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Implementation of the rule of law conditionality regime

TA-10-2025-0343 · P10_TA(2025)0343 · PE774.270

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Parliament's resolution assesses the EU's rule of law conditionality regime, which links EU funding to respect for the rule of law. It finds implementation insufficient and calls for more consistent, transparent and timely application across all member states. It demands that the Commission revise its guidelines, publish methodologies, and improve transparency and democratic scrutiny, including giving Parliament a formal role and equal footing with the Council. It stresses that suspended funds must only be released after full and verifiable compliance, and that backsliding should lead to resuspension or recovery. It criticises the Commission's proposal for the next long-term budget for creating overlaps and fragmentation, and calls for a unified framework under the Conditionality Regulation.

Key points

  1. Recalls that the rule of law is a founding EU value and essential for sound financial management; stresses that the Conditionality Regulation applies to the whole budget without time limit.
  2. Calls on the Commission to enforce legislation fully, reflecting CJEU rulings, and to include restrictions on civic space and media pluralism as risk indicators.
  3. Regrets that the Commission did not trigger the mechanism earlier and that only two formal notifications have been sent; stresses that gaps between findings and enforcement undermine credibility.
  4. Urges consistent application across all member states, rejecting political bargaining; calls for full and timely use of the instrument, not only as a last resort.
  5. Calls on the Commission to publish its risk-scoring methodology and to ensure impartial, proportionate assessments.
  6. Stresses that funds must only be released after full remediation, with objective benchmarks and on-site checks; calls for ex post audits and resuspension if backsliding occurs.
  7. Regrets the Commission's interpretation of the regulation as a last resort and the fragmentation of responsibilities; calls for a unified framework and better coordination with other tools.
  8. Demands that Parliament receive systematic, timely access to all relevant information and documentation, and be given a formal consultative role before proposals.
  9. Calls for better protection of final recipients and beneficiaries, including direct payment mechanisms and communication, and for treating reprisals against whistle-blowers as aggravating factors.
  10. Calls for revision of the 2022 Guidelines to address fund diversion, publish proportionality methodology, define 'sufficiently direct link', and handle backsliding.
  11. Calls for strengthening links between annual rule of law report recommendations and EU funding, and for triggering conditionality when breaches have a direct link to the budget.
  12. Criticises the MFF proposal for overlapping instruments and lack of Parliament's role; calls for consolidation and for ensuring that decommitted funds are decided by the budgetary authority.

Who is affected

  • Member states: must respect the rule of law and address breaches to avoid suspension of EU funds.
  • Final recipients and beneficiaries: should not be penalised for government breaches; need better protection and access to funds.
  • Civil society organisations: should receive adequate EU funding and be protected from restrictions.
  • Whistle-blowers and investigative journalists: need protection from reprisals; such acts should be aggravating factors.
  • Commission: must improve transparency, revise guidelines, and streamline responsibilities.

Figures and deadlines

  • 85 % of Eurobarometer respondents support making EU funds conditional on rule of law compliance.
  • 55 % of budgetary commitments for three cohesion operational programmes suspended for Hungary.
  • Up to 100 % of funding could be suspended under the Conditionality Regulation.

Legal basis: Articles 2, 4(3) and 7 TEU