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DRAFT REPORT (2026/2024(INI))

On hybrid warfare and the protection of the EU’s territorial integrity and critical security and defence infrastructure

SEDE-PR-788818

Committee on Security and Defence · Rapporteur: Rasa Juknevičienė

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This draft report by Parliament's Committee on Security and Defence sets out a proposed resolution on hybrid warfare and the protection of the EU's territorial integrity and critical security and defence infrastructure. It finds that hybrid attacks linked to Russia, Belarus, China, Iran and North Korea have escalated, target critical infrastructure and democratic processes, and that the EU response has been fragmented. It calls for a cross-domain EU action plan with retaliatory options, a permanent Russian crisis cell, a horizontal EU sanctions framework for hybrid threats, and operationalising the solidarity and mutual assistance clauses. It asks for stronger EU-NATO cooperation, a common definition of hybrid warfare, and support for Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, the Western Balkans and Taiwan.

Committee position. The rapporteur proposes that Parliament adopt a resolution finding that hybrid attacks have escalated, calling for a proactive EU strategy with retaliatory options, a cross-domain action plan, a permanent Russian crisis cell, a horizontal sanctions framework, operationalisation of the solidarity and mutual assistance clauses, and stronger EU-NATO and partner-country cooperation.

Key points

  1. Affirms that hybrid operations are continuous, coordinated attacks by state and non-state actors designed to stay below the threshold of armed conflict while producing effects comparable to conventional aggression.
  2. Underlines that hybrid warfare aims to erode EU defence readiness, disrupt the defence industrial base and critical infrastructure, undermine public support for EU defence, and install favourable governments through interference in democratic processes.
  3. Warns that foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) is a core element of hybrid warfare, made faster and harder to detect by AI tools, and that the EU response lacks permanent real-time monitoring, attribution and response capabilities.
  4. Calls on Member States to adopt whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches prioritising resilience and preparedness, and for EU institutions to invest in democratic resilience.
  5. Condemns attacks on critical infrastructure, welcomes the focus on military mobility infrastructure in the Commission's proposed regulation, and calls on Member States to protect it.
  6. Is concerned about EU dependence on high-risk non-EU countries, particularly China, for network-connected hardware and software, and calls on the Commission to extend supply chain security assessments across all critical infrastructure sectors.
  7. Stresses that submarine cables are a key strategic vulnerability and commends the 2024 Commission Recommendation and the 2025 Joint Communication on cable security as first steps.
  8. Calls for permanent public-private cooperation frameworks for information sharing, contingency planning and crisis response, and for defence requirements to be integrated into civilian infrastructure planning, design and funding as a condition for EU support.
  9. Calls on the Commission and Council to develop a cross-domain action plan against hybrid warfare with calibrated retaliatory options and clear response chains complementing NATO, and on Member States to review rules of engagement.
  10. Calls for cross-border pattern-recognition to be recognised as a core EU competence, for a permanent Russian crisis cell, and for urgent advancement of intelligence sharing.
  11. Calls for the solidarity clause and the mutual assistance clause to be further operationalised, including through regular exercises, guidelines on activation, and a decision-making playbook for severe crises.
  12. Calls for a horizontal EU sanctions framework for hybrid threats, a strengthened EU FIMI Toolbox, binding security obligations and dedicated funding for eastern border regions under the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework, and inclusion of hybrid warfare in the new global EU security strategy.

Who is affected

  • EU Member States: asked to adopt whole-of-government approaches, protect critical infrastructure, review rules of engagement and use legal tools against hybrid attacks.
  • The Commission and the Council: asked to develop a cross-domain action plan, issue guidelines on the mutual assistance clause, and create a horizontal sanctions framework.
  • NATO: called on for increased cooperation, a common definition of hybrid warfare, and alignment of counter-drone capabilities.
  • Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Western Balkan partners and Taiwan: cooperation and support to be strengthened, with lessons learned from their experiences.

Figures and deadlines

  • 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework: dedicated funding streams for eastern border regions.

Legal basis: Articles 42(7) and 222 TEU; Title V of the TEU, Chapter Two, Section Two on the common security and defence policy.