What changed

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

P10_TA(2025)0146

on the securitySecurity of energy supply in the EU

(2025/2055(INI))

Committee on Industry, Research and Energy

PE769.948

European Parliament resolution of 8 July 2025 on the security of energy supply in the EU (2025/2055(INI))

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 194 thereof,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 July 2020 entitled ‘Powering a climate-neutral economy: An EU Strategy for Energy System Integration’ (COM(2020)0299),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1316/2013 and (EU) No 283/2014,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (‘European Climate Law’),

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1788 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on common rules for the internal markets for renewable gas, natural gas and hydrogen, amending Directive (EU) 2023/1791 and repealing Directive 2009/73/EC (recast),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1789 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on the internal markets for renewable gas, natural gas and hydrogen, amending Regulations (EU) No 1227/2011, (EU) 2017/1938, (EU) 2019/942 and (EU) 2022/869 and Decision (EU) 2017/684 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 (recast),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1787 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on the reduction of methane emissions in the energy sector and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/942,

L. whereas while most Russian oil and coal imports have been sanctioned, Russian gas and nuclear imports have regrettably remained outside of the EU’s sanctions regime amid concerns over security of supply;

M. whereas the share of Russian pipeline gas, both liquefied natural gas (LNG) and pipeline, in the EU’s total energy imports significantly decreased from 45 % in 2021 to approximately 19 % in 2024; whereas EU imports of Russian fossil fuels in the third year of the invasion have surpassed the EU financial aid sent to Ukraine in the same period (EUR 18.718,7 billion in 2024); whereas since the beginning of the war, Russia has earned a total of EUR 206 billion in revenue from fossil fuel exports to the EU; whereas global fossil fuel exports constitute the single largest source of revenue for Russia, amounting to EUR 250 billion per year – equivalent to 160 % of the Russian military budget for this year;

N. whereas among the 100 reactors operating in the EU, 18 are located in five EU countries and are of Russian or Soviet-design, each with varying levels of built-in reliance on Rosatom, which poses a particular risk to European energy security; whereas in 2024, Russia met around 23 % of the EU’s total demand for uranium conversion services and 24 % for uranium enrichment services;

P. whereas in its November 2024 resolution, Parliament called for the EU and its Member States to ban all imports of Russian energy, including LNG and nuclear, to require that ships exporting LNG from Russia be banned from entering EU ports and to refrain from concluding any new agreements with Rosatom or its subsidiaries;

Q. whereas the absence of an updated robust EU energy security strategy is adversely affecting businesses, industries and households; whereas, among other contributing factors, this has led to a sharp rise in energy poverty with nearly one in ten households (10.6(10,6 %) unable to adequately heat their homes in 2023, an increase from 6.96,9 % in 2021;

R. whereas attacks against critical energy infrastructure can lead to a loss of power affecting several Member States simultaneously and substantial economic damage, undermine public security and have implications for the EU’s defence capabilities; whereas Europe’s energy sector has been inundated with cyberattacks since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; whereas the Baltic Sea’s critical energy infrastructure is under regular attack from Russia; whereas the growing number of perimeter harassment incidents against offshore energy infrastructure poses a serious concern;

6. Stresses that decarbonisation should take into account the specificities of Member States and their regions, including Europe’s outermost territories and Just Transition Fund regions and their level of access to different types of clean energy sources, the needs of their industries and the vulnerability of their citizens in order to ensure a just transition that maintains energy security by creating synergies between climate ambitions, geographical and natural conditions, and social and economic realities;

7. Notes the need for a broader approach to non-fossil flexibility and energy storage that incorporates molecules and heat; highlights the potential of district heating systems that can use thermal storage to reduce the temperature of the loop and incorporate waste heat, solar, geothermal and other renewable sources, where appropriate, using natural gas and biomass in a transition period; draws attention to the important role that the optimal use of high-efficiency cogeneration, in line with the Energy Efficiency Directive, can play in contributing to balancing the electricity grid and to the competitiveness of some industrial sectors, especially those that do not have alternative ways of producing affordable heat in their industrial processes; stresses the need to modernise and expand district heating grids to this end;

8. Emphasises that technological neutrality plays a key role in enhancing the security of energy supply while avoiding lock-in effects and fostering sustainability, economic efficiency and a just transition; recalls the need to invest in a diverse portfolio of clean technologies that allow regions to adopt technologies best suited to their needs in a cost-effective way, making energy more affordable and accessible;

10. Stresses that the development of nuclear energy remains a national prerogative in the framework of EU law; notes that for the Member States that choose to have nuclear power in their energy mix, it can have an important role to play in an integrated energy system with increasing penetration of renewables; notes that a number of Member States see a need to support the development and deployment of both existing and a new generation of nuclear technologies, as well as the entire nuclear fuel cycle, that will contribute to building a competitive technological supply chain in the EU so as to ensure open strategic autonomy; stresses the importance of assessing the full cost of the entire nuclear energy life cycle, including construction, operation, security, environmental and health impacts, waste management and decommissioning; notes the existing and ongoing reliance on foreign providers, with approximately 97 % of the EU’s natural uranium supply in 2022 coming from oversea sources and stresses the need to diversify uranium and nuclear fuel supply sources and to follow the Euratom Supply Agency’s recommendation in developing reliable supply chains to meet the growing demand for nuclear and new nuclear technologies; notes, in this regard, the European Investment Bank’s recent decision to renew its support for strengthening European uranium enrichment capacities; underlines that small modular reactors (SMRs) and advanced modular reactors (AMRs) have the potential to enhance energy security by providing low-carbon power; notes, however, that the technology is not yet fully developed; welcomes the announced assessment of the possibility of streamlining licensing practices for new nuclear energy technologies such as SMRs;

11. Recognises that renewable energy constitutes an enabler of energy autonomy and long-term security of supply; stresses that renewables are essential in delivering energy security as they already constitute the main source of home-grown energy for the EU; highlights the importance of maximising the use of existing renewable capacities, particularly by tackling the issue of curtailment, as grid congestion in the EU curtailed over 12 TWh of renewable electricity in 2023, resulting in an additional 4.24,2 million tons of CO₂ emissions; notes that renewables have already helped to reduce EU dependence on Russian gas as they accounted for 25 % of the energy and 45 % of the electricity consumed in the EU in 2023; reaffirms the importance of sustained EU support for the development and deployment of established renewable technologies, such as solar, wind power, geothermal and heat pumps; reiterates the necessity of policy and investment support for less developed or emerging sectors in order to accelerate the deployment of renewable technologies that are the most relevant given their national and local circumstances, such as innovative geothermal technologies, biomethane, solar thermal, marine energy, tidal energy, osmotic energy and concentrated solar power; expresses concern that, without targeted support policies, some innovative technologies may fail to reach commercialisation in a timely manner, and therefore calls on the Member States to support their research, demonstration, market adoption and scale-up; calls on the Commission to present an investment plan for these renewable technologies;

12. Notes, in particular, the potential of geothermal energy, estimated to reach 510 GW by 2035 at a capacity factor of 80-90 %; highlights the vast untapped resources in certain EU regions and calls on the Commission to deliver on Parliament’s call to support the development of geothermal energy, including through the establishment of risk mitigation instruments;

38. Calls on the Member States to include gas deliveries to the EU from the Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2 terminals in the scope of EU sanctions and the respective sanctioning of the singular fleet of ice-class LNG carriers linked to the Yamal LNG project; notes that sanctioning LNG carriers would be highly effective, as there is a limited number of ice-class LNG carriers in the world; stresses that the above actions would require adequate assessments of the legal and economic impacts on the European companies concerned and to ensure their ability to exit contracts;

39. Commends the inclusion of the nuclear supply chain in the roadmap; notes, with concern, that Russian nuclear fuel remains present in the EU market, including through indirect supply chains, and that in 2023, 23.523,5 % of the uranium consumed in the EU came from Russia and 30.130,1 % of the uranium used in the EU’s nuclear fleet was enriched by Russia; notes that while domestic providers are ramping up capacity in their European facilities to meet increased demand, as utilities proactively move away from Russian supply, clear policy decisions are urgently required at EU and national level to address the above vulnerabilities in the nuclear supply chain; calls therefore for support for projects within the Union that contribute to greater autonomy and security of nuclear fuel supply;

40. Expresses concern that official data does not provide a complete picture of Russian energy imports and their final destination, as relabelled Russian oil and gas continue to enter the EU market; notes with regret that this, in some cases, occurs with the acquiescence of the state actors involved;

59. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

In the Versailles Declaration, Member States agreed that the new situation requires a thorough reassessment of how the EU should ensure the security of energy supply. The update should reflect the technological changes that have taken place in recent years and the progress made in the cross-sectoral integration of the energy system. It should also reflect changes in the geopolitical situation. This is not limited to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the profound changes in supply routes and the EU’s increased dependence on Liquefied Natural Gas imports, but should also take into account broader geopolitical developments in the world. We need to analyse the new US administration’s decision to take a step back on climate policy, including withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, and see what the consequences are for our economy, for the existing competitiveness gap between the US and the EU, and whether this requires a reassessment of our policies, including in the field of energy and climate.

The reassessment would be incomplete without taking into account the lessons learned and acknowledging the shortcomings of existing policies. This applies to the EU’s unstable and ambivalent policy towards natural gas, which has undermined the trading position of EU companies, leaving them unable to conclude long-term contracts, partly due to the legal limitation of gas contracts to 2049, leaving Europe exposed to global spot market prices and creating a dangerous gap between what the bloc has contractually secured and what will be imported over time. The above also applies to the existing approach to nuclear energy, which has been treated as an elephant in the room of EU policy for years. This has gradually changed in recent years, with the result that Commissioner Dan Jorgensen has been given the task in his mission letter of facilitating the deployment of small and modular reactors in the EU. The role of nuclear power should be further reassessed as it has an important role to play in an integrated energy system with increasing penetration of renewables, providing flexible load following and frequency control, allowing very rapid changes in output and underpinning security of supply in Member States. EU energy policy should be firmly based on the principle of technological neutrality, which is crucial for security of supply as it allows for a diverse mix of energy sources and innovations - from renewables to nuclear and low-carbon fuels - to increase resilience, reduce dependence on specific suppliers and ensure a stable and adaptable energy system in the face of geopolitical and market uncertainties.

The Rapporteur expresses her concern that the short-sightedness and self-interest of some EU Member States in securing cheap energy imports for their economies, against the warnings of other countries, has taught the whole continent, at enormous cost, the dangers of dependence on an unreliable energy supplier such as Russia. The report stresses that the lessons of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine must be at the heart of future EU action. EU energy sanctions against Russia should be fully implemented and further strengthened. This is required not only by our obligations to Ukraine, which is the first line of defence of the European continent against an aggressive, revisionist and imperialist Russia. It is also required by the resilience of our energy systems, which must not fall back into the trap of energy dependence on Russia and its inevitable future blackmail. For this reason, the Rapporteur calls for the adoption of a phase-out plan that should pave the way for the definitive end of all energy imports from Russia, including in nuclear and related technologies. The text also emphasises the need to ensure transparency and traceability of Russian energy imports into the EU, as a clear picture of what and how much is actually being imported should be a prerequisite and a basis for future measures guiding the EU’s phasing out of Russian imports. The Rapporteur believes that the forthcoming revision of the security of supply architecture should be used as an opportunity to include in its framework an obligation for each Member State to prepare an exit plan for Russian energy sources and to monitor the preparation of exit plans at the level of national companies. This should be used in the future to prevent other dependencies, as we cannot have a situation where we move from dependence on one country to total dependence on another.

The Rapporteur condemns calls for a return to Russian energy imports as part of a peace settlement in Ukraine. This would undermine the commitments made in the Versailles Declaration and undermine all aspects of the Union’s security. Given that gas imports are not (yet) sanctioned by the EU, the Rapporteur calls on the Commission and Member States to put in place much needed safeguards against the import of gas volumes that threaten the security of the Union. These safeguards could take the form of a required countersignature by the Commission on any potential contract with Russia or the mandatory use of the AggregateEU platform for this type of purchase.

The Rapporteur emphasises that the geopolitical situation underscores the need to revise the understanding of energy security. This requires reconceptualising that the “peace dividend” is over and that resilience of energy systems, broadly understood, is now a strategic imperative. Member States urgently need to cooperate and invest in protecting their critical infrastructure against man-made threats, both cyber and military. We need to learn the lessons from a war in Ukraine and Russia’s deliberate attacks on its energy infrastructure assets and increase the preparedness of our energy systems.

Climate change poses significant risks to energy infrastructure, as rising temperatures, extreme weather events and changing rainfall patterns threaten the reliability and resilience of energy systems. Heat waves can reduce the efficiency of power plants and transmission lines, while droughts can limit hydropower generation and the availability of cooling water for thermal and nuclear power plants. More frequent storms, floods and wildfires can damage critical infrastructure, leading to power outages and costly repairs. These challenges require urgent adaptation measures, such as strengthening networks, decentralising energy production and integrating climate resilience into infrastructure planning. Strengthening the energy system against climate impacts is an essential element of a policy to ensure a stable, secure and sustainable energy supply in a rapidly changing environment. We must therefore ensure that all new energy infrastructure is “resilient by design” and provides a high level of protection against climate and man-made threats.

The Rapporteur would like to draw attention to the fact that the increasing complexity of the energy system, driven by the integration of variable renewable energy, decentralised production, digitalisation and the electrification of key sectors, requires greater policy coordination between Member States in order to ensure stability, efficiency and security of supply. As energy flows become increasingly interconnected across borders, unilateral action can often lead to inefficiencies, market distortions and supply risks. This should not be limited to network infrastructure and emergency response mechanisms, which are essential to prevent congestion, increase flexibility and optimise the use of resources across regions. As has been shown, national decisions to remove generation capacity from the system, such as the closure of nuclear power plants, can have a major impact on the availability and affordability of energy in neighbouring countries, to the extent that some of them are considering insulating their markets from EU energy system influence. Energy security is increasingly a shared responsibility of Member States and these decisions require closer coordination.

Securing a stable and diversified energy supply is essential for economic resilience, industrial competitiveness and social stability. Domestic energy production, improving energy efficiency and strengthening the infrastructure for alternative sources, such as hydrogen and biomethane, are essential to reduce dependence and increase resilience. Strong trade partnerships, especially with like-minded countries, are essential for energy security as they diversify sources of supply, reduce dependence on individual suppliers, increase market stability and facilitate access to critical energy resources and technologies needed for a resilient and sustainable energy system. A secure energy system not only protects economies from geopolitical shocks, but also supports long-term climate goals, enhancing both sustainability and strategic autonomy.

ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the report, prior to the adoption thereof in committee:

Entity and/or person

SolarEdge

Trina Solar

Forum Energii

ACER

CEWEP - Confederation of European Waste-to-Energy Plants

Edison

EUTurbines

EUgine

Cefic - European Chemical Industry Council

ENTSO-G

ENTSO-E

Urenco

PKEE - Polish Electricity Association

PGE

COGEN Europe

Gas Infrastructure Europe

Offshore Norway

Fluxys

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

Date adopted

25.6.2025

Result of final vote

+:

–:

0:

56

15

1

Members present for the final vote

Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Wouter Beke, Hildegard Bentele, Tom Berendsen, Michael Bloss, Paolo Borchia, Borys Budka, Raúl de la Hoz Quintano, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Elena Donazzan, Matthias Ecke, Christian Ehler, Jan Farský, Niels Fuglsang, Alexandra Geese, Jens Geier, Giorgio Gori, Bart Groothuis, Christophe Grudler, András Gyürk, Niels Flemming Hansen, Eero Heinäluoma, Ivars Ijabs, Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă, Seán Kelly, Rudi Kennes, Michał Kobosko, Isabella Lövin, Fulvio Martusciello, Sara Matthieu, Eva Maydell, Mirosława Nykiel, Thomas Pellerin-Carlin, Pascale Piera, Virgil-Daniel Popescu, Jüri Ratas, Julie Rechagneux, Elena Sancho Murillo, Jussi Saramo, Paulius Saudargas, Benedetta Scuderi, Anthony Smith, Diego Solier, Marcin Sypniewski, Beata Szydło, Bruno Tobback, Yvan Verougstraete, Mariateresa Vivaldini, Andrea Wechsler, Anna Zalewska, Auke Zijlstra, Nicola Zingaretti

Substitutes present for the final vote

Paulo Cunha, Margarita de la Pisa Carrión, Hanna Gedin, Michalis Hadjipantela, Radan Kanev, Lara Magoni, Jutta Paulus, Massimiliano Salini, Oliver Schenk, Davor Ivo Stier, Francesco Torselli, Brigitte van den Berg, Sophie Wilmès

Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

Rachel Blom, Zsuzsanna Borvendég, Vasile Dîncu, Marieke Ehlers, Alicia Homs Ginel, Marlena Maląg, Volker Schnurrbusch

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

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