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Adopted text

EU strategic defence and security partnerships

TA-10-2026-0040 · P10_TA(2026)0040 · PE778.180

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This resolution addresses EU strategic defence and security partnerships (SDPs), stressing their necessity for the EU's security and strategic autonomy. It calls for deepening partnerships with NATO, Ukraine, the US, and other like-minded countries, and for strengthening cooperation in areas like defence industry, cybersecurity, and maritime security. It urges the EU to develop additional SDPs, enhance parliamentary oversight, and ensure tangible results through monitoring and review. It also highlights the importance of the European Peace Facility and calls for overcoming Hungary's obstruction of its use.

Key points

  1. Underlines that SDPs are essential for the EU to respond to threats, enhance strategic autonomy, and act with like-minded partners, while remaining complementary to NATO.
  2. Stresses that Russia's aggression is the most significant threat, and calls for reinforcing defence capabilities, addressing hybrid threats, and reassessing economic cooperation with China.
  3. Highlights the reinforced EU-NATO partnership, calling for full implementation of joint declarations and increased information sharing, while stressing the need for a strong European pillar within NATO.
  4. Calls for standardisation and simplification of rules to ensure interoperability and a competitive European defence industry, in synergy with NATO's Defence Planning Process.
  5. Welcomes existing SDPs with eight countries and calls for more, including with Iceland, and for structured industrial cooperation to scale up EU-based production.
  6. Calls for prioritising SDPs with Norway, the UK, and Canada, and for exploring formalised SDPs with the US and Ukraine, with continued support for Ukraine's security.
  7. Encourages partnerships with Indo-Pacific countries, the Black Sea region, Western Balkans, and other like-minded partners, and calls for a comprehensive EU Black Sea security strategy.
  8. Stresses the importance of EU-UN cooperation and partnerships with regional organisations, including on peace operations and the Women, Peace and Security agenda.
  9. Calls for strengthening cooperation in the Southern Neighbourhood, focusing on maritime security, counter-terrorism, and border management.
  10. Deplores Hungary's obstruction of the European Peace Facility and urges Member States to pressure Hungary to end its blockade, calling for alternative solutions.
  11. Calls for securing supply chains, reducing strategic dependencies, and ensuring democratic oversight in defence industry partnerships.
  12. Requests regular reports to Parliament on SDP implementation and calls for extending parliamentary capacity-building projects to Ukraine and other partners.

Who is affected

  • EU member states, particularly those on the eastern flank, are called to strengthen defence capabilities and cooperation.
  • Partner countries with SDPs, such as Norway, the UK, Canada, and Ukraine, are targeted for deeper cooperation and inclusion in EU initiatives.
  • The European Peace Facility is affected by calls to overcome Hungary's blocking of assistance to Ukraine.
  • The European External Action Service is asked to provide regular reports to Parliament on SDP implementation.

Figures and deadlines

  • 23 of 27 EU Member States are NATO members.
  • SDPs are in place with eight countries so far.

Legal basis: Title V of the Treaty on European Union, provisions on the common security and defence policy