On drones and new systems of warfare – the EU’s need to adapt to be fit for today’s security challenges

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on drones and new systems of warfare – the EU’s need to adapt to be fit for today’s security challenges

(2025/2088(INI))

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to the Commission proposal for a Council regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2028 to 2034 (COM(2025) 0571),

– having regard to the European Competitiveness Fund with a defence and space component to strengthen the defence industrial base, including drones,

– having regard to the 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague and the deepening EU-NATO strategic partnership, notably on drone integration, innovation and Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) capabilities, including the Rapid Adoption Action Plan and the Innovation Cooperation Roadmap with Ukraine designed to provide support for Ukraine and enhance protection of allied airspace and critical infrastructure,

– having regard to the Readiness Action Plan, launched at the 2014 NATO Wales Summit in response to Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, and its evolution into a baseline framework for NATO’s deterrence and defence posture, culminating in the 2022 NATO Force Model,

– having regard to the tailored EU security and defence partnerships with Norway, Moldova, Japan, South Korea, Albania, North Macedonia and the United Kingdom, each framed to strengthen cooperation in areas such as crisis management, maritime and cybersecurity, military mobility, and defence industry collaboration,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 26 June 2025 on Ukraine, the Middle East, European defence and security, EU in the world, competitiveness, migration, the Republic of Moldova, Western Balkans, internal security, preparedness, hybrid activities and other items, and industrial readiness and the ReArm Europe Plan / Readiness 2030 objectives, the European Defence Fund (EDF) interim report and the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP),

– having regard to the report of 27 June 2025 by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) entitled ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy Report - Our priorities in 2025’,

– having regard to its resolution of 19 September 2024 on continued financial and military support to Ukraine by EU Member States,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 March 2025 entitled, ‘Joint white paper for European Defence Readiness 2030’ and the European defence industrial strategy (EDIS),

– having regard to the European Peace Facility and its support of dronerelated capability delivery in Ukraine,

– having regard the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform, including the Security Action for Europe and Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency instruments, as critical enablers for scaling up dualuse innovation and industrial resilience,

– having regard to the Horizon Europe research and innovation framework programme,

– having regard to Single European Sky ATM Research and its relevance to the integration of military drones in shared airspace,

– having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ and chapter four thereof on increasing security and reducing dependencies,

– having regard to the political guidelines of 18 July 2024 for the European Commission 2024-2029, by the then candidate for the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, entitled ‘Europe’s choice’,

– having regard to its resolution of 17 July 2024 on the need for the EU’s continuous support for Ukraine,

– having regard to the Commission Implementing Decision C(2024)1702 of 15 March 2024 on the financing of the instrument for the reinforcement of the European defence industry through common procurement (EDIRPA) established by Regulation (EU) 2023/2418 of the European Parliament and of the Council and the adoption of the work programme for 2024-2025,

– having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on the need for unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after two years of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine,

– having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2023 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2022, which emphasises the urgency of developing drone and counter-drone capacities within common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions,

– having regard to the Versailles Declaration of 10 and 11 March 2022,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 24 January 2022 on the European security situation and of 22 January 2018 on the Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises,

– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence,

– having regard to the European Defence Agency’s Action Plan on Autonomous Systems (APAS), approved on 11 January 2024, which establishes a phased, comprehensive framework to accelerate the development, interoperability, regulation, standardisation, certification, and cross-domain deployment of autonomous systems across land, air, maritime and hybrid operations,

– having regard to the APAS’s structured roadmap for the period 2024-2038, including flagship projects targeting cross-domain autonomous swarms and manned-unmanned teaming, supported by the Autonomous Systems Community of Interest and the Ad Hoc Working Group to coordinate implementation and stakeholder engagement,

– having regard to relevant NATO doctrines and guidelines on Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), including STANAG 4671 (airworthiness), STANAG 4703 (C2), and the NATO Joint Air Power Strategy,

– having regard to the European Defence Agency’s European Military Airworthiness Requirement (EMAR) of 18 April 2024, which provides Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) to support and interpret the European Military Airworthiness Requirements on continuing airworthiness (EMAR M),

– having regard to the EMAR M framework and its AMC and GM as essential tools for aligning military airworthiness practices with the latest regulatory standards and ensuring their effective implementation within the military aviation environment,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 November 2022 entitled, ‘Action plan on military mobility 2.0’, which expands and digitalises military mobility infrastructure and administrative processes to streamline cross-border troop and equipment movement,

– having regard to the Commission’s Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport’s adoption of automated systems for authorising personnel carriages in military freight trains, as part of a broader effort to modernise and accelerate logistic procedures across the trans-European transport network,

– having regard to the decision by the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation and Member States (France, Germany, Italy, Spain) to launch the Eurodrone MALE RPAS programme, formalised by the EUR 7.1 billion contract signed in February 2022 to develop and produce 60 drones, and its evolution through the 2024 preliminary design review and the nearing critical design review in 2025, EU funding support (of EUR 100 million in 2024) and the accession of India as an observer in early 2025,

– having regard to the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs’ recommendations on lethal autonomous weapons systems and UN reports on the use of armed drones under international law,

– having regard to national frameworks and doctrinal publications on military drones,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1092,

– having regard to the Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1835 of 12 October 2015 defining the statute, seat and operational rules of the European Defence Agency, the Capability Development Plan (CDP), the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the Overarching Strategic Research Agenda (OSRA), and the Key Strategic Activities (KSA) methodology,

– having regard to Articles 42(7) and 222 of the Treaty on European Union,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Security and Defence (A[100000/2025]),

A. whereas the mass proliferation of precision strike capability has permanently changed the modern battlefield, EU defence needs and resilience requirements for the Member States;

B. whereas procurement and financing of drones must be considered as a service, requiring trained personnel, smart investments, simplified procedures, access to public and private financing, regional manufacturing hubs and strong cooperation with small and medium-sized enterprises, tech firms and academia;

C. whereas the Member States must work to align doctrines, training facilities, certification procedures, assembly lines, battlefield coordination, real-time targeting, training, resilient C2s and full integration;

D. whereas strategic partnerships are essential to achieving the mass and qualitative edge required to reach operational thresholds and access to expertise and raw materials;

E. whereas the Member States must utilise various new EU defence spending initiatives to devise cost-effective solutions to drone warfare;

Drone warfare in the modern battlefield

1. Recognises that for armed forces to operate in the modern battlefield, soldiers must create real-time ‘drone walls’ that integrate radar, acoustic sensors and laser-based ‘hard-kill’ solutions to sustain their survivability, mobility, lethality and situational awareness;

2. Recognises the challenge of drone recognition faced by frontline soldiers and recommends the integration of anti-drone rifles, electronic warfare (EW) capabilities and resilient C2s into infantry forces via training and attachment of EW units so infantry forces can effectively operate on the frontline, maximising their protection and repair capability, and ensuring the correct identification and interception of enemy drones;

3. Recognises the challenge posed by the high cost of drone interceptions and calls for joint programmes to promote the development of cost-effective C-UAS capabilities such as EW, laser, and AI-guided interception to lower the per-intercept cost;

4. Encourages armed forces to integrate and align drones into all combat doctrines as a layer in operational planning;

5. Encourages the Member States and Ukraine to jointly train and certify drone pilots with standards equivalent to artillery or unmanned aerial vehicle operators, invest in counter-drone systems – hard-kill and soft-kill alike – at all echelons, reassess armour survivability, ensure tanks and armoured personnel carriers are modified for counter unmanned aerial vehicles expand EW units to ensure all battalions have jamming capabilities and establish drone defence zones around critical infrastructure;

6. Underlines the growing use of drones in hybrid and terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure; recalls Operation ‘Spider web’, the 2023 sabotage attempt on Moldova’s energy grid, and repeated Houthi drone strikes disrupting Red Sea shipping; stresses that such cases illustrate how low-cost systems enable disruption; urges the Member States to integrate drone-specific response protocols into national resilience plans;

7. Recommends the development of comprehensive national civil defence strategies against drone attacks, ensuring preparedness at the national, regional, municipal, community, and household levels that emphasises early warning systems for local populations, clear instructions regarding response behaviour, and protected spaces (sheltering) for the population and infrastructures;

Sourcing, financing and procuring drones and C-UAS capabilities

8. Calls on the European Defence Agency (EDA) to implement pre-approved vendor lists and priority orders for critical drone components and platforms, allowing faster contracting during crises;

9. Encourages the Member States and the EDA to streamline certification and airworthiness standards to speed integration and reduce duplication in testing and credentialing;

10. Calls on the Commission to simplify intra-EU transfer rules for drone-related technology under Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items;

11. Ensure that all drone platforms funded by the EDF comply with EU-origin criteria for major subcomponents;

12. Encourages EDIP and other financial instruments to prioritise the financing of regional drone manufacturing hubs with shared infrastructure and regulatory fast-tracking, particularly among frontline states;

13. Calls on the EDA to expand its operational experimentation campaign into a standing drone innovation accelerator for fast-track fielding;

14. Calls on the Commission to draft a critical drone component manufacturing action plan that provides targeted subsidies for brushless direct current motor, lithium battery, sensor and additive manufacturing in the EU;

15. Calls on the Commission to draft a working plan to develop strategic reserves of powder, propellant, primers, carbon frames, electronics, motors, microchips and other key materials for UAS development;

Best practices and doctrine

16. Invites the Commission, the EDA and Member States to launch a European defensive drone academy to train engineers, operators and technicians; calls for the academy to be able to offer joint degrees, vocational training and operator certification with industry and leading technical universities; stresses the need to include mandatory modules on AI, robotics, EW and cyber-resilience to meet operational standards;

17. Encourages the speedy alignment of doctrine and aggregation of demand for drones with Ukraine, to streamline the development and integration of drones;

18. Calls for the stockpiling of drone components and critical raw materials across the Member States, rather than complete systems, and for the creation of forwarddeployed repairandregeneration hubs, colocated with NATO depots, to ensure sustained operational readiness and rapid rotation of upgraded components;

19. Calls on the EDA to establish a dedicated, flexible budget for UAS that spans the full capability lifecycle, with flexible requirements and appropriations to accelerate acquisition and fielding;

20. Recommends that the Member States, particularly frontline states, adopt missile and drone launch detection systems that can transmit information across the EU to serve as a ‘shield’ for Europe’s multi-layered aerial defence capabilities;

21. Recommends the co-financing of regular training and technical expertise development across service academies and military colleges via the EDA, which sponsors technical capability-building blocks via joint training;

22. Recommends the integration of C-UAS into joint training exercises and EU-level civil protection planning with an emphasis on critical infrastructure;

23. Calls for the enforcement of EU-wide UAS standardisation, for continued aerial worthiness to be made obligatory, and for Open-Earth-Monitor Cyberinfrastructure and EMAR to be necessary;

24. Calls for expanding certified testing grounds for training on and integration of drone capabilities where industry and armed forces can rapidly co-develop, test and iterate drone solutions in operational conditions;

EU-NATO cooperation in counter-drone warfare

25. Calls for the creation of a joint EU-NATO drone centre of excellence in a frontline state with ongoing NATO Enhanced Forward Presence, active testing facilities and an active drone manufacturing hub to streamline joint exercises and interchangeability across the Member States;

26. Calls for the institutionalisation of Ukraine-NATO-EU knowledge transfer programmes via rotational staff exchanges with Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel and by expanding joint training programmes under the EDA, focused on real-world drone survivability and innovation lessons;

27. Calls for the establishment of a permanent EU-NATO drone coordination cell to bridge doctrinal and operational gaps between EU and NATO operations with a permanent joint coordination cell within the European Union Military Staff with a mandate to synchronise drone doctrine, prioritise capability integration, and facilitate real-time information sharing between EU CSDP missions and NATO operations;

28. Calls for a unified EU-NATO UAS interoperability standard designed for common communication protocols, classification systems for UAS/C-UAS, and data-sharing formats designed to be binding for all CSDP missions and synchronised with NATO’s C-UAS doctrine to ensure seamless coordination in joint operations;

29. Calls for EU-NATO cooperation in implementing NATO’s Rapid Adoption Action Plan aimed at accelerating national procurement processes; encourages efforts to reform acquisition cycles, testing protocols, and certification frameworks, ensuring that military innovation keeps pace with the threat environment;

Ad-hoc strategic partnerships

30. Supports EU cooperation with the International Drone Coalition to align battlefield procurement with EDF objectives; invites the Commission to explore co-financing with key partners to boost drone-related production, in synergy with EU industrial and technological initiatives;

31. Encourages utilising new EU strategic partnerships and security and defence partnership agreements to pursue a regulatory environment and procurement processes that coordinate and integrate with the current European ecosystem, whereby strategic partners bring needed critical capabilities and raw materials and emphasise joint development in propulsion, EW, laser development and mission-critical software;

32. Recommends the establishment of bilateral agreements with non-EU strategic partners for secure co-production and technology transfer, using co-development and co-financing models to gain access to proven systems while building production capacity;

33. Calls for greater synergy between the Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/694 (Chips Act)and EU defence funding initiatives through the use of the act’s ‘Chips for Europe Initiative’ and the European Semiconductor Board to aid further development of semiconductor manufacturing among the Member States;

Drones and counter-terrorism operations outside the EU

34. Calls for the establishment of a modular C-UAS training curriculum for Counter Terrorism (CT) units, covering drone recognition, interdiction techniques, and red team simulations;

35. Calls for the incorporation of C-UAS doctrine into joint EU CT exercises under the EDA and FRONTEX;

36. Calls for the funding of joint procurement and research and development for C-UAS systems via the EDF, with priority for rapidly deployable mobile solutions suitable for expeditionary CT operations upon request;

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37. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President of the Commission and competent commissioners, the UN Secretary-General, the NATO Secretary-General, the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, EU security and defence agencies and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

The use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) in Ukraine, as well as by non-state actors such as Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis, has demonstrated how drone warfare is now a defining feature of both conventional and hybrid conflicts.

The October 2023 terrorist attacks against Israel and their regional repercussions further illustrated the proliferation of low-cost drone technologies in asymmetric theatres, posing a direct challenge to European preparedness and strategic stability.

The intensive use of Iranian drones, in both Ukraine and across the Middle East, further demonstrates the risk that mass proliferation of precision strike capability presents across both state and non-state actors against Member States.