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MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

P10_TA(2025)0335

on militaryMilitary mobility

(2025/2090(INI))

Committee on Security and Defence, Committee on Transport and Tourism

PE774.374

European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2025 on military mobility (2025/2090(INI))

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular Titles VI and XVI thereof,

8. Stresses that a centrally managed and dedicated EU transport funding instrument such as the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) must be continued in the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) as the main source for robust military mobility funding, and its overall budget for transport must be significantly increased; welcomes, therefore, the proposal for an increased budget for military mobility in the forthcoming MFF, which allocates over EUR 50 billion for transport under the CEF for 2028-2034, including over EUR 17 billion for military mobility;

9. Recalls the Council’s unprecedented cut of 75 % to military mobility funding under the 2019-20272021-2027 MFF, as compared to the position of Parliament and the Commission, and stresses that such a situation cannot be repeated; underlines that due to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the military mobility budget had to be frontloaded and was entirely consumed by the beginning of 2024; insists that the resources allocated to military mobility within the next MFF be drastically increased to bring them into line with the estimated investment need of at least EUR 100 billion for addressing the 500 hotspots identified in the EU as needing urgent upgrading;

10. Insists, taking this investment need as well as the recommendations of the Draghi report into consideration, on the importance of at least preserving the indicated amount of EUR 17 billion in the subsequent negotiations on the overall MFF ceiling, while protecting the allocation for the achievement of the TEN-T; stresses that the Council must not make any proposal to cut the amount of this funding and believes that the channelling of these funds towards military mobility will need to be closely monitored;

59. Stresses the need to accelerate the transposition and implementation of the NIS2 Directive, and to enhance cooperation between sectoral transport authorities, competent cybersecurity agencies, computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs) and the European cyber crisis liaison organisation network (EU-CyCLONe); stresses the importance of including concrete measures addressing military mobility aspects in EU and national cybersecurity risk assessments;

60. Highlights the importance of protecting and improving the resilience of critical transport infrastructure, including against cyber-attacks and hybrid threats that jeopardise civil air, maritime and land traffic; recalls that energy and communication critical infrastructure (areal,(aerial, surface and sub-sea or underwater, including GNSS) also directly affects the success of military mobility activities;

61. Calls for the establishment of a European mechanism for monitoring and providing rapid response in the event of cyber or hybrid attacks on critical transport, energy and communication infrastructure, to be developed in close cooperation with NATO;

99. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, NATO, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the EU security and defence agencies and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

Increasing commitment for military mobility

The EU faces evolving security challenges that necessitate a robust and responsive military mobility framework. The SEDE and TRAN Rapporteurs outline in their draft report the critical aspects of enhancing military mobility within the EU, focusing on the need for regulatory improvements, financial considerations and strengthened cooperation with NATO and other partners.

Military mobility is an essential enabler for European security and defence and for the EU’s support to Ukraine. It enhances the ability of Member States and allies’ armed forces to swiftly move military personnel, materiel and assets across the EU in case of conflict or intensified hybrid warfare.

Legally, territorial defence is a competence of the 27 Member States, 23 of which are also members of NATO. In terms of EU-NATO cooperation, military mobility has been included in the common set of proposals to implement the three EU-NATO Joint Declarations of 2016, 2018 and 2023, and is currently a flagship project of cooperation between the two organisations, with an ongoing structured dialogue to ensure coordination.

Military mobility first gained attention at the EU level in 2017-18 through the launch of the first EU Action Plan and the various commitments undertaken by the Member States at the Foreign Affairs Council of June 2018, which included developing national plans for military mobility and ensuring permissions for cross-border movement within five working days. A Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) project to enhance cooperation on military mobility was launched in 2018.

The EU’s strategic need for military mobility became even more urgent in light of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the problems encountered by armed forces in the EU. This proves that more steps need to be taken to improve military mobility.

In that context, the Strategic Compass on Security and Defence of March 2022 confirmed that substantially enhancing military mobility is paramount for European security and defence. In line with the Strategic Compass, the Action Plan 2.0 was adopted in November 2022, for the period 2022-2026. It provides the current framework to develop a well-connected military mobility network, with shorter reaction times and capable, secure, sustainable and resilient transport infrastructure and capabilities.

Military mobility was designated a strategic priority at EU political level and identified as a priority focus area in EU defence capabilities and defence readiness by the Granada declaration adopted by the European Council on 6 October 2023.

In March 2024, the Commission published the European Defence Industrial Strategy, which indicates the need to address the remaining bottlenecks of military mobility.

In May 2024, Member States adopted an updated Military Mobility Pledge that complements and reinforces the Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0. Member States committed to implement 13 concrete commitments before the end of 2026. These include, among others, prioritising investments in transport infrastructure benefitting military movements, accelerating cross-border movement permissions and enhancing EU-NATO cooperation.

In February 2025, the European Court of Auditors published an audit of military mobility, which considered that progress has so far been variable. It makes recommendations in different areas to strengthen the EU’s impact on military mobility, including governance, funding predictability and the selection of dual use infrastructure projects under the post-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF).

In March 2025, the Commission and the HR presented a White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030. It sets out the necessary steps to rebuild European defence, to support Ukraine, address critical capability shortfalls and establish a strong and competitive defence industrial base. Based on the defence capability gaps already identified by Member States, the White Paper identifies military mobility as one of the seven priority areas that are critical to build a robust European defence.

The White Paper acknowledges that considerable obstacles remain to moving troops and equipment unhindered across the EU, and identifies areas where urgent action is needed:

· Red tape, often requiring both diplomatic clearance specific to military transports and compliance with regular administrative rules and processes.

· Non-harmonised procedures, including customs, often cause severe delays in the issuance of cross-border permissions.

· The EU and Member States need to immediately simplify and streamline regulations and procedures and ensure priority access for the armed forces to transport facilities, networks and assets. For their movements, the armed forces need access to critical transport infrastructure that is fit for a dual-use purpose.

· Armed forces need both the availability of all transport modes and multiple routings across the EU and connections to partner countries.

· The EU and Member States need to identify possible immediate and future energy supply bottlenecks together with relevant partners, in particular NATO.

· There is a need for increased availability of specialised and dual use transport assets in all transport modes. Strengthened cooperation with EU industries would allow to increase supply of such critical assets and maintain lead market position of European companies offering dual use technologies.

Dual use transport infrastructure

In December 2021, the Commission presented its proposal to revise the TEN-T Regulation, with an amended proposal presented in July 2022 to reflect the changed geopolitical situation. The revised Regulation entered into force in July 2024. It contains four key elements to support military mobility within and beyond the EU:

1. It anchors within EU law the notion of a military mobility transport network;

2. Through its new Article 48 on military mobility, it mandates the Commission to identify priority military mobility corridors;

3. It sets the TEN-T on the path of becoming a largely dual-use transport infrastructure network, notably by requiring the Member States to consider military mobility needs when constructing or upgrading infrastructure on the TEN-T; and

4. It strengthens and aligns several transport infrastructure requirements with military requirements, especially for rail; in some instances the updated maps also reflect the military needs, most notably with extensions into neighbouring countries Ukraine and Moldova.

To further align standards of the TEN-T and the EU military transport network, the Council adopted in October 2023 the revised military requirements including Annex II on “Multi-Modal Transport Corridors”. The revision process included consultations with NATO. The enlarged scope of military requirements encompasses: (i) logistics hubs; (ii) the supply-chain infrastructure for fuel; (iii) lessons identified from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; and (iv) military criteria for the evaluation of dual-use infrastructural project proposals.

In March 2025, the Council adopted the revised Annex II of the military requirements, which includes four priority multi-modal corridors (rail, road, sea and air) for military mobility for short-notice and large-scale movements of troops and equipment. These corridors were identified by the Commission together with the EU Military Staff representing the EEAS, and Member States, followed by consultations with NATO. The corridors can better guide and prioritise future investments in the military mobility network at both EU and national level.

Within these four priority corridors, 500 hot-spot projects have already been identified as being in need of urgent upgrade. Their security, maintenance and repair also need to be assured.

Your Rapporteurs believe that improving the capacity of transport infrastructure to handle military assets requires new measures, including streamlining and harmonizing complex national rules and procedures.

The military mobility package

The Commission has announced the presentation by the end of 2025 of a Military Mobility package, consisting of a joint communication, a regulation and amendments to existing EU laws. It will address existing infrastructure bottlenecks, procedural obstacles and capability gaps, and it is expected to present strategic objectives, harmonise national procedures and enhance infrastructure resilience. If ambitious enough, these measures will streamline military movements across the EU while integrating military needs with broader policies, such as transport, energy and taxation.

Your Rapporteurs encourage the Commission to consider the revision of all necessary pieces of EU legislation and look forward to this very much needed Military mobility package. The EU must simplify, harmonize, and digitalize military mobility procedures to accelerate the granting of permissions and ensure priority access for armed forces to transport facilities and networks. This includes customs formalities for military operations, the transport of dangerous goods, and diplomatic clearances.

Funding

The main funding instrument for military mobility is the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF).

Under the MFF 2021-2027, a budget of approximately EUR 1.7 billion was allocated to co-fund dual-use transport infrastructure through the CEF. This figure represents 75% less than the EUR 6.5 billion proposed initially by the Commission and supported by Parliament. The dedicated military mobility envelope under the CEF has been exhausted after three calls (2021, 2022, and 2023).

In the current MFF period, transport infrastructure projects can receive funding through the CEF ‘General and Cohesion’ envelope.

With EUR 14.5 billion, the MFF’s overall Security and Defence heading – created for the first time in 2019 –remains modest. The current level of funds does not match the scale of additional investment needed to meet the demands of better preparedness for our own deterrence, as well as to support Ukraine in the long term.

To address this funding gap, the Commission presented, as part of the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030, a defence package providing financial levers to EU Member States to drive an investment surge in defence capabilities, including the allocation of resources to CEF for military mobility projects. The Commission also adopted a Communication on Accommodating increased defence expenditure within the Stability and Growth Pact.

Your Rapporteurs call on the Commission, the Council and the Member States to address the funding gap for military mobility to bolster European security. A more ambitious and forward-looking approach in the next MFF is needed to ensure adequate funding and flexibility for Member States to implement key infrastructure projects.

Relations with NATO

The Rapporteurs believe that enhanced military mobility reinforces the transatlantic alliance since NATO relies on the infrastructure of EU Member States for moving Allied forces and military equipment. The progress in EU-NATO cooperation has ensured that the EU's military requirements are consistent with NATO's technical and geographical requirements. The EU must intensify its essential partnership with NATO, focusing on areas such as military requirements, transport infrastructure, customs, and cross-border movement permissions. Avoiding duplication of efforts and improving information sharing between the EU and NATO is crucial for achieving synergies and enhancing overall defence capabilities.

Interoperability with key regional partners such as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and the Western Balkans is essential for enhancing military mobility and strengthening dual-use infrastructure leading to the Union's Eastern and South-Eastern borders.

Conclusions

Your Rapporteurs strongly believe that enhancing military mobility within the EU is a multifaceted endeavour that requires concerted efforts at the EU and national levels. By urgently and efficiently addressing financial, regulatory, and institutional issues, and by strengthening cooperation with NATO and other partners, the EU can ensure a robust and responsive defence framework capable of meeting current and future security challenges in order to protect EU citizens and defend the Union's interests and shared values.

ANNEX: DECLARATIONS OF INPUT

DECLARATION OF INPUT FROM PETRAS AUŠTREVIČIUS

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that he included in his report input on matters pertaining to the subject of the file that he received, in the preparation of the report, prior to the adoption thereof in committee, from the following interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register, or from the following representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies:

1. Interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register

European association of abnormal road transport and mobile cranes (ESTA)

European Logistics Platform

European Commission

Brigadier (Ret’d) Robbie BOYD, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)

FEPORT- Federation of European Private Port Companies and Terminals

European Transport Workers’ Federation

European Investment Bank

UNIFE - The European Rail Supply Industry Association

2. Representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies

Permanent Delegation of Türkiye to the EU

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that he has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament's Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

DECLARATION OF INPUT FROM ROBERTS ZĪLE

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that he included in his report input on matters pertaining to the subject of the file that he received, in the preparation of the report, prior to the adoption thereof in committee, from the following interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register, or from the following representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies:

1. Interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register

Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)

European Sea Ports Organisation

Community of European Railway and Infrastructure Companies

European association of abnormal road transport and mobile cranes (ESTA)

European Union Military Staff

UNIFE

Deutsche Bahn AG

European External Action Service

European Commission

European Secure Parking Organisation

DHL Group

ALLRAIL Alliance of Rail New Entrants

FuelsEurope

UIRR, International Union for Road-Rail Combined Transport METRANS a.s.

2. Representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that he has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament's Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

Date adopted

24.11.2025

Result of final vote

+:

–:

0:

56

11

2

Members present for the final vote

Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Petras Auštrevičius, Adrian-George Axinia, Wouter Beke, Tom Berendsen, Rachel Blom, Marc Botenga, Nikolina Brnjac, Nina Carberry, Carlo Ciccioli, Vivien Costanzo, Tobias Cremer, Johan Danielsson, Salvatore De Meo, Özlem Demirel, Valérie Devaux, Elio Di Rupo, Michał Dworczyk, Borja Giménez Larraz, Raphaël Glucksmann, Christophe Gomart, Niclas Herbst, Dariusz Joński, François Kalfon, Merja Kyllönen, Julien Leonardelli, Milan Mazurek, Alexandra Mehnert, Vangelis Meimarakis, Sven Mikser, Andrey Novakov, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Philippe Olivier, Kostas Papadakis, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Jaroslava Pokorná Jermanová, Reinis Pozņaks, Marjan Šarec, Volker Schnurrbusch, Rosa Serrano Sierra, Virginijus Sinkevičius, Mārtiņš Staķis, Stanislav Stoyanov, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Michał Szczerba, Kai Tegethoff, Riho Terras, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Pekka Toveri, Mihai Tudose, Roberto Vannacci, Alexandr Vondra, Elissavet Vozemberg-Vrionidi, Maciej Wąsik, Lucia Yar, Roberts Zīle, Kosma Złotowski

Substitutes present for the final vote

Jeannette Baljeu, Siegbert Frank Droese, Bart Groothuis, Norbert Lins, Ville Niinistö, Hélder Sousa Silva, Villy Søvndal, Cristian Terheş, Annamária Vicsek, Marta Wcisło, Isabel Wiseler-Lima

Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

Marco Falcone

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

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