On EU strategic defence and security partnerships

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on EU strategic defence and security partnerships

(2025/2119(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Title V of the Treaty on European Union, in particular the provisions on the common security and defence policy (CSDP),

– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security, adopted by the Council on 21 March 2022,

– having regard to the Versailles Declaration adopted at the informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government on 10 and 11 March 2022,

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States1,

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/890 of 18 March 2024 amending Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 establishing a European Peace Facility2,

– having regard to the conclusions of the European Council, particularly those of 26 June 2025, 20 March 2025 and 6 March 2025,

– having regard to the security and defence partnerships respectively signed on 21 May 2024 by the EU and Moldova, on 28 May 2024 by the EU and Norway, on 1 November 2024 by the EU and Japan, on 4 November 2024 by the EU and South Korea, on 19 November 2024 by the EU and North Macedonia, on 18 December 2024 by the EU and Albania, on 19 May 2025 by the EU and the United Kingdom (UK) and on 23 June 2025 by the EU and Canada,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/10923,

– having regard to the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030 presented by the Presidency of the European Commission on 19 March 2025, and its five-pillar financing plan, ‘ReArm Europe’,

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 22 April 2025 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2021/694, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697, (EU) 2021/1153, (EU) 2023/1525 and 2024/795, as regards incentivising defence-related investments in the EU budget to implement the ReArm Europe Plan (COM(2025)0188),

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 19 March 2025 for a Council regulation establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the reinforcement of the European defence industry Instrument (COM(2025)0122),

– having regard to the Commission proposal on the Defence Readiness Omnibus package of 17 June 2025 aimed at simplifying the relevant legal and administrative frameworks to strengthen the EU’s defence readiness,

– having regard to Mario Draghi’s report of 9 September 2024 on the future of European competitiveness,

– having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together: Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

– having regard to the three joint declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed by the Presidents of the European Council and the Commission as well as the NATO Secretary General on 10 January 2023, 5 December 2018 and 6 December 2016, respectively,

– having regard to the Strategic Concept adopted at the NATO Madrid Summit on 29 June 2022,

– having regard to the Hague Summit Declaration of 25 June 2025,

– having regard to its resolution of 2 April 2025 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 20244,

– having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the white paper on the future of European defence5,

– having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2021 on EU-NATO cooperation in the context of transatlantic relations6,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry’ (JOIN(2024)0010),

– having regard to the political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029, entitled ‘Europe’s choice’, presented on 18 July 2025 by the candidate for the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen,

– having regard to the Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management signed by the Secretary General of the United Nations and the President of the European Council on 24 September 2003,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Security and Defence (A10-0000/2025),

A. whereas the current geopolitical context, in particular the return of war to the European continent and the consequent decision of the EU to take more responsibility for security and defence, including military support to Ukraine, requires the EU to forge stronger and tailored partnerships to enhance cooperation with like-minded partners in a mutually beneficial way;

B. whereas the EU remains fully committed to promoting international cooperation and strengthening effective multilateralism at all levels;

C. whereas the EU-wide range of partnerships and dialogues on peace, security and defence are a key source of strength and resilience;

D. whereas the Strategic Compass called for extending and deepening partnerships with bilateral, regional and multilateral partners worldwide to ensure mutual benefit and enhanced collaboration;

European security environment

1. Underlines that security and defence partnerships (SDPs) are key for Europe to become more sovereign, more responsible for its own defence, better equipped to act and deal autonomously and in a coordinated way with immediate and future challenges and threats, with a 360° approach; states that these partnerships are a necessity, not an option for the EU;

2. Underlines that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has been a wake-up call for Europe to invest more in security and defence; underlines that Russia continues its aggression on the European continent also with the support of its proxies; notes the malicious activities of our strategic competitors, which constitute threats for European security and for the international rules-based order; underlines that the EU has to manage strategic competition from China, and spillover from conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, while addressing common, global threats and challenges;

3. Underlines that through the EU Strategic Compass, the EU commits to engage more coherently, consistently and comprehensively with its bilateral partners and thus build tailored partnerships based on shared values and interests;

Criticality of the EU-NATO partnership

4. Highlights the reinforced strategic partnership with NATO, which includes more structured political dialogues and enhanced operational and sectoral cooperation – particularly in defence industry and capability development – thereby strengthening NATO’s European pillar;

5. Underlines that the EU relationship with NATO is a priority and needs to continue to develop, including through increased intelligence and information sharing; stresses that EU-NATO cooperation is key for critical infrastructure, military mobility, energy grids, digital communications, space and defence ecosystems, and societal and democratic resilience;

6. Stresses that NATO remains a key collective transatlantic defence with the EU and NATO playing complementary and mutually reinforcing roles to ensure security in Europe and enhance international security, and encourages close collaboration with the United States in this area;

Necessity of EU security and defence partnerships

7. Welcomes the fact that the EU is positioning itself as a reliable global security partner by strengthening its CSDP, including through mutually beneficial SDPs and deeper bilateral and multilateral dialogues; notes that SDPs are in place with eight countries so far and more are in the pipeline;

8. Believes that this SDP framework is giving new impetus to ongoing dialogues and practical cooperation; underlines the importance of having tangible deliverables; stresses the need for results monitoring, bilateral reviews and dialogue on threat perceptions and mutual interests, which are crucial to the implementation of the partnerships;

9. Underlines the strategic importance and prioritisation of the SDPs signed with Norway, the UK and Canada, which are NATO allies and the EU’s crucial defence partners; encourages the deepening of these partnerships, including in the area of the defence industry, in building joint military capabilities and encouraging closer collaboration;

10. Underlines that the EU-US relationship remains critical for European security and defence; stresses the importance of exploring a formalised SDP with the United States; points out the need for constant dialogue and alignment of threat perceptions; reiterates that our partnership with the United States is of strategic importance and calls for a deepening of our cooperation in a mutually beneficial way, including finding the best paths for collaboration between defence industries;

11. Stresses that there can be no European security without Ukrainian security; affirms that Ukraine is a strategic priority partner for the EU as it prepares to take its place as a member of the Union; reiterates that the EU will provide continued, sustainable support with everything that it takes to secure Ukraine’s victory as soon as possible; insists that the EU must contribute to robust legally-backed security guarantees for Ukraine in order to deter further Russian aggression; stresses that closer cooperation between the EU and the Ukrainian defence industrial sector is a priority; underlines the importance of EU partnerships in coordinating assistance to Ukraine; encourages the use of frozen Russian assets in supporting Ukraine;

12. Underlines the strategic importance of EU partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific, such as Japan and the Republic of Korea, which have already signed SDPs, and encourages the rapid conclusion of negotiations with Australia and the exploration of further partnerships with other countries in the region;

13. Calls on the Member States and the European External Actions Service (EEAS) to further explore the setting up of SDPs with other partners, notably with Switzerland and EU candidate countries in the Western Balkans as well as with Türkiye, India, and with countries in Africa and the Middle East that are key for EU border security;

Developing UN and multilateral partnerships

14. Stresses the importance of the EU-UN strategic partnership on peace operations and crisis management; welcomes the new priorities of the EU-UN Strategic Partnership for 2025-2028 and stresses the need for increased coherence between and the effectiveness of EU and UN missions and operations;

15. Notes that the EU and the African Union maintain a strategic partnership, particularly in peace and security; stresses the need to deepen strategic partnerships with other regional organisations, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the League of Arab States and the Organization of American States, in areas of mutual interests through joint initiatives, dialogue and increased diplomatic activity;

Boosting wide and tailor-made ways of cooperation

16. Stresses that the EU’s integrated approach to CSDP includes the legal frameworks for the participation of third countries and regional organisations in missions and operations;

17. Underlines the strategic role of the European Peace Facility (EPF) as a key instrument in strengthening military and defence capacities, supporting military aspects of peace operations as well as to providing equipment to the armed forces of EU partners;

18. Deplores Hungary’s ongoing obstruction of the use of this instrument to assist Ukraine and urges the Member States to actively pressure the Hungarian Government to end its irresponsible blockade of the EPF;

19. Welcomes the strengthening of the EEAS network of military advisors in EU Delegations, which strengthen relations with partners’ military and civilian institutions;

20. Insists that the EU’s defence readiness 2030 requires partnerships; stresses that achieving this requires securing supply chains, including of raw materials and critical components, reinforcing the European defence technological and industrial base and reducing the EU’s strategic dependencies, without creating new ones;

21. Welcomes the fact that privileged access to the Security Action for Europe instrument (SAFE) could be granted, further to specific bilateral agreements, to those countries with which there is an SDP; notes that SAFE-compliant agreements for the UK and Canada are under negotiation; underlines the importance of Ukraine’s participation in SAFE;

22. Notes that the European Defence Agency also cooperates with third countries, organisations and entities in the framework of tailor-made administrative arrangements;

Strengthening key areas of collaboration within SDPs

23. Underlines SDPs’ role in integrated border management and maritime security, which are especially important given Russia’s recent provocations and violations of NATO airspace, and continued management of illegal migration flows;

24. Calls for more joint maritime security exercises to promote interoperability and operational readiness in strategically important waterways and chokepoints around the world; insists on the importance of the surveillance of critical maritime infrastructure, including undersea cables and pipelines;

25. Underlines the importance of SDPs for CSDP missions and operations, as they remain the cornerstone of EU external security engagement, and are a key pillar of the EU’s work on conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict stabilisation;

26. Stresses that cyberattacks and foreign information manipulation and interference, including disinformation, are a growing security threat for the EU; calls for further cooperation; underlines the importance of SDPs for building societal and democratic resilience;

27. Emphasises the importance of counterterrorism and the prevention of violent extremism, addressing both state and non-state threats through integrated security frameworks;

28. Insists that partnerships are essential to promote peaceful and responsible behaviours in outer space, respond to space threats and support the use of space services for security and defence;

29. Underlines that the SDPs contain an effective review clause that allows for adjustments related to implementation and to respond to new security developments; highlights that these partnerships are constantly being strengthened and are delivering concrete results;

Developing Parliament’s role in fostering defence cooperation

30. Recalls that Parliament has repeatedly highlighted the significance of the Strategic Compass’s partnerships; believes that parliamentary diplomacy complements and supports these partnerships; underlines the key roles played by the Committee on Security and Defence as well as the Delegation for Relations with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly;

31. Believes that the Schuman Forum on Security and Defence is a key platform for dialogue;

32. Encourages building closer ties with societies in partner countries, strengthening the EU’s strategic communication;

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33. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

We are at a crucial moment, when Europe faces unprecedented challenges, with the war of aggression at our doorstep. We can see this today more clearly than ever – Russia’s escalation has resulted in violation of EU’s and NATO’s airspace in several countries. The broader geopolitical landscape is undergoing profound changes and shifts. This volatile international environment means major challenges, the security of Europe is at serious risk.

Escalation in the Middle East has led to significant and varied risks for European and global security, and in the long-term, China’s rise as a global power may introduce new strategic complexities.

It is therefore paramount that we maintain strong and unified transatlantic relations within NATO and with partners in the Indo-Pacific, such as Japan and the Republic of Korea. Europeans must take more responsibility for our own security and do more to deter Russia.

Addressing this risk, clearly requires new forms of cooperation and targeted partnerships that deliver concrete results and build real capabilities. This is where EU and its security and defence partners play a key role. If challenges and threats know no borders, then we need friends to tackle them. The European Union cannot do it alone.

The evolving geopolitical landscape, marked by Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, increasing tensions in the Indo-Pacific, and the shifting role of NATO has intensified the need for a robust and cohesive European security and defence partnerships.

The report places EU Security and Defence Partnerships in the overall context of EU Common Security and Defence Policy. Overall, the Strategic Compass of the EU commits to engage more with its bilateral partners and thus build tailored partnerships based on shared values and interests.

Cooperation with strategic partners the UK, Canada, Norway, South Korea, Japan, Moldova, Albania, North Macedonia, but also such as the US and Ukraine, with which the EU has not yet formal partnerships, serves as a key element of the common security and defence policy.

Today, the EU is on a path of an overhaul of its defence policy – critical for Europe to be able to defend itself and advance its interests globally. This overhaul also has to reach partnerships in the security and defence sphere.

The EU has always sought partners to uphold the rules-based multilateral order – today more than ever the outreach needs to reflect defence and security interests of EU countries. Current volatile international environment poses increased threats and challenges to our common security – which requires more efforts, new forms of cooperation and targeted partnerships that deliver concrete results and build real capabilities.

Promoting partnerships on security and defence is also essential for our capability development, innovation and defence industrial readiness as well as to diversify supplies of raw material or critical components.

In line with the White Paper, the EU has taken concrete steps to advance its partnership agenda in the field of security and defence with allies and like-minded partners, notably NATO, with which the EDA will pursue a technical arrangement for the exchange of classified information.

Partnerships are crucial to help enhance interoperability and reinforce industrial cooperation, as well as diversify supplies of raw material or critical components. This model is pioneered with United Kingdom and Canada, with which bilateral agreements are being negotiated to allow their respective defence industries and products to benefit from joint procurement under the SAFE instrument. Defence industrial cooperations is also at the centre of Defence Industrial Dialogues with Japan and, potentially in the future, with India. The EU should also deepen its security and defence partnership with Moldova.

The report aims to take stock of the current and develop proposals for future defence partnerships – providing concrete policy suggestions and actions for adaptation. It explores alignments with some of the broader objectives of building a strong defence policy of the European Union, including relations with NATO, and alignment with its capabilities, ensuring innovation and rapid advancement of defence industries.

As the EU seeks to bolster its Common Security and Defence Policy strengthened partnerships with NATO and regional partners are becoming increasingly vital. The relation with NATO is a priority one, and needs to keep improving, including through increased intelligence and information sharing. The EU-NATO cooperation will also be important for working on critical infrastructure, transport infrastructure, energy grids, digital communication, or civilian satellites.

There is consensus among EU Member States on the importance of EU Partnerships. EU Council conclusions also outline security and defence priorities for the EU. They state that “Europe must become more sovereign, more responsible for its own defence and better equipped to act and deal autonomously and in a coordinated way with immediate and future challenges and threats, with a 360° approach”.

The conclusions also state that “The European Council underlines the importance of working together with like-minded partners, who share our foreign and security policy goals. It welcomes in that regard the EU’s recent Security and Defence Partnerships with the UK and Canada”. This forms a clear direction from Member States to move forward robustly on implementing the partnerships.

The report calls for alignments with some of the broader objectives of building a strong European Defence Union, including improving relations with NATO, and alignment with its capabilities.

The partnerships vary in their scope, as highlighted in the report, but they are critical for depending on the assessed mutual interests of the EU and each partner, but several areas can be outlined as thematic components:

Common areas of focus for the partnerships will be the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations – as they remain the cornerstone of its external security engagement. These missions, both civilian and military, are also linked EU’s work on conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict stabilisation, areas which will also be evaluated in the report.

Closely aligned with these are efforts in integrated border management and maritime security. In these domains, and other ones, operational presence, intelligence sharing, and strategic foresight are increasingly vital – and should be shared among partners.

As indicated in the report – sustained long-term support for Ukraine is vital for EU defence and security. This also goes for building a direct partnership with Ukraine defence industry – where a lot of lessons can be learned from each other, especially on usage of drones and new technique on battlefield.

The partnerships should have an important component of responding to emerging threats and resilience building. The EU’s approach to hybrid threats and cybersecurity reflects a growing recognition of non-traditional security challenges. Coordination and cooperation on (cyber) capacity building, particularly for partners, demonstrates the EU’s dual focus on internal resilience and external projection.

This also includes efforts to bolster the resilience of critical infrastructure and improve strategic communication (STRATCOM) and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) responses.

In the partnerships, the EU should continue to emphasise counterterrorism and the prevention of violent extremism, reflecting the need to address both state and non-state threats through integrated security frameworks – developed with partners. Preventing trafficking in humans and small arms are also important areas.

Partnerships should also be strengthened through structured consultations on relevant defence initiatives, tools, and instruments. These should include cooperation of defence industries (including financing).

Training, education, and capacity building—whether cyber-specific or more broadly defence-related — are key levers for deepening cooperation with partner states and organisations. These initiatives aim to elevate shared standards, interoperability, and strategic alignment.

It will be important to implement a well-coordinated engagement in international forums to promote the partnerships and reflect a multilateral approach to global security governance.

An important component will be ensuring that partnerships can support innovation and rapid advancement of defence industries and working towards industry effectiveness and economic efficiency.

A multi-stakeholder process is needed, involving the European Parliament, Council and Commission, along with Member States and should launch a process of broader consultations and engagement on EU security and defence partnerships – which will also have the aim to move the monitor existing and encouraging new partnerships.

In summary – the report shows where progress needs to be consistent to build up EU Security and Defence Partnerships – and importantly, that they align with defence priorities and political goals of EU external engagement. This is key for its priorities and its responses to the changing global landscape.