What changed

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

P10_TA(2026)0040

on EU strategic defence and security partnerships

(2025/2119(INI))

Committee on Security and Defence

PE778.180

European Parliament resolution of 11 February 2026 on EU strategic defence and security partnerships (2025/2119(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Versailles Declaration adopted at the informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government on 10 and 11 March 2022,

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States1,States,

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/890 of 18 March 2024 amending Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 establishing a European Peace Facility2,Facility,

– having regard to the conclusions of the European Council, particularly those of 23 October 2025, 26 June 2025, 20 March 2025 and 6 March 2025,

– having regard to the security and defence partnerships signed on 21 May 2024 by the EU and Moldova, on 28 May 2024 by the EU and Norway, on 1 November 2024 by the EU and Japan, on 4 November 2024 by the EU and South Korea, on 19 November 2024 by the EU and North Macedonia, on 18 December 2024 by the EU and Albania, on 19 May 2025 by the EU and the United Kingdom (UK) and on 23 June 2025 by the EU and Canada,

– having regard to the joint security commitments between the EU and Ukraine signed on 27 June 2024;2024,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/10923,2018/1092,

– having regard to the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030 presented by the Presidency of the European Commission on 19 March 2025, and its five-pillar financing plan, ‘ReArm Europe’,

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 22 April 2025 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2021/694, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697, (EU) 2021/1153, (EU) 2023/1525 and (EU) 2024/795, as regards incentivising defence-related investments in the EU budget to implement the ReArm Europe Plan (COM(2025)0188),

– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 of 27 May 2025 establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the Reinforcement of the European Defence Industry Instrument,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry’ (JOIN(2024)0010),

– having regard to the political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029, entitled ‘Europe’s choice’, presented on 18 July 20252024 by the candidate for the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen,

– having regard to the Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management signed by the Secretary General of the United Nations and the President of the European Council on 24 September 2003,

20. Commends the conclusion on 21 May 2024 of the EU-Moldova SDP with a focus on combating hybrid threats;

21. Underlines the strategic importance of EU partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific, such as Japan andJapan, the Republic of Korea,Korea and India, which have already signed SDPs, and encourages the rapid conclusion of negotiations with Australia and the exploration of further partnerships with other countries in the region, notably New Zealand; emphasises that Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security challenges are closely intertwined; emphasises that deepening cooperation with India could be mutually beneficial; underlines the need to deepen cooperation on security and defence with Taiwan;

22. Underlines the need to explore enhanced cooperation at different levels and in various formats on energy security, connectivity and critical infrastructure protection with countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia; notes the strategic importance of these regions for diversifying energy supplies, developing secure transport corridors and strengthening Europe’s overall resilience;

54. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

We are at a crucial moment, when Europe faces unprecedented challenges, with the war of aggression at our doorstep. We can see this today more clearly than ever – Russia’s escalation has resulted in violation of EU’s and NATO’s airspace in several countries. The broader geopolitical landscape is undergoing profound changes and shifts. This volatile international environment means major challenges, the security of Europe is at serious risk.

Escalation in the Middle East has led to significant and varied risks for European and global security, and in the long-term, China’s rise as a global power may introduce new strategic complexities.

It is therefore paramount that we maintain strong and unified transatlantic relations within NATO and with partners in the Indo-Pacific, such as Japan and the Republic of Korea. Europeans must take more responsibility for their security and do more to deter Russia.

Addressing this risk, clearly requires new forms of cooperation and targeted partnerships that deliver concrete results and build real capabilities. This is where the EU and its security and defence partners play a key role. If challenges and threats know no borders, then we need friends to tackle them. The European Union cannot do it alone.

The evolving geopolitical landscape, marked by Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, the shifting role of NATO, and increasing tensions in the Indo-Pacific has intensified the need for a robust and cohesive European security and defence partnerships.

The report places EU Security and Defence Partnerships in the context of EU Common Security and Defence Policy. Overall, the Strategic Compass of the EU commits to engage more with its bilateral partners and thus build tailored partnerships based on shared values and interests.

Cooperation with strategic partners such as the UK, Canada, Norway, South Korea, Japan, Moldova, Albania, North Macedonia, as well as the US and Ukraine, with which the EU does not yet have formal partnerships, is a key element of the Common Security and Defence Policy.

Today, the EU is on a path of an overhaul of its defence policy, which is critical for Europe’s ability to defend itself and advance its interests globally. This overhaul must also extend to security and defence partnerships.

The EU has always sought partners to uphold the rules-based multilateral order – today more than ever the outreach needs to reflect defence and security interests of EU countries. Current volatile international environment poses increased threats and challenges to our common security – which requires more efforts, new forms of cooperation and targeted partnerships that deliver concrete results and build real capabilities.

Promoting partnerships on security and defence is also essential for our capability development, innovation and defence industrial readiness as well as to diversify supplies of raw material or critical components.

In line with the White Paper, the EU has taken concrete steps to advance its partnership agenda in the field of security and defence with allies and like-minded partners, notably NATO, with which the EDA will pursue a technical arrangement for the exchange of classified information.

Partnerships are crucial to help enhance interoperability and reinforce industrial cooperation, as well as diversify supplies of raw material or critical components. This model is pioneered with the UK and Canada, with which bilateral agreements are being negotiated to allow their respective defence industries and products to benefit from joint procurement under the SAFE instrument. Defence industrial cooperations is also at the centre of Defence Industrial Dialogues with Japan and, potentially in the future, with India. The EU should also deepen its security and defence partnership with Moldova.

The report aims to take stock of the current and develop proposals for future defence partnerships – providing concrete policy suggestions and actions for adaptation. It explores alignments with some of the broader objectives of building a strong defence policy of the EU, including relations with NATO, and alignment with its capabilities, ensuring innovation and rapid advancement of defence industries.

As the EU seeks to bolster its Common Security and Defence Policy strengthened partnerships with NATO and regional partners are becoming increasingly vital. The relation with NATO is a priority one, and needs to keep improving, including through increased intelligence and information sharing. The EU-NATO cooperation will also be important in addressing critical, and transport infrastructure, energy grids, digital communications and civilian satellites.

There is consensus among EU Member States on the importance of EU Partnerships. The conclusions state that “The European Council underlines the importance of working together with like-minded partners, who share our foreign and security policy goals. It welcomes in that regard the EU’s recent Security and Defence Partnerships with the UK and Canada”. This forms a clear direction from Member States to move forward robustly on implementing the partnerships. The EU Council conclusions also set out the priorities for security and defence. They state that “Europe must become more sovereign, more responsible for its own defence and better equipped to act and deal autonomously and in a coordinated way with immediate and future challenges and threats, with a 360° approach”.

The report calls for alignments with some of the broader objectives of building a strong European Defence Union, including improving relations with NATO, and consistent with its capabilities.

The partnerships vary in their scope, as highlighted in the report, but they are critical for depending on the assessed mutual interests of the EU and each partner. However, several areas can be outlined as thematic components.

Common areas of focus for the partnerships will be the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations – as they remain the cornerstone of its external security engagement. These missions, both civilian and military, are also linked EU’s work on conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict stabilisation, areas which will also be evaluated in the report.

Closely aligned with these are efforts in integrated border management and maritime security. In these domains, and other ones, operational presence, intelligence sharing, and strategic foresight are increasingly vital – and should be shared among partners.

As indicated in the report – sustained long-term support for Ukraine is vital for EU defence and security. This also goes for building a direct partnership with Ukraine defence industry – where a lot of lessons can be learned from each other, especially on usage of drones and new technique on the battlefield.

The partnerships should have an important component of responding to emerging threats and resilience building. The EU’s approach to hybrid threats and cybersecurity reflects a growing recognition of non-traditional security challenges. Coordination and cooperation on (cyber) capacity building, particularly for partners, demonstrates the EU’s dual focus on internal resilience and external projection.

This also includes efforts to bolster the resilience of critical infrastructure and improve strategic communication (STRATCOM) and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) responses.

In the partnerships, the EU should continue to emphasise counterterrorism and the prevention of violent extremism, reflecting the need to address both state and non-state threats through integrated security frameworks – developed with partners. Preventing human trafficking and small arms proliferation are also important areas.

Partnerships should also be strengthened through structured consultations on relevant defence initiatives, tools, and instruments. These should include cooperation of defence industries (including financing).

Training, education, and capacity building – whether cyber-specific or more broadly defence-related – are key levers for deepening cooperation with partner states and organisations. These initiatives aim to elevate shared standards, interoperability, and strategic alignment.

It will be important to implement a well-coordinated engagement in international forums to promote the partnerships and reflect a multilateral approach to global security governance.

An important component will be ensuring that partnerships can support innovation and rapid advancement of defence industries and working towards industry effectiveness and economic efficiency.

A multi-stakeholder process is needed, involving the European Parliament, Council and Commission, along with Member States and should launch a process of broader consultations and engagement on EU Security and Defence Partnerships – which will also have the aim to monitor existing and encouraging new partnerships.

In summary – the report shows where progress needs to be consistent in order to build up EU Security and Defence Partnerships – and importantly, that these align with the defence priorities and political goals of the EU’s external engagement. This is key for its priorities and its responses to the evolving global landscape.

DECLARATION OF INPUT FROM MICHAŁ SZCZERBA

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that he included in his report input on matters pertaining to the subject of the file that he received, in the preparation of the report, prior to the adoption thereof in committee, from the following interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register, or from the following representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies:

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that he has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament's Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

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