Drones and new systems of warfare – the EU’s need to adapt to be fit for today’s security challenges

P10_TA(2026)0020

Drones and new systems of warfare – the EU’s need to adapt to be fit for today’s security challenges

Committee on Security and Defence

PE775.735

European Parliament resolution of 22 January 2026 on drones and new systems of warfare – the EU’s need to adapt to be fit for today’s security challenges (2025/2088(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

– having regard to Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Article 222 TFEU,

– having regard to the Commission proposal for a Council regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2028 to 2034 (COM(2025)0571),

– having regard to the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the European Competitiveness Fund (‘ECF’), including the specific programme for defence research and innovation activities, repealing Regulations (EU) 2021/522, (EU) 2021/694, (EU) 2021/697, (EU) 2021/783, repealing provisions of Regulations (EU) 2021/696, (EU) 2023/588, and amending Regulation (EU) (COM(2025)0555), which includes a defence and space component to strengthen the defence industrial base, including drones,

– having regard to the 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague and the deepening EU-NATO strategic partnership, notably on drone integration, innovation and counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS) capabilities, including the NATO Rapid Adoption Action Plan and the NATO-Ukraine Innovation Cooperation Roadmap, which is designed to provide support for Ukraine and enhance protection of allied airspace and critical infrastructure,

– having regard to the Readiness Action Plan, launched at the 2014 NATO Wales Summit in response to Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, and its evolution into a baseline framework for NATO’s deterrence and defence posture, culminating in the 2022 NATO Force Model,

– having regard to the tailored EU security and defence partnerships with Norway, Moldova, Japan, South Korea, Albania, North Macedonia and the United Kingdom, each framed to strengthen cooperation in areas such as crisis management, maritime and cybersecurity, military mobility, and defence industry collaboration,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 26 June 2025 on Ukraine, the Middle East, European defence and security, EU in the world, competitiveness, migration, the Republic of Moldova, Western Balkans, internal security, preparedness, hybrid activities and other items, and industrial readiness and the ReArm Europe Plan / Readiness 2030 objectives, the European Defence Fund (EDF) interim report and the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP),

– having regard to its resolution of 9 October 2025 on a united response to recent Russian violations of EU Member States’ airspace and critical infrastructure,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 21 February 2025 entitled ‘EU Action Plan on Cable Security’ (JOIN(2025)0009),

– having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the ‘White Paper’ on the future of European defence (2025/2565(RSP)),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 29 November 2022 entitled ‘A Drone Strategy 2.0 for a Smart and Sustainable Unmanned Aircraft Ecosystem in Europe’ (COM(2022)0652),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A New European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU Readiness through a Responsive and Resilient European Defence Industry’ (JOIN(2024)0010),

– having regard to the Informal meeting of Heads of State or Government in Copenhagen of 1 October 2025,

– having regard to the Integrated Air and Missile Defence (NATO IAMD), tailored to address all types of air and missile threats from all strategic directions,

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC,

– having regard to the Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services Briefing of 2025 entitled ‘Military drone systems in the EU and global context: Types, capabilities and regulatory frameworks’, which refers to the EU funding support to the Eurodrone programme, including EUR 98 million in 2020 and EUR 100 million in 2024,

– having regard to NATO standard STANAG 4748 (Digital Underwater Signalling),

– having regard to the European Court of Auditors’ Special Report 04/2025 entitled ‘EU Military Mobility – Full speed not reached due to design weaknesses and obstacles en route’,

– having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency, amending Directive 1999/45/EC and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 793/93 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 76/769/EEC and Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC (REACH Regulation),

– having regard to the report of 27 June 2025 by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) entitled ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy Report – Our priorities in 2025’,

– having regard to its resolution of 19 September 2024 on continued financial and military support to Ukraine by EU Member States,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 March 2025 entitled, ‘Joint white paper for European Defence Readiness 2030’, which refers to the European Peace Facility and its support of dronerelated capability delivery in Ukraine,

– having regard the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform, including the Security Action for Europe and Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency instruments, as critical enablers for scaling up dualuse innovation and industrial resilience,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination, and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1290/2013 and (EU) No 1291/2013,

– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014, laying down the framework for Single European Sky ATM Research, which seeks to enable the integration of military drones in shared airspace,

– having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ and chapter four thereof on increasing security and reducing dependencies,

– having regard to the political guidelines of 18 July 2024 for the European Commission 2024-2029, by the then candidate for the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, entitled ‘Europe’s choice’,

– having regard to its resolution of 17 July 2024 on the need for the EU’s continuous support for Ukraine,

– having regard to the Commission Implementing Decision of 15 March 2024 on the financing of the instrument for the reinforcement of the European defence industry through common procurement (EDIRPA) established by Regulation (EU) 2023/2418 of the European Parliament and of the Council and the adoption of the work programme for 2024-2025 (C(2024)1702),

– having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on the need for unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after two years of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine,

– having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2023 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2022, which emphasises the urgency of developing drone and counter-drone capacities within common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions,

– having regard to the Versailles Declaration of 10 and 11 March 2022,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 24 January 2022 on the European security situation and of 22 January 2018 on the Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises,

– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence,

– having regard to the European Defence Agency’s Action Plan on Autonomous Systems (APAS), approved on 11 January 2024, which establishes a phased, comprehensive framework to accelerate the development, interoperability, regulation, standardisation, certification, and cross-domain deployment of autonomous systems across land, air, maritime and hybrid operations,

– having regard to the APAS’s structured roadmap for the period 2024-2038, including flagship projects targeting cross-domain autonomous swarms and manned-unmanned teaming, supported by the Autonomous Systems Community of Interest and the Ad Hoc Working Group to coordinate implementation and stakeholder engagement,

– having regard to relevant NATO doctrines and guidelines on Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), including STANAG 4671 (unmanned aircraft systems airworthiness requirements), STANAG 4703 (C2), and the NATO Joint Air Power Strategy,

– having regard to the European Defence Agency’s European Military Airworthiness Requirement (EMAR) of 18 April 2024, which provides Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) to support and interpret the European Military Airworthiness Requirements on continuing airworthiness (EMAR M), and to the EMAR M framework and its AMC and GM as essential tools for aligning military airworthiness practices with the latest regulatory standards and ensuring their effective implementation within the military aviation environment,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 November 2022 entitled, ‘Action plan on military mobility 2.0’ (JOIN(2022)0048), which expands and digitalises military mobility infrastructure and administrative processes to streamline cross-border troop and equipment movements,

– having regard to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/675 of 4 April 2025 amending Regulation (EU) No 1302/2014 concerning a technical specification for interoperability relating to the rolling stock — locomotives and passenger rolling stock subsystem of the rail system in the European Union and Implementing Decision 2011/665/EU on the register of authorised types of railway vehicles and the Commission’s Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport’s adoption of automated systems for authorising personnel carriages in military freight trains, as part of a broader effort to modernise and accelerate logistic procedures across the trans-European transport network,

– having regard to the decision by the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation and Member States (France, Germany, Italy and Spain) to launch the Eurodrone MALE RPAS programme, formalised by the EUR 7,1 billion contract signed in February 2022 to develop and produce 60 drones, and its evolution through the 2024 preliminary design review and the upcoming critical design review in 2025, EU funding support (of EUR 100 million in 2024) and the accession of India as an observer in early 2025,

– having regard to the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs’ recommendations on lethal autonomous weapons systems and UN reports on the use of armed drones under international law,

– having regard to national frameworks and doctrinal publications on military drones,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1092,

– having regard to the Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1835 of 12 October 2015 defining the statute, seat and operational rules of the European Defence Agency,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020 (Critical Raw Materials Act),

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Security and Defence (A100270/2025),

Drone warfare

A. whereas the mass proliferation of precision-strike capability has permanently changed the modern battlefield, EU defence needs and resilience requirements for the Member States;

B. whereas recent hostile drone incidents and incursions targeting EU Member States, notably on the Union’s Eastern flank, have demonstrated the urgent need to field multilayered defences integrating kinetic and non-kinetic C-UAS to protect critical infrastructure and enhance resilience; whereas drones now serve multiple purposes including reconnaissance, decoy operations, target acquisition and precision strikes, while their widespread, war-proven use in Ukraine and other active theatres has reshaped air-defence requirements and operational doctrines;

C. whereas they have become a defining feature of modern warfare and hybrid conflicts, acting as force-multipliers that deliver real-time intelligence and accelerate decision-making; whereas related unmanned domains (UGS, USV and UUV) are expanding and must be reflected in future defence planning; whereas Europe must adapt its air- and joint-operations concepts and ensure that all military use of drones fully complies with international law, including human rights law;

D. whereas adversaries’ rapid development of drone manufacturing capacity, supported by external partners, together with the dominance of certain third-country suppliers of key components such as sensors, batteries, semiconductors and rare-earth materials, heightens strategic dependencies and underlines the urgency of strengthening Europe’s dual-use innovation base and secure supply chains; whereas Russia continues to scale up drone output, producing several million annually, outproducing the United States and Europe combined, with the emergence of Russian-developed loitering munitions and prototypes of heavier systems; whereas Russia’s drone industry’s capabilities are being supported by Iran and China and have led to a mass proliferation of increasingly lethal and sophisticated drones with precision strike capability;

Impact the continuously evolving nature of drone warfare is having on Member State armed forces and on the European Union’s security and defence framework

E. whereas drones have become a defining feature of modern warfare, exemplified in Ukraine where they have inflicted more casualties than any other weapon; whereas their use has now spread to multiple conflicts worldwide, including those in Gaza, Israel, Lebanon, Iran, Yemen, Sudan, Myanmar, and Azerbaijan’s war against Armenia, as well as in attacks on international vessels in the Red Sea;

F. whereas the European drone ecosystem is composed largely of SMEs and start-ups that drive technological innovation, flexibility, and competitiveness while the strategic deployment of UAS can significantly enhance situational awareness in remote, fragile, or conflict-prone border zones, collect real-time data and significantly aid detection and deterrence against a range of threats;

G. whereas the extensive use of UAS in Ukraine has demonstrated their decisive role not only as reconnaissance and strike tools but also as a means of maintaining defensive lines, medical evacuation and supply delivery, electronic warfare and signals intelligence, communication relay, detection and neutralisation of mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), real-time mapping and surveillance, search and rescue operations, protection of convoys, loitering munitions and precision strikes, decoy and deception missions, CBRN monitoring, and the documentation of war crimes; whereas UAS are evolving beyond support tools into core combat enablers, capable of functioning under intensive ‘barrage jamming’; whereas marine drones have created a new paradigm for maritime security, spanning mine detection to attacks on military targets, as demonstrated in the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea, and they will pose a new challenge to the security of the European Union in large naval theatres such as the Mediterranean Sea;

H. whereas the integration of space-based assets into drone-collected imagery can provide continuous, cross-validated and secure situational awareness for early warning, crisis management, and hybrid threat detection, monitoring terrorist movements, trafficking routes and border areas;

Supply chain vulnerabilities

I. whereas 60 % of the components of drones originate in the United States and China, creating a critical vulnerability for the EU’s Defence Readiness 2030; whereas Chinese companies manufacture most of the components needed to assemble drones, such as semiconductors, power transistors, magnets, batteries and navigation chips; whereas strategic cooperation should also address emerging technological competition from Russia and China and safeguard European access to innovation and materials required for sustainable drone and counter-drone capabilities;

J. whereas China has emerged as a leader in the field of drones, producing a wide range of combat and reconnaissance systems, while also investing in naval drones and swarms of autonomous mini-drones; whereas its armed drones have been exported on a large scale and employed by third countries in various theatres;

K. whereas the Chinese company DJI commands an estimated 74 % share of the commercial drone market, and Chinese companies manufacture most of the components needed to assemble them, such as semiconductors, power transistors, magnets, batteries and navigation chips; whereas 9 out of 10 sensors or optical systems needed to identify and strike targets are made in China; whereas Beijing controls 85 % of global lithium battery capacity and 98 % of rare earth refining, the backbone of both consumer electronics and modern weapons, resulting in Europe’s dependency on China’s supply; whereas China has started restricting exports of drone components and materials for Ukraine and Western buyers; whereas China, by effectively controlling access to the necessary materials – ranging from raw materials to batteries and software – and increasing its deliveries to Russia, decisively impacts the nature of drone warfare;

L. whereas on 9 October 2025 China introduced sweeping export controls on rare-earth elements and related processing technologies, citing national security concerns;

M. whereas these new rules cover virtually all rare-earth elements essential to drone manufacture and anti-drone capabilities and require Chinese suppliers to obtain export licences from the Ministry of Commerce, effectively subjecting the entire EU drone industry to Chinese export approval, demonstrating the strategic imperative of building a resilient and autonomous downstream supply chain for the drone industry;

N. whereas the new Chinese export restrictions announced and partially implemented on 9 October 2025 require export licences for products containing even trace amounts (above 0,1 %) of rare earth metals mined or processed in China, with Beijing explicitly stating that licences will not be granted to foreign defence sector entities;

O. whereas the EU must urgently develop alternative sources, recycling capacity and sovereign extraction of critical raw materials to reduce the vulnerabilities created by Chinese export restrictions and global supply-chain concentration;

Procurement and financing

P. whereas the production, procurement and financing of drones and C-UAS capabilities can be considered a service, requiring qualified personnel, smart investments, simplified procedures, access to public and private financing, regional production centres and close cooperation with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), technology companies and academia;

Align doctrine

Q. whereas the Member States must work to align doctrines, training facilities, certification procedures, assembly lines, battlefield coordination, real-time targeting, training, resilient C2 and full integration of all of the above;

R. whereas this alignment should also include relevant laws and regulations on drone use and production, ensure full compatibility with NATO doctrines and STANAG standards; and promote joint training with Ukraine to accelerate operational readiness;

S. whereas the EU and its Member States should aim to take the lead in the drone domain by deepening cooperation on training, certification, industrial assembly and operational coordination, while fully respecting national sovereignty as reaffirmed in Articles 4(2) and 42(2) TEU;

Strategic partnerships

T. whereas strategic partnerships are essential to achieving the mass and qualitative edge required to reach operational thresholds and access to expertise and raw materials;

U. whereas such partnerships must reinforce European security and defence capabilities, remain reciprocal, transparent and consistent while avoiding critical dependencies on third countries in defence technologies, components, software and raw materials;

V. whereas cooperation with key partners such as Ukraine is of particular importance, given its unparalleled battlefield experience, rapid innovation and adaptation cycles, integration of civilian and military innovation ecosystems and large-scale drone-production capacity, which provide unique insights for strengthening the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB);

W. whereas sharing lessons learned with partners experienced in C-UAS developing advanced drone-defence systems, are critical for Europe’s resilience;

X. whereas partnerships in the Western Balkans and in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood are also essential for regional stability and resilience;

Y. whereas the Western Balkans, which share over 2 500 km of land borders with the European Union and form its closest neighbouring region, are of direct strategic importance for the Union’s security, stability and prosperity;

Drone wars throughout the periphery

Z. whereas the EU’s immediate neighbourhood sees multiple drone intensive conflicts, with multiple Member States facing hostile drone incursions into their airspace; whereas the reflection on drones must take into account the protection of all European flanks;

AA. whereas regions bordering Member States, whether by land or sea, play a crucial role in the development and testing of drones and defence technologies, given the specific requirements arising from their geography and geopolitical position within the European security landscape; recognises that the Western Balkans, Mediterranean and Black Sea regions are all exposed to malign foreign influence, hybrid threats, disinformation and political interference seeking to undermine European security; whereas these regions are vulnerable to hostile drone activity and that partners in these regions are essential as a first line of defence in safeguarding collective security;

AB. whereas drone technology is being used by terrorist organisations to carry out attacks on political figures, penetrate EU penitentiary facilities, and to transport explosives and weapons;

AC. whereas naval drones represent a significant threat for both commercial and military vessels, and important trade routes, making the development of defence capabilities a necessity;

AD. whereas Ukraine produces over 4,5 million drones annually while under daily attack from increasingly sophisticated Russian drone swarms and has demonstrated, since the brutal aggression by Russia launched in February 2022, that the drone industry can be rapidly upgraded and modernised, thereby democratising access to key technologies and enabling effective self-defence;

Scaling to meet the Russian threat

AE. whereas Ukraine’s battlefield innovation and growing production capacity should be progressively integrated into the EDTIB;

AF. whereas Russia and China lead the mass development and proliferation of drone technology, operating on a three-to-six-month innovation cycle;

AG. whereas European states’ dependence on third countries in this sector is an unacceptable strategic vulnerability; whereas it is therefore essential that all European defence spending acts as a lever towards making European states fully autonomous in defence matters;

Cost-effective solutions

AH. whereas the Member States must utilise various new EU defence spending initiatives and instruments to devise cost-effective solutions to drone warfare; whereas these solutions should prioritise industrial resilience in Europe, reduce our dependencies on third countries, support SMEs in the defence sector, and ensure that investments translate into concrete capabilities that are rapidly deployable to support Ukraine and the EU’s defence;

AI. whereas UAS are inherently dual-use, having brought a major transformation to mobility, logistics and emergency management while the effectiveness of drone deployment and counter-drone operations relies on resilient cross-border infrastructure enabling rapid transport of mobile launch systems, command vehicles, and maintenance units; whereas there is a need for harmonised transportation infrastructure standards allowing drones used for logistics, surveillance and intelligence to operate safely in shared airspace and transport corridors;

Dual use for resilience

AJ. whereas the dual-use potential of drones for civil protection, disaster response, and border management is of growing importance across the EU, where ongoing security and migration crises, as well as hybrid threats, highlight the urgent need for situational awareness and rapid-response capabilities; whereas many critical drone technologies for defence originate in the civilian domain and use critical components of a dual-use nature, and the drone sector as a whole can make an important contribution to Europe’s operational capabilities;

AK. whereas the development of drones and counter-drone systems should be accompanied by robust safeguards for civilian protection, social resilience, and the responsible dual-use of technology, ensuring that investments in defence also strengthen health, humanitarian logistics and civil protection capacities; whereas there is strategic value in cross-domain and dual-use innovation, particularly in integrating aerial, maritime and land-based unmanned systems with civilian technologies;

Drone warfare in the modern battlefield

Adapting operations to drone warfare

1. Emphasises the need to integrate UAS and C-UAS at the tactical and operational levels, recognising that for armed forces to operate effectively on the rapidly evolving modern battlefield, soldiers must be capable of creating real-time ‘drone walls’ that integrate radar, acoustic sensors, radio frequency sensors, cameras, electro-optical and infra-red sensors and laser-based ‘hard-kill’ solutions to ensure their survivability, mobility, lethality, situational awareness and kinetic operation capacities;

2. Underlines the need to ensure technological adaptability, regular modernisation and upgrade cycles to prevent obsolescence, and to promote continuous integration of innovative systems across all operational domains, including land, air, sea and underwater;

3. Stresses that the development and deployment of such technologies necessitates investment in research and development (R&D), the facilitation of civil-military research partnerships, and support for start-ups and SMEs working in the high-tech defence industrial sector;

4. Calls on Member States and the Commission to integrate multirole and transport aircraft (such as A400M and AEW&C platforms) as airborne command, control and communications (C3) relay, battle management and drone-carrier nodes to sustain connectivity and operational reach; encourages cooperation between the European Defence Agency (EDA) and European industry to develop interoperable, open-architecture C3 ecosystems linking high-altitude and tactical unmanned assets;

5. Stresses the need for a robust, sovereign military airlift chain to transport, deploy and support modular drone systems, ensuring rapid force projection, resilient logistics, and full European control over data, networks and mission autonomy;

6. Encourages Member States to assess the long-term implications of this shift for force structure and training, and ethical standards in warfare;

Front-line challenges and equipment needs

7. Recognises the challenge of drone recognition faced by front-line soldiers and recommends the integration of anti-drone rifles, missiles, interceptor drones, drone catchers, gun-based close-in weapon systems, anti-drone jamming rifles and signal intelligence, electronic warfare (EW) capabilities and resilient C2 into infantry forces via training and attachment of EW units so infantry forces can operate effectively on the front line, maximising their protection and repair capability, and ensuring the correct identification and interception of enemy drones;

8. Warns that the absence of unit-level UAS creates a time-critical capability gap in the initial phase of combat that adversaries could exploit, leading to higher casualties and reduced operational freedom, and calls for urgent measures to close this gap through training and doctrinal adaptation;

Need for low-cost C-UAS capabilities

9. Stresses the challenge posed by the current unsustainably high cost of drone interceptions and calls for joint programmes and market-driven initiatives to promote the development of cost-effective C-UAS capabilities such as EW, laser, acoustic detection systems and AI-guided interception to lower the per-intercept cost and calls on the Commission to study the feasibility of using current defence industrial tools to support the goal of lowering the per-intercept cost of drones;

10. Calls for the enhanced production and technological development of existing anti-aircraft systems, following the example of Ukraine, where they have so far proven to be the most effective, mobile and cost-efficient counter-UAS measure;

11. Calls for emphasis on the development of simple, low-cost counter-UAS systems that can be rapidly produced and deployed to ensure immediate operational readiness;

Adapting combat doctrine to drones

12. Encourages armed forces to integrate and align drones in all combat doctrines as a layer in operational planning with a focus on hybrid warfare scenarios, ensuring interoperability with NATO C2 systems, civil air traffic management systems, and the EU’s U-Space framework for drone integration;

13. Calls for updating capability targets and planning between Member State armed forces to ensure the lessons learned in Ukraine are integrated into combat doctrine;

14. Stresses that anti-drone capabilities must be integrated not only within infantry units but also across all major military platforms, including naval vessels, tanks, armoured personnel carriers and logistics vehicles; calls on the Member States and the EDA to ensure that future procurement and modernisation programmes systematically include C-UAS modules adapted to the operational environment of each platform; underlines that such integration will enhance force protection, improve survivability of high-value assets, and strengthen interoperability between land, air and maritime domains;

15. Recommends that all drone corridors and supporting infrastructure co-financed by the EU include built-in cyber-resilience and redundancy layers, in line with the recommendation of the European Court of Auditors (ECA) to strengthen Pillar III (‘Resilience and Preparedness’) of the Military Mobility Action Plan 2.0;

16. Calls for sustained funding within EU instruments and national programmes to retrofit existing fleets and ensure permanent readiness through training and maintenance cycles;

17. Encourages the establishment of mobile drone maintenance and data-link relay stations along upgraded military mobility corridors to ensure sustained C2 and repair capabilities even in degraded communication environments;

18. Recommends the integration of aerial surveillance drones into existing European transport infrastructure monitoring systems (for bridges, tunnels and airfields), enhancing both civil protection and the rapid defence response; calls for prioritisation of dual use funding models for drone systems that align with competitiveness targets;

19. Urges the Commission and the Member States to swiftly implement a phased plan for interoperable UAS units, with clear milestones, deliverables and accountability and recommends that all drone corridors and supporting infrastructure co-financed by the EU include built-in cyber-resilience and redundancy layers;

20. Calls for the establishment of pilot corridors under the EU Drone Defence Initiative, focusing on the protection of port and energy infrastructure, which would serve to validate C-UAS operational playbooks and to provide small and medium-sized enterprises with real-world deployment opportunities;

21. Recognises that the rules of engagement for drones are unclear and encourages Member States in coordination with NATO, to review the rules of engagement for all types of drone-related threats to ensure they are adequate to respond to the most innovative threats;

Training and certifying drone pilots

22. Encourages the Member States and Ukraine to jointly train and certify drone pilots with standards equivalent to artillery or unmanned aerial vehicle operators, invest in counter-drone systems – hard-kill and soft-kill alike – at all echelons, reassess armour survivability, ensure tanks and armoured personnel carriers are modified to counter unmanned aerial vehicles; expand EW units to ensure all battalions have hardening of jamming capabilities and establish drone defence zones around critical infrastructure;

23. Stresses the need for iterative development and testing of drone systems to ensure their adaptability and responsiveness to emerging threats, given the rapid pace of technological advancements in this field; underlines the importance of software-defined systems that can be quickly modified and updated to address the evolving needs of the battlefield, thereby enabling armed forces to stay ahead of potential adversaries and maintain a competitive edge in this domain;

Growing threat of mass deep strike drone swarms

24. Underlines the growing use of drones in hybrid and terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure and the asymmetric advantages such attacks can generate;

25. Recalls the incursions by drones of unknown origin disrupting critical infrastructure in Denmark, Norway, Germany and Belgium, including international airports and military bases and Operation ‘Spider web’, the 2023 sabotage attempt on Moldova’s energy grid, and repeated Houthi drone strikes disrupting Red Sea shipping; stresses that such cases illustrate how low-cost systems enable disruption; urges the Member States to integrate drone-specific response protocols into national resilience plans;

26. Strongly condemns the recent series of Russian drone incursions and suspected hostile overflights in several EU Member States, including Poland, Romania and the Baltic States, targeting border areas, energy facilities and logistics hubs;

27. Warns that these incidents demonstrate the increasing capability of state and non-state actors to employ low-cost unmanned systems to threaten public safety, disrupt supply chains and test EU and NATO defensive readiness;

28. Stresses that such cases illustrate how low-cost systems enable disruption;

29. Highlights that drones may pose not only military but also broader public safety risks, including their potential misuse in contexts affecting public health, environmental protection and civil infrastructure; urges the Member States and the Commission to integrate these aspects into national and EU-level risk assessments and preparedness strategies and to include drone-specific response protocols in national resilience plans;

30. Recognises that ‘Operation Spider Web’, ‘Operation Rising Lion’ and the use of the Russian shadow fleet have demonstrated the capacity for deep strike capability from within an adversarial state against strategic assets and encourages the civil defence planners of Member States to protect against such scenarios in emergency planning doctrine;

31. Recognises that drones have reshaped the strategic and operational environment of modern warfare, from tactical reconnaissance and battlefield targeting to strategic deep strikes and cyber-enabled operations, and that they introduce asymmetries that can both strengthen and destabilise EU defence postures;

32. Highlights the risk of ‘grey-zone’ saturation attacks on EU infrastructure.

33. Emphasises the need to protect Europe’s energy networks, roads, railways, transport hubs and digital infrastructure as priority targets of hybrid warfare and the necessary synergy between military, law enforcement, first responders, border control and civil society for effective implementation of emergency planning doctrine; recommends the establishment of a platform for sharing best practices among authorities managing strategic infrastructure;

34. Stresses the urgent need for enhanced maritime surveillance in the Baltic, North and Black Sea region where Russian drone activities pose particular threats; stresses the importance of addressing the Russian shadow fleet given the suspicions of its involvement in drone incursions into European airspace; believes that the new operational dimension of hybrid warfare requires the integration of maritime security and counter-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strategies; welcomes the launch of NATO-led operations, such as Baltic Sentry;

Resilience and protective spaces

35. Recommends the development of comprehensive national civil defence strategies to counter drone attacks, ensuring preparedness at the national, regional, municipal, community and household levels emphasising early warning systems for local populations, clear instructions on how to respond, and protected spaces (sheltering) for the population and infrastructure;

36. Underlines the need for common guidelines on how to shape national C-UAS strategies, in full respect of the sovereignty of the Member States and according to the specificities of the theatres in which these C-UAS strategies need to operate;

37. Calls for the regular update of the existing Joint Research Centre Handbooks on ‘Protection against Unmanned Aircraft Systems’ in order to ensure that counter measures against this constantly evolving threat remain efficient in terms of technology, doctrines and practice;

38. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure the protection of critical EU infrastructures and entities against possible drone attacks, in line with Directive (EU) 2022/2557;

39. Encourages the Member States to conduct a comprehensive audit and assessment of existing shelter infrastructure and supports the creation of permanent no-fly and counter-UAS zones around critical EU infrastructure, coordinated by national authorities and Frontex, and supported by shared C2 platforms; recommends equipping these zones with layered detection and mitigation systems, funded by the Internal Security Fund, the EDF’s counter-UAS envelope, and other relevant EU instruments;

40. Stresses the urgent need to deploy a strengthened anti-drone protection plan around critical energy infrastructure and encourages the Member States to explore the potential of involving voluntary national defence actors as part of civil protection and resilience-building efforts; notes that such actors can play a crucial role in enhancing local preparedness, awareness and support capacity in hybrid and crisis situations;

41. Encourages the Member States to revise national doctrines and operational concepts for emergency management of UAS attacks to include risk analysis and threat mapping, the development of effective sheltering standards and protection of strategic infrastructure, training for emergency services, local authorities, and communities, technological integration, including C4I systems and AI-driven threat analysis, and the establishment of a national emergency management centre (NEMC) that establishes and implements multi-year training programmes;

42. Further recommends making stronger use of the voluntary national defence resources of EU Member States as part of civil protection frameworks, particularly to enhance local community preparedness and crisis management capabilities, and considers it essential for Member States to ensure effective early warning systems and clear communication protocols to maintain public trust, reduce panic and ensure compliance during emergencies; recommends that these strategies include provisions for psychological and social support services for affected populations and civil defence training for local communities to enhance overall resilience;

43. Calls for EU-funded programmes to foster collaboration between the defence, space, civil protection and transport sectors to accelerate the development of interoperable, multi-domain unmanned and counter-unmanned systems; considers that funding for research in the field of drones should also contribute to improving the civilian uses of drones, for instance in fighting forest fires or in search and rescue operations; encourages facilitating exchanges between the civilian and defence sectors, leading to suitable dual-use research, in line with the Commission’s Drone Strategy 2.0;

44. Stresses the importance of comprehensive public information campaigns and educational initiatives to raise societal awareness of drone security, complemented by enhanced measures to monitor and counter disinformation activities in the domain of unmanned systems, particularly those aimed at exerting psychological influence on civilian populations;

45. Considers the need for a comprehensive civil defence strategy as paramount; recommends that it include the following:

a. defining the methodology for assessing threats and needs;

b. designing and implementing an operational concept that ensures clear decision-making, inter-agency coordination, and real-time information flow at all levels;

c. preparedness and early warning that establishes mechanisms for early preparedness, timely alerts, and clear instructions to the population;

d. first response with clearly defined roles and coordination between first responders, medical services, civil defence, military forces and volunteers, supported by advanced communication systems;

e. physical protection and continuity with defined protection levels for the population and critical infrastructure to reduce losses and ensure uninterrupted operations;

f. critical infrastructure resilience aimed at guaranteeing the survivability and continuous functionality of essential services;

g. border defence integrating technological solutions to prevent infiltration, supported by intelligence and rapid response capabilities;

h. enhancing community resilience by supporting national and local leadership, integrating volunteers, supporting vulnerable populations, and providing real-time community guidance;

i. support to public information and communication campaigns that advise on credible communication strategies through official channels and social media to maintain trust and awareness;

j. developing economic resilience by supporting the coordination of emergency stocks and resources, and the continuity of essential services at all levels;

k. training and exercises conducted jointly, with simulations focusing on ensuring preparedness and effective crisis management;

46. Recommends the joint development and procurement of multilayered defence systems and robust homeland preparedness emphasising civil alert systems, protected shelters and public education campaigns;

47. Emphasises that unmanned systems are particularly vulnerable to cyberattacks and intelligence infiltration; calls on the Member States and the relevant EU agencies to strengthen the overall security of drone technologies, including cyber-resilience, encryption standards, ownership control, and resistance to espionage and hostile intelligence activities, ensuring protection across the entire life cycle of such systems;

Rapid deployability

48. Stresses the challenges posed by UAS to the Member States owing to their dynamic targeting in urban and concealed environments, tactical flexibility, surgical accuracy, asymmetrical advantage and mass deployment capacity;

49. Recognises the challenges posed by Russia’s adoption of layered drone operations combining intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) drones that provide real-time data, followed immediately by strike drones, giving national defence forces’ limited time to strengthen defences and organise response capabilities;

50. Strongly condemns the recent series of Russian drone incursions and suspected hostile overflights in several EU Member States, targeting border areas, energy facilities, military sites and logistics hubs;

51. Warns that these incidents demonstrate the increasing capability of state and non-state actors to employ low-cost unmanned systems to threaten public safety, disrupt supply chains and test EU and NATO defensive readiness;

52. Expresses serious concern regarding Russia’s deployment of drones delivered by its partners both over Ukrainian territory and in violation of EU Member States’ airspace;

53. Calls for enhanced sanctions that target Russian supply chains and manufacturing components, as well as Russian technological transfers that enable other countries to supply Russia with drone technology;

54. Urges the Commission to take the necessary measures to prevent such actions;

55. Stresses that effective national civil defence strategies against drone attacks must be supported by modernised dual-use transport and communication infrastructure allowing the swift movement of counter-UAS units, mobile radar assets and repair teams, ensuring that resilience plans translate into operational mobility;

56. Considers Ukraine’s adoption of decentralised drone units with platoon-level control a valuable methodology worthy of emulation;

57. Recommends that drone strike teams with autonomous decision cycles be integrated into Member States’ armed forces brigades;

58. Urges the Commission and the Member States, together with NATO, to launch a six-month EU-NATO pilot to form, certify and validate initial company-level combat drone units for deployment with allied brigades, with a requirement to publish the pilot validation report and recommended follow-on actions;

59. Recognises that the effectiveness of UAS systems primarily depends on the accuracy of navigation while operating in intense EW environments;

60. Recommends that controlled reception pattern antennas (CRPAs) and the use of reliable global navigation satellite system (GNSS) signals such as the Galileo Public Regulated Service be adopted by armed forces’ drone operators to provide a precise timing reference and reduce navigation error;

61. Emphasises the need to complement offensive UAS investments with counter-UAS systems, electronic protection measures and GNSS resilience to minimise vulnerability to enemy jamming and interference;

62. Calls for immediate funding and rapid implementation of combat drone units, both anti-tank and anti-personnel, across NATO and EU armed forces at company, battalion and brigade levels, and for these to be organically embedded within combat units across Europe; requests that Ukraine be included as a full operational and doctrinal partner in the development, training and certification process; urges the Commission and the High Representative to devise a two-year accelerated programme for procurement, training, sustainment and certification;

63. Recommends that the Member States develop, on the basis of their national defence strategies, a joint response to UAS attacks, including by jointly developing and procuring technological solutions that can be jointly deployed and are fully interoperable with NATO C2 systems and seamlessly integrated into civil air traffic management systems and the EU’s U-Space framework for drone integration to address hybrid warfare scenarios;

64. Stresses the potential and benefits of civil drones and the major transformation they have brought to mobility, logistics, emergency management and cartography, among many other fields, and notes that they already represent significant progress in addressing the EU’s security and defence challenges;

Sourcing, financing and procuring drones and C-UAS capabilities

Pre-approved vendors

65. Calls on the national and international procurement and contracting authorities, including, among others, the Commission and the EDA, to establish open and transparent pre-approved vendor lists and priority orders for critical drone components and platforms, in close coordination with the Member States and ensuring equal access for SMEs across the Union, to allow faster contracting during crises;

66. Stresses that such lists should be based on transparent and competitive selection processes that are regularly updated to reflect operational feedback (including from Ukraine), and should avoid creating long-term market favours that could distort competition; calls for the expansion of access to EU financial instruments and for procurement procedures that include start-ups and research institutions on equal terms;

67. Calls for the EU to establish an EDA-managed roster of pre-approved vendors for critical drone sub-assemblies, and notes the importance of allowing SMEs to qualify through on-site audits rather than by demonstrating full past performance, in order to facilitate their participation in the European defence industrial base;

SME support

On regional hubs and financing instruments

68. Encourages the Member States and the EDA to streamline certification and airworthiness standards to speed up integration and reduce duplication in testing and credentialling; encourages the EDIP and other financial instruments to prioritise the financing of regional drone manufacturing and C-UAS innovation hubs with shared infrastructure and regulatory fast-tracking, particularly among front line states; emphasises the importance of promoting fair labour practices, social protection and skills development for a high-quality workforce, while also supporting local communities and SMEs, with a focus on creating sustainable employment opportunities;

69. Calls for dedicated support for SMEs to access these financial instruments, including simplified application procedures and award criteria;

On SME access to funding and procurement

70. Notes that SMEs face significant barriers to accessing EU defence funds and are often excluded from large-scale procurement dominated by legacy contractors; encourages, therefore, the creation of specific mechanisms to support SME onboarding by reducing administrative burdens, introducing direct-funding instruments with tolerance for failure, and providing opportunities for mini-grants and rapid-funding tools essential for SMEs, while ensuring fair conditions through proportionate consortium requirements, reasonable guarantees and flexible payment terms; encourages the inclusion of start-ups and research organisations in procurement processes;

71. Recognises that 80 % of the European industry involved in the development, manufacture and operation of light drones consists of SMEs, which are essential for R&D and innovation in drone technology and for a swift response to unexpected changes in the industry, as demonstrated in Ukraine, and that these companies face difficulties in obtaining financing for their projects;

72. Calls on the Commission to establish a single contact point to inform and assist EU drone manufacturing SMEs in obtaining and accessing financing, given that their business structure makes it difficult for them to bear the bureaucratic burden associated with these processes;

73. Welcomes the Commission’s existing initiatives, particularly through the EDF’s EU Defence Innovation Scheme (EUDIS), to support EU defence SMEs and start-ups;

74. Calls on the EDA and the Commission to build upon these efforts by exploring additional measures to fast-track European drone SME deployment of high-impact defence systems in a way that enables these SMEs to pursue export opportunities beyond Europe – to ensure their commercial viability – while simultaneously developing European defence capabilities and facilitating integration with the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) and promoting frequent joint innovation efforts;

On SME growth, scaling and industrial integration

75. Recognises that the majority of drone industry firms are SMEs and start-ups, and that it is therefore essential to simplify procedures and support measures for SMEs, such as grants, regulatory support, integration and scaling;

76. Calls for the establishment of regional drone innovation clusters that connect SMEs, research centres and larger defence integrators to promote technology transfer and industrial synergies;

77. Recognises the EDF’s potential in aiding SME development into key suppliers and encourages programmes that aid SME capacity to source components, develop manufacturing engineering and support high levels of automation to ramp up production;

78. Encourages EDF programmes to allow more rapid scaling of SMEs via a series of funding rounds that support early growth and access to capital, product development, testing and evaluation, building on the BraveTech EU initiative;

79. Calls on the Commission to incentivise joint ventures between major European defence primes and SME drone innovators to scale up production; recommends the inclusion of Ukrainian industry in this regard;

On testing, certification and regulatory simplification

80. Recognises the lengthy period between testing and validation of drones and encourages Member States to repeal procurement constraints that cause obstruction to SME testing of key capabilities;

European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB)

81. Encourages the Member States and the Council to integrate next-generation drone technologies such as edge AI, swarm autonomy and hardened C2 links into the EDTIB, while seeking the gradual and mutually beneficial integration of the Ukrainian defence technology and industrial base and making use of long-term industrial roadmaps, flagship EDF clusters and to fast-track EDIP instruments to ensure timely adaptation and preserve the Union’s technological edge;

82. Calls for drones to be considered critical capabilities by the EU; stresses the urgent need to invest in the EDTIB to enable the mass production of affordable drones, and underlines the need for cost-effective systems that can be deployed at scale and ensure the EU becomes autonomous with regard to drone capacities; considers that the development of such capabilities must be carried out in close cooperation with Ukraine and stresses the importance of directing more EU defence investments towards joint procurement, with the support of the EDA;

83. Calls for the Union and its Member States to urgently work on concrete projects intended to fill capability gaps in the field of integrated air and missile defence, particularly related to drone and anti-drone warfare, in order to create a multilayered deep zone of technologically advanced systems with interoperable anti-drone capabilities for detection, tracking and neutralisation; underlines the equal importance of air superiority, such as the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) project; invites the Member States to consider using the European Defence Projects of Common Interest framework to set up the projects; recognises the need for cross-sector collaboration between the defence, cybersecurity and research communities in order to develop holistic strategies that integrate the latest digital and cyber defence technologies;

84. Highlights the need to expand such capabilities to cover all Member States, particularly the areas around critical infrastructure and populated areas;

85. Stresses, however, that these joint programmes must also be structured to ensure rapid development cycles and to actively enable the participation of innovative SMEs; underlines that such companies are often significantly more agile and inventive than traditional prime contractors, and that leveraging their creativity and speed is essential to keep pace with the evolving threat environment and field cost-effective solutions quickly;

86. Recognises that the pace of technological evolution in the field of unmanned and counter-unmanned systems is unprecedented and calls on the Commission, the EDA and Member States to adopt faster innovation and acquisition cycles, enabling rapid fielding of new drone and C-UAS technologies; stresses that lengthy certification, procurement and testing processes risk making EU capabilities obsolete by the time they are deployed;

Drone wall

87. Supports a drone surveillance and defence system (‘drone wall’) proposed by the President of the Commission, with a robust, end-to-end system encompassing advanced detection, resilient C2, and cost-effective interception capabilities and calls for a technical roadmap to be developed in close cooperation with Ukraine; insists that the Commission’s proposals must draw substantially on Ukrainian front line experience, which demonstrates that effectiveness depends not only on platform technology but on integrated command-and-control, trained personnel, and a resilient warfare ecosystem, including localised manufacturers, operators, innovators and data/analytics providers;

Streamline certification

88. Encourages the Member States, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the EDA to streamline certification and airworthiness standards to speed up integration and reduce duplication in testing and credentialling; notes that adoption of EMARs and cross-certification is a must;

89. Calls on the EASA to speed up ‘permits to fly’ application processing and define clear certification criteria for HALE/MALE-class systems in conjunction with NATO; stresses the urgent need to designate a sufficient number of auditors and streamline procedures to avoid unnecessary delays in innovation;

90. Calls for the adoption of a European framework for the rapid authorisation of border crossing and transit of UAS/drone equipment among Member States in the context of military mobility;

91. Calls on the Commission to harmonise defence-oriented drone regulatory action to create a binding EU regulatory framework for military drone operations (in parallel with civilian EASA rules); stresses that it should clarify rules of engagement, certification, military airspace use and ethical safeguards for CSDP missions and national defence planning in order to facilitate interoperability and speed up joint operations under the CSDP or NATO missions;

Intra-EU transfers

92. Calls on the Commission to simplify intra-EU transfer rules for drone and counter-drone related technology and create synergies between Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the community and the related technology and Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items;

93. Calls for the removal of unnecessary bureaucratic barriers and red tape which delay operational readiness;

94. Emphasises the need to complement offensive UAS investments with counter-UAS systems, electronic protection measures and GNSS resilience to minimise vulnerability to enemy jamming and interference;

EU-origin criteria compliance

95. Calls for the reshoring of manufacturing to avoid disproportionate dependence on third countries, in particular China, for the production of drone systems;

96. Calls on the Member States, the Commission and the EDA to urgently address the EU’s critical dependency on Chinese rare earth metals essential for the defence industry, including in the field of drone and counter-drone manufacturing; stresses the need to establish alternative and sustainable sources of rare earth extraction and processing, to invest in research and development in the area of recycling and substitution technologies, and to include these priorities in future EDF and EDIP programmes aimed at strengthening Europe’s strategic industrial resilience;

97. Asks the Commission to ensure that all drone platforms funded by European programmes and/or financial instruments comply with the respective EU-origin eligibility criteria for major sub-components and to take action to ensure that the supply of such subcomponents is reliable and guaranteed;

98. Further calls for subcontractors to be subject to the same criteria; stresses the importance of ensuring full and direct European control over human-machine interfaces and other drone-related software;

99. Calls on the Commission to ensure that all drone platforms funded by the EU budget comply with EU-origin criteria and be free from restrictions from third countries on the definition, adaptation and evolution of the product’s design, including the legal authority to substitute or disintegrate components subject to such restrictions;

100. Calls for incentives to ensure that drone platforms financed through the EDA meet the criteria for EU origin, or originate from partner countries such as Ukraine, Norway and the UK, particularly with regard to key components;

EDF grant structure and awarding criteria

101. Recommends incentivising EDF grants to ensure:

(1) that competitions give vendors extra points to companies sourcing components from the EU;

(2) that tenders are open to select third countries such as Ukraine and third countries with Strategic Partnership Agreements with the EU;

(3) staff-to-staff exchanges on the sourcing of components;

102. Calls on the EDA to assess vendors on their operational impact and cost-efficiency in completing mission objectives rather than focusing solely on unit price;

103. Encourages the Member States to permit conditional fielding of and experimentation with systems not yet fully certified for urgent operational use with real-time evaluation in controlled environments;

104. Encourages the EDIP and other financial instruments to prioritise the financing of regional drone manufacturing hubs with shared infrastructure and regulatory fast-tracking, particularly among front line states;

Regional Manufacturing Hubs

C-UAS and regional manufacturing hubs

105. Calls on the Member States to urgently accelerate the expansion of European drone and anti-drone development and production capacities, including through the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument;

106. Calls on the Commission to propose an EU drones package focusing on drone and anti-drone systems and auxiliary capabilities, which should contain a strategy for using existing instruments to stimulate research and development and the localisation of critical supply chains and a regulation on the use of drones in civilian and military contexts that is fit for the present threat scenario; calls for increased investments focusing on the integration of next-generation digital technologies into drone and anti-drone defence systems to enhance their resilience, scalability and efficiency;

107. Calls for the establishment of national hubs for drone testing, certification and interoperability across the EU;

108. Emphasises that such hubs would facilitate the testing and certification of UAV and C-UAS systems in line with EU and NATO standards;

109. Emphasises the need for drone and C-UAS testing, production and training, with the aim of strengthening the external borders and deterring hybrid aggression;

110. Stresses that regional drone manufacturing hubs should be co-located with dual-use logistics nodes connected to the TEN-T, enabling seamless movement of military and civil drone assets, spare parts and operators across borders in an integrated manner across the EU and in line with any future ‘drone wall’ concept;

111. Supports the creation of maintenance centres co-located with NATO facilities with appropriate technical equipment to enable rapid servicing of C-UAS assets;

Qualified manufacturers, fair competition and regional ecosystems

112. Emphasises that the European drone market should develop under the principles of fair competition, innovation, and open access for qualified manufacturers; notes that stability of demand and clear long-term perspectives are essential for the sustainability of European drone producers;

113. Highlights the importance of scaling up local industrial capacity to ensure competitiveness, resilience and the long-term viability of the European unmanned systems sectors;

114. Stresses that the benefits of drone-related innovation and manufacturing should be geographically balanced;

115. Calls for the creation of innovation corridors and testing sites across all regions of the Union, to ensure access to funding and to stimulate local ecosystems of start-ups, SMEs and research institutes contributing to Europe’s technological sovereignty;

116. Notes that actions related to drone and anti-drone capabilities lack long-standing pre-established practices and thus urges the Union and its Member States to take advantage of the fact by ensuring from the outset that planning, research, development, procurement and management of such capabilities are increasingly done through a European lens and that there is access to critical sovereign technologies related to drone- and anti-drone warfare in the Union;

117. Calls for ensuring that EDF eligibility criteria are adjusted to ensure higher scoring for joint procurements with more equitable geographical representation of Member States, ensuring that consortia being built are in a position to ramp up their defence industrial production;

Innovation, R&D clusters and critical component manufacturing

118. Calls on the Commission to adapt its defence and defence industrial policy instruments to ensure that they are fit for purpose to support the development of drone and anti-drone capabilities;

119. Calls for EU funding to support the creation of an advanced drone component manufacturing hub, particularly in regions with strong engineering and IT sectors by contributing to both regional development and the Union’s strategic autonomy;

120. Calls on the EDF to finance multi-national R&D clusters focused on drone propulsion, AI autonomy and hardened C2 links;

121. Stresses the importance of directing strategic investments to relevant industrial and technological hubs across the EU and supporting raw material processing, semiconductor production, battery manufacturing, drone assembly and C2 integration, while ensuring that such investments also strengthen the broader European defence industrial base;

Fast-track fielding

Drone innovation accelerator and experimentation

122. Welcomes the first European Defence Innovation Operational Experimentation (OPEX) campaign launched by the EDA and invites the EDA to transform it into a standing drone and C-UAS innovation accelerator for fast-track fielding and to validate front line feedback, accelerate prototyping, and fast-track fielding through short competitive calls in order to enable progress and innovation;

Procurement flexibility and accelerated acquisition

123. Calls on the EDA to permit Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracts to ensure that a baseline supply is met;

124. Calls on the EDA and other tendering agencies to establish a dedicated acquisition track for UAS for off-the-shelf procurement of advanced UAS to bypass conventional multiyear acquisition processes and service contracts;

125. Calls for ensuring that EDF projects and other EU joint procurement initiatives in defence have priority rating orders that aid speedy acquisition processes and reduce complications in procurements;

Inclusion of SMEs and non-traditional vendors

126. Encourages developing national defence industries and supporting local public-private partnerships without prejudice to the quality, safety and security requirements applicable to the technology;

127. Encourages the removal of lower entry barriers for non-traditional vendors by removing non-critical security requirements in early testing and fielding to enable SMEs and non-traditional vendors to participate in defence innovation;

Critical drone component manufacturing action plan

128. Calls on the Commission in conjunction with NATO to draft a critical drone component manufacturing action plan that provides targeted subsidies for critical components, especially for brushless direct current motor, lithium battery, sensor and additive manufacturing in the EU; calls for the development and production of essential and emerging technologies and materials within the EU, including optics, communication modules and additive manufacturing; underlines the need to ensure the EU’s resilience and self-sufficiency in drone production, with strict eligibility criteria to ensure the resilience of the supply chain, and to bear in mind the longer-term goal of achieving strategic autonomy by developing indigenous European drone technologies based on EU-essential components, supported by resilient supply chains;

129. Highlights that such an action plan must ensure cooperation with European SMEs;

130. Underlines the need to include microchips, advanced software and cyber-resilience;

Regulatory environment/ESG

Regulatory simplification and harmonisation

131. Stresses the need to remove unnecessary regulatory and administrative burdens, particularly for SMEs, for the drone industry and its suppliers and to establish a European Drone Sovereignty Index to serve as an EU-wide audit tool to assess each platform’s percentage of non-EU dependencies, which can be used to prioritise funding in favour of platforms and programmes with the highest percentage of Member State-based components;

132. Calls for fast-track intra-EU licence derogations to ease internal trade while reinforcing external export controls;

133. Calls for strengthening regulatory and export control harmonisation by:

a. developing pan-EU export licensing and Regulation (EU) 2021/821-compliant component pathways to make European drones more competitive abroad while respecting EU and national export rules to make European drones more competitive abroad;

b. aligning civilian drone regulations (e.g. EASA standards) with military procurement needs to accelerate dual-use innovation;

Industrial autonomy, ESG conditionality and operational efficiency

134. Stresses that the allocation of funds for the development and production of drones and C-UAS should be based exclusively on criteria of efficiency, security, resilience and operational performance;

135. Calls for the prioritisation of spare parts, modular reparability, and rapid engine replacement capabilities in order to ensure that units remain operational under combat conditions; stresses the need for a coherent industrial and supply chain policy that provides European industry with incentives to produce scalable and easily repairable systems, while maintaining adequate stockpiles of critical components; urges the Commission and the Member States to remove procurement bottlenecks that hinder timely production and the fielding of essential defence equipment;

Security of production and overarching EU drone regulation

136. Urges the Commission and the Member States to prioritise the reinforcement and protection of EU weapons firms and European defence industry facilities, in order to mitigate potential hybrid or direct drone threats to their production lines;

137. Calls on the Commission to propose an EU Drones Package, focusing on drone and anti-drone systems and auxiliary capabilities, containing a strategy for using existing instruments to stimulate R&D and localisation of critical supply chains and a regulation on the use of drones in civilian and military contexts that is fit for the present threat scenario;

138. Calls for increased investments focusing on the integration of next-generation digital technologies into drone and anti-drone defence systems to enhance their resilience, scalability and efficiency;

139. Calls for the harmonisation of rules of engagement for offensive UAS employment across the Member States, including export controls and legal frameworks, ensuring full compliance with international humanitarian law;

Working plan for key materials

140. Calls on the Commission to draft a working plan to develop strategic reserves and stockpiles of critical components, including explosives, propellants, primers, carbon frames, electronics, motors, microchips and other key materials for UAS, USV and UUV development, reducing dependencies on third countries and increasing the resilience of the EDTIB;

141. Emphasises that these reserves should be managed with NATO coordination to ensure interoperability and avoid duplication of stockpiles;

142. Stresses the importance of new wire-guidance technology for drones designed to counter interference and EW;

143. Calls on European companies to manufacture these fibre-optic-connected cables within the EU or in a NATO member country in order to avoid opaque technologies and strengthen the security of drone technological components;

EU financial envelopes – the multiannual financial framework (MFF), SAFE, ReArm, etc.

Strategic funding and EU financial envelopes

144. Emphasises the need to ensure, through current instruments and the next MFF, the sustained development of drone-related defence innovation, skills, certification standards, testing and training infrastructure across the Union;

145. Calls for Ukraine’s access to the SAFE mechanism to be used to include investment in developing its UAS capability;

146. Calls for the swift adoption of the Omnibus Defence package presented by the Commission in June 2025, which aims to reduce administrative and bureaucratic burdens (e.g. permitting) and bottlenecks (e.g. access to finance) for defence companies, organisations and Member States, therefore facilitating the development of innovative drone solutions and production;

147. Invites the Commission to make use of funding programmes such as SAFE to highlight the need for EU countries to develop their drone industry, and recommends that the Member States give this need the attention and priority it deserves;

Alignment of defence instruments and investment frameworks

148. Underlines the vitality of C-UAS technological capabilities; calls on the Member States to invest duly in both drone and C-UAS capabilities;

149. Recalls that drone-related investments should be aligned with Union instruments supporting the defence industrial base, including, where relevant, the Critical Raw Materials Act, the European Chips Act, the strategic technologies for Europe platform (STEP) and other frameworks, to ensure that dual-use innovation contributes meaningfully to operational readiness;

150. Calls on the EDA to include specific drone capability goals in the upcoming EU CDP, monitored through CARD and backed by projects under the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) framework;

151. Welcomes the use of SAFE and the Defence Equity Facility to scale production, secure supply chains and support SME participation in the unmanned systems sector;

152. Encourages the Commission to reinforce EDF scoring incentives favouring multinational consortia, shared platforms and high EU origin content; stresses that such measures are vital to consolidate demand, boost resilience and scale up Europe’s autonomous drone capabilities; supports the development of a sovereignty index to measure and incentivise the reduction of dependencies on non-EU sources across the drone value chain;

Governance and subsidiarity in fund management

153. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to involve local and regional administrations in the management of EU defence projects, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity;

Reinforcing supply chains

Onshoring and industrial localisation

154. Encourages the Member States to prioritise onshoring of critical components by:

a. co-financing production facilities in the Member States for brushless DC motors, lithium-ion batteries, semiconductors, and electro-optical sensors through public-private partnerships;

b. offering Member State-backed subsidies and tax incentives for firms willing to localise production within the EU and ensuring that this is coordinated at EU level to ensure maximum efficiency and mitigate distortions of competition in the internal market;

c. leveraging the European Chips Act to prioritise defence applications in the allocation of strategic semiconductor funding;

155. Underlines the need for a cross/EU effort to secure reliable access to critical raw materials, such as lithium, rare-earth magnets and semiconductors, and to invest in high-performance batteries, sensors and secure datalinks;

156. Calls for the expansion of joint security agreements with strategic partners to strengthen supply chain resilience and mutual access to strategic technologies;

Diversification and strategic redundancy

157. Calls for building redundant and diversified supply chains that:

a. encourage dual-sourcing strategies for essential drone components across multiple EU Member States and like-minded partners;

b. support domestic rare-earth extraction and refinement efforts under the Critical Raw Materials Act, while building recycling capacity for lithium, cobalt, and neodymium magnets;

c. establish emergency stockpiles of critical drone components for use during geopolitical supply disruptions;

d. ensure drone production is decentralised across the EU to limit supply-chain risks and enhance security of supply for drones;

Workforce, standards and sustainable partnerships

158. Stresses the need to invest in workforce and manufacturing infrastructure by:

a. standardising open architectures and interfaces for interoperability;

b. mandating open modular standards for all EU-funded drone systems to enable plug-and-play component swaps (e.g. sensors, radios) from multiple suppliers, and coordinating with NATO to align standards and interoperability needs;

159. Recalls the address made by Greenlandic Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen to Parliament on 8 October 2025, and underlines the strategic scope of developing stronger collaboration between the EU and Greenland in order for European companies to gain access to raw materials in a partnership with the Greenlandic Government based on the use of sustainable practices;

Testing facilities and intra-EU training

Testing infrastructure and regulatory simplification

160. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to recognise the importance of testing drones and new technological developments in large open spaces, in order to ensure the safety, efficiency and effectiveness of such innovations; urges the Commission and the Member States to reduce unnecessary red tape and bureaucratic burdens, streamline testing procedures and facilitate the rapid deployment and evaluation of emerging drone technologies;

161. Encourages joint initiatives to ensure rapid access to testing infrastructure by reforming outdated regulatory barriers or outsourcing testing to enable trials in conditions replicating operational environments;

162. Regards regulations on UAS testing requirements in EW, long-range flights and non-standard frequencies as a particular obstacle to qualitative military advantage among Member States’ armed forces and encourages improved accessibility for proven innovators in UAS capabilities to ensure frequent and easy access to testing areas;

Innovation units and AI-enabled training

163. Encourages Member States to support permanent innovation units and training across national security services where commercial technologies are tested in real operational settings and by end users;

164. Calls on the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and EDA to ensure joint training of AI-enabled UAS systems among the Member States and to support the procurement of AI UAS systems so that they can be trained and tested in operationally relevant conditions to perform effectively in real-world scenarios;

Joint ranges, integration and interoperability

165. Encourages Member State cooperation in the joint establishment of NATO Innovation Ranges where armed forces and vendors can engage in year-round testing;

166. Proposes establishing an EU mechanism for integration and interoperability testing between selected unmanned and counter-unmanned systems, including cyber, electronic warfare, and rules of engagement (ROE) scenarios, producing verified integration profiles rather than technical demonstrations;

167. Calls on the Commission to include, within the framework of its Sustainable Investment Facilitation Agreements, the need for the European drone industry and the Member States to secure sufficient reserves of the key materials and components essential for UAS development;

Certifications

168. Calls on the EDA to develop multilingual, standardised operator certification pathways across all Member States;

169. Encourage modular system architectures, so components (e.g. payloads radios and cameras) can be upgraded independently without full platform re-certification;

Standardisation

Technological standards, modularity and digital integration

170. Calls on the EDF to institutionalise in its research and development processes, rapid prototyping, modular design and digital-native C2 as a standard across development models;

171. Calls on the Commission to ensure that future regulations enable a safe, secure and scalable drone integration that focuses on cybersecurity, fail-safe systems and dual-use standardisation;

172. Encourages the adoption of a ‘commercial first’ approach for UAS that prioritises direct acquisition from commercial providers to test new acquisition models that can later be scaled across other capability areas;

173. Calls for dedicated UAS funding to be contingent upon broad mission-aligned categories to enable rapid problem-solving and support commercial innovation;

174. Calls on the EDA to launch a unified digital platform to manage end-to-end collaboration with the commercial sector, enabling real-time communication, proposal tracking and progress monitoring;

Interoperability and operational frameworks

175. Notes the critical importance of rapid detection, attribution and neutralisation capabilities for unmanned systems and calls for a common EU framework for cross-border data sharing, interoperable situational awareness and joint targeting protocols to prevent and respond to incursions; stresses that such cooperation should include common standards for sensors and C2, coordinated procurement where appropriate, and mechanisms for the secure, real-time exchange of telemetry and incident reports to enable coordinated action across the Member States and with European NATO members; stresses the need to establish an EU-wide interoperability standard by mandating open modular standards for C-UAS systems under EDF-funded programmes to ensure ‘plug-and-play’ compatibility and reduce vendor lock-in; notes the importance of standardising operational requirements for Class I–III drones across the EU to enable joint purchases and interoperability based on a capability-focused categorisation that considers operational standards for drones of different operational uses that utilise EW integration and AI-assisted threat detection;

Regulatory modernisation and aviation safety

176. Calls for an update of the aviation regulatory framework to ensure aviation safety in the light of the increasing use of drones and anti-drone infrastructure;

Artificial intelligence

Technological advancement and strategic importance

177. Calls on the Commission to recognise the strategic importance of and further promote emerging technologies for the European drone industry, particularly in the field of artificial intelligence; recalls Operation Spiderweb and the technology employed by Ukrainian drones, which enabled these unmanned systems to autonomously identify and engage military targets; encourages the EDF to continue supporting and further developing programmes such as AIR-D-EPE in order to advance the research, testing, and deployment of AI-based solutions for the autonomous operation and navigation of drones;

178. Further recommends the design of scalable control algorithms that test swarm strategies and synthesise environments;

Operational evolution and emerging risks

179. Recognises the speed at which drones are evolving in terms of integrating AI algorithms for real-time decision-making, obstacle avoidance and mission optimisation, enabling greater autonomy, precision and versatility; recognises, too, that once deployed in the battlefield, fully autonomous drones will significantly complicate matters for military and civil emergency planners at all levels, risking a further intensification of UAS threats such as fully autonomous drone swarms, deep-strikes and targeted assassinations;

Governance, ethics and international law

180. Calls on the Member States to ensure that the development and deployment of new warfare systems, including drones with autonomous capabilities, are strictly governed by international law, including international humanitarian law, and a human-in-the-loop principle to ensure meaningful human control over lethal force;

Direct energy weapons

181. Encourages prioritising the development and production of solid-state batteries as a key enabler for next-generation drone and defence technologies;

182. Notes that these batteries offer higher energy density, longer lifespans, and faster charging speeds; underlines that their non-flammable solid electrolytes greatly enhance safety and reduce the risk of fire or explosion, making solid-state batteries vital to strengthening the EU’s technological autonomy and operational resilience;

183. Calls on the Commission, the EDA and the EDF to prioritise R&D in the field of advanced electronic warfare systems and directed-energy weapon technologies aimed at countering potential hybrid threats and drone attacks targeting Member States;

184. Further calls for fostering the development of counter-technologies and protective measures capable of mitigating the effects of such directed-energy weapons;

Additive manufacturing

185. Encourages the Member States to further explore low-cost options, including additive manufacturing, and calls for EDF R&D financing for UAS warhead capacity that aims to create new warheads and new chemical approaches for warheads focused on achieving weapon target match;

Skill building

186. Recognises the role of the EUDIS Business Accelerator in streamlining the development and deployment of drone and C-UAS capabilities across the Member States via rapid prototyping, joint testing, and fast-track certification of new technologies to keep pace with evolving battlefield requirements;

187. Calls for the EUDIS to expand the operation of living labs to at least three Member States, with Ukraine as an associate partner;

188. Calls on the Commission to launch a public education campaign on the responsible use of technologies in defence, civilian protection, and legal accountability mechanisms in order to build legitimacy and ensure political support for drone expansion;

189. Calls for the implementation of student training programmes across Member States, coordinated with NATO and EDA, to support education in the field of flying drones, including technical skills and engineering knowledge, and foster public interest;

190. Encourages the Member States, Ukraine and the Commission to develop and implement actions aimed at enhancing skills in the field of developing and operating drones, including both software and hardware components, and at attracting talent from other deep tech sectors and supporting the creation of agile teams capable of designing, manufacturing and programming relevant software; stresses that this should include science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) education initiatives, such as drone building workshops, webinars and hackathons, to train people in the construction and operation of drones; welcomes, in this regard, the initiatives already undertaken by the Commission, such as the EUDIS Hackathons and BraveTechEU, which aim to facilitate the development of innovative defence solutions and foster collaboration among stakeholders;

Best practices and doctrine

Deterrence and defence posture and Article 42.7

191. Calls on the front line Member States to adopt strategic development plans and investment frameworks, and to define strategic programmes and projects aimed at developing and securing comprehensive drone and C-UAS capabilities within their territories, covering the entire capability cycle from research and development, testing and certification to production, deployment and training; underlines that such efforts should be supported, where appropriate, through EU instruments such as the EDF, the European Defence Industry Programme and the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity;

192. Stresses that these measures are essential to ensure an adequate, coordinated and timely response to the evolving hybrid and conventional security challenges faced by Europe, in particular along its eastern and southern flanks;

193. Calls for a tailored, risk-based approach to anti-drone capabilities across the EU that recognises differing operational needs; notes that while the eastern flank requires a mix of active counter-drone and offensive precision strike options to deny and deter ground-based threats in the event of an attempted invasion, other states, including Mediterranean ones, may require different capability priorities; urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure burden-sharing; asks the Commission to evaluate capability packages against regional threat profiles to maximise both effectiveness and delivery speed without undermining overall European interoperability;

194. Calls on the Member States to be ready to activate Article 42(7) TEU where aggressive actions amount to an armed attack, or contribute to preparing for an imminent attack;

195. Urges the EU and its Member States to define operational procedures and mechanisms in the event of a Member State triggering Article 42(7) TEU;

196. Stresses that such activation should trigger a joint EU response mechanism, including coordinated defensive measures, rapid intelligence exchange, mutual assistance, and a unified strategic communication to ensure deterrence, solidarity and public resilience across the EU;

197. Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs to present concrete plans to operationalise Article 42(7) TEU on mutual assistance, including in the context of responding to drone threats, ensuring solidarity among Member States, especially those whose geographical position leaves them directly exposed to imminent threats and challenges;

198. Supports NATO’s efforts to reinforce Europe’s deterrence and defence posture along its eastern flank, including through the launch of Operation Eastern Sentry and the development of the full spectrum of measures under this operation; encourages deterrence efforts to be done in close cooperation with NATO and partner countries, and calls on the EU to ensure that no EU Member State is excluded from ad hoc EU-NATO defence and security collaborations;

Drone academy

199. Invites the Commission, the EDA and Member States to launch a European defensive drone academy to train engineers, operators and technicians, and decision-makers within command structures; calls for the academy to be able to offer joint degrees, vocational training and operator certification in cooperation with industry and leading technical universities; stresses the need to include mandatory modules on AI, robotics, EW, force protection and cyber-resilience to meet operational standards;

200. Calls for the establishment of dedicated training units within research institutes, technical universities and military academies to coordinate drone-related training programmes among themselves, with universities, and across EU and NATO Member States, ensuring the exchange of best practices and interoperability of curricula that includes a focus on civil protection modules and dual-use applications;

Decentralisation

201. Encourages the establishment of an EU ‘drone and anti-drone innovation mechanism’ under the EDA to ensure continuous co-development between offensive and defensive capabilities; emphasises that such a loop would enhance Europe’s resilience against asymmetric threats while ensuring that ethical, legal and operational standards evolve in parallel with technological innovation;

202. Underlines that reliance solely on large, centralised production facilities increases vulnerability to strategic strikes and supply disruptions; notes that decentralised manufacturing models, such as those developed in Ukraine, have proven to enhance operational resilience in wartime by reducing single points of failure;

203. Encourages the development of national and EU policies supporting a mixed industrial approach, combining the strategic capacity of established defence manufacturers with agile, small-scale production clusters, SME networks, and civilian-military cooperation, enabling rapid local production, modular supply chains, geographically distributed maintenance, and swift field repairs as complements to large-scale industrial programmes;

204. Stresses that EU financial instruments and defence-related funding mechanisms, including the EDF and EDIP, should take such decentralised and hybrid models into account when designing eligibility criteria and project support, ensuring that flexibility, resilience and scalability are rewarded alongside industrial capacity;

205. Recalls the ECA’s conclusion which found that the Commission had not produced a robust needs assessment or quantified infrastructure gaps before launching funding calls; urges, therefore, that future gap analyses under the Connecting Europe Facility explicitly include drone-relevant transport nodes, energy and communication sites, to ensure that dual-use infrastructure is planned on evidence rather than ad hoc criteria;

Align doctrine and aggregate demand

206. Encourages the rapid alignment of doctrine and the aggregation of demand for drones with Ukraine, to streamline the development and integration of drones;

207. Calls for defence cooperation with Ukraine to be substantially stepped up, in particular regarding both drone technology and countermeasures, including through enhanced industrial cooperation between Member States and Ukraine;

208. Emphasises that procurement processes must be accelerated and simplified to ensure timely delivery of capabilities despite extremely short technological cycles in the field of unmanned systems, which require continuous innovation and adaptation;

209. Underlines that cooperation and exchange of experience with Ukraine are essential, but stresses that the alignment of doctrines should take into account the differing operational realities and defence structures of each Member State;

PESCO

210. Calls for the development of an EU-wide drone capability roadmap under the PESCO framework to align national budgets and reduce duplication;

211. Welcomes EU flagship projects such as Eurodrone, INTERACT, sixth-wave PESCO efforts, the EDA’s swarm robotics demonstrators, and the U-space/Single European Sky Air Traffic Research frameworks as essential building blocks of Europe’s drone ecosystem; underlines their role in paving the way for future capabilities and calls on the Member States to scale up joint development, consolidate efforts and match the pace of emerging threats;

212. Notes that cooperative capability development programmes aiming at finding efficient and cost-effective C-UAS solutions have already been launched under the EDF (Joint European system C-UAS and European C-UAS) and the PESCO (C-UAS) frameworks;

213. Calls for the review of these programmes in order to ensure that their objectives and expected outcomes are in line with the new reality of drone warfare, especially those stemming from the lessons learned from the war in Ukraine;

214. Underlines that, in order to achieve the desired outcomes, projects aimed at developing state-of-the-art C-UAS technologies need to receive adequate funding across all phases, from research and development to industrialisation and procurement;

215. Commends the development of common European UAS platforms, such as the Medium Altitude Long Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft System Euro-drone, or potential anti-UAS equipment, such as the Airborne Electronic Attack device, as state-of-the-art projects in European defence cooperation under PESCO; encourages the exploration of similar defence projects, such as naval drones, portable anti-drone devices or integrated electronic warfare modules;

216. Deplores the concerning delay in the Eurodrone project;

217. Calls for deeper cooperation between the EDA and the Horizon Europe programme to foster dual-use innovation and programme development;

Stockpiling

218. Calls for the stockpiling of drone components and critical raw materials across the Member States, rather than complete systems, and for the creation of forward-deployed repair-and-regeneration hubs, co-located with NATO depots, to ensure sustained operational readiness and the rapid rotation of upgraded components; urges the Commission to integrate these efforts into an overarching raw materials strategy that secures supply chains by reducing the strategic dependency on China as an important supplier of raw materials and minerals;

219. Underlines that supply chain disruptions for critical components such as motors, batteries and semiconductors have constrained the capacity of European SMEs to contribute effectively to the EU’s defence industrial base; calls for the establishment of a ‘component stockpile access’ mechanism that would enable SMEs certified by the EDA and Member States to draw such components from EU strategic stockpiles at negotiated prices and to repay in kind once production scales up; insists that these stockpiles should also be accessible to Ukraine;

220. Notes that this approach is fully aligned with the objectives of the ReArm Europe Plan and the European Chips Act, reinforcing industrial readiness and resilience across the EU;

221. Notes that the war in Ukraine has demonstrated the extremely short technological cycles in the field of unmanned systems, requiring continuous innovation and adaptation; underlines that cooperation and exchange of experience with Ukraine are essential, but stresses that the alignment of doctrines should take into account the differing operational realities and defence structures of each Member State;

222. Calls for the development of modular systems with interchangeable components, in order to keep pace with rapid innovation cycles in mass-produced drones and to adapt to the continuous evolution of air defence requirements in high-intensity contingencies;

223. Stresses, however, that maintaining such readiness and stockpiling capacity entails significant costs for industry, and that companies are unlikely to sustain inventories of critical components without clear public guidance and financial support; suggests that national supply security agencies could serve as importers and wholesalers for key components, thereby ensuring adequate stock levels, enabling regular stock rotation, and alleviating the financial burden on individual firms; underlines that this model would require coordinated public-private partnership and dedicated funding mechanisms at both national and EU levels to ensure resilience and supply continuity;

224. Calls for a ‘bankability kit’ to enhance defence financing efficiency by publishing standard European Investment Bank/EDF loan pack templates, including milestone schedules, warranty provisions and intellectual property clauses, to reduce legal friction with Member State banks involved in distributing defence-related credit lines;

225. Calls on the Commission to include, within the framework of its Sustainable Investment Facilitation Agreements, measures to ensure that the European drone industry and the Member States secure sufficient reserves of key materials and components essential for UAS development;

226. Urges the Commission to integrate these efforts into an overarching raw materials strategy that secures supply chains by reducing strategic dependency on China and recommends that Member States safeguard the security of supply for drones by identifying critical components and competencies that must be locally sourced;

Dedicated EDA Budget

227. Calls on the European Council to mandate the EDA to establish a dedicated, flexible budget for UAS that spans the full capability life cycle, including R&D, prototyping, training, fielding and maintenance, with flexible requirements and appropriations to accelerate acquisition and fielding;

228. Considers that Structure for European Armament Programmes (SEAPs) could be a useful tool for the development of UAS as it spans the full capability life cycle, accelerating the acquisition or production of relevant capabilities and their availability;

229. Calls on the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security and the Member States, in consultation with NATO, to establish dedicated EU funding lines for the rapid procurement, training, sustainment and spare-parts provisioning of combat UAS units;

Front line states detection systems

230. Considers that the numerous incursions by Russian drones into the airspace of many Member States show that the EU is no longer merely under threat but is being provoked;

231. Believes that the overflight of sovereign airspace by fighter jets or military drones is not a hybrid act, but a deliberate violation of sovereignty;

232. Calls on the EU and the Member States to develop the capacity to deter, swiftly detect, attribute, intercept and be ready to neutralise such attacks;

233. Recommends that the Member States, particularly front line states, significantly upgrade or adopt new missile and drone launch detection systems that can transmit information across the EU to serve as a ‘shield’ for Europe’s multilayered aerial defence capabilities;

234. Calls for full integration with NATO’s air and space defence structures to maximise interoperability;

235. Calls for the EU Sky Shield Initiative to integrate C-UAS capabilities within the broader architecture of the European IAMD system framework, and supports the EU-wide early warning and data-sharing network that integrates detection telemetry and launch indications with EU and national air-defence command systems;

236. Recalls that only with a comprehensive 360-degree approach can the EU effectively protect its borders;

237. Calls for targeted EU co-financing of counter-drone defences to protect critical energy and transport infrastructure in front line Member States;

238. Recommends that Member States implement baseline, layered C-UAS protection for critical infrastructure such as energy systems, transport nodes, telecommunications networks and space ground segments based on interoperable interfaces and common technical specifications, with harmonised incident reporting and clear civil-military coordination, underpinned by legally authorised and safely deconflicted EW training and testing;

Co-financing regular trainings

239. Recommends the co-financing of regular training and technical expertise development across service academies and military colleges via the EDA with coordination from the European Security and Defence College, which sponsors technical capability-building blocks via joint training that prioritise key areas such as human swarm interfaces, swarm intelligence algorithms, edge computing, secure datalinks, multi-viable programmes/platforms, simulation of experimentation platforms for AI tactical development, and simulations that optimise threat sequencing and weapon efficiency, ensuring that such activities will be aligned with NATO training standards and contribute to common European capability-building and interoperability objectives, including the incorporation of AI, robotics and aerospace technologies, in order to enhance competitiveness;

Joint C-UAS trainings in civil protection planning

240. Recommends the integration of C-UASs into joint training exercises and EU-level civil protection planning, with an emphasis on critical infrastructure that enables police, airport authorities and energy sector operators to access EU-wide training and standardised C-UAS capabilities;

241. Encourages strengthening industry-in-the-loop experimentation and iterative field trials to rapidly validate new counter-drone technologies and operational concepts;

242. Encourages the Member States to prioritise integrating command and control systems with first responders, civil defence and UAS defence doctrine to ensure that civil preparedness, sheltering, early warning, and technological integration are optimised to the fullest extent possible;

243. Considers that the implementation of the directive on the resilience of critical entities should take into account threats posed by the illegal use of drones, and calls on the Commission to establish a regulatory framework authorising state security bodies, including police, border guards and other interior forces, to procure and operate C-UAS systems; stresses that such authorisation should be subject to stringent oversight and accountability provisions comparable to those applied to lethal weapons, ensuring the effective protection of civilian infrastructure while upholding EU safety and security standards;

EU-wide UAS standardisation

244. Calls for EU-wide UAS standardisation, continued aerial worthiness to eventually be made obligatory, and Open-Earth-Monitor Cyberinfrastructure and EMAR to be necessary while fully respecting Member States’ sovereignty and ensuring that such requirements do not create unnecessary administrative burdens or impede innovation and the growth of SMEs;

245. Calls on the Commission to monitor, using EU trade instruments, the proliferation of drone manufacturers that apply opaque data-handling practices; invites the development of a regulatory framework to ensure the full traceability of hardware and software technologies employed by drones operating within the EU;

Expanding testing grounds

246. Calls for the expansion of certified testing grounds for training on and integration of drone capabilities, where industry and armed forces can rapidly co-develop, test and iterate drone solutions in operational conditions;

247. Calls on the Commission to provide adequate financing for capacity and infrastructure building of these sites to achieve their optimal innovation potential; encourages the inclusion of SMEs and start-ups to accelerate R&D to strengthen Europe’s technological edge;

248. Recognises that the gradual integration of drone capabilities into multinational units, such as the recent incorporation of a counter-drone element into NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence brigade in Latvia, serve as a model for future force development; calls for greater use of existing certified testing grounds for training and integration; stresses that operators require access to secure ranges, simulation environments and live-fire exercises to train in swarm tactics, counter-UAS and autonomous targeting; notes that joint European centres, drawing on the Canada-led Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battalion’s operational experience with drones on the eastern flank, would enhance cross-country training options, interoperability, doctrinal convergence and efficiency across the EU;

249. Encourages the Commission, in consultation with the Member States, to simplify regulations for unpopulated test areas to enable testing in line with common safety standards; encourages the incorporation of AI-enabled simulation and real-world exercises to ensure technology readiness and doctrinal relevance;

250. Encourages the Commission to reduce administrative burdens, if necessary, in order to streamline procedures in line with the provisions of the Defence Readiness Omnibus;

251. Notes that drones made in Europe must be tested in real wartime conditions such as in Ukraine;

252. Recommends the financing and building of an EDA managed ‘defence metaverse’ for simulated drone combat (naval and aerial), beginning with particle-based simulations and then moving towards high-resolution environments;

253. Recommends the development and frequent evaluation of intelligent coordination strategies for drone swarms using simulation environments supported by high performance computing;

254. Recognises that high performance computing infrastructure with graphics processing unit clusters and parallel processing are required for testing and synthesising drone swarms, and that scalability requires scalable computation; recommends, therefore, financing for the EDA to prioritise training in this field;

255. Emphasises the need for stronger civil-military airspace coordination, notably through the integration of drones into U-space corridors under the Single European Sky initiative; supports the expansion of joint simulation and interception exercises involving civilian, law enforcement and military actors to enhance preparedness for multi-domain threats; underlines that such exercises should be conducted on an annual mandatory basis to ensure sustained readiness and interoperability;

Threat monitoring platform

256. Recommends the establishment of a European hybrid-threat monitoring platform for unmanned systems, hosted by the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell and coordinated with the EUMS under the EU Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity;

257. Stresses that the platform should deliver strategic alerts to the Council’s Political and Security Committee, with military input from the Council’s European Union Military Committee and the EU’s Military Planning and Conduct Capability, and be interoperable with, and informed by, the expertise of NATO, its Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, and Member State early warning systems; underlines the need to keep Parliament’s stakeholders regularly informed to guarantee proper oversight and enable evidence-based policymaking;

258. Underlines that front line EU Member States should leverage their regional expertise and strategic positioning to enhance situational awareness and operational effectiveness;

259. Calls for the deployment of an EU-wide situational awareness layer action by funding an integrated UAS tracking and threat database, modelled on NATO IAMD systems designed to improve detection, coordination and civilian protection across borders;

260. Calls on the Member States to designate a national C-UAS operations centre to ensure round-the-clock coordination and interoperable data sharing among competent authorities, including civil aviation and air navigation services, law-enforcement, defence, intelligence, border and coast guards, civil protection authorities and critical-infrastructure operators, and with other Member States, based on common or open interfaces, harmonised reporting formats and robust legal and privacy frameworks;

261. Recognises the ‘Danish model’ as best practice for the Member States to emulate in order to enhance the acquisition of cutting-edge weapons systems at the lowest price point available, while supporting the Ukrainian economy and stimulating faster research and development from the firms best positioned to innovate according to battlefield realities;

262. Highlights the opportunity for the Member States to allow for the production of defence capabilities through joint procurement and industrial cooperation with Ukrainian companies;

263. Encourages joint UAS experimentation between the EUMS and UAF that permits a streamlined pathway for European-level integration that accommodates scalability, interoperability, and utilises Ukraine’s strengths in modular, low-cost solutions, digital-native C2 and field-driven innovation;

Co-development of EW & counter-electronic warfare capabilities

264. Recognises that the intensification of EW in Ukraine has triggered a race in ‘barrage jamming’ capabilities, demonstrating the need for armed forces to overcome this challenge by jointly developing EW capabilities that can overcome anti-drone guns, frequency hopping, offline modes and other evasive manoeuvres;

C2 systems

265. Encourages investment in the creation of effective, efficient and EW-resistant matrix wireless data transmission communication methods, in order to allow for effective C2 on a battlefield expected to be flooded with unmanned flying vehicles and unmanned ground vehicles which require effective wireless data to function;

266. Calls on the Commission and the EDA to prioritise the integration of the GOVSATCOM and IRIS² programmes for reliable, secure and cost-effective satellite communications supporting EU defence missions and drone C2 links;

267. Urges targeted EDF investment in low-latency, high-bandwidth satellite terminals and resilient communications payloads to ensure real-time data transmission and protection against interference, interception and jamming;

268. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to establish interoperable C3 standards which integrate manned and unmanned systems across EU and NATO frameworks;

269. Encourages EDF and EDIP support for unified, secure architectures using AI and cloud-based data fusion to enable coordinated, real-time multi-platform operations while ensuring human oversight and cybersecurity;

EU-NATO cooperation in counter-drone warfare

EU-NATO drone centre of excellence

270. Calls for the creation of a joint EU-NATO drone centre of excellence in a front line state with ongoing NATO Enhanced Forward Presence, active testing facilities and an active drone manufacturing hub to streamline joint exercises and interchangeability across the Member States;

271. Calls for the EU-NATO drone centre of excellence to cooperate with the PESCO project on military mobility and the European Air Transport Command to develop joint standards for the transport, refuelling and deployment of unmanned systems via military mobility corridors;

272. Underlines that such a centre must have a 360-degree approach, avoid duplication with existing NATO structures and focus on the rapid transfer of lessons learned from Ukraine;

273. Proposes the creation, by 2027, of a network of EU centres of excellence for drone operations, each specialising in a domain (e.g. loitering munitions, swarms, motherships, tactical UAS, maritime drones and counter-UASs), pooling national expertise and aligning with NATO centres of excellence and the EDA’s harmonised certification scheme;

Ukraine-NATO-EU knowledge transfer programmes

274. Calls for the institutionalisation of Ukraine-NATO-EU knowledge transfer programmes through rotational staff exchanges with UAF personnel and through the expansion of joint training programmes under the EUMS and its EU Cell at SHAPE; recommends the establishment of a permanent, jointly-funded EU-NATO-Ukraine training and logistics hub in a front line state to streamline operational planning, logistics and maintenance, with a focus on real-world drone survivability and innovation lessons;

275. Calls for EU-NATO cooperation in institutionalising the lessons learned from Ukraine’s battlefield experience by integrating doctrinal and technological innovations in modern combat conditions, in cooperation with the European Security and Defence College and the EUMS;

276. Invites the Member States to consider their engagement in training missions in Ukraine in order to fully absorb the expertise and innovative techniques possessed by the UAF;

277. Recommends that this cooperation should also include the exchange of operational experience on integrating drone units as independent branches of the armed forces, as recently demonstrated by Ukraine’s establishment of the Unmanned Systems Forces;

278. Calls for synergy between EU cooperation with Ukraine and the NATO-Ukraine Innovation Cooperation Roadmap as a key means of establishing closer ties between research institutions and defence industries, streamlining innovation pipelines and enabling rapid prototyping and deployment of drone-related systems;

279. Calls for annual joint drone doctrine integration exercises across CSDP operations and EU Battlegroups, coordinated through the Military Planning and Conduct Capability and evaluated in partnership with NATO’s Joint Force Command and Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre, to ensure doctrinal compatibility and operational realism;

280. Recommends launching joint EU-NATO exercises on drone swarm defence, electronic warfare resilience, low-cost kinetic effectors and directed-energy systems at multinational test ranges, with structured EU observer status and reciprocal access for EU-led initiatives;

281. Encourages the integration of UAS and C-UAS technologies into the structure of the EUMS and the Member States’ standing military exercises;

EU-NATO drone coordination cell

282. Calls for the establishment of a permanent EU-NATO drone coordination cell to bridge doctrinal and operational gaps between EU and NATO operations, with a permanent joint coordination cell within the EUMS tasked with synchronising drone doctrine, prioritising capability integration, and facilitating real-time information sharing between EU CSDP missions and NATO operations;

Establishing joint interoperability standards

283. Calls for a unified EU-NATO UAS interoperability standard designed for common communication protocols, classification systems for UAS/C-UAS, and data sharing formats designed to be binding for all CSDP missions and synchronised with NATO’s C-UAS doctrine to ensure seamless coordination in joint operations; stresses the importance of close cooperation between NATO and the EU to take advantage of the complementary roles of both organisations in strengthening Europe’s defence and deterrence; calls, in particular, on the Commission to propose legally binding instruments to ensure that NATO standards are followed;

284. Insists that EDF, EDIP and ReArm Europe funding be conditional on strict compliance with these standards to avoid vendor lock-in and maximise plug-and-play compatibility; encourages following the results of the Preparatory Action for Defence Research 2019 INTERACT – INTERoperability Standards for Unmanned Armed Forces Systems project as a best practice reference;

285. Calls for the institutionalisation of drone integration into CSDP missions, the establishment of joint interoperability standards with NATO, and the deployment of a layered defence approach to counter-UAS threats;

286. Recommends institutionalising joint C-UAS Testing at CSDP and NATO installations and innovation ranges;

287. Calls for the EU Sky Shield initiative to integrate C-UAS capabilities within the broader architecture of the European IAMD system;

288. Calls for the introduction of a CSDP ‘responsible use of technologies in defence’ framework, with input from the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, focusing on civilian harm mitigation, data protection, and accountability mechanisms;

289. Calls for EU-NATO cooperation in implementing NATO’s Rapid Adoption Action Plan, which aims accelerate national procurement processes; calls on Member States to reform acquisition cycles, including developing possible models for procuring UAVs as a service, testing protocols, and certification frameworks, to ensure that military innovation keeps pace with the threat environment; welcomes, in this regard, the upcoming proposal for an EU Defence Industry Transformation Roadmap;

290. Encourages the Commission and Member States to link the implementation of NATO’s Rapid Adoption Action Plan with the EU’s military mobility infrastructure projects, ensuring that newly developed drone systems can be rapidly transported and integrated into joint operations;

Ad-hoc strategic partnerships

Drone coalition

291. Supports EU cooperation with the International Drone Coalition to align battlefield procurement with EDF objectives; invites the Commission to explore co-financing with key partners to boost drone-related production, in synergy with EU industrial and technological initiatives;

292. Recognises the ongoing role the Drone Coalition plays in the standardisation of UAS, its critical aid to Ukraine and ensuring that Member States keep pace with fast changing requirements in the battlefield; encourages Member States to utilise this partnership to reduce lengthy procurement, clearances, development and testing requirements to aid in the speedy acquisition of UASs;

293. Supports EU cooperation with the International Drone Coalition and encourages Member States to join and actively contribute to the Coalition, which continues to purchase drones and support innovative developments to enhance Ukrainian forces’ battlefield capabilities; calls on Member States to align their battlefield procurement with Drone Coalition objectives; invites the Commission to explore co-financing possibilities with key partners to boost drone-related production, and promote industrial collaboration, in synergy with EU industrial and technological initiatives;

Security and defence partnership (SDP) cooperation

294. Encourages leveraging new EU strategic partnerships and security and defence partnership agreements to pursue a regulatory environment and procurement processes that coordinate and integrate with the current European ecosystem, whereby strategic partners bring needed critical capabilities and raw materials and emphasise joint development in propulsion, signal intelligence, EW, kinetic, laser development and mission critical software;

295. Highlights the importance of involving EU candidate countries that are fully aligned with the EU’s CSDP in European drone capacity building;

New bilateral agreements for drones

296. Recommends the establishment of bilateral agreements with non-EU strategic partners for secure co-production and technology transfer, using co-development and co-financing models to gain access to proven systems while building production capacity;

297. Emphasises that these agreements must include strict safeguards for intellectual property, and protect European industrial competitiveness and technological sovereignty and ensure interoperability with non-EU NATO forces, particularly non-EU Western European states;

298. Calls on the Commission to integrate willing Western Balkan countries into the Drone Wall project, alongside deeper cooperation in the fields of security and defence, including capacity-building, countering hybrid threats and protecting critical infrastructure;

299. Encourages the prioritisation of drone-specific assistance within the framework of the European Peace Facility and other relevant EU external action instruments, enabling partner countries to effectively address asymmetric threats and be better equipped for counterterrorism (CT) operations;

300. Recognises the significant progress and expertise of like-minded democratic partners in the Indo-Pacific, in drone and emerging technologies and in dual-use research; calls for enhancing security and defence cooperation and partnership with the EU’s Indo-Pacific partners, including Taiwan, particularly in drone technology and relevant industries; stresses the importance of building secure, non-red supply chains underpinned by democratic values to strengthen security and resilience;

301. Recommends the use of co-development and co-financing models with like-minded partners that do not contravene the security interests of the EU and its Member States to gain access to proven systems while building EU production capacity;

302. Calls on the Commission to ensure that new trade or political agreements of the EU with other countries, or possible modifications to existing ones, do not jeopardise access to key technologies for drone development or create vulnerable dependencies;

Cooperation with Ukraine

303. Highlights that, at the moment, the two countries with the most experience in drone warfare are Russia and Ukraine;

304. Urges the EU and its Member States to partner with Ukraine for all its drone-related initiatives, both as a way to accelerate drone development in the EU and to increase support to Ukraine; invites, in particular, the Member States to consider their engagement in training missions in Ukraine on drone and counter-drone warfare in order to fully absorb the expertise and innovative techniques possessed by the UAF;

305. Recommends the institutionalisation of knowledge sharing from Ukraine by developing formal exchange programmes between Ukrainian drone operators and EU/NATO trainers, coordinated via NATO’s Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre, the NATO Security Assistance for Ukraine centre and the EDA, to ensure that battlefield-proven tactics are quickly internalised;

306. Recommends the establishment of a sustained and systematic exchange of best practices and trainings with Ukraine, integrating their operational and tactical military experience across multiple echelons, including at the strategic command level;

307. Calls for the inclusion of Ukrainian experts on governance boards, trial teams and in pilot training exchanges;

308. Calls for the establishment of a lessons learnt and coordination database with Ukrainian participation to collect battlefield data, publish validated tactics and update doctrines rapidly;

309. Calls on the EDA to establish an office in Ukraine, leveraging the existing EU Defence Innovation Office with an EDA attaché mandated to participate in Ukraine-Member State Working Groups to facilitate the sharing of best practices between Ukraine and Member States;

310. Encourages Ukraine to deploy more drone flight operators to EU and NATO training schools and programmes to expand the number of Member States Ukraine can collaborate with;

311. Recognises that Ukraine’s output of drones is severally hampered by capital investment and insists on the use of frozen Russian assets to aid Ukraine’s drone development;

312. Urges the Commission, the Member States and their defence industries to support, invest in and partner with the Ukrainian defence industry in order to make full use of the potential of production capacities in Ukraine in the most efficient way, in line with the ‘Danish model’;

313. Encourages deepening industrial cooperation with Ukrainian drone manufacturers that are battle-tested, affordable and capable; urges the Member States and their defence industries to make additional investments, set-up joint ventures, and develop partnerships with Ukraine for the joint development of defence products in the EU, particularly in the areas of UAS and C-UAS;

314. Stresses the need to develop a long-term strategy to drive innovation and the development of drone capabilities after the end of the war in Ukraine, as drones will continue to be further employed in other global conflicts and that a narrow focus on the European theatre risks missing out on the ongoing global development and evolution of drone technologies;

Coordinating regulatory environment with strategic partners

315. Encourages the Member States to pursue a regulatory environment and procurement processes that coordinates and integrates the current European ecosystem with strategic partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and Japan, particularly where they bring needed critical capabilities and raw materials, emphasising joint development in propulsion, EW, laser development and mission critical software;

316. Recognises the differences in regulatory frameworks between Member States and non-EU countries and encourages collaboration with other major drone-producing states to enhance regulatory alignment and support safer global UAS integration;

317. Highlights that the semiconductor ecosystem established by the Chip’s Act should also support the digital backbone of European drone corridors and military mobility infrastructure, enabling secure data exchange, sensor fusion, and AI-driven traffic coordination for both military and civilian unmanned systems;

318. Calls for a supply chain analysis and the onshoring of critical components necessary for long-term drone production capacities;

319. Stresses the importance of maintaining cooperation and the exchange of technical and operational experience in the design, production and operation of unmanned systems, including with partners outside the EU and NATO;

320. Underlines that such cooperation should include collaboration among engineers, mechatronics specialists, IT experts, and electronics and optoelectronics professionals, in order to enhance innovation, interoperability and technological development across the broader defence ecosystem;

321. Calls for greater synergy between the Chips Act and EU defence funding initiatives through the use of the Act’s Chips for Europe Initiative and the European Semiconductor Board to aid further development of semiconductor manufacturing among the Member States;

Drones and counter-terrorism operations outside the EU

Integrate C-UAS into EU counter-terrorism exercises

322. Calls for the establishment of a modular C-UAS training curriculum for CT units, covering drone recognition, interdiction techniques and red team simulations;

323. Calls for the incorporation of C-UAS doctrine into joint EU CT exercises under the EDA and Frontex; underlines the importance of intelligence-sharing with NATO and strategic partners to anticipate the terrorist use of drones;

324. Encourages the use of drones in EU missions and FRONTEX border operations to monitor suspected terrorist movements, smuggling and trafficking routes, and areas of migratory pressure; notes that UASs offer high-resolution imagery, and thermal, multispectral and synthetic aperture radar sensors that can penetrate cloud cover or darkness, enabling the detection of suspicious movement or vehicles; notes that in conflict-affected or remote border zones, drones can provide persistent, low-risk intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities far beyond what current manned or ground-based platforms can achieve, with their data directly contributing to intelligence fusion, border command and control, and rapid decision-making;

325. Highlights the important role of surveillance drones in EU border security, but also warns that drones have the potential to become an instrumental and irreplaceable tool for smuggling operations; urges the Member States to integrate drone-specific response protocols into national resilience plans; calls for the inclusion of border control and law enforcement officers in drone operation and interception training;

326. Calls for the funding of joint procurement and research and development for C-UAS systems via the EDF, with priority for rapidly deployable mobile solutions suitable for expeditionary CT operations on request;

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327. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President of the Commission and competent commissioners, the UN Secretary-General, the NATO Secretary-General, the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, EU security and defence agencies and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.