Skip to content
Adopted text

Control, transparency and traceability of performance-based instruments

TA-10-2026-0122 · P10_TA(2026)0122 · PE778.127

✦ In short · AI summary of this text, generated 4 Sept 2026

Written by a language model from the full text only; every figure comes from the text. The paragraph links open the paragraph a statement rests on — check the text itself before relying on it.

Parliament's resolution on performance-based instruments stresses that they must respect sound financial management and transparency, and calls for stronger control, transparency and traceability of EU funds. It warns against the generalised use of financing not linked to costs, citing risks of fraud and double funding, and demands safeguards, including a single interoperable information system and clear thresholds for corrective measures. It insists that Parliament's role as budgetary and discharge authority be respected, and calls for public access to data and assessments, as well as for audits by the ECA.

Key points

  1. Performance-based instruments must respect legality, regularity, economy, efficiency and effectiveness; simplification must not undermine sound financial management.
  2. The RRF is the first major performance-based instrument using financing not linked to costs; its model has been replicated in the Ukraine Facility and Western Balkans Facility.
  3. Lessons from RRF weaknesses include reduced accountability and limited EU oversight; transparency on final recipients must be ensured via a uniform, interoperable reporting system.
  4. Future instruments should have specific key performance indicators and be harmonised, transparent and stable; the Commission should integrate data mining and cross-checking tools.
  5. Concern about the EU's growing debt and borrowing costs; ECA estimates outstanding borrowing could exceed EUR 900 billion by 2027.
  6. Generalised use of FNLC increases risks of irregularities and fraud; calls for robust governance and full respect for Parliament's discharge authority.
  7. Calls for a unified framework under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation and for FNLC to be compatible with it.
  8. Notes EPPO cases and estimated damage; calls for stronger EU oversight and corrective measures in cases of systemic failures.
  9. Calls for clear standards for when national control systems are insufficient, and for a single integrated information system as a precondition for funding.
  10. FNLC should not be generalised; large-scale projects should remain cost-based; supports lump sums and simplified cost options for smaller beneficiaries.
  11. Demands transparency, including public access to cost estimation methodology and Parliament access to estimated costs of national plans.
  12. Calls for traceability to final beneficiaries, ex post evaluations, and for the Commission to publish clear thresholds for corrective measures.

Who is affected

  • Member States: must ensure transparency, use interoperable systems, and comply with audit standards.
  • Commission: must develop and use interoperable systems, publish thresholds, and provide guidance and training.
  • Beneficiaries: smaller ones may use simplified options; large-scale projects must remain cost-based.
  • European Court of Auditors: should have direct access to original data.
  • European Public Prosecutor's Office and OLAF: should have real-time access to data on final recipients.

Figures and deadlines

  • EUR 900 billion: estimated outstanding EU borrowing by 2027.
  • 311 active EPPO cases related to NGEU at end of 2024.
  • 17 % of all active expenditure fraud investigations.
  • 51 % increase in NGEU-related cases compared to 2023.
  • EUR 2,8 billion estimated damage to EU financial interests.
  • 30 % of total estimated damage from all EU expenditure fraud.
  • 24 of 27 Member States participate in the EPPO.

Legal basis: Articles 311, 312, 319, 323 and 324 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union