What changed
The text adds a new condemnation of third-country interference in certain outermost regions and overseas countries and territories. #5 It adds that information manipulation operations have been detected against three candidates for France's 2027 presidential election and attributed to Russia. #3 It changes the number of EU sanctions packages imposed since 2022 from 20 to 21. #4 It shifts the call to assess legal gaps in Europol and Eurojust mandates from the Commission to co-legislators and from a planned to an ongoing revision. #8 The other changes are formal: decimal separators, punctuation and a spelling correction. #1#2#6#7
4 changes of substance, plus 4 formal. Each change below carries a one-line ✦ note from the same model. Written from the two texts only — read the highlighted passages before relying on it.
The changes to the text itself, in document order. Cover page, citations (“having regard to …”), standard resolution paragraphs and punctuation-only edits are left out — they are in “Show every difference”.
Change #3 Substance
Adds that information manipulation operations have been detected against three candidates for France's 2027 presidential election and attributed to Russia.
BU. whereas operations to manipulate information have already been detected against three candidates for France’s 2027 presidential election and have been attributed to Russia;
Change #4 Substance
Changes the number of EU sanctions packages imposed since 2022 from 20 to 21.
CN.CO. whereas since 2022, the EU has imposed a total of 2021 packages of extensive and unprecedented sanctions in response to Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine; whereas those sanctions are aimed at substantially increasing pressure on the Russian war economy by targeting key sectors such as energy, finance and the defence industry, special economic zones, and enablers and profiteers of its war of aggression, and ending the EU’s dependency on fossil fuel imports from Russia; whereas the EU has also adopted sanctions against Belarus, Iran and North Korea in response to their support for Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine; whereas the efficacy of such measures should be strengthened and loopholes allowing for their circumvention should be closed;
Change #5 Substance
Adds a paragraph condemning third-country interference in certain outermost regions and overseas countries and territories.
6. Condemns third-country interference in certain outermost regions and overseas countries and territories, where the impact may be further compounded by their isolation and geographical distance from the European continent;
Change #8 Substance
Replaces the call on the Commission to assess legal gaps during the planned revision of Europol and Eurojust mandates with a call for co-legislators to perform a careful assessment during the ongoing revision.
78.79. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication acknowledges the positive contribution of criminal justice and law enforcement cooperation to countering FIMI and disinformation activities; calls onfor the Commission,co-legislators whento preparingperform, during the plannedongoing revision of the mandates of Europol and Eurojust, toa carefullycareful assessassessment of the legal gaps and limitations that currently prevent those agencies from providing their full assistance to the Member States confronted with hybrid threats, and to explore ways to overcome those limitations while respecting fundamental rights and Treaty-based competences; considers that the addition of hybrid threats in Annex I to the Europol Regulation would clarify the legal framework and facilitate Europol’s work in this area; underlines, moreover, the need to ensure that Europol and Eurojust are provided with adequate financial and human resources to effectively implement the upcoming strengthening of their mandates;