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Adopted text

Economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability

TA-10-2026-0323 · P10_TA(2026)0323 · PE784.226

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Parliament's position at first reading amends Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 on economic and budgetary surveillance of euro area Member States in financial difficulty, aligning it with the 2024 economic governance reform. It clarifies when a Member State receiving precautionary financial assistance becomes subject to enhanced surveillance, and deletes the old provisions on that. It redefines post-programme surveillance, focusing it on the capacity to repay assistance, and introduces a tiered system with a specific assessment five years after surveillance starts. It requires the Commission to share documents with Parliament without undue delay and to seek administrative arrangements with the ESM and other institutions.

Key points

  1. A Member State requesting or receiving financial assistance from other states, third countries, the EFSM, the ESM or another institution such as the IMF falls under the Regulation.
  2. A Member State receiving precautionary financial assistance that requires new policy measures must be subject to enhanced surveillance, including where the assistance has not been drawn.
  3. The Commission should assess case by case whether new ESM precautionary instruments require new policy measures and so justify enhanced surveillance.
  4. A Member State under enhanced surveillance must adopt measures addressing the sources of difficulties, taking into account recommendations under Regulation (EU) 2024/1263, Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 or Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011.
  5. On Commission request, that Member State must communicate disaggregated financial information, carry out stress tests or sensitivity analyses, submit to peer review of supervisory capacities, and provide information on macroeconomic imbalances and budgetary surveillance.
  6. The division of responsibilities between the ECB and national competent authorities under Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 must be respected, and information communicated is treated as confidential.
  7. A Member State intending to request financial assistance must immediately inform the President of the Eurogroup Working Group, the Commission member for Economic and Monetary Affairs and the President of the ECB.
  8. Where a Member State requests assistance from the EFSM or ESM, the Commission assesses government debt sustainability and financing needs and submits the assessment to the Eurogroup Working Group or the EFC.
  9. A draft macroeconomic adjustment programme must take into account an active national medium-term fiscal-structural plan, wage formation practice and institutions, and fully observe Article 152 TFEU and Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
  10. The Commission must ensure that memoranda of understanding signed on behalf of the ESM are fully consistent with the approved macroeconomic adjustment programme or the relevant Council decision.
  11. Post-programme surveillance lasts as long as at least 75 % of the financial assistance received has not been repaid, and the Council may extend it on a Commission proposal in case of persistent repayment risk.
  12. The Commission monitors repayment capacity, implementation of reforms and the need for corrective measures, reporting every six months, and may after five years suspend assessments for five years if there are no material medium-term risks.

Who is affected

  • Euro area Member States experiencing or threatened with serious financial difficulties, which face enhanced or post-programme surveillance.
  • Member States requesting or receiving financial assistance from other states, the EFSM, the ESM or institutions such as the IMF.
  • The Commission, which assesses debt sustainability, monitors programmes and reports to Parliament and the EFC.
  • The ECB, ESAs and ESRB, which cooperate on stress tests, assessments and information exchange.
  • The ESM and other international financial institutions, with which the Commission seeks administrative arrangements.

Figures and deadlines

  • 75 % of the financial assistance received must be repaid for post-programme surveillance to end.
  • Five years after post-programme surveillance starts, the Commission may carry out a specific assessment.
  • Assessments may be suspended for a period of five years if there are no material medium-term risks.
  • The Commission reports every six months on its post-programme assessment.
  • The Commission informs the EFC every three months on progress in the macroeconomic adjustment programme.
  • The Council may reject a Commission proposal to extend post-programme surveillance within 10 days by qualified majority.
  • A general government debt-to-GDP ratio above 90 % is a factor in the specific assessment.
  • The Regulation enters into force on the twentieth day following its publication in the Official Journal.

Legal basis: Article 136 in conjunction with Article 121(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.