportionate share of advertising revenue; whereas according to a 2023 report by the French ARCOM and Ministry of Culture, media organisations that invest in news content and audiovisual creation received only 40 % of advertising revenue in 2022, down from 65 % in 2012, and this figure is projected to fall to 29 % by 2030; whereas this is often to the detriment of professional European media companies and the sustainability of independent journalism;

✦ Formal Updates the decimal separator in the EUR 2,95 billion fine figure.

AF. whereas the abusive practices of dominant online advertising market players, such as the practices that resulted in the Commission imposing a EUR 2.952,95 billion fine against Google for distorting competition in online advertising, underscore the need for more structural measures to ensure fair competition, greater transparency, accountability and safeguards to protect media pluralism, editorial independence and the integrity of democratic processes; whereas structural deficiencies in the digital advertising market can be exploited by malicious actors, as demonstrated by the so-called doppelganger operators using advertisements on social media to target users and by various Russian online campaigns aimed at discouraging Ukrainian men from enlisting;

AG. whereas the DMA is essential for ensuring fair digital markets and media pluralism; whereas challenges remain in its implementation; whereas under the DMA, app developers can inform customers, free of charge, of offers outside app stores; whereas the Commission is investigating a potential DMA breach by Google in demoting media publishers’ content; whereas the Commission launched its first review of the DMA on 3 July 2025;

AM. whereas Parliament and Council negotiators reached a provisional agreement on the proposed regulation on the screening of foreign investments in the EU on 11 December 2025;

✦ Formal Updates the decimal separator in the EUR 5,5 million emergency funding figure.

AN. whereas the work of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) is of strategic interest to the EU; whereas the EU has approved EUR 5.55,5 million in emergency funding for this work, in the aftermath of the reform of the US foreign aid policy; whereas a sustainable funding solution needs to be developed for RFE/RL and other independent media outlets that are essential to the strengthening of democratic resilience in neighbouring countries;

AO. whereas new technologies, such as AI, can improve journalistic working conditions and methods but can also expose journalists to new threats, such as quick and cheap impersonations of existing media, doppelganger campaigns, the mass creation of disinformation outlets and coordinated attacks against journalists; whereas any impersonation of existing media amounts to identity theft and should be addressed appropriately by the judicial authorities; whereas AI models must comply with Union copyright law in order to ensure the protection of rightsholders and legal certainty; whereas the news media sector is facing challenges from the growing influence of AI systems, which is affecting public trust, advertising revenue and copyright protection; whereas the developments in generative AI should be discussed in the context of the Commission’s upcoming review of the EU Copyright Directive, complemented by a report on the main findings; whereas greater transparency of AI training data is important in the context of media policy;

BT. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and China’s assertive geopolitical posture have intensified the use of disinformation, economic coercion and strategic influence, targeting not only the EU, but also vulnerable regions such as the Western Balkans, Eastern Partnership countries and the Global South; whereas various sources reveal that Russia’s annual budget for spreading disinformation and propaganda amounts to several billion euro; whereas Russia’s disinformation warfare has not been matched by the EU with adequate financing or effective strategy; whereas elections and political events across Europe demonstrate persistent, targeted and sophisticated full-scale offensive hybrid warfare perpetrated by Russia, aiming to destabilise trust in European political systems and institutions, and to create constant confusion between facts and false information; whereas such warfare requires an appropriate response and a shift from a mere defensive strategy to an offensive one;

✦ Adds that information manipulation operations have been detected against three candidates for France's 2027 presidential election and attributed to Russia.

BU. whereas operations to manipulate information have already been detected against three candidates for France’s 2027 presidential election and have been attributed to Russia;

BV. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as its broader hybrid warfare against Europe and interference in the democratic processes of other countries, has been enabled and justified by the nationalist imperialist ideology of ‘Ruscism’, and forms part of a wider strategy directed against the West and its interests and values, including the international rules-based order, the rule of law, democracy, human rights and common security; whereas Parliament has condemned the ideology, policies and practices of the current Russian regime as incompatible with international law and EU values;

CN. whereas judicial independence is an indispensable structural component of electoral integrity; whereas electoral integrity depends on the existence of accessible and effective remedies against violations of voting rights and electoral procedures, insulated from political and executive pressure;

✦ Changes the number of EU sanctions packages imposed since 2022 from 20 to 21.

CN.CO. whereas since 2022, the EU has imposed a total of 2021 packages of extensive and unprecedented sanctions in response to Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine; whereas those sanctions are aimed at substantially increasing pressure on the Russian war economy by targeting key sectors such as energy, finance and the defence industry, special economic zones, and enablers and profiteers of its war of aggression, and ending the EU’s dependency on fossil fuel imports from Russia; whereas the EU has also adopted sanctions against Belarus, Iran and North Korea in response to their support for Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine; whereas the efficacy of such measures should be strengthened and loopholes allowing for their circumvention should be closed;

CP. whereas since 8 October 2024, the EU sanctions framework has been expanded to enable the targeting of a broad range of hybrid activities carried out by Russia, including the undermining of electoral processes and the functioning of democratic institutions, threats against and the sabotaging of economic activities, services of public interest and critical infrastructure, the use of coordinated disinformation and FIMI, malicious cyber activities, the instrumentalisation of migration, and other destabilising activities; whereas this framework has already led to the sanctioning of tens of individuals and entities, including Russian oligarchs, propagandists, military intelligence operatives, media outlets and companies, for spreading pro-Kremlin narratives, conducting sabotage and undermining democratic processes; whereas this sanctions regime now allows the EU to include asset freezes, travel bans and the suspension of broadcasting licences, and to prohibit financial and crypto-asset transactions linked to hybrid activities;

5. Insists that the key policy priorities outlined in the European Democracy Shield initiative – including combating FIMI and hybrid threats, strengthening electoral resilience, enhancing cybersecurity, supporting civil society and promoting independent media and investigative journalism – must be sufficiently funded in the upcoming MFF; underscores that investment in democratic resilience is crucial for EU security, sovereignty and prosperity; expresses its support for the Commission’s commitment to mainstreaming democratic resilience across EU funding programmes; underlines, in that context, the need for various aspects of hybrid defence to be integrated into EU defence initiatives; stresses, however, that clear goals with measurable actions and outcomes are needed to use EU and national resources effectively and avoid waste or fragmented funding;

✦ Adds a paragraph condemning third-country interference in certain outermost regions and overseas countries and territories.

6. Condemns third-country interference in certain outermost regions and overseas countries and territories, where the impact may be further compounded by their isolation and geographical distance from the European continent;

European Centre for Democratic Resilience

26. Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to draw up a DSA incidents and crisis protocol, including clear processes for coordination between relevant authorities, to further address major incidents and interference in the information environment; considers that this protocol should encourage the participation of online platforms and online search engines and should address, among other things, electoral interference through coordinated inauthentic behaviour in the online space, particularly through bot-driven amplification and engagement that effectively distort genuine public discourse; stresses the need for platforms to respond quickly and effectively through preventive and corrective measures against such interference, and for the authorities to react swiftly in cases of non-compliance, rather than relying on ex post measures and late enforcement; welcomes, in this context, Google’s proactive removal in 2025 of nearly 11 000 YouTube channels and accounts linked to state-backed propaganda from China, Russia, and other malicious actors, and urges all platforms to systematically address such threats;

✦ Formal Corrects the punctuation in the EUR 120 million fine figure.

26.27. Welcomes the Commission’s finalisation of its investigation into the platform X’s breach of transparency obligations under the DSA, followed by the imposition of a fine of EUR 120 million,, as well as the Commission’s decision to start investigations of Grok AI’s integration into X and to expand existing investigations into X’s recommender systems; urges the Commission to accelerate remaining investigations, including into Meta, particularly in the light of preliminary findings on breaches of transparency and user-protection obligations, and reports indicating persistent issues related to scam advertising and regulatory circumvention; stresses the need for enforcement action in cases of election interference, persistent algorithmic opacity and the large-scale proliferation of fake accounts and bot networks that distort public discourse; calls on the Commission, in this context, to swiftly conclude investigations into TikTok’s compliance with the DSA in relation to foreign interference in the 2024 Romanian presidential elections, which highlighted worrying possibilities of recommender systems and bot networks being exploited, and in relation to TikTok’s obligation to mitigate systemic risks to democratic processes and to ensure deterrence during electoral periods; further takes note of the Commission’s preliminary evaluation indicating that TikTok is in breach of the DSA for its addictive design;

28. Underlines the need for increased transparency regarding actors behind online content and accounts, particularly for advertising purposes; stresses that measures to combat coordinated inauthentic behaviour without abolishing anonymity online are essential to prevent FIMI, bot farms and covert political campaigning; invites the Commission to explore possible measures that would support online platforms in adopting proportionate steps to verify that a human is behind an account, thereby countering the activities of bot accounts; calls on platforms to prioritise the development of effective mechanisms to identify, scrutinise and, where necessary, suspend inauthentic accounts, especially those involved in coordinated influence operations; stresses that measures targeting inauthentic accounts must not undermine the ability to remain anonymous online, which is essential for protecting journalists, activists, marginalised communities and individuals in vulnerable situations (such as whistle-blowers, dissidents and political opponents of autocratic regimes), and should continue to allow space for satirical and humorous accounts;

32. Urges the development of regulatory sandboxes and funding mechanisms to support EU tech start-ups and value-driven European alternatives, based on fair remuneration, such as those emerging in the Netherlands, to reduce strategic dependencies; welcomes the Commission’s EU Open Source strategy; further supports the long-term vision of EU social media platforms designed in accordance with EU values of transparency, data protection, fundamental rights, freedom of expression and democratic accountability;

✦ Formal Corrects the spelling of 'remuneration'.

32.33. Underlines that advertising and revenue-sharing practices may incentivise the spread of manipulative or harmful content, undermine electoral integrity and lead to the emergence of new disinformation actors and networks; recalls that disinformation cannot be demonetised without existing monetisation practices being sufficiently transparent; calls on the Commission, the EU digital regulators, the national competent authorities and online platforms to work together to detect and prevent illicit financing and ensure transparency in revenue redistribution programmes, advertising policies and other monetisation services that could allow FIMI actors or even sanctioned entities to earn income or other benefits; calls on platforms to publicly disclose renumerationremuneration flows and their beneficiaries, at least once a year; considers that the monetisation of FIMI activities under such programmes should be addressed as part of the risk assessment and mitigation obligations under the DSA; considers the monetisation of content from sanctioned entities to be a systemic risk, requiring swift corrective action such as suspending revenue-sharing; underlines that genuine creators and media outlets should be compensated for their losses in cases of erroneous or unfair demonetisation; is concerned by the gradual rollback of corporate commitments to internet freedom initiatives;

34. Notes with concern the findings of the Dutch data protection authority, which are indicative of wider concerns across the EU, indicating that AI chatbots may provide biased and unreliable voting advice, thereby posing risks to electoral integrity; calls on the AI Office to investigate whether such practices breach applicable law, especially the AI Act, and to deliver on its commitment to prepare guidance on the application of AI in electoral processes in order to ensure the responsible use of AI;

78. Takes the view that all criminal law tools available at Member State and EU level should be applied and, where appropriate, further developed to prevent and counter illegal conduct aimed at undermining democratic institutions and processes; stresses the need for competent national authorities to be equipped with adequate tools and cooperation channels to prevent, investigate, detect and prosecute criminal offences related to foreign interference; considers that the corruption and intimidation of elected and public officials by criminal networks should be addressed as part of the EU’s response to hybrid threats via strengthened cooperation between specialised anti-corruption agencies, law enforcement authorities and relevant Union bodies; asks the Commission to assess the added value of establishing in Union law minimum rules on the definition of and sanctions for the criminal offence of knowingly participating in organised activities of interference on behalf of foreign powers; notes that the forthcoming revision of the mandates of a number of EU bodies in the area of justice and home affairs could provide an opportunity to strengthen the operational dimension of the European Democracy Shield; supports, in particular, the Commission’s commitment to an ambitious overhaul of Europol’s mandate, with a view to turning it into a truly operational police agency that better supports the Member States;

✦ Replaces the call on the Commission to assess legal gaps during the planned revision of Europol and Eurojust mandates with a call for co-legislators to perform a careful assessment during the ongoing revision.

78.79. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication acknowledges the positive contribution of criminal justice and law enforcement cooperation to countering FIMI and disinformation activities; calls onfor the Commission,co-legislators whento preparingperform, during the plannedongoing revision of the mandates of Europol and Eurojust, toa carefullycareful assessassessment of the legal gaps and limitations that currently prevent those agencies from providing their full assistance to the Member States confronted with hybrid threats, and to explore ways to overcome those limitations while respecting fundamental rights and Treaty-based competences; considers that the addition of hybrid threats in Annex I to the Europol Regulation would clarify the legal framework and facilitate Europol’s work in this area; underlines, moreover, the need to ensure that Europol and Eurojust are provided with adequate financial and human resources to effectively implement the upcoming strengthening of their mandates;

80. Considers transnational repression to be a growing and serious threat to democracy and internal security in the EU; underlines that transnational repression can be perpetrated online, via hate and defamation campaigns and the spreading of illegal content, but can also lead to physical assaults and murder; notes, with concern, the increasing examples of how malicious non-EU-country actors use crime as a service and criminal organisations as proxies within the EU to target individuals and entities identified as political adversaries; stresses that such practices constitute an intolerable act of foreign interference, with potentially destabilising effects on our societies; underlines, in this context, the need to close remaining loopholes in Union law and further reinforce EU-level coordination in the field of criminal justice and law enforcement through a police and judicial cooperation framework dedicated to transnational repression as part of the European Democracy Shield, while involving individuals and groups that are targeted and ensuring their protection; draws attention to the urgency of addressing the abuse of Interpol red notices for politically motivated purposes;

134. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

The European Union is founded on the values of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, which form the basis of its political order, institutional legitimacy and societal cohesion. Over the past years, these foundations have been increasingly targeted by a rapid intensification of hostile activities. Foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), hybrid operations, coordinated disinformation campaigns, and other forms of malign influence have grown in scale, sophistication and impact.

These tactics deliberately exploit social fractures, manipulate public debate, and seek to undermine citizens’ confidence in the institutions and democratic processes of the Union and its Member States. Their increasingly digital nature – amplified through opaque online platforms and cross-border dissemination networks – has made the threat landscape more complex and more difficult for Member States to confront individually. Against this backdrop, the Union has recognised the need for a more strategic, coordinated, and anticipatory response. Building on the work carried out by its previous special committees dedicated to foreign interference in democratic processes (INGE and INGE2), the European Parliament decided in December 2024 to establish a Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield (EUDS), tasked with examining how the Union can better defend its democratic foundations.

The Joint Communication on the European Democracy Shield, presented by the Commission together with the VP/HR, marks an important contribution to this effort. It provides a structured overview of the current threat environment and identifies several domains where further action is required to protect the Union against FIMI and disinformation, and to strengthen societal resilience. The rapporteur welcomed this initiative and recognised its added value in consolidating the Union’s understanding of the challenges ahead.

However, while the Communication sets the right direction, its level of ambition remains overly limited in light of the scale of the threats. What is needed is not only a framework for reflection but a concrete reform agenda capable of delivering operational capacity, accountability, and long-term preparedness.

The Union has developed a growing ecosystem of structures, tools, and programmes aimed at countering foreign information manipulation and disinformation. These efforts – including the work of relevant task forces, cooperation networks, and early-warning mechanisms – are significant. Yet, to take this work to the next level, reforms must also be put in place. The proposal to establish a European Centre for Democratic Resilience is a welcome and promising initiative. However, in the form presented in the Communication, such initiative lacks the operational clarity required for the Centre to become an effective hub of expertise and action. Concrete recommendations have been put forward in the report for this objective to be achieved.

Regarding the digital sphere – which in many ways is exploited by malign third-country actors to conduct their operations – the Special Committee is of the view that relevant EU legislation must be upheld and that the Commission needs to intensify its enforcement actions, particularly where there are indications of election-related manipulation, systemic algorithmic opacity, coordinated inauthentic behaviour, or large-scale misuse of platform functionalities.

The evolving threat environment also requires the Member States to cooperate more effectively at Union level on the conduct of elections. The integrity of electoral processes lies at the heart of democratic resilience. In this context, the report stresses the need for significantly enhancing the European Cooperation Network on Elections (ECNE) and encourages a comprehensive reform to make this network more ambitious and operationally relevant. Furthermore, election-related infrastructure should be recognised as part of the Union’s critical infrastructure and protected accordingly.

The rapporteur also welcomed that the Joint Communication on the European Democracy Shield included an external dimension. The objectives of the Democracy Shield cannot be achieved without close cooperation with relevant candidate countries and partners in the Union’s neighbourhood, that are increasingly exposed to intense foreign interference. Support for their resilience – including through capacity-building, training, and the provision of expertise – is indispensable for safeguarding Europe’s wider democratic space. The report calls on the EEAS to systematically incorporate hybrid-threat preparedness measures into the mandates of CSDP missions and operations, thereby strengthening the ability of national counterparts to detect and counter malign influence. As part of the Shield’s external dimension, a review of relevant sanctions instruments should also be undertaken to ensure they are optimally calibrated to target actors undermining Europe’s democratic integrity. Alignment with like-minded partners is also important with a view to ensuring effective collective responses; the report welcomes the use of multilateral and bilateral channels of cooperation, including the existing EU Security and Defence Partnerships.

The report further emphasises the need for an ambitious agenda to make society more resilient. Reforms to support the media sector are an important component of this, alongside measures to strengthen media literacy. Civil society and the EU’s dedicated strategy constitute another key aspect: a strong and independent civil society is essential for democratic resilience. The report pleads in favour of robust programmes supporting the policy priorities outlined in the European Democracy Shield initiative within the next multiannual financial framework 2028-2034.

In strengthening societal resilience, enhanced protection of critical infrastructure is also crucial and should be reassessed in light of the objectives of the Democracy Shield. This in turn necessitates reforms to increase European sovereignty over digital infrastructure, operating systems, data centres, semiconductors, AI, cybersecurity, cloud computing, and various digital platforms and services. The revision of the mandates of relevant EU agencies, such as Europol and Frontex, can also play a significant role in improving resilience and protection against hybrid threats.

Finally, the report stresses that building democratic resilience also requires societies that can continue to function under exceptional or disruptive conditions. Reforms aimed at strengthening preparedness – from crisis-management capacities to the continuity of democratic institutions – must therefore form an integral part of the European Democracy Shield. The report concludes that protecting and strengthening Europe’s democratic systems requires not only vigilance and resilience at every level of society, but also a coordinated and forward-looking Union strategy, backed by sufficient resources and political commitment.