Security and defence implications of China's influence on critical infrastructure in the European Union
TA-9-2024-0028 · P9_TA(2024)0028 · PE750.176
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Parliament's resolution examines the security and defence risks of China's influence over EU critical infrastructure and sets out what the EU should do about them.¶¶¶ It describes China's military-civil fusion strategy as a state-led programme to acquire cutting-edge technology and strengthen the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Liberation Army.¶¶ It warns about Chinese stakes in European ports, undersea cables, 5G networks and rare earth supplies, and about dependencies in critical raw materials.¶¶¶ It calls for stronger screening of foreign investment, a rapid response mechanism for dual-use infrastructure, new rules on undersea cable suppliers, and EU-wide export licensing systems operational by the end of 2024.¶¶¶ It asks the Commission to report annually to Parliament on possible dual use of strategic infrastructure and on respect for EU trade legislation.¶¶ It calls for extending de-risking measures to the EU's closest partners and for implementing the Global Gateway Investment Package of EUR 150 billion.¶¶
Key points
- Parliament finds that China's military-civil fusion strategy is a state-led programme to acquire world technologies and strengthen the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Liberation Army.¶
- It says Chinese companies' international activities support the Chinese Communist Party's goals of expanding influence, undermining geopolitical rivals and increasing China's influence.¶
- It warns that Chinese involvement in EU strategic assets risks transferring civilian technology to China's military and urges Member States to increase oversight and background checks.¶
- It notes that 98% of EU demand for rare earths is met by China and calls for diversifying sources and strategic partnerships with reliable third countries.¶¶
- It is concerned about Chinese-operated undersea cables used for EU and Member State diplomatic and military communications and calls for a joint effort to prevent similar cases.¶
- It calls on the Council and Commission to exclude equipment and software from manufacturers based in China in core network functions and to propose additional security standards for 5G and 6G suppliers.¶
- It considers TikTok in breach of the European data privacy framework and welcomes suspensions of its use on EU institutions' devices.¶
- It urges all Member States to make EU-wide electronic customs and export licensing systems operational by the end of 2024.¶
- It calls on the Commission to compile an exhaustive inventory of critical assets and to expand legislative initiatives to address risks beyond foreign direct investment screening.¶
- It calls for generalised screening of all stakeholders in EU critical infrastructure projects, including collaborative ventures, partnerships and technology transfers, and for due-diligence standards.¶
- It calls on the Commission to design a rapid response mechanism for detecting dual use or misuse of EU infrastructures under Chinese ownership, participation or concession.¶
- It calls on the Commission to propose a new legislative framework to mitigate security risks from undersea cable system suppliers and to develop European-owned companies in that field.¶
Who is affected
- EU Member States, which are urged to implement foreign direct investment screening and reduce espionage risks in critical infrastructure.¶¶
- The Commission, which is asked to report to Parliament, propose new rules and strengthen screening.¶¶¶
- Chinese companies in EU ports, undersea cables, 5G networks and other critical infrastructure, which face tighter screening and possible exclusion.¶¶¶
- EU accession countries and neighbourhood partners, to which de-risking measures should be extended.¶
- African countries, where Chinese-financed infrastructure and the Global Gateway Investment Package are at issue.¶
Figures and deadlines
- more than 10 % of Europe's total shipping container capacity handled by European ports where Chinese state-owned companies have stakes¶
- 14 out of 29 ports close to naval bases or providing logistical support to NATO forces
- 98 % of EU demand for rare earths met by the PRC¶
- EU record trade deficit of EUR 396 billion in 2022¶
- 100 % of the 5G RAN in Cyprus composed of Chinese equipment, and 59 % in Germany¶
- Huawei received EUR 3,89 million of funding in total from 11 Horizon Europe projects until June 2023
- Chinese companies owned or operated terminals in 96 ports across 53 countries in 2022¶
- Global Gateway Investment Package of EUR 150 billion agreed at the 6th EU-AU Summit in February 2022¶
Legal basis: Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union, in particular Chapter Two, Section Two on provisions on the common security and defence policy¶