Sittings · Document

Draft report (2026/2024(INI)) 2026-06-11

Hybrid warfare and the protection of the EU’s territorial integrity and critical security and defence infrastructure

Committee on Security and Defence

Amendment 1

Michał Dworczyk, Cristian Terheş

Motion for a resolution

Citation 8 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the Declaration of the North Atlantic Council Summit in The Hague, adopted by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 25 June 2025,

Or. en

Amendment 2

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Citation 10

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to the report of 30 October 2024 by Sauli Niinistö entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’ (Niinistö report),	– having regard to the report of 30 October 2024 by Sauli Niinistö entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’ (Niinistö report) and the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 26 March 2025 on the European Preparedness Union Strategy,

Or. en

Amendment 3

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Citation 10 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the Commission proposal of 10 December 2025 for guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure (COM/2025/1006),

Or. en

Amendment 4

Nathalie Loiseau, Helmut Brandstätter

Motion for a resolution

Citation 10 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the Commission’s White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030,

Or. en

Amendment 5

Nathalie Loiseau, Helmut Brandstätter

Motion for a resolution

Citation 10 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the 2025 US National Security Strategy (NSS),

Or. en

Amendment 6

Elena Donazzan, Alberico Gambino, Cristian Terheş

Motion for a resolution

Citation 13 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to non-paper 'Countering hybrid warfare: an active strategy’ by the Minister for Defence of the Italian Republic, November 2025,

Or. it

Amendment 7

Alexandr Vondra

Motion for a resolution

Citation 14 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council of 16 October 2025 entitled 'Preserving Peace - Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030',

Or. en

Amendment 8

Nathalie Loiseau, Helmut Brandstätter

Motion for a resolution

Citation 14 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the work of the European Parliament’s Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield,

Or. en

Amendment 9

Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Citation 17 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the European Parliament resolution of 7 October 2021 on the situation in Belarus after one year of protests and their violent repression,

Or. es

Amendment 10

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Citation 17 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the implementing guidelines for the Framework for a coordinated EU response to hybrid campaigns (EU Hybrid Toolbox),

Or. en

Amendment 11

Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Citation 17 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 21 and 22 October 2021 expressly condemning the instrumentalisation of migrants by third states for political purposes and hybrid attacks against the EU’s external borders,

Or. es

Amendment 12

Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Citation 17 c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the Council decision of 15 November 2021 extending the sanctions regime against Belarus in response to the instrumentalisation of migrants and hybrid attacks against the EU’s external borders,

Or. es

Amendment 13

Michał Dworczyk, Cristian Terheş

Motion for a resolution

Citation 18 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the Commission Communication of 11 December 2024 on countering hybrid threats from the weaponisation of migration and strengthening security at the EU’s external borders (COM(2024)0570);

Or. en

Amendment 14

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Citation 20 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/38, establishing the EU Cybersecurity Reserve under the Cyber Solidarity Act, and to Regulation (EU) 2025/37, amending Regulation (EU) 2019/881 as regards managed security services, aimed at strengthening the Union’s capacity to prepare for, respond to and recover from major cyber incidents,

Or. en

Amendment 15

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Citation 20 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the Commission communication of 1 April 2025 on ProtectEU: a European Internal Security Strategy (COM/2025/148 final),

Or. en

Amendment 16

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Citation 20 c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2557 on the resilience of critical entities (Critical Entities Resilience Directive – CER Directive),

Or. en

Amendment 17

Michał Dworczyk, Cristian Terheş

Motion for a resolution

Recital A

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
A. whereas the intensity and scope of hybrid attacks against the EU have escalated significantly since the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, with incidents repeatedly linked to Russia, Belarus, China, Iran and North Korea;	A. whereas the intensity and scope of hybrid attacks against the EU have escalated significantly since the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, with incidents repeatedly linked to Russia, Belarus, China, Iran and North Korea; whereas the instrumentalisation of migration orchestrated by the Belarusian regime against the EU’s eastern borders constituted a major hybrid attack against the Union and its Member States already prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine;

Or. en

Amendment 18

Nathalie Loiseau, Helmut Brandstätter

Motion for a resolution

Recital A

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
A. whereas the intensity and scope of hybrid attacks against the EU have escalated significantly since the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, with incidents repeatedly linked to Russia, Belarus, China, Iran and North Korea;	A. whereas the intensity and scope of hybrid attacks against the EU have escalated significantly since the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, with incidents repeatedly linked to Russia, Belarus, China, Iran, North Korea, and Azerbaijan; whereas Russia has persistently violated the principle of territorial integrity and political independence set forth in article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter despite being a founding member of the organisation;

Or. en

Amendment 19

Christophe Bay, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Recital A

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
A. whereas the intensity and scope of hybrid attacks against the EU have escalated significantly since the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, with incidents repeatedly linked to Russia, Belarus, China, Iran and North Korea;	A. whereas the intensity and scope of hybrid attacks against the EU have escalated significantly since the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, with incidents repeatedly linked to Russia, Belarus, China, Iran and North Korea in particular;

Or. fr

Amendment 20

Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Rasa Juknevičienė

Motion for a resolution

Recital A a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Aa. whereas hybrid warfare has become a structural feature of the current geopolitical environment, in which hostile state actors seek to exploit the Union’s political, technological, industrial, economic and societal vulnerabilities; whereas the growing convergence between security, defence, competitiveness and technological leadership requires the Union to strengthen its industrial and innovation capacities as a prerequisite for long-term resilience against hybrid threats;

Or. en

Amendment 21

Marta Wcisło

Motion for a resolution

Recital A a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Aa. whereas Russia’s war against Ukraine has demonstrated that contemporary hybrid warfare is conducted as a continuous campaign combining military and non-military instruments, including sabotage, energy disruption, cyberattacks, foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), economic coercion, instrumentalisation of migration and political subversion;

Or. en

Amendment 22

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Michał Dworczyk

Motion for a resolution

Recital A a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Aa. whereas the Russian Federation constitutes the primary and most significant security threat to the European Union and its Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 23

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Recital B

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
B. whereas the severity of these attacks has increased drastically, representing a blatant violation of Member States’ sovereignty, the EU’s territorial integrity and international law;	B. whereas the severity of these attacks has increased drastically ranging from discrete operations — including unauthorised drone incursions, 'smuggling balloons', airspace violations, clandestine tunnels for infiltration and smuggling, sabotage and espionage of critical security and defence infrastructure, the sabotage of undersea cables and pipelines, GPS jamming and navigation spoofing, cyberattacks, arson and assassination plots — to sustained campaigns including the weaponisation of migration, the instrumentalisation of organised crime, elite capture, covert foreign investment, economic coercion, data exfiltration, political subversion and economic penetration, foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), constituting a blatant violation of Member States’ sovereignty, the EU’s territorial integrity and international law;

Or. en

Amendment 24

Eszter Lakos

Motion for a resolution

Recital B

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
B. whereas the severity of these attacks has increased drastically, representing a blatant violation of Member States’ sovereignty, the EU’s territorial integrity and international law;	B. whereas the severity of these attacks has increased drastically, representing a blatant violation of Member States’ sovereignty, the EU’s territorial integrity and international law; whereas the European Parliament in its Resolution of 21 January 2026 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2025 has recognised the use of hybrid tactics by foreign malign actors as a fully-fledged security threat to the EU and its Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 25

Christophe Bay, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Recital B

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
B. whereas the severity of these attacks has increased drastically, representing a blatant violation of Member States’ sovereignty, the EU’s territorial integrity and international law;	B. whereas the severity of these attacks has increased drastically, representing a blatant violation of Member States’ sovereignty, their territorial integrity and international law;

Or. fr

Amendment 26

Marta Wcisło

Motion for a resolution

Recital B a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Ba. whereas Russia’s hybrid strategy increasingly relies on incremental political subversion strategies aimed at weakening democratic societies, institutions, political consensus and societal cohesion from within through the systematic exploitation of societal divisions, support for extremist and anti-system actors, information manipulation, illicit financing and the gradual erosion of public trust in democratic institutions;

Or. en

Amendment 27

Jorge Buxadé Villalba, György Hölvényi

Motion for a resolution

Recital B a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Ba. whereas hybrid threats against the EU are not limited to the eastern flank, but also affect the southern European flank, including the Mediterranean, the Sahel, North Africa and the external borders of Member States particularly exposed to such threats, such as Spain, Italy, Greece, Malta and Cyprus;

Or. es

Amendment 28

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Recital B a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Ba. whereas certain international actors, most notably authoritarian states, are jeopardising European security and stability through a vast set of hybrid activities;

Or. en

Amendment 29

Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Recital B b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Bb. whereas the growing presence and influence of hostile actors in North Africa and the Sahel, including Russia’s military and strategic cooperation with various countries in the region, has direct implications for the security and stability of the Mediterranean, the EU’s external borders and the Member States on the southern European flank;

Or. es

Amendment 30

Marta Wcisło

Motion for a resolution

Recital B b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Bb. whereas repeated violations of the airspace of EU Member States, including incidents affecting Poland, the Baltic States and Romania, as well as GPS jamming and other forms of interference with civil aviation, constitute deliberate attempts to test response procedures, situational awareness and political cohesion within the EU and NATO;

Or. en

Amendment 31

Nathalie Loiseau, Helmut Brandstätter

Motion for a resolution

Recital C

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
C. whereas hostile state actors target the EU’s territorial integrity on two fronts: through direct physical attacks against Member States and through political operations aimed at engineering Member States’ withdrawal from the EU;	C. whereas hostile state actors target the EU’s territorial integrity on three fronts: through direct physical attacks against Member States, through interference operations aiming at outermost regions and overseas countries and territories (OCT), and through political operations aimed at engineering Member States’ withdrawal from the EU; whereas these attacks also target candidate countries and EU neighbours, notably Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia and the Western Balkans; whereas the territorial integrity of EU’s neighbourhood is key to ensure peace, stability and security in Europe and the wider world;

Or. en

Amendment 32

Alexandr Vondra

Motion for a resolution

Recital C

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
C. whereas hostile state actors target the EU’s territorial integrity on two fronts: through direct physical attacks against Member States and through political operations aimed at engineering Member States’ withdrawal from the EU;	C. whereas hostile state actors target the EU's territorial integrity on two fronts: through direct physical attacks against Member States and through political operations aimed at, inter alia, crippling or slowing down decision-making processes both at national and EU levels, undermining Europe's determination and capacity to increase its defence readiness, and deepening political divisions both within member states and between them and the EU institutions;

Or. en

Amendment 33

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks

Motion for a resolution

Recital C

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
C. whereas hostile state actors target the EU’s territorial integrity on two fronts: through direct physical attacks against Member States and through political operations aimed at engineering Member States’ withdrawal from the EU;	C. whereas hostile state actors target the EU member states' territorial integrity on two fronts: through direct physical attacks against Member States and through political operations aimed at engineering Member States’ withdrawal from the EU; whereas both forms of hostile activities, when coordinated and directed against the sovereignty, security and constitutional order of Member States and the Union, constitute acts within the continuum of warfare and should be recognised as such under the Union’s security and defence framework;

Or. en

Amendment 34

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Recital C

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
C. whereas hostile state actors target the EU’s territorial integrity on two fronts: through direct physical attacks against Member States and through political operations aimed at engineering Member States’ withdrawal from the EU;	C. whereas hostile state actors, in particular Russia, target the EU’s territorial integrity on two fronts: through direct physical attacks against Member States and through political operations aimed at engineering Member States’ withdrawal from the EU; whereas, Russia continuously engages in cognitive warfare, aiming to change political opinions and systems in the long term;

Or. en

Amendment 35

Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Recital C

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
C. whereas hostile state actors target the EU’s territorial integrity on two fronts: through direct physical attacks against Member States and through political operations aimed at engineering Member States’ withdrawal from the EU;	C. whereas hostile state actors target the EU Member States' territorial integrity on two fronts: through direct physical attacks against Member States and their borders; through operations intended to jeopardise public security and public order; and through political operations aimed at engineering Member States’ withdrawal from the EU;

Or. es

Amendment 36

Christophe Bay, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Recital C

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
C. whereas hostile state actors target the EU’s territorial integrity on two fronts: through direct physical attacks against Member States and through political operations aimed at engineering Member States’ withdrawal from the EU;	C. whereas hostile state actors are undermining the territorial integrity of Member States through physical attacks, cyber-attacks, acts of sabotage, information operations, the weaponisation of migration flows and political operations aimed at destabilising national institutions;

Or. fr

Amendment 37

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Recital C

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
C. whereas hostile state actors target the EU’s territorial integrity on two fronts: through direct physical attacks against Member States and through political operations aimed at engineering Member States’ withdrawal from the EU;	C. whereas hostile state actors target the EU’s territorial integrity on two fronts: through direct physical attacks against Member States and through political interference aimed at influencing Member States’ electoral processes and decision-making;

Or. en

Amendment 38

Merja Kyllönen

Motion for a resolution

Recital C

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
C. whereas hostile state actors target the EU’s territorial integrity on two fronts: through direct physical attacks against Member States and through political operations aimed at engineering Member States’ withdrawal from the EU;	C. whereas hostile state actors target the EU’s territorial integrity on two fronts: through direct physical attacks against Member States and through political operations, including aimed at engineering Member States’ withdrawal from the EU;

Or. en

Amendment 39

Villy Søvndal

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Recital C

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
C. whereas hostile state actors target the EU’s territorial integrity on two fronts: through direct physical attacks against Member States and through political operations aimed at engineering Member States’ withdrawal from the EU;	C. whereas hostile actors target the EU’s territorial integrity on two fronts: through direct physical attacks against Member States and through political operations aimed at destabilizing, dividing, and undermining Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 40

Michał Dworczyk, Cristian Terheş

Motion for a resolution

Recital C

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
C. whereas hostile state actors target the EU’s territorial integrity on two fronts: through direct physical attacks against Member States and through political operations aimed at engineering Member States’ withdrawal from the EU;	C. whereas hostile state actors target the EU’s territorial integrity on two fronts: through direct physical attacks against Member States and through political operations aimed at undermining the unity of the Union;

Or. en

Amendment 41

Nathalie Loiseau, Helmut Brandstätter

Motion for a resolution

Recital C a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Ca. whereas religious groups have been used to conduct interference operations in the EU; whereas Russia is making full use of the Russian Orthodox Church to spread its propaganda; whereas networks affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood operate within the territory of several Member States of the European Union through associations, charities and educational bodies that enable them to carry out activities involving ideological influence, funding and recruitment; whereas these activities form part of a strategy to undermine democratic values and the rule of law, ultimately undermining the EU’s ability to defend itself;

Or. en

Amendment 42

Villy Søvndal

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Recital C a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Ca. whereas interference from non-EU countries in Greenland, notably inflammatory narratives and the conduct of hybrid actions on Greenland’s territory, as well as the US Government’s formulation of explicit threats against Greenland’s sovereignty, have raised concerns regarding Greenland’s sovereignty and territorial integrity;

Or. en

Amendment 43

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Recital D

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
D. whereas these attacks aim to create chaos, destabilise the political situation in the Member States, sow fear and public distrust among EU citizens, test defence readiness and weaken the EU’s support for Ukraine;	D. whereas these attacks aim not only to create chaos and destabilise the Member States, but also to undermine democratic integrity, manipulate decision-making processes, sow fear and public distrust among EU citizens, weaken defence readiness and the EU’s support for Ukraine, generating cascading effects across the Union;

Or. en

Amendment 44

Villy Søvndal

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Recital D

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
D. whereas these attacks aim to create chaos, destabilise the political situation in the Member States, sow fear and public distrust among EU citizens, test defence readiness and weaken the EU’s support for Ukraine;	D. whereas these attacks aim to create chaos, destabilise the political situation in the Member States, sow fear and public distrust among EU citizens, test defence readiness and weaken the EU’s support for Ukraine; sometimes with the aim of creating greater disunity within the European Union;

Or. en

Amendment 45

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Recital D a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Da. whereas hybrid attacks represent a recognised security threat facing the Union and the Member States, with a significant impact on democracy; whereas internal security remains a responsibility of the Member States, however the cross-border, interconnected and multi-dimensional nature of those attacks requires strengthened cooperation, systematic information-sharing and coordinated action at EU level, supported by adequate funding;

Or. en

Amendment 46

Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Rasa Juknevičienė

Motion for a resolution

Recital D a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Da. whereas foreign information manipulation and interference, including disinformation campaigns, artificial intelligence-enabled manipulation, deepfakes and coordinated inauthentic behaviour, constitute a central component of hybrid warfare, aimed at eroding public trust, polarising democratic societies, weakening social cohesion and undermining support for European security and defence policies;

Or. en

Amendment 47

Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Recital D a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Da. whereas the instrumentalisation of migration flows by third states or hostile actors can be a form of hybrid pressure targeting the Union’s external borders, as previously recognised by the EU institutions with regard to the Belarusian regime’s action against Poland, Lithuania and Latvia;

Or. es

Amendment 48

Elena Donazzan, Alberico Gambino, Cristian Terheş

Motion for a resolution

Recital D a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Da. whereas hybrid warfare has now become a structural and permanent component of contemporary strategic competition, characterised by persistent multi-domain actions taking place below the threshold of armed conflict and tending to blur the distinction between peacetime and times of crisis;

Or. it

Amendment 49

Petras Auštrevičius

Motion for a resolution

Recital D a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Da. whereas, according to the EEAS 4th Annual Report on FIMI Threats, Russian FIMI activity is expected to intensify in 2026, with the budget for state-controlled media projected to reach approximately €1.56 billion, 7% higher than in 2025, with the Baltic Sea and Arctic regions anticipated among the primary targets;

Or. en

Amendment 50

Marta Wcisło

Motion for a resolution

Recital D a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Da. whereas sabotage operations increasingly target transport infrastructure, energy systems, defence-industrial facilities, telecommunications networks and undersea infrastructure through the use of proxies, criminal networks and recruited intermediaries, thereby complicating attribution and response;

Or. en

Amendment 51

Merja Kyllönen

Motion for a resolution

Recital D a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Da. whereas hybrid operations impact societal resilience, border security and trust in democratic institutions;

Or. en

Amendment 52

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Recital D b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Db. whereas the situation at the external borders of the Member States with Russia and Belarus remains of concern due to persistent hybrid threats; whereas EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) agencies have a key role to play, in cooperation with national authorities, in establishing and maintaining common situational awareness of risks related to such threats and in assisting frontline Member States in crisis situations; whereas the Commission has included the strengthening of Frontex in its flagship initiatives for the 2024-2029 legislative terms, as well as a revision of the mandates of Europol and Eurojust; whereas other initiatives such as the “Eastern Flank Watch” may contribute to strengthening the protection of the external borders and enhancing resilience against hybrid threats;

Or. en

Amendment 53

Marta Wcisło

Motion for a resolution

Recital D b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Db. whereas hostile actors systematically exploit historical grievances, identity-based tensions and societal divisions in order to weaken social cohesion, undermine democratic resilience and erode support for European security and defence policies;

Or. en

Amendment 54

Merja Kyllönen

Motion for a resolution

Recital D b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Db. whereas attacks on dual-use infrastructure can potentially have major impacts on crucial civilian energy, transport and communications infrastructure;

Or. en

Amendment 55

Marta Wcisło

Motion for a resolution

Recital D c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Dc. whereas foreign adversaries seek to amplify extremist, anti-democratic and anti-European narratives through support for political actors, media ecosystems and influence networks that contribute to societal polarisation and weaken democratic institutions;

Or. en

Amendment 56

Marta Wcisło

Motion for a resolution

Recital D d (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Dd. whereas hostile information operations increasingly seek to cultivate war fatigue, defence-spending fatigue and declining support for assistance to Ukraine in order to weaken Europe’s long-term deterrence posture and strategic resolve;

Or. en

Amendment 57

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks

Motion for a resolution

Recital E

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
E. whereas EU Member States have so far failed to develop a coordinated and coherent response to hybrid attacks;	E. whereas EU Member States have so far failed to develop a coordinated and coherent response to hybrid attacks; whereas the development of effective EU countermeasures against hybrid threats requires a clear understanding of the differences between the European Union’s understanding of the hybrid attacks directed against it and the manner in which the Russian Federation perceives and operationalises hybridity, including the scope, objectives and methods of its hybrid activities; whereas Russian hybrid activities are frequently designed to generate cumulative and long-term strategic effects, including the erosion of trust in democratic institutions and political class, the weakening of societal resilience and the gradual expansion of influence within target societies; whereas the EU, by contrast, primarily understands hybridity in terms of multidimensional responses across policy domains; whereas acknowledging this asymmetry is essential for designing countermeasures that address not only the immediate manifestations and effects of hybrid threats but also the underlying mechanisms of penetration and influence through which they are enabled; whereas an effective EU approach should therefore complement multimodal responses with long-term strategies aimed at strengthening societal resilience, protecting institutional integrity and preventing sustained foreign influence and penetration;

Or. en

Amendment 58

Nathalie Loiseau, Helmut Brandstätter

Motion for a resolution

Recital E

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
E. whereas EU Member States have so far failed to develop a coordinated and coherent response to hybrid attacks;	E. whereas EU’s response to hybrid attacks suffers from persisting legislative gaps, lack of harmonised approach at Member States’ level, varying degrees of awareness, and absence of adapted structure or entity tasked with monitoring these attacks; whereas, as a consequence, Member States have so far failed to develop a coordinated and coherent response to hybrid attacks;

Or. en

Amendment 59

Christophe Bay, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, György Hölvényi, Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Recital E

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
E. whereas EU Member States have so far failed to develop a coordinated and coherent response to hybrid attacks;	E. whereas EU Member States have so far failed to develop a coordinated and coherent response to hybrid attacks; whereas any joint response must fully respect national competences in the areas of security, intelligence, defence and public order;

Or. fr

Amendment 60

Alexandr Vondra

Motion for a resolution

Recital E

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
E. whereas EU Member States have so far failed to develop a coordinated and coherent response to hybrid attacks;	E. whereas EU Member States have so far failed to develop a sufficiently coordinated and coherent response to hybrid attacks; whereas responsibility for national security remains primarily with the Member States and effective coordination must fully respect national competences;

Or. en

Amendment 61

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Recital E

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
E. whereas EU Member States have so far failed to develop a coordinated and coherent response to hybrid attacks;	E. whereas EU Member States have yet to develop a fully coordinated and coherent response to hybrid warfare, both individually and at European level;

Or. en

Amendment 62

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Recital E

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
E. whereas EU Member States have so far failed to develop a coordinated and coherent response to hybrid attacks;	E. whereas over the past years the EU and Member States have developed tools and mechanisms to counter new and evolving hybrid threats, and further efforts are required to develop a fully coordinated and coherent response to hybrid operations;

Or. en

Amendment 63

Michał Dworczyk, Cristian Terheş

Motion for a resolution

Recital E

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
E. whereas EU Member States have so far failed to develop a coordinated and coherent response to hybrid attacks;	E. whereas, despite significant efforts undertaken by several Member States, particularly those on the EU’s eastern flank, EU Member States have not yet developed a sufficiently coordinated and coherent response to hybrid attacks;

Or. en

Amendment 64

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Recital E a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Ea. whereas the EU and its Member States cannot tackle the threats and challenges of the present and the future with the tools and capabilities of the past;

Or. en

Amendment 65

Nicolás Pascual de la Parte

Motion for a resolution

Recital F

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
F. whereas sabotage activities are increasingly being carried out using intermediaries, proxies and ‘disposable agents’, thereby complicating attribution and response;	F. whereas sabotage activities are increasingly being carried out using intermediaries, proxies and ‘disposable agents’, thereby complicating attribution and response; whereas such activities may also target vulnerable points in industrial supply chains, private operators and smaller technology providers;

Or. en

Amendment 66

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Recital F

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
F. whereas sabotage activities are increasingly being carried out using intermediaries, proxies and ‘disposable agents’, thereby complicating attribution and response;	F. whereas sabotage activities by Russian intelligence are increasingly being carried out using intermediaries, vulnerable society groups, including underaged persons, proxies and ‘disposable agents’, thereby complicating attribution and response;

Or. en

Amendment 67

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Recital F a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Fa. whereas the emergence of advanced AI systems constitutes a structural disruption to existing cybersecurity architectures, invalidating threat models and defensive assumptions developed over the preceding decades; whereas hostile state and non-state actors are already exploiting AI capabilities to enhance the speed, scale, and precision of hybrid operations, including cyber intrusions, disinformation campaigns, and critical infrastructure targeting; whereas the EU's collective cyber resilience frameworks must be adapted to address the new vulnerabilities;

Or. en

Amendment 68

Merja Kyllönen

Motion for a resolution

Recital F a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Fa. whereas remote regions at the external borders as well as the Union’s maritime areas are particularly susceptible to hybrid attacks, creating challenges for identification and early warning and response;

Or. en

Amendment 69

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Michał Dworczyk

Motion for a resolution

Recital F b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Fb. whereas as part of its broader hybrid warfare strategy, Russia has sought to expand its influence through the strategic deployment of religious, cultural, and value-based narratives aimed at shaping public discourse, influencing ecclesiastical dynamics, and complicating Euro-Atlantic integration; whereas such activities are consistent with the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation, approved by President Vladimir Putin on 31 December 2015 and building upon the Military Doctrine of 25 December 2014, which emphasises the protection of so-called “traditional Russian spiritual and moral values” against perceived Western influence and demonstrates the use of cultural and civilisational narratives as instruments of geopolitical strategy 1a; whereas this approach was further consolidated in the 2021 National Security Strategy, which elevated the safeguarding of “traditional values”, the promotion of the “Russian World” and the protection of compatriots abroad to core state priorities framed as matters of national security and civilisational sovereignty1b;
	_________________
	1a 1a https://www.csis.org/analysis/unpacking-russias-new-national-security-strategy.
	1b 1b https://www.ndc.nato.int/fr/russias-updated-national-security-strategy/.

Or. en

Amendment 70

Villy Søvndal

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Recital G

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
G. whereas significant increases in Member States’ defence spending, in combination with the EU’s defence initiatives, are beginning to address long-standing capability shortfalls, but a faster translation into concrete operational capabilities is needed to better protect the EU and its citizens against hybrid attacks;	G. whereas significant increases in Member States’ defence spending, in combination with the EU’s defence initiatives, are beginning to address long-standing capability shortfalls, but suffer from a lack of economies of scale and focus, highlighting the need for more efficiency and the streamlining of military expenses; whereas very little national defence spending is coordinated or even pooled with other Member States or invested in European collaborative projects; whereas a faster translation into concrete operational capabilities is needed to better protect the EU and its citizens against hybrid attacks;

Or. en

Amendment 71

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Recital G

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
G. whereas significant increases in Member States’ defence spending, in combination with the EU’s defence initiatives, are beginning to address long-standing capability shortfalls, but a faster translation into concrete operational capabilities is needed to better protect the EU and its citizens against hybrid attacks;	G. whereas significant increases in Member States’defence spending, in combination with the EU’s defence initiatives such as SAFE and other measures under the Defence Readiness 2030 framework, are beginning to address long-standing capability shortfalls, but a faster translation into concrete operational capabilities is needed to better protect the EU and its citizens; whereas in this area further potential remains for dual use technologies; whereas further response is equally required in the area of internal security;

Or. en

Amendment 72

Michał Dworczyk, Cristian Terheş

Motion for a resolution

Recital G

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
G. whereas significant increases in Member States’ defence spending, in combination with the EU’s defence initiatives, are beginning to address long-standing capability shortfalls, but a faster translation into concrete operational capabilities is needed to better protect the EU and its citizens against hybrid attacks;	G. whereas significant increases in Member States’ defence spending, in combination with the EU’s initiatives aimed at strengthening the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) and continued efforts within NATO, are beginning to address long-standing capability shortfalls, but a faster translation into concrete operational capabilities is needed to better protect the EU, Member States and their citizens against hybrid attacks;

Or. en

Amendment 73

Jorge Buxadé Villalba, György Hölvényi

Motion for a resolution

Recital G

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
G. whereas significant increases in Member States’ defence spending, in combination with the EU’s defence initiatives, are beginning to address long-standing capability shortfalls, but a faster translation into concrete operational capabilities is needed to better protect the EU and its citizens against hybrid attacks;	G. whereas significant increases in Member States’ defence spending, in combination with the EU’s defence initiatives, are beginning to address long-standing capability shortfalls, but a faster translation into concrete operational capabilities is needed to better protect the EU and its citizens against hybrid attacks, for which Member States must identify their needs and national security and defence threats;

Or. es

Amendment 74

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Recital G

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
G. whereas significant increases in Member States’ defence spending, in combination with the EU’s defence initiatives, are beginning to address long-standing capability shortfalls, but a faster translation into concrete operational capabilities is needed to better protect the EU and its citizens against hybrid attacks;	G. whereas significant increases in Member States’ defence spending, in combination with the EU’s defence initiatives, are beginning to address long-standing capability shortfalls, but a faster translation into concrete operational capabilities is needed to better protect the EU and its citizens against hybrid operations;

Or. en

Amendment 75

Christophe Bay, Pierre-Romain Thionnet

Motion for a resolution

Recital G a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Ga. whereas the Member States’ land, maritime, air, digital and information borders are vulnerable to various forms of hybrid action, including disinformation, sabotage, cyber-attacks, the exploitation of migration flows, drone intrusions, economic pressure and interference in democratic processes;

Or. fr

Amendment 76

Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez

Motion for a resolution

Recital G a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Ga. Whereas Russia continues to exploit Mediterranean maritime routes for the transportation of military equipment and strategic enablers; whereas the sinking of a Russian vessel off the coast of Cartagena (Spain) in December 2024, reportedly heading to North Korea with nuclear-related material for submarines, highlights the security risks associated with such activities;

Or. en

Amendment 77

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Recital G a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Ga. whereas the EU’s dependence on foreign actors and foreign-made technologies in critical infrastructure and supply chains, including the sourcing of raw materials from third countries, is one of the EU’s most significant vulnerabilities and a key challenge for European security and strategic autonomy;

Or. en

Amendment 78

Nicolás Pascual de la Parte

Motion for a resolution

Recital G a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Ga. whereas SMEs, mid-caps, start-ups and scale-ups play an increasingly important role in Europe’s defence innovation ecosystem, particularly in dual-use technologies, cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, drones, counter-drone systems, secure communications and critical infrastructure protection;

Or. en

Amendment 79

Elena Donazzan, Alberico Gambino, Cristian Terheş

Motion for a resolution

Recital G a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Ga. whereas the Mediterranean is increasingly exposed to a wide range of hybrid security threats, including those affecting maritime security and the resilience of critical maritime and undersea infrastructure;

Or. it

Amendment 80

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Recital G a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Ga. whereas any measures and initiatives coordinated or proposed at the EU level must be framed and implemented in full respect of Member States’ exclusive competences and aligned with the EU Hybrid, FIMI and Cyber Diplomacy Toolboxes;

Or. en

Amendment 81

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Michał Dworczyk

Motion for a resolution

Recital G b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Gb. whereas the evolving nature, scale and speed of hybrid threats require the European Union and its Member States to undertake urgent and comprehensive adjustments at strategic, operational and tactical levels in order to effectively deter, detect and respond to such activities; whereas the window of opportunity to strengthen resilience and establish effective countermeasures is narrowing due to the increasing sophistication, integration and tempo of hybrid operations conducted by hostile state and non-state actors and penetration of political decision-makers; whereas not only is the window of opportunity to strengthen resilience and establish effective countermeasures against hybrid threats closing rapidly, but the EU Member States are also already acting with significant delay, having begun to systematically adapt their doctrines and policy frameworks to explicitly include hybrid warfare only in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea; whereas this late institutional recognition underscores that hybrid methods of influence, subversion and coercion had been employed long before these events; whereas timely and accelerated action is therefore essential to ensure that the Union remains capable of anticipating, attributing and responding decisively to hybrid attacks while safeguarding its democratic institutions, critical infrastructure and societal cohesion;

Or. en

Amendment 82

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Recital G b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Gb. whereas the current security environment confronting the Union is neither peace nor open armed conflict, but a zero stage warfare in which adversaries deploy hybrid instruments to exploit the gap between the Union's peacetime governance structures and the decisiveness required to deter and respond; whereas existing EU foreign and security policy frameworks, calibrated for consensus-based deliberation, generate structural latency that adversaries actively exploit; whereas this in-between condition demands a fundamental reassessment of EU decision-making architecture in the security and defence domain;

Or. en

Amendment 83

Nicolás Pascual de la Parte

Motion for a resolution

Recital G b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Gb. whereas strengthening the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) requires the better integration of SMEs and innovative companies into European defence value chains, while ensuring access to finance, procurement opportunities and cross-border industrial cooperation;

Or. en

Amendment 84

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Recital G b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Gb. whereas hybrid threats encompass the kinetic, information, cognitive, cyber, technological, economic, and societal dimensions of strategic confrontation;

Or. en

Amendment 85

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Recital G c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Gc. Whereas the credibility of deterrence rests not only on the material capabilities and technological edge of the European and allied forces, but decisively on political will, strategic cohesion, and a common understanding of the threat; whereas Russia's hybrid strategy is calibrated to erode precisely these qualities — through ambiguity, division, and sub-threshold pressure — in order to degrade the credibility of collective defence commitments before any kinetic threshold is reached; whereas a resolute and cohesive coalition of smaller scale will deter more effectively than a larger but divided one;

Or. en

Amendment 86

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Recital G c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Gc. whereas experts have identified a recurring sequence in malicious hybrid operations, whereby a kinetic trigger — such as drone sightings — creates confusion, hostile actors immediately seed narratives in digital spaces, and these narratives are then amplified and translated through proxy networks, reframing and normalising the kinetic incident as institutional incompetence or overreaction, thereby saturating the information space before the facts are officially established by public authorities;

Or. en

Amendment 87

Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Rasa Juknevičienė

Motion for a resolution

Recital G c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Gc. whereas excessive dependencies on third countries in critical technologies, including semiconductors, cloud services, artificial intelligence, advanced telecommunications and critical raw materials, may create vulnerabilities that can be exploited through hybrid operations;

Or. en

Amendment 88

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Recital G d (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Gd. whereas FIMI and cognitive operations exploit open societies, fragmented information spaces and platform business models to erode trust, polarise societies, delegitimise elected governments and manipulate democratic debate, and the FIMI attacks are increasingly adapted to local political contexts, languages and cultures;

Or. en

Amendment 89

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Recital G e (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Ge. whereas the cognitive domain should not be understood merely as a communication or FIMI layer surrounding a physical, cyber or geopolitical incident, but as a transversal operational field with its own infrastructure; whereas cognitive indicators need therefore be fully integrated into the common operational picture used by cyber, intelligence, law enforcement, military and critical infrastructure structures;

Or. en

Amendment 90

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Recital G f (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Gf. whereas it is now impossible to carry out a successful military operation without controlling cyberspace – a domain that cuts across all others – and the effectiveness of any public institution in this sphere depends on its use of cyberspace, its digital resources and its information systems;

Or. en

Amendment 91

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Recital G g (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Gg. whereas European digital sovereignty is not only an economic or industrial objective, but a democratic and security imperative, as Europe’s ability to protect its values, citizens, data, public services and democratic processes against external hybrid threats depends on maintaining strategic control, choice and democratic oversight over its digital infrastructure;

Or. en

Amendment 92

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Recital G h (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Gh. whereas national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State, but hybrid threats directly affect areas - including internal security and critical infrastructure protection, cybersecurity, external action and crisis coordination - where the Union has clear responsibilities and added value as part of a ‘European security layer’ that supports, connects and strengthens national capabilities;

Or. en

Amendment 93

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Subheading 1

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
Hybrid warfare:between war and peace	Hybrid threats: between war and peace

Or. en

Amendment 94

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Michał Dworczyk

Motion for a resolution

Subheading 1

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
Hybrid warfare:between war and peace	Hybrid Warfare - the End of Peace

Or. en

Amendment 95

Vasile Dîncu

Motion for a resolution

Subheading 1

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
Hybrid warfare:between war and peace	Hybrid warfare: war and peace

Or. en

Amendment 96

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks

Motion for a resolution

Subheading 1 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Calls on the Union and the Member States to recognise that hybrid warfare constitutes a form of warfare and hostile action against a Member State regardless of whether conventional force is employed directly; underlines that the onset of hybrid activities marks the definitive end of peace and that the traditional distinction between conventional and hybrid warfare must not obscure a critical strategic reality: cyberattacks, infrastructure sabotage, foreign information manipulation, economic coercion, and other coordinated hostile measures are deliberate instruments of a broader, unified conflict specifically designed to undermine sovereignty, democratic institutions, national security, and societal resilience; emphasises that the increasing use of hybrid methods seeks to exploit legal and political ambiguities in order to remain below traditional thresholds for collective response; considers, therefore, that the Union should develop a doctrine based on the nature, scale, effects, and attribution of hostile acts rather than on artificial categorisations of warfare;

Or. en

Amendment 97

Engin Eroglu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 1

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
1. Affirms that hybrid operations are continuous, coordinated attacks carried out by state and non-state actors across multiple domains; stresses that they are designed to resemble isolated incidents in order to stay below the threshold of armed conflict, while producing effects comparable to those of conventional aggression;	1. Affirms that hybrid operations are continuous, coordinated attacks carried out by state and non-state actors across multiple domains, including through political, economic, cyber-related, information-related, intelligence and military means; stresses that they are designed to resemble isolated incidents in order to stay below the threshold of armed conflict, using targeted ambiguity, limited attribution and operational concealment to make an effective response more difficult, while producing effects comparable to those of conventional aggression; recalls that hybrid operations are increasingly carried out by middlemen, proxies and so-called ‘disposable agents’;

Or. de

Amendment 98

Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 1

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
1. Affirms that hybrid operations are continuous, coordinated attacks carried out by state and non-state actors across multiple domains; stresses that they are designed to resemble isolated incidents in order to stay below the threshold of armed conflict, while producing effects comparable to those of conventional aggression;	1. Affirms that hybrid operations are continuous, coordinated attacks, including but not limited to the instrumentalisation of migration flows, economic coercion, information manipulation campaigns promoted by hostile foreign actors, cyberattacks, sabotage and actions targeting critical infrastructure, carried out by state and non-state actors across multiple domains; stresses that they are designed to resemble isolated incidents in order to stay below the threshold of armed conflict, while producing effects comparable to those of conventional aggression;

Or. es

Amendment 99

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 1

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
1. Affirms that hybrid operations are continuous, coordinated attacks carried out by state and non-state actors across multiple domains; stresses that they are designed to resemble isolated incidents in order to stay below the threshold of armed conflict, while producing effects comparable to those of conventional aggression;	1. Affirms that intelligence led hybrid operations are deliberate, coordinated acts carried out by states — including through non-state actors, agents and proxies acting on their behalf — spanning simultaneously the infrastructure, cyber and electromagnetic, information and social, political, economic and diplomatic domains; stresses that they are designed to appear as isolated incidents and to remain below the threshold of armed conflict, while producing effects comparable to those of conventional aggression making attribution and response significantly harder;

Or. en

Amendment 100

Villy Søvndal

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 1

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
1. Affirms that hybrid operations are continuous, coordinated attacks carried out by state and non-state actors across multiple domains; stresses that they are designed to resemble isolated incidents in order to stay below the threshold of armed conflict, while producing effects comparable to those of conventional aggression;	1. Affirms that hybrid operations are continuous, coordinated attacks carried out by state and non-state actors across multiple domains; stresses that they are designed to resemble isolated incidents in order to stay below the threshold of armed conflict, while producing effects comparable to those of conventional aggression; notes that they are designed to operate in the grey zone between peace and war, combining conventional and unconventional methods such as sabotage, espionage and political infiltration to undermine the EU’s stability and resilience;

Or. en

Amendment 101

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 1

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
1. Affirms that hybrid operations are continuous, coordinated attacks carried out by state and non-state actors across multiple domains; stresses that they are designed to resemble isolated incidents in order to stay below the threshold of armed conflict, while producing effects comparable to those of conventional aggression;	1. Affirms that hybrid operations are deliberate, continuous, combined and coordinated attacks carried out by state and non-state actors across multiple domains aimed at exploiting the systemic vulnerabilities and seams of democratic societies; stresses that they are designed to make it difficult to attribute and to resemble isolated incidents in different domains in order to stay below the threshold of armed conflict, while causing substantial damages and affecting institutions and citizens;

Or. en

Amendment 102

Nathalie Loiseau, Helmut Brandstätter

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 1

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
1. Affirms that hybrid operations are continuous, coordinated attacks carried out by state and non-state actors across multiple domains; stresses that they are designed to resemble isolated incidents in order to stay below the threshold of armed conflict, while producing effects comparable to those of conventional aggression;	1. Stresses that hybrid operations are continuous, coordinated attacks carried out by state and non-state actors across multiple domains; stresses that some are designed to resemble isolated incidents in order to stay below the threshold of armed conflict, while producing effects comparable to those of conventional aggression;

Or. en

Amendment 103

Nathalie Loiseau, Helmut Brandstätter

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 1 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	1a. Affirms that Russia, either directly or via its multiple proxies, is the main source of hybrid operations in the EU; notes that Belarus and to a lesser extent Serbia serve as proxies for Russian hybrid operations both in the EU and in the Western Balkans in the latter case; recalls that, in addition to Russia, China, Iran and North Korea all pose critical challenges to the EU; is extremely concerned by the US Administration attitude towards Europe, in particular as described by the National Security Strategy; considers that the US Administration action towards Greenland, an OCT of Denmark, are unacceptable and a blatant and direct threat to the EU’s territorial integrity; condemns further the US Administration open willingness to interfere in European affairs aiming at weakening its legislative integrity on digital issues as well as any attempts at establishing European preference in matter of defence;

Or. en

Amendment 104

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Michał Dworczyk

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 1 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	1a. Recalls that the invocation of NATO Article 5 following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 demonstrated that collective defence can be triggered not only by the actions of a state actor but also by attacks involving non-state actors and complex networks operating across national borders; stresses that this precedent highlights the evolving nature of security threats and the need to adapt collective response mechanisms accordingly; underlines that effective deterrence against hybrid threats requires improved common standards and procedures for attribution, enabling the timely identification of both state and non-state actors responsible for hostile activities and ensuring that ambiguity cannot be exploited to undermine collective security and response efforts;

Or. en

Amendment 105

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 1 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	1a. Calls on the Commission and the Council to assess the adequacy of existing EU legal frameworks for addressing hybrid threats and to bring forward proposals to close identified gaps and enforce civil-military cooperation, recognising that hybrid threats by Russia’s intelligence services deliberately calibrated to remain below the threshold of armed attack cannot be addressed through law enforcement instruments alone and must be treated as collective security matters;

Or. en

Amendment 106

Merja Kyllönen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 1 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	1a. Underlines the importance of preparedness to threats posed by operations targeting computer systems, jamming GPS-systems, affecting border secyrity, damaging energy and data cables, or disrupting the functioning port and logistical facilities;

Or. en

Amendment 107

Marta Wcisło

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 1 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	1a. Considers non-linear warfare as the coordinated use of military and non-military means across multiple domains with the objective of achieving strategic effects while remaining below the threshold of conventional armed conflict;

Or. en

Amendment 108

Merja Kyllönen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 1 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	1b. Recognises that EU Member States bordering Russia face persistent hybrid threats targeting territorial integrity, societal resilience, border security, democratic institutions and critical infrastructure, requiring enhanced EU-NATO coordination and permanent preparedness;

Or. en

Amendment 109

Engin Eroglu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
2. Underlines that the primary objective of hybrid warfare is to erode the EU’s defence readiness by disrupting its defence industrial base and critical infrastructure, undermining public and political support for EU defence, and installing governments favourable to the perpetrators through systematic interference in democratic processes;	2. Underlines that the primary objective of hybrid warfare is to erode the EU’s defence readiness by disrupting its defence industrial base, critical infrastructure as well as energy, data transmission, transport and logistics systems, undermining public and political support for EU defence through systematic interference in democratic processes, in the shaping of public opinion and in public trust in state institutions; further stresses that open democratic societies are particularly vulnerable to disinformation and influence campaigns due to their freedom of information and digital connectivity; calls, therefore, for a more coordinated European approach to strengthen societal and institutional resilience, as well as capabilities for early detection and attribution of hybrid threats;

Or. de

Amendment 110

Vasile Dîncu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
2. Underlines that the primary objective of hybrid warfare is to erode the EU’s defence readiness by disrupting its defence industrial base and critical infrastructure, undermining public and political support for EU defence, and installing governments favourable to the perpetrators through systematic interference in democratic processes;	2. Underlines that the primary objective of hybrid warfare is to erode the EU’s defence readiness by disrupting its defence industrial base and critical infrastructure, undermining public and political support for EU defence, and installing governments favourable to the perpetrators through systematic interference in democratic processes; stresses the urgent need to relaunch and modernize regional defense production capacities, considering the defense industry not just as a security priority, but as an industrial ecosystem generating job opportunities for medium and high qualified workers, demanding advanced research facilities, requiring structural transformation, improved financing, and deepening the integration into the Euro-Atlantic supply chains;

Or. en

Amendment 111

Michał Dworczyk, Cristian Terheş

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
2. Underlines that the primary objective of hybrid warfare is to erode the EU’s defence readiness by disrupting its defence industrial base and critical infrastructure, undermining public and political support for EU defence, and installing governments favourable to the perpetrators through systematic interference in democratic processes;	2. Underlines that the primary objective of hybrid warfare is to harm and destabilise certain Member States because of their strategic posture and policy choices, to erode both their national and collective defence readiness by targeting critical infrastructure, the defence industrial base and other strategic vulnerabilities, to undermine public confidence in democratic institutions and governments, and ultimately to weaken the transatlantic alliance and support for NATO;

Or. en

Amendment 112

Nathalie Loiseau, Helmut Brandstätter

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
2. Underlines that the primary objective of hybrid warfare is to erode the EU’s defence readiness by disrupting its defence industrial base and critical infrastructure, undermining public and political support for EU defence, and installing governments favourable to the perpetrators through systematic interference in democratic processes;	2. Underlines that the primary objective of hybrid warfare is to erode the Member States and the EU’s ability to act, in particular on defence readiness, by disrupting the defence industrial base and critical infrastructure, undermining public and political support for EU defence, falsely depicting defence investments as bellicose, and installing governments favourable to the perpetrators through systematic interference in democratic processes;

Or. en

Amendment 113

Nicolás Pascual de la Parte

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
2. Underlines that the primary objective of hybrid warfare is to erode the EU’s defence readiness by disrupting its defence industrial base and critical infrastructure, undermining public and political support for EU defence, and installing governments favourable to the perpetrators through systematic interference in democratic processes;	2. Underlines that the primary objective of hybrid warfare is to erode the EU’s defence readiness by disrupting its defence industrial base and critical infrastructure, undermining public and political support for EU defence, and installing governments favourable to the perpetrators through systematic interference in democratic processes; by disrupting its defence industrial base and critical infrastructure, undermining its economic security and exploiting strategic technological dependencies, eroding public and political support;

Or. en

Amendment 114

Villy Søvndal

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
2. Underlines that the primary objective of hybrid warfare is to erode the EU’s defence readiness by disrupting its defence industrial base and critical infrastructure, undermining public and political support for EU defence, and installing governments favourable to the perpetrators through systematic interference in democratic processes;	2. Underlines that the primary objective of hybrid warfare is to destabilize, divide, and undermine the EU and its member states; recalls that it further aims to erode the EU’s defence readiness by disrupting its defence industrial base and critical infrastructure, undermining public and political support for EU defence, and strengthening political forces favourable to the perpetrators through systematic interference in democratic processes;

Or. en

Amendment 115

Jorge Buxadé Villalba, György Hölvényi

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
2. Underlines that the primary objective of hybrid warfare is to erode the EU’s defence readiness by disrupting its defence industrial base and critical infrastructure, undermining public and political support for EU defence, and installing governments favourable to the perpetrators through systematic interference in democratic processes;	2. Underlines that the primary objective of hybrid warfare is to erode the Member States’ defence readiness by disrupting its defence industrial base and critical infrastructure, jeopardising public security and public order, undermining public and political support for EU defence, and installing governments favourable to the perpetrators through systematic interference in democratic processes;

Or. es

Amendment 116

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
2. Underlines that the primary objective of hybrid warfare is to erode the EU’s defence readiness by disrupting its defence industrial base and critical infrastructure, undermining public and political support for EU defence, and installing governments favourable to the perpetrators through systematic interference in democratic processes;	2. Underlines that the primary objective of hybrid threats is to undermine the security and stability of the EU, weaken its resolve to respond to external threats and reduce its defence readiness, by exploiting the systemic vulnerabilities of democracies in order to erode trust in public institutions, manipulate decision-making, and systematically interfere in democratic processes;

Or. en

Amendment 117

Michał Dworczyk, Cristian Terheş

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	2a. Stresses that the weaponisation of migration by Russia and Belarus, often intertwined with the activities of criminal networks and migrant smugglers, through the artificial and unlawful facilitation of irregular migration flows towards the EU’s external borders, constitutes one of the most coercive forms of hybrid warfare. Highlights that such practices exploit vulnerable individuals, endanger human lives, undermine fundamental rights and are intended to destabilise Member States, exert political pressure on the Union and weaken its security and resilience;

Or. en

Amendment 118

Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Rasa Juknevičienė

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	2a. Stresses that hybrid warfare increasingly exploits strategic dependencies in critical technologies, energy systems, supply chains, communications networks and raw materials in order to weaken the Union’s resilience, economic security and freedom of action; calls on the Commission and Member States to systematically incorporate dependency reduction schemes into their security and defence planning;

Or. en

Amendment 119

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	2a. Recalls that the conceptual model developed by the Hybrid CoE provides a common analytical framework to visualise and understand how hostile actors combine specific tools across different domains in order to conduct hybrid activities — including interference, influence, operations/campaigns and warfare/war — which may evolve through three phases: priming, destabilisation and coercion;

Or. en

Amendment 120

Petras Auštrevičius

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	2a. Stresses that, since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has remained the most threatening state actor conducting hybrid warfare operations against EU Member States, employing tactics such as sabotaging critical infrastructure, manipulating information, launching cyberattacks, attempting to undermine democracy and the electoral process, and coercing the energy sector;

Or. en

Amendment 121

Marta Wcisło

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	2a. Stresses that hybrid threats should be assessed as coordinated campaigns rather than isolated incidents and calls on the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States to strengthen mechanisms for identifying patterns across different sectors, jurisdictions and threat domains;

Or. en

Amendment 122

Urmas Paet, Lucia Yar, Petras Auštrevičius, Engin Eroglu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	2a. Condemns the deliberate instrumentalisation of migration flows by hostile state actors, Russia and Belarus, as a form of hybrid warfare aimed at destabilising the EU, putting pressure on border regions and undermining public trust in democratic institutions;

Or. en

Amendment 123

Villy Søvndal

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	2a. Stresses that cyberattacks have become a central element of hybrid campaigns, exploiting the increasing digitalisation of critical sectors such as healthcare, finance and energy, causing cascading disruptions with potentially severe economic and societal consequences;

Or. en

Amendment 124

Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Rasa Juknevičienė

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	2b. Underlines that the protection of the Union against hybrid threats requires not only military preparedness but also a resilient industrial and technological base capable of ensuring the continuity of essential production, critical infrastructure and essential services and defence-related supply chains during periods of crisis;

Or. en

Amendment 125

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	2b. Notes with deep concern that state actors -like Russia, China, North Korea and Iran, and their proxies- have developed or are developing hybrid campaigns aimed at targeting European democracies and eroding the Union’s interests abroad;

Or. en

Amendment 126

Villy Søvndal

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	2b. Notes with great concern the drone incursions in several European countries; underlines that the increasing use of drones by state and non-state actors constitutes a growing component of hybrid warfare;

Or. en

Amendment 127

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2 c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	2c. Notes with deep concern that non-state actors — including terrorist groups, organised crime networks, oligarchic and kleptocratic networks, private military companies, extremist movements and influence-for-hire operators — may also conduct or enable hybrid campaigns against European democracies, driven by ideological, political, economic, criminal or proxy-related motivations;

Or. en

Amendment 128

Nicolás Pascual de la Parte

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2 c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	2c. Recognises the growing role of dual-use technologies in countering hybrid threats and stresses the importance of strengthening Europe's innovation ecosystem, including SMEs, start-ups and scale-ups developing capabilities relevant to both civilian and defence applications;

Or. en

Amendment 129

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2 d (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	2d. Notes that attribution is particularly difficult in the context of hybrid threats, as hostile actors deliberately design their activities to appear fragmented, covert or plausibly deniable, often using proxies and actions below response thresholds; underlines that public attribution requires a combination of technical evidence, intelligence assessments and political decision-making, and is essential to enable coordinated responses and ensure accountability for perpetrators;

Or. en

Amendment 130

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2 e (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	2e. Stresses that as of now, Russia poses the gravest threat to peace and democratic governance in Europe and its neighbourhood and condemns the Russian Federation and its proxies for their persistent, coordinated, and long-standing hybrid campaigns aimed at threatening and undermining the security, resilience and democratic foundations of the EU, its Member States and its partners, as well as undermining support to Ukraine and its ability to defend itself; observes with concern that Russian hybrid operations are coordinated across political, economic, cultural, religious and informational spheres to weaken democratic institutions; deepen social and political divisions, and amplify radical forces that undermine the legitimacy of the EU, pro-EU governments and Europe’s reputation abroad; welcomes that the Union has developed a strategic approach to counter the Russian Federation’s hybrid threats and campaigns (EU RESTRICTED) around four main pillars - situational awareness, deterrence by denial (resilience), deterrence by cost imposition and partnership;

Or. en

Amendment 131

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2 f (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	2f. Notes that China and state-linked actors use hybrid tools, including investment in critical infrastructure and technologies, information operations, pressure on diaspora communities and the exploitation of strategic dependencies, with the aim of expanding China’s international influence, shaping public perceptions and political decisions, gaining strategic advantage, protecting its geopolitical interests and weakening the response capacity of open democracies;

Or. en

Amendment 132

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Subheading 1 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Physical and kinetic dimension

Or. en

Amendment 133

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2 g (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	2g. Underlines the need for the EU and its Member States to strengthen collective resilience and preparedness against hybrid threats across traditional operational domains, including land, sea, air and space, recognising that hostile actors combine tools across domains to exploit vulnerabilities, create ambiguity and generate cascading effects;

Or. en

Amendment 134

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2 h (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	2h. Alerts that individual kinetic incidents may either trigger or be deliberately engineered to provide cover for immediate, synchronised and orchestrated information and cognitive activity, with hostile actors exploiting the gap before official statements are issued to shape public perception, sow confusion and undermine trust in institutions as part of a single hybrid operation;

Or. en

Amendment 135

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2 i (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	2i. Calls for this information gap to be duly addressed in the EU strategy against hybrid threats, in particular by improving public-private coordination in the information domain, especially in cases involving attacks against critical infrastructure; stresses the need to strengthen the role of public authorities and bodies, including law enforcement, as early and trusted information anchors for the public, and to develop pre-cleared response playbooks enabling faster, coordinated and accurate communication before hostile narratives saturate the information space;

Or. en

Amendment 136

Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius, Urmas Paet, Engin Eroglu, Lucia Yar

Motion for a resolution

Subheading 2

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
Information warfare and cognitive security	Information warfare, cognitive security and cyber threats

Or. en

Amendment 137

Engin Eroglu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 3

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
3. Underlines that information warfare is one of the core elements of hybrid warfare; expresses concern at the growing scale of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), which aims to erode trust, polarise societies and undermine public support for European security and defence, including support for Ukraine; highlights that AI tools – deepfakes, algorithmic amplification and automated account networks – are making such influence operations faster, cheaper and harder to detect;	3. Underlines that information warfare is one of the core elements of hybrid warfare; expresses concern at the growing scale of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), which aims to erode trust in democratic institutions and media, polarise societies and undermine public support for European security and defence, including support for Ukraine; highlights that AI tools – deepfakes, algorithmic amplification, bots and automated account networks – are making such influence operations faster, cheaper and harder to detect, deliberately exploiting emotional reactions, cognitive biases and social polarisation; notes that state-sponsored disinformation campaigns are increasingly combined with cyberattacks and other hybrid measures;

Or. de

Amendment 138

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 3

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
3. Underlines that information warfare is one of the core elements of hybrid warfare; expresses concern at the growing scale of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), which aims to erode trust, polarise societies and undermine public support for European security and defence, including support for Ukraine; highlights that AI tools – deepfakes, algorithmic amplification and automated account networks – are making such influence operations faster, cheaper and harder to detect;	3. Underlines that information warfare is one of the core elements of hybrid warfare; expresses concern at the growing scale of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), which aims to erode societal trust, increase polarisation and undermine public support for European security and defence, including support for Ukraine; highlights that AI tools – deepfakes, algorithmic amplification and automated account networks – are making such influence operations faster, cheaper and harder to detect, enabling strategic effects before detection or response;

Or. en

Amendment 139

Villy Søvndal

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 3

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
3. Underlines that information warfare is one of the core elements of hybrid warfare; expresses concern at the growing scale of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), which aims to erode trust, polarise societies and undermine public support for European security and defence, including support for Ukraine; highlights that AI tools – deepfakes, algorithmic amplification and automated account networks – are making such influence operations faster, cheaper and harder to detect;	3. Underlines that information warfare is one of the core elements of hybrid warfare; expresses concern at the growing scale of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), which aims to erode trust in democratic institutions, polarise societies and undermine public support for European security and defence, including support for Ukraine; highlights that AI tools – deepfakes, algorithmic amplification and automated account networks – are making such influence operations faster, cheaper and harder to detect;

Or. en

Amendment 140

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 3

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
3. Underlines that information warfare is one of the core elements of hybrid warfare; expresses concern at the growing scale of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), which aims to erode trust, polarise societies and undermine public support for European security and defence, including support for Ukraine; highlights that AI tools – deepfakes, algorithmic amplification and automated account networks – are making such influence operations faster, cheaper and harder to detect;	3. Underlines that information warfare is one of the core elements of hybrid threats in a world where it is increasingly easy to weaponise information; expresses concern at the growing scale of cognitive warfare together with foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), which aims to erode trust, polarise societies, delegitimise elected governments and undermine democratic decision-making, as well as public support for European security and defence, including support for Ukraine;

Or. en

Amendment 141

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Michał Dworczyk

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 3 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	3a. Underlines that FIMI must be understood as a coordinated and intentional activity conducted by foreign state or state-linked actors, or by proxies acting on their behalf, aimed at influencing political processes, public opinion and societal dynamics in another state, which extends far beyond the dissemination of false or misleading information in conventional or digital media; highlights that FIMI encompasses covert, deceptive and manipulative practices designed to distort democratic debate, undermine trust in institutions, create divisions and polarise societies and weaken social cohesion; points out that FIMI operates across multiple domains of social life and uses strategic cognitive-psychological methods designed to shape decision-making processes, individual and collective perception, identity formation, cultural norms, historical memory, moral frameworks and religious belief systems, while exploiting technological infrastructures, media ecosystems and economic or political vulnerabilities; outlines, therefore, that FIMI constitutes a hybrid threat to democratic governance, national security and the integrity of the information environment, requiring a comprehensive, whole-of-society and whole-of-government response;

Or. en

Amendment 142

Petras Auštrevičius

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 3 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	3a. Expresses concern over continuous reports of foreign interference in European elections through cyber-attacks and AI-enabled disinformation targeting not only political campaigns but also critical public infrastructure in the period leading up to elections; stresses that, according to the EEAS 4th Annual Report on FIMI Threats, Russia targeted elections in Germany, Poland, Romania, Moldova and the Czech Republic in 2025, with Estonia, Latvia, Sweden and Denmark potentially facing similar interference patterns ahead of their upcoming elections;

Or. en

Amendment 143

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 3 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	3a. Highlights that AI tools — including deepfakes, algorithmic amplification and automated account networks — are making influence operations faster, cheaper and harder to detect; considers that the EU response to AI-enabled FIMI should recognise AI both as a threat vector and as a critical defensive capability, by investing in AI-powered detection systems able to match the speed and scale of adversarial deployment, and by strengthening public-private cooperation in the research, testing and deployment of such tools;

Or. en

Amendment 144

Christophe Bay, Pierre-Romain Thionnet

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 3 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	3a. Stresses that certain third countries, notably Russia and Belarus, are exploiting migration flows as part of hybrid strategies designed to exert political pressure and destabilise the European Union; calls for the Union’s capacities for prevention and detection of, and response to, these forms of hybrid coercion to be strengthened;

Or. fr

Amendment 145

Vasile Dîncu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 3 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	3a. Defines cognitive security as the capacity of democratic societies to preserve autonomous judgement, informed public deliberation and trust in democratic institutions against coordinated manipulation, coercive persuasion and hostile information operations;

Or. en

Amendment 146

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Michał Dworczyk

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 3 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	3b. Recognises that “reflexive control”, a concept originating in Soviet military theory and defined as the deliberate shaping of an adversary’s decision-making environment through the transmission of carefully calibrated information, seeks to induce the target to adopt choices that advance the influencing actor’s strategic objectives; notes with concern that the Russian Federation has incorporated such techniques into its broader hybrid influence operations targeting democratic institutions, electoral processes and policy formation; stresses that these practices, which extend beyond conventional disinformation, exploit cognitive biases, institutional vulnerabilities and cultural narratives in order to distort perception, encourage miscalculation and influence outcomes without the use of overt coercion, thereby undermining rational decision-making and democratic governance;

Or. en

Amendment 147

Christophe Bay, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 3 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	3b. Underscores that certain third countries and hostile actors may exploit vulnerabilities linked to migration flows from Africa or the Middle East as a means of exerting political, economic or security pressure on Member States; points out that the weaponisation of migration flows is now recognised as a means of waging hybrid warfare;

Or. fr

Amendment 148

Vasile Dîncu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 3 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	3b. Highlights that the EU's enlargement policy is heavily challenged and finally endangered by coordinated disinformation campaigns; calls for dedicated strategic communication mechanisms explicitly tailored to the geopolitical challenges targeting the Western Balkans and Eastern Flank partners;

Or. en

Amendment 149

Petras Auštrevičius

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 3 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	3b. Regrets the declining cooperation between the United States and the EU on intelligence and threat information sharing;

Or. en

Amendment 150

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Michał Dworczyk

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 3 c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	3c. Underlines that the method of "reflexive control" operates by systematically introducing tailored informational inputs into a target’s decision-making cycle in order to subtly shape perceptions, narrow perceived options and influence choices over time in ways that are difficult to detect, attribute or counter through conventional FIMI responses; notes that such techniques have been observed in hybrid and cognitive influence operations targeting European decision-makers and public opinion; stresses that these frameworks can distort policy debates, embed self-reinforcing narratives within EU institutions and Member States, and ultimately contribute to policy outcomes that inadvertently advance external strategic interests rather than the Union’s own security objectives; stresses that the development and sustained resourcing of a comprehensive EU FIMI toolkit, capable of systematically identifying infringements, documenting responses and evaluating their effectiveness, must explicitly integrate reflexive control detection and countermeasures into its operational architecture, in order to safeguard the integrity of EU decision-making and enhance policy resilience against sophisticated cognitive influence operations;

Or. en

Amendment 151

Christophe Bay, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, György Hölvényi, Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 3 c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	3c. Reiterates that terrorist organisations and extremist networks continue to pose a persistent threat to European security and emphasises that these threats may be exploited indirectly by rival powers as part of hybrid strategies aimed at undermining social cohesion, exacerbating internal tensions or overstretching national security capacities;

Or. fr

Amendment 152

Christophe Bay, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, György Hölvényi, Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 3 d (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	3d. Calls on the Commission and the Council to place the Muslim Brotherhood on the European Union’s list of terrorist organisations, in light of concerns regarding certain activities, affiliated networks and funding mechanisms that may contribute to the spread of extremist ideologies, and calls for an in-depth assessment of the security implications for the Union and its Member States;

Or. fr

Amendment 153

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Michał Dworczyk

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 3 d (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	3d. Stresses the importance of improving the understanding of individual susceptibility and resilience to information manipulation, including the interplay between endogenous factors (such as cognitive biases, attention mechanisms and emotional responses) and exogenous factors (such as coordinated disinformation, algorithmic amplification and targeted influence operations);

Or. en

Amendment 154

Nathalie Loiseau, Helmut Brandstätter

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 4

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
4. Notes that the EU’s response to FIMI remains largely reactive and insufficiently operational, due to the lack of permanent real-time monitoring, attribution and response capabilities; insists that FIMI must be treated as a serious security threat requiring an operational approach, including early detection, predefined response options and stronger protection of democratic processes;	4. Notes that the EU’s response to FIMI remains largely reactive and insufficiently operational, due to the lack of permanent real-time monitoring, attribution and response capabilities; insists that FIMI must be treated as a serious security threat requiring an operational approach, including early detection, predefined response options and stronger protection of democratic processes; invites the Commission and the Member States to assess and build on the recommendations of the EUDS Special Committee; notes that the EU’s Rapid Alert System needs to be able to address information manipulation in real time and should have operational responsibility;

Or. en

Amendment 155

Vasile Dîncu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 4

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
4. Notes that the EU’s response to FIMI remains largely reactive and insufficiently operational, due to the lack of permanent real-time monitoring, attribution and response capabilities; insists that FIMI must be treated as a serious security threat requiring an operational approach, including early detection, predefined response options and stronger protection of democratic processes;	4. Notes that the EU’s response to FIMI remains largely reactive and insufficiently operational, due to the lack of permanent real-time monitoring, attribution and response capabilities; insists that FIMI must be treated as a serious security threat requiring an operational approach, including early detection, predefined response options and stronger protection of democratic processes; insists that all measures to counter foreign information manipulation must fully respect the fundamental rights, media freedom and pluralism, and avoid undue restrictions on civil liberties;

Or. en

Amendment 156

Christophe Bay, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 4

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
4. Notes that the EU’s response to FIMI remains largely reactive and insufficiently operational, due to the lack of permanent real-time monitoring, attribution and response capabilities; insists that FIMI must be treated as a serious security threat requiring an operational approach, including early detection, predefined response options and stronger protection of democratic processes;	4. Notes that the EU’s response to FIMI remains largely reactive and insufficiently operational, due to the lack of permanent real-time monitoring, attribution and response capabilities; insists that FIMI must be treated as a serious security threat requiring an operational approach, including early detection, predefined response options and stronger protection of democratic processes; nonetheless stresses that any measure to combat disinformation must be fully transparent and compatible with freedom of expression, press freedom and political pluralism;

Or. fr

Amendment 157

Villy Søvndal

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 4

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
4. Notes that the EU’s response to FIMI remains largely reactive and insufficiently operational, due to the lack of permanent real-time monitoring, attribution and response capabilities; insists that FIMI must be treated as a serious security threat requiring an operational approach, including early detection, predefined response options and stronger protection of democratic processes;	4. Notes that the EU’s response to FIMI remains largely reactive and insufficiently operational, due to the lack of permanent real-time monitoring, attribution and response capabilities; insists that FIMI must be treated as a serious security threat requiring an operational approach, including early detection, predefined response options and stronger protection of democratic processes; calls on member states to a greater extent cooperate and integrate these responses and underlines the need for member states to share best practices with one another;

Or. en

Amendment 158

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 4

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
4. Notes that the EU’s response to FIMI remains largely reactive and insufficiently operational, due to the lack of permanent real-time monitoring, attribution and response capabilities; insists that FIMI must be treated as a serious security threat requiring an operational approach, including early detection, predefined response options and stronger protection of democratic processes;	4. Notes that the EU’s response to FIMI remains largely reactive and insufficiently operational, due to the lack of permanent real-time monitoring, attribution and response capabilities; insists that FIMI must be treated as a serious security threat requiring an operational approach, better coordination at all levels, including early detection, predefined response options and stronger protection of democratic processes, particularly during electoral periods;

Or. en

Amendment 159

Petras Auštrevičius

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 4

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
4. Notes that the EU’s response to FIMI remains largely reactive and insufficiently operational, due to the lack of permanent real-time monitoring, attribution and response capabilities; insists that FIMI must be treated as a serious security threat requiring an operational approach, including early detection, predefined response options and stronger protection of democratic processes;	4. Notes that the EU’s response to FIMI remains largely reactive and insufficiently operational, due to the lack of permanent real-time monitoring, attribution and response capabilities; insists that FIMI must be treated as a serious security threat requiring an operational approach, including early detection, predefined response options and stronger protection of democratic processes; calls for strengthened cooperation with law enforcement authorities, thereby ensuring more robust enforcement of existing digital regulations;

Or. en

Amendment 160

Merja Kyllönen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 4

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
4. Notes that the EU’s response to FIMI remains largely reactive and insufficiently operational, due to the lack of permanent real-time monitoring, attribution and response capabilities; insists that FIMI must be treated as a serious security threat requiring an operational approach, including early detection, predefined response options and stronger protection of democratic processes;	4. Notes that the EU’s response to FIMI remains largely reactive and insufficiently operational, due to the lack of permanent real-time monitoring, attribution and response capabilities; welcomes initiatives of the European Commission, the External Action Service and the European Parliament to combat FIMI in Member States; insists that FIMI must be treated as a serious security threat requiring an operational approach, including early detection, predefined response options and stronger protection of democratic processes;

Or. en

Amendment 161

Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 4

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
4. Notes that the EU’s response to FIMI remains largely reactive and insufficiently operational, due to the lack of permanent real-time monitoring, attribution and response capabilities; insists that FIMI must be treated as a serious security threat requiring an operational approach, including early detection, predefined response options and stronger protection of democratic processes;	4. Notes that the EU’s response to FIMI campaigns remains largely reactive and insufficiently operational; insists that such acts are a serious threat to the security of Member States and may require cooperation in detection, analysis and attribution; points out, however, that any action in this area must fully respect freedom of thought and ideology, freedom of expression, political pluralism, freedom of the press and legitimate debate within the Member States and cannot be used to restrict legitimate political opinions;

Or. es

Amendment 162

Eszter Lakos

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 4

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
4. Notes that the EU’s response to FIMI remains largely reactive and insufficiently operational, due to the lack of permanent real-time monitoring, attribution and response capabilities; insists that FIMI must be treated as a serious security threat requiring an operational approach, including early detection, predefined response options and stronger protection of democratic processes;	4. Notes that the EU’s response to FIMI remains largely reactive and insufficiently operational, due to the lack of permanent real-time monitoring, attribution and response capabilities; insists that FIMI must be treated as a serious security threat requiring an operational approach, including early detection, predefined response options and stronger protection of democratic processes; calls for the full operationalization of the FIMI Toolbox developed by the EEAS;

Or. en

Amendment 163

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 4

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
4. Notes that the EU’s response to FIMI remains largely reactive and insufficiently operational, due to the lack of permanent real-time monitoring, attribution and response capabilities; insists that FIMI must be treated as a serious security threat requiring an operational approach, including early detection, predefined response options and stronger protection of democratic processes;	4. Notes that the EU’s response to FIMI remains largely reactive and insufficiently operational, largely due to the lack of resources to enhance permanent real-time monitoring, enabling faster, collective political attribution and proactive response capabilities; insists that FIMI must be treated as a serious security threat requiring an operational approach, including early detection, adequate response options and stronger protection of democratic processes;

Or. en

Amendment 164

Urmas Paet, Lucia Yar, Petras Auštrevičius, Engin Eroglu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 4 – point a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	(a) Notes with concern the increasing alignment and cooperation among authoritarian regimes, including Russia, China, Iran and North Korea, in supporting or enabling hostile influence activities that undermine European security and democratic resilience; stresses that these actors, while employing different methods, contribute to a common ecosystem of foreign information manipulation and interference, cyber operations, sanctions circumvention and support for Russia’s war efforts; underlines that the EU must adopt a comprehensive approach to hybrid threats that addresses not only Russian and Belarusian activities but also the growing strategic role of China, Iran and North Korea in enabling and amplifying hostile actions against European interests and security;

Or. en

Amendment 165

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 4 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	4a. Condemns the use of online platforms by hostile actors for hybrid activities and encourages the full use of relevant Union instruments to address such activities; calls on online platforms to enhance cooperation with the EU and the Member States, including through the detection and disruption of covert and coordinated operations on their services; stresses, however, that platform action alone cannot ensure legal accountability or deter future operations, particularly as well-resourced state-backed FIMI actors may rapidly reconstitute after removal; calls, therefore, on the Member States to complement platform disruption with law enforcement and judicial action targeting the sources of influence operations; notes the importance of distinguishing between overt influence, which requires transparency, and deceptive behaviours such as identity masking, coordinated inauthentic networks or artificial amplification;

Or. en

Amendment 166

Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius, Urmas Paet, Lucia Yar

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 4 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	4a. Urges EU institutions and Member States to publicly attribute and call out offensive cyber and FIMI incidents directed against the Union and its institutions and bodies; considers that failing to do so constitutes a missed opportunity to inform the broader public about the scale and persistence of the cyber and FIMI threats the EU faces; further believes that the Union should impose costs on such malicious operations, including through the more active use of imposing sectoral tarrifs after intellectual property theft from European companies, and by linking eligibility under EU procurement frameworks to the attribution of offensive cyber operations conducted by foreign powers against the EU, in line with the Implementing Act specifying the pre- qualification and award criteria for NZIA;

Or. en

Amendment 167

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 4 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	4a. Underlines that FIMI extends beyond traditional media into educational, cultural, and religious domains; highlights the strategic use of religious institutions and faith networks, including the instrumentalization of the Russian Orthodox Church by the Kremlin, to project moral authority, disseminate state-sponsored narratives, and gradually undermine societal resilience and democratic cohesion; calls on the EEAS to establish a dedicated task force for faith-based diplomacy and religious literacy, enabling the Union to better understand the role of religion in international affairs, detect and counter influence operations exploiting religious channels, identify emerging hybrid threats, and strengthen the protection of democratic values;

Or. en

Amendment 168

Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Rasa Juknevičienė

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 4 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	4a. Calls for a stronger enforcement of existing Union rules on digital platforms, in particular regarding transparency of recommended systems, political advertising, coordinated inauthentic behaviour and the rapid dissemination of manipulated or AI-generated content linked to hostile foreign interference;

Or. en

Amendment 169

Vasile Dîncu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 4 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	4a. Calls on the Commission, within the framework of the Digital Services Act, to develop mandatory risk-assessment methodologies for algorithmic amplification systems, particularly regarding the amplification of coordinated manipulation campaigns, synthetic media and foreign influence operations;

Or. en

Amendment 170

Marta Wcisło

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 4 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	4a. Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to establish a permanent mechanism for anticipatory strategic communication and public warning capable of identifying and exposing hostile influence operations before they achieve significant societal impact;

Or. en

Amendment 171

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 4 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	4b. Welcomes the work done by the EEAS in monitoring, detecting and responding to FIMI campaigns, as well as in coordinating with international partners in this regard; underlines the relevance of the Rapid Alert System (RAS) in reinforcing coordinated and joint responses to disinformation; stresses that both are valuable examples of how EU institutions can act as facilitators among Member States in areas falling within national competences, where European coordination brings clear added value, particularly in the field of security; calls for EU mechanisms to be further strengthened with a view to react quickly, continue developing a coordination framework, and streamlining the response;

Or. en

Amendment 172

Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Rasa Juknevičienė

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 4 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	4b. Underlines the need to develop European technological capabilities for the detection, analysis and attribution of foreign information manipulation and interference, including AI-enabled tools, secure data-sharing mechanisms and interoperable early-warning systems among Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 173

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 4 c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	4c. Stresses the importance of strengthening public resilience to FIMI, including through measures to foster a well-informed and critically engaged public, improve media literacy and digital skills, support independent media and promote fact-checking initiatives, like the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), in full respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms; calls for stronger cooperation with media and audiovisual actors in detecting, attributing and responding to FIMI campaigns;

Or. en

Amendment 174

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
5. Calls on the Member States to adopt whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches, prioritising resilience and preparedness as emphasised in the Niinistö report; urges the Member States and calls for the EU institutions to invest in democratic resilience;	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 175

Villy Søvndal

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
5. Calls on the Member States to adopt whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches, prioritising resilience and preparedness as emphasised in the Niinistö report; urges the Member States and calls for the EU institutions to invest in democratic resilience;	5. Calls on the Member States to adopt whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches, recognising that contemporary threats increasingly target not only military capabilities but also civilian infrastructure, democratic institutions, economic systems and social cohesion; strongly supports the many good recommendations on resilience and preparedness put forward by the Niinistö report which presents a comprehensive and holistic approach to preparedness and readiness that encompasses all civilian and military aspects; urges the Member States and calls for the EU institutions to invest in democratic resilience by strengthening the integrity, transparency and security of democratic processes and institutions, including electoral systems, political parties, independent media, civil society organisations and public administrations;

Or. en

Amendment 176

Vasile Dîncu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
5. Calls on the Member States to adopt whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches, prioritising resilience and preparedness as emphasised in the Niinistö report; urges the Member States and calls for the EU institutions to invest in democratic resilience;	5. Calls on the Member States to adopt whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches, prioritising resilience and preparedness as emphasised in the Niinistö report; insists that such approaches must ensure the active inclusion of civil society, trade unions, and local communities, ensuring that resilience-building does not disproportionately burden the most vulnerable segments of society; urges the Member States and calls for the EU institutions to invest in democratic resilience by specifically addressing the vulnerabilities of the public institutions and reinforcing local communities on the EU’s external borders against hostile psyops;

Or. en

Amendment 177

Merja Kyllönen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
5. Calls on the Member States to adopt whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches, prioritising resilience and preparedness as emphasised in the Niinistö report; urges the Member States and calls for the EU institutions to invest in democratic resilience;	5. Calls on the Member States to adopt whole-of-government and whole-of-society resilience models, including civil preparedness, reserve systems, public-private cooperation and continuity-of-government mechanisms, prioritising resilience and preparedness as emphasised in the Niinistö report; urges the Member States and calls for the EU institutions to further invest in democratic resilience; underlines the importance of a strong and resilient media landscape; stresses the importance of clear public communication and information sharing from governments in case of extraordinary measures to maintain trust in public institutions;

Or. en

Amendment 178

Engin Eroglu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
5. Calls on the Member States to adopt whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches, prioritising resilience and preparedness as emphasised in the Niinistö report; urges the Member States and calls for the EU institutions to invest in democratic resilience;	5. Calls on the Member States to adopt whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches, prioritising resilience and preparedness as emphasised in the Niinistö report; urges the Member States and calls for the EU institutions to invest in democratic resilience and capabilities to detect and counter disinformation; further stresses that in addition to defensive measures, the EU and its Member States should further develop strategic communication and counter-information capabilities to effectively counter coordinated foreign information manipulation and disinformation campaigns;

Or. de

Amendment 179

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
5. Calls on the Member States to adopt whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches, prioritising resilience and preparedness as emphasised in the Niinistö report; urges the Member States and calls for the EU institutions to invest in democratic resilience;	5. Calls on the Member States to adopt whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches, prioritising resilience and preparedness as emphasised in the Niinistö report; urges the Member States and calls for the EU institutions to invest in democratic resilience through civic education, media literacy and strategic communications, to raise public awareness, clarify legal consequences of hybrid activities, strengthen societal resilience through enhanced capacities to detect, identify and expose FIMI activities and strengthen public support and democratic legitimacy for the Union’s security and defence;

Or. en

Amendment 180

Nathalie Loiseau, Helmut Brandstätter

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
5. Calls on the Member States to adopt whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches, prioritising resilience and preparedness as emphasised in the Niinistö report; urges the Member States and calls for the EU institutions to invest in democratic resilience;	5. Calls on the Member States to adopt whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches, prioritising resilience and preparedness as emphasised in the Niinistö report; urges the Member States and calls for the EU institutions to invest in democratic resilience; welcome in that regards the establishment of the European Centre for Democratic Resilience; notes in particular thar preparedness is key to ensure democratic stability and therefore welcomes the proposal for a Digital Network Act in which the “must carry” principle should be entrenched;

Or. en

Amendment 181

Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Rasa Juknevičienė

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
5. Calls on the Member States to adopt whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches, prioritising resilience and preparedness as emphasised in the Niinistö report; urges the Member States and calls for the EU institutions to invest in democratic resilience;	5. Calls on the Member States to adopt whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches, prioritising resilience and preparedness as emphasised in the Niinistö report; urges the Member States and calls for the EU institutions to invest in democratic resilience; stresses, in this regard, the importance of strengthening democratic resilience and citizens' awareness of foreign information manipulation and interference, in particular among young people, as long-term instruments to reduce the effectiveness of hostile information manipulation;

Or. en

Amendment 182

Eszter Lakos

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
5. Calls on the Member States to adopt whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches, prioritising resilience and preparedness as emphasised in the Niinistö report; urges the Member States and calls for the EU institutions to invest in democratic resilience;	5. Calls on the Member States to adopt whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches, prioritising resilience and preparedness as emphasised in the Niinistö report; urges the Member States and calls for the EU institutions to invest in democratic resilience; welcomes the establishment of the European Centre for Democratic Resilience and calls for a proper definition of its tasks in order to avoid duplication with existing initiatives;

Or. en

Amendment 183

Alexandr Vondra

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
5. Calls on the Member States to adopt whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches, prioritising resilience and preparedness as emphasised in the Niinistö report; urges the Member States and calls for the EU institutions to invest in democratic resilience;	5. Calls on the Member States to adopt whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches, prioritising resilience and preparedness as emphasised in the Niinistö report; urges the Member States and calls for the EU institutions to invest in democratic resilience; Stresses that resilience measures should include the protection of national identity, democratic institutions and freedom of expression;

Or. en

Amendment 184

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	5a. Stresses that European public opinion constitutes a primary target of Russian hybrid operations, and that decades of peace have created conditions of strategic complacency that adversary influence operations are designed to exploit and deepen; considers that governments and EU institutions bear a shared responsibility to build public understanding of the nature and proximity of the hybrid threat, and that the failure to do so creates the political conditions in which deterrence is undermined from within; calls on member states to develop sustained public communication strategies on defence readiness as an integral component of their national resilience frameworks;

Or. en

Amendment 185

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	5a. Underlines the convergence between FIMI and cybersecurity, noting that cyberattacks often occur at the early stages of FIMI campaigns, including for content development, infrastructure set-up and account compromise; stresses that cybersecurity analysis is often essential to enable attribution and expose the technical infrastructure behind information manipulation campaigns; calls, therefore, for counter-FIMI mechanisms to be systematically connected with cybersecurity capabilities in order to detect, attribute and disrupt coordinated manipulation infrastructure at an early stage;

Or. en

Amendment 186

Christophe Bay, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, György Hölvényi, Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	5a. Roundly condemns the cynical use of migrants as a means of exerting political pressure by third countries or organised networks; calls on Member States to step up effective border controls, cooperation between police, intelligence, customs and border guard services, and build up their capacity to detect coordinated operations aimed at provoking migration crises;

Or. fr

Amendment 187

Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	5a. Calls on the Member States to identify and monitor media outlets, online platforms and information networks that are funded or backed by hostile third-country regimes, such as Russia, Iran or Venezuela, and that are used to spread foreign interference and manipulation of information, or narratives aimed at undermining democratic institutions and the social cohesion of the EU;

Or. en

Amendment 188

Jorge Buxadé Villalba, György Hölvényi

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	5a. Is concerned about illegitimate interference with freedom of expression by some governments and the Commission itself, especially on social media, the baseless justification for which is the fight against freedom of expression; this is an unacceptable contradiction;

Or. es

Amendment 189

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	5b. Notes that cyberspace has become established as the fifth military domain and as a central enabler of hybrid threats, allowing hostile actors to operate persistently, ambiguously and below the threshold of armed conflict; underlines that the growing dependence of military platforms, critical infrastructure and command, control, communications and intelligence systems on digital technologies makes cybersecurity essential to freedom of action, operational superiority and resilience across all domains; stresses, therefore, the need for sovereign cyber capabilities for detection, response and intelligence, including offensive capabilities, to neutralise threats and sustain credible deterrence;

Or. en

Amendment 190

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	5b. Calls on the Commission, the High Representative and Member States to make consistent and coordinated use of the FIMI Toolbox and to apply the FIMI Deterrence Playbook, including through coordinated attribution and, where appropriate, the use of restrictive measures, targeting not only individual incidents but the financial flows, technical infrastructure and intermediary and proxy networks that sustain FIMI operations;

Or. en

Amendment 191

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Subheading 2 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Cybersecurity

Or. en

Amendment 192

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5 c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	5c. Notes that the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell within the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC) remains the EU’s central body of an exclusive expertise of all-sources analysis of hybrid threats providing intelligence-based situational awareness; reiterates that SIAC is the single gate for intelligence in the EU and underlines its special status within the EU security architecture; endorses the Hybrid Trend Analysis as a key tool for identifying emerging hybrid threats, detecting patterns and vulnerabilities, and its proper involvement in the policymaking processes; further supports the systematic use of the Hybrid Incident Tracking Mechanism to strengthen coordinated monitoring, assessment and early warning of hybrid incidents affecting the Union and its Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 193

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5 c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	5c. Warns that hybrid cyber activities increasingly blur the boundaries between cybercrime, hacktivism and state-aligned operations, including through low-impact cyberattacks used to generate visibility, amplify insecurity and support information operations; expresses concern at the rise of “faketivism”, whereby state-aligned actors leverage hacktivist personas to conceal attribution and align cyber activity with geopolitical events, elections or kinetic operations;

Or. en

Amendment 194

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5 d (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	5d. Warns that the expansion of the Internet of Things (IoT) increases the risk that cyberattacks generate physical effects, as more connected systems become embedded in critical infrastructure and essential services; stresses that IoT deployment must therefore be matched by stronger cybersecurity requirements, vulnerability detection, incident response capabilities and security-by-design obligations, so that connected devices do not become entry points for hybrid operations with real-world consequences;

Or. en

Amendment 195

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5 e (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	5e. Calls on the EU to draw lessons from existing mechanisms in the cyber domain, such as the Cyber Blueprint for crisis coordination, EU CyCLONe for operational cooperation, the CSIRTs Network and CERT-EU for technical information-sharing, Cross-Border SOCs for early detection, and the Joint Cyber Unit for multi-actor coordination, with a view to developing a more integrated hybrid-threat coordination architecture connecting early warning, cross-domain situational awareness, rapid information-sharing and coordinated response;

Or. en

Amendment 196

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5 f (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	5f. Highlights that detection is a key cybersecurity capability for identifying signals of malicious activity within vast volumes of digital interactions; notes that networks of SOCs (Security Operations Centres), CSIRTs (Computer Security Incident Response Teams), and information-sharing systems are essential components of detection and early warning; encourages the identification of national best practices that could be scaled up at European level and the development of EU-supported projects to strengthen and interconnect these networks; underlines that such initiatives show how the Union and its Member States can move from a purely institutional logic, where each body detects threats in isolation, towards a distributed, coordinated and collaborative detection model, integrating public administrations, providers, the private sector and intelligence sources in order to strengthen common situational awareness and collective cyber resilience against hybrid threats;

Or. en

Amendment 197

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5 g (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	5g. Takes note of the PESCO project “Cyber and Information Domain Coordination Centre” (CIDCC) and welcomes the proposal for an EU Cyber Defence Coordination Centre (EU CDCC) to further strengthen EU and Member States’ capabilities in cyberspace as the fifth domain of operations; believes that well-developed and shared common situational awareness in cyberspace is a prerequisite for a common understanding of threats and an effective response;

Or. en

Amendment 198

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5 h (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	5h. Warns that full cyber protection does not exist and that, in the context of hybrid threats and persistent hostile activity, a shift in mindset towards cyber resilience is needed, understood as the ability to limit damage, resist, respond and recover from cyber incidents; stresses that Europe’s cyber resilience must be trained through frequent, realistic and comprehensive cyber exercises against potential incidents; underlines that cyber resilience concerns not only systems, but also the protection of data, which is both a target and an enabler of hybrid threats; underlines further the need to strengthen cyber resilience across the European economic fabric, including SMEs and providers of essential digital services;

Or. en

Amendment 199

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5 i (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	5i. Calls for greater harmonisation of incident-reporting obligations and key legal concepts across EU cybersecurity and resilience frameworks, in order to reduce fragmentation, improve interoperability and ensure that the rapid restoration of essential services remains a central priority in hybrid crisis scenarios;

Or. en

Amendment 200

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5 j (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	5j. Recognises the EU Cybersecurity Reserve, managed by ENISA under the Cyber Solidarity Act, as a strategic EU cyber rapid-response capacity; calls for its funding to be adapted to operational demand and highlights its first deployment in Moldova as an important step in strengthening the Union’s operational cyber resilience and support to partner countries; calls on Member States’ cybersecurity authorities to foster trust and structured cooperation with the trusted providers participating in the EU Cybersecurity Reserve, so as to make full use of available incident response capabilities when hybrid threats materialise through significant or large-scale cyber incidents;

Or. en

Amendment 201

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5 k (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	5k. Reiterates the importance of making full use of the Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox to prevent, deter and respond to cyber threats and malicious cyber activities; recalls that cybersecurity is today a central factor of power, stability, trust and global leadership; takes note of the launch in March 2026 of the first permanent UN Global Mechanism on cybersecurity, and believes that the Union should focus its action on areas where there is UN consensus and clear European added value, while further strengthening European cyber diplomacy;

Or. en

Amendment 202

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5 l (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	5l. Underlines that European technological sovereignty is a key component of resilience against hybrid threats, as hostile actors exploit strategic dependencies, supply-chain vulnerabilities, foreign control over critical technologies and the lack of control over data infrastructures to create leverage, enable interference and weaken the Union’s capacity to respond; stresses, in this regard, the increasing and potential future malign use of critical and emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and distributed ledger technologies, for hybrid campaigns, while acknowledging that these technologies also provide opportunities for countering and mitigating hybrid threats, including through early detection and analysis; notes that technological sovereignty applied to defence and security must be translated into operational terms;

Or. en

Amendment 203

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Subheading 2 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Technological sovereignty

Or. en

Amendment 204

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5 m (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	5m. Recalls that the EU remains structurally reliant on non-EU providers for more than 80 % of its digital products, services, infrastructure and intellectual property, in a geopolitical context in which supply chains are increasingly being weaponised and excessive dependencies in critical sectors are becoming strategic liabilities; highlights, in particular, Europe’s dependence on US software and cloud services and Chinese hardware and components; stresses that European technological sovereignty should be understood as a progressive strategy to reduce critical dependencies, diversify supply chains, foster research, knowledge transfer and industrial cooperation, and strengthen Europe’s capacity to develop, control and scale critical technologies while continuing to work with like-minded partners;

Or. en

Amendment 205

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5 n (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	5n. Underlines that technological sovereignty in critical and emerging technologies — including AI, semiconductors, quantum technologies, cloud, cyber, space and autonomous systems — is increasingly linked to defence readiness and resilience against hybrid threats; stresses that Europe’s ability to detect, withstand and respond to hybrid campaigns depends on its capacity to develop, secure and scale these technologies within a resilient European industrial and technological base (EITB); calls, therefore, for robust, sufficient and coherent EU investment across all relevant EU financial instruments, ensuring that funding for these strategic technologies is aligned with Europe’s security, defence, industrial and resilience objectives;

Or. en

Amendment 206

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5 o (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	5o. Warns that AI is not only a tool used in hybrid cyber activities, but also a critical technology that can itself be targeted, manipulated or compromised through prompt injection, training data poisoning and supply-chain attacks; stresses that, given the growing reliance on commercial and dual-use AI systems in civilian, security and defence contexts, the EU must develop a clear position on the cybersecurity, resilience and governance of dual-use AI, including safeguards for model integrity, trusted supply chains and oversight at the boundary between civilian, defence and national security applications;

Or. en

Amendment 207

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5 p (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	5p. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for the European Technological Sovereignty Package, which directly addresses several vectors relevant to hybrid threats, including foreign interference, the weaponisation of dependencies, strategic dependencies, cybersecurity, resilience, critical infrastructure, supply chain resilience, foreign jurisdictional data reach and surveillance, and public order risks;

Or. en

Amendment 208

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5 q (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	5q. Underlines the need to further enhance the protection of EU’s critical infrastructure and strengthen their resilience against hybrid threats; calls on Member States to ensure the effective implementation of relevant Union legal acts, in particular the Network and Information Security (NIS2) and the Critical Entities Resilience (CER) Directives; takes note of ongoing initiatives, including the Preparedness Union Strategy, the European Internal Security Strategy (ProtectEU) and the EU Action Plan on Cable Security, which could contribute further to enhancing the Member States’ resilience against hybrid threats;

Or. en

Amendment 209

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Michał Dworczyk

Motion for a resolution

Subheading 3 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Economic Warfare: The Strategic Use of Economic Instruments as Tools of Hybrid Threats

Or. en

Amendment 210

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks

Motion for a resolution

Subheading 3 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Underlines that hostile state actors increasingly leverage economic tools to exert political influence, specifically through strategic acquisitions of critical European assets in technology, transport, and defense sectors; notes that the infiltration of domestic financial systems through illicit capital flows, shell companies, and state-backed investments serves to corrupt local political processes and erode European strategic autonomy; stresses the urgent need to strengthen the EU’s Foreign Direct Investment screening mechanisms to comprehensively identify and block investments that form part of a broader hostile hybrid campaign;

Or. en

Amendment 211

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5 r (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	5r. Calls for stronger EU-level technical certification, standardisation and verification frameworks for critical digital technologies and supply chains, building on the expertise of ENISA and the European Cybersecurity Competence Centre (ECCC); stresses the need for dedicated funding to help European companies adopt cybersecurity audit and certification frameworks, while reducing excessive administrative barriers and allowing proportionate flexibility for Member States in non-essential parts of the supply chain;

Or. en

Amendment 212

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Michał Dworczyk

Motion for a resolution

Subheading 3 c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Underlines that the Russian Federation has systematically integrated economic coercion into its hybrid warfare doctrine, using the weaponization of energy supplies, abrupt trade embargoes, and the blockade of critical maritime trade routes as political levers; notes with concern that these actions are deliberately designed to trigger market volatility, drive inflation, and exploit socio-economic vulnerabilities within the European Union and its neighborhood to fracture Western unity; urges the European Commission and Member States to permanently eliminate dependencies on Russian commodities, strengthen European energy solidarity mechanisms against Kremlin-engineered economic shocks, and fully sever remaining trade relations with the Russian Federation; further calls for the complete closure of all overland and maritime transit routes through Russian territory, with specific emphasis on halting the use of the Northern Corridor, in order to fully isolate the aggressor economy and eliminate strategic supply chain vulnerabilities exploited by Moscow;

Or. en

Amendment 213

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 6

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
6. Condemns the hybrid warfare attacks targeting the EU’s critical infrastructure; welcomes the focus on the protection and resilience of military mobility infrastructure in the Commission proposal for a regulation on military mobility (COM(2025)0847); calls on the Member States to take adequate measures to ensure this infrastructure is protected;	6. Condemns the hybrid warfare attacks targeting the EU’s critical infrastructure — in particular energy and transport infrastructure linked to civil energy infrastructure, military mobility, including logistical hubs, communications infrastructure — which constitutes a critical enabler for the Union’s collective defence and resilience; welcomes the focus on the protection and resilience of energy and military mobility infrastructure in the Commission proposal for a regulation on military mobility (COM(2025)0847) and the Commission proposal for guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure (COM/2025/1006); calls on the European Commission and the Member States to take all necessary measures to ensure its protection;

Or. en

Amendment 214

Jorge Buxadé Villalba, György Hölvényi

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 6

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
6. Condemns the hybrid warfare attacks targeting the EU’s critical infrastructure; welcomes the focus on the protection and resilience of military mobility infrastructure in the Commission proposal for a regulation on military mobility (COM(2025)0847); calls on the Member States to take adequate measures to ensure this infrastructure is protected;	6. Condemns the hybrid warfare attacks targeting the EU’s critical infrastructure; points out that effective protection of the EU’s external borders is also an essential element for the security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Member States in the face of hybrid threats; welcomes the focus on the protection and resilience of military mobility infrastructure in the Commission proposal for a regulation on military mobility (COM(2025)0847); calls on the Member States to take adequate measures to ensure this infrastructure is protected;

Or. es

Amendment 215

Nathalie Loiseau, Helmut Brandstätter

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 6

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
6. Condemns the hybrid warfare attacks targeting the EU’s critical infrastructure; welcomes the focus on the protection and resilience of military mobility infrastructure in the Commission proposal for a regulation on military mobility (COM(2025)0847); calls on the Member States to take adequate measures to ensure this infrastructure is protected;	6. Condemns the hybrid warfare attacks targeting the EU’s critical infrastructure; welcomes the focus on the protection and resilience of military mobility infrastructure in the Commission proposal for a regulation on military mobility (COM(2025)0847); recalls that investments in military mobility infrastructure are in essence dual use, as they can also be used by civil protection units in case of a disaster; calls on the Member States to take adequate measures to ensure this infrastructure is protected;

Or. en

Amendment 216

Marta Wcisło

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 6

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
6. Condemns the hybrid warfare attacks targeting the EU’s critical infrastructure; welcomes the focus on the protection and resilience of military mobility infrastructure in the Commission proposal for a regulation on military mobility (COM(2025)0847); calls on the Member States to take adequate measures to ensure this infrastructure is protected;	6. Condemns the hybrid warfare attacks targeting the EU’s critical infrastructure welcomes the focus on the protection and resilience of military mobility infrastructure including ports, airports, rail corridors, logistic hubs, satellite infrastructure and energy interconnectors, in the Commission proposal for a regulation on military mobility (COM(2025)0847); calls on the Member States to take adequate measures to ensure this infrastructure is protected;

Or. en

Amendment 217

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 6

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
6. Condemns the hybrid warfare attacks targeting the EU’s critical infrastructure; welcomes the focus on the protection and resilience of military mobility infrastructure in the Commission proposal for a regulation on military mobility (COM(2025)0847); calls on the Member States to take adequate measures to ensure this infrastructure is protected;	6. Condemns the hybrid operations, including acts of hybrid warfare, targeting the critical infrastructure in the EU; welcomes the focus on the protection and resilience of military mobility infrastructure in the Commission proposal for a regulation on military mobility (COM(2025)0847); calls on the Member States to take adequate measures to ensure this infrastructure is protected;

Or. en

Amendment 218

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Michał Dworczyk

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 6 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	6a. Expresses grave concern over the escalation of hybrid activities in the Black Sea, including recent drone strikes and covert attacks against commercial shipping and logistics assets operating in proximity to Ukrainian and regional ports, which directly threaten critical maritime infrastructure and the functioning of Ukraine’s and the EU’s export corridors; underlines that such incidents, including repeated attacks on merchant and “shadow fleet” vessels operating in sanctioned energy trade routes, demonstrate the increasing militarisation of civilian maritime space and the use of hybrid tactics to disrupt supply chains, energy flows and port operations in the wider Black Sea basin; calls for strengthened EU coordination with Ukraine and regional partners to protect port infrastructure, shipping lanes and maritime logistics systems against sabotage, unmanned systems and other hybrid threats;

Or. en

Amendment 219

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 6 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	6a. Welcomes the adoption of the Critical Entities Resilience (CER) Directive and NIS2 as important steps towards strengthening resilience, but stresses that implementation delays across Member States represent a shared and urgent vulnerability and calls for their full and timely implementation; urges the Commission to make full use of its monitoring and enforcement powers where necessary; calls on Member States to embed resilience by design as a standard requirement in all new and revised legislation;

Or. en

Amendment 220

Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Rasa Juknevičienė

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 6 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	6a. Stresses that critical technologies, including artificial intelligence, cloud infrastructure, advanced semiconductors, quantum technologies and secure communications systems, should be increasingly considered part of the Union's critical security infrastructure given their essential role in defence readiness, economic resilience and operational continuity;

Or. en

Amendment 221

Villy Søvndal

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 6 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	6a. Calls for the EU and its Member States to equip authorities with the means to counter drones at critical infrastructure sites such as airports and power plants; notes that such means must be suitable for the civilian context and follow a model of layered defence with multiple systems that can take down drones kinetically and electronically;

Or. en

Amendment 222

Marta Wcisło

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 6 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	6a. Calls on the Member States to conduct regular resilience and stress-testing exercises for critical infrastructure, including scenarios involving coordinated sabotage, cyber-physical attacks, drone incursions, supply-chain disruption and simultaneous multi-site incidents;

Or. en

Amendment 223

Angelika Niebler

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 6 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	6a. Stresses the strategic importance of regional defence and security clusters and calls for dedicated EU funding lines to integrate their know-how and infrastructure into cross-border projects that enhance the resilience of Europe’s critical infrastructure;

Or. en

Amendment 224

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 6 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	6b. Expresses concern over foreign ownership of critical infrastructure in the EU, in particular by Russia and China, which greatly increases the risk of espionage and external interference and dependence; welcomes the political agreement reached between the European Parliament and the Council on a strengthened EU Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) screening mechanism; calls on Member States to rapidly implement this regulation, complemented by a 'Buy European' approach, where possible, for critical infrastructure and defence equipment with a view to strengthen the EU's strategic autonomy;

Or. en

Amendment 225

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Michał Dworczyk

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 6 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	6b. Highlights the growing use of hybrid warfare tools in the Black Sea, including GPS jamming, spoofing, and the deployment of unregulated or “shadow fleet” vessels, which increase the risk of maritime accidents, conceal state-linked activity, and create direct vulnerabilities for critical infrastructure such as subsea cables, offshore energy installations and port facilities; notes recent incidents of electronic interference and suspected deliberate targeting of commercial vessels in the Black Sea maritime corridor, illustrating the convergence of cyber, electronic and kinetic hybrid tactics;

Or. en

Amendment 226

Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Rasa Juknevičienė

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 6 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	6b. Underlines that attacks against critical infrastructure not only threaten security and defence capabilities but may also undermine economic resilience, disrupt the functioning of the Single Market and weaken the Union's competitiveness;

Or. en

Amendment 227

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 6 c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	6c. Expresses grave concern over the intensification of hybrid warfare activities in the Black Sea region, which constitute a direct extension of the wider conflict environment and increasingly affect EU interests and Member States’ security; notes with alarm the convergence of kinetic, cyber, electronic warfare and information manipulation tactics targeting maritime corridors, port infrastructure and commercial shipping routes; underlines that the Black Sea has become a critical theatre for testing and deploying hybrid warfare techniques with direct implications for European security and global trade stability; stresses in this regard the added value of establishing a dedicated Black Sea Maritime Hub, as a permanent coordination and situational awareness platform to enhance monitoring, information-sharing, and rapid response capabilities among relevant stakeholders; highlights that Romania would constitute a strategically appropriate location for such a hub, given its status as a frontline EU and NATO Member State on the Black Sea, its direct exposure to maritime hybrid threats, its existing operational infrastructure, and its role in facilitating secure access to Danube–Black Sea and wider Euro-Atlantic logistics corridors;

Or. en

Amendment 228

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 7

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
7. Is concerned about the EU’s dependence on high-risk non-EU countries, particularly China, for the supply of network-connected hardware and software; stresses the urgent need to address these vulnerabilities and calls on the Commission to extend supply chain security assessments systematically, across all critical infrastructure sectors, and to accelerate efforts to reduce such strategic dependencies;	7. Is concerned about the EU’s dependence on high-risk non-EU countries, particularly China, for the supply of network-connected hardware and software assets, such as solar inverters, wind turbines, connected vehicles, and consumer digital devices, that can access, transmit or control systems remotely and therefore form a significant vulnerability; welcomes, in this context, that the proposed revision of the Cybersecurity Act aims to provide a framework to ban network-connected components capable of remote access from high-risk suppliers, and that the Strategic Roadmap for Digitalisation and AI in the Energy Sector provides for a review of the energy security-of-supply framework; calls for the swift adoption of these measures; addition calls on the Commission to extend supply chain security assessments systematically, across all critical infrastructure sectors, and to accelerate efforts to reduce such strategic dependencies; calls on Member States to follow up on these assessments;

Or. en

Amendment 229

Christophe Bay, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 7

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
7. Is concerned about the EU’s dependence on high-risk non-EU countries, particularly China, for the supply of network-connected hardware and software; stresses the urgent need to address these vulnerabilities and calls on the Commission to extend supply chain security assessments systematically, across all critical infrastructure sectors, and to accelerate efforts to reduce such strategic dependencies;	7. Is concerned about the EU’s dependence on high-risk non-EU countries, particularly China, for the supply of network-connected hardware and software; stresses the urgent need to address these vulnerabilities and calls on the Commission to extend supply chain security assessments systematically, across all critical infrastructure sectors, and to accelerate efforts to reduce such strategic dependencies; is further concerned about the Union’s strategic dependencies in respect of its supply of critical raw materials and rare earths, which are essential inputs for the defence, aerospace and critical technologies sectors; stresses the urgent need to strengthen the resilience of European value chains, particularly in the areas of mining, refining and processing, by pursuing strategies to diversify suppliers in order to reduce the risks of economic coercion and geopolitical blackmail by third countries;

Or. fr

Amendment 230

Engin Eroglu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 7

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
7. Is concerned about the EU’s dependence on high-risk non-EU countries, particularly China, for the supply of network-connected hardware and software; stresses the urgent need to address these vulnerabilities and calls on the Commission to extend supply chain security assessments systematically, across all critical infrastructure sectors, and to accelerate efforts to reduce such strategic dependencies;	7. Is concerned about the EU’s dependence on high-risk non-EU countries, particularly China, for the supply of network-connected hardware and software, in particular ICT applications, surveillance systems, social media and digital platforms, open source AI applications, EVs, or green energy technologies; stresses the urgent need to address these vulnerabilities, particularly in the area of critical infrastructure, public institutions and government and military sites, and calls on the Commission to extend supply chain security assessments systematically, across all critical infrastructure sectors, and to develop clear criteria for risk-based de-risking and to accelerate efforts to reduce such strategic dependencies;

Or. de

Amendment 231

Alexandr Vondra

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 7

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
7. Is concerned about the EU’s dependence on high-risk non-EU countries, particularly China, for the supply of network-connected hardware and software; stresses the urgent need to address these vulnerabilities and calls on the Commission to extend supply chain security assessments systematically, across all critical infrastructure sectors, and to accelerate efforts to reduce such strategic dependencies;	7. Is concerned about the EU’s dependence on high-risk non-EU countries, particularly China, Russia and other authoritarian regimes, for the supply of network-connected hardware and software; stresses the urgent need to address these vulnerabilities and calls on the Commission to extend supply chain security assessments systematically, across all critical infrastructure sectors, and to accelerate efforts to reduce such strategic dependencies; Calls on the Commission and the Member States to prioritise European and allied suppliers in strategic sectors whenever security considerations so require;

Or. en

Amendment 232

Vasile Dîncu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 7

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
7. Is concerned about the EU’s dependence on high-risk non-EU countries, particularly China, for the supply of network-connected hardware and software; stresses the urgent need to address these vulnerabilities and calls on the Commission to extend supply chain security assessments systematically, across all critical infrastructure sectors, and to accelerate efforts to reduce such strategic dependencies;	7. Is concerned about the EU’s dependence on high-risk non-EU countries, particularly China, for the supply of network-connected hardware and software; stresses the urgent need to address these vulnerabilities and calls on the Commission to extend supply chain security assessments systematically, across all critical infrastructure sectors, and to accelerate efforts to reduce such strategic dependencies; emphasises the importance of strengthening EU energy independence, particularly in Eastern Member States, including through investments in renewable energy, interconnecting the national grids, while securing and exploiting the Black Sea natural gas resources;

Or. en

Amendment 233

Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 7

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
7. Is concerned about the EU’s dependence on high-risk non-EU countries, particularly China, for the supply of network-connected hardware and software; stresses the urgent need to address these vulnerabilities and calls on the Commission to extend supply chain security assessments systematically, across all critical infrastructure sectors, and to accelerate efforts to reduce such strategic dependencies;	7. Is concerned about the EU’s dependence on high-risk non-EU countries, particularly China, for the supply of network-connected hardware and software; stresses the urgent need to address these vulnerabilities and calls on the Commission to extend supply chain security assessments systematically, across all critical infrastructure sectors, and to accelerate efforts to reduce such strategic dependencies; calls on Member States to refrain from engaging Chinese state-owned enterprises in general, especially whenever critical structure, security, intelligence and information are concerned;

Or. es

Amendment 234

Merja Kyllönen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 7

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
7. Is concerned about the EU’s dependence on high-risk non-EU countries, particularly China, for the supply of network-connected hardware and software; stresses the urgent need to address these vulnerabilities and calls on the Commission to extend supply chain security assessments systematically, across all critical infrastructure sectors, and to accelerate efforts to reduce such strategic dependencies;	7. Notes with concern the EU’s dependence on high-risk non-EU countries, particularly China, for the supply of network-connected hardware and software; underlines the urgent need for the EU to increase its technological sovereignty; stresses the urgent need to address these vulnerabilities and calls on the Commission and Member States to extend supply chain security assessments systematically, across all critical infrastructure sectors, and to accelerate efforts to reduce such strategic dependencies across the EU in a coordinated manner;

Or. en

Amendment 235

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 7

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
7. Is concerned about the EU’s dependence on high-risk non-EU countries, particularly China, for the supply of network-connected hardware and software; stresses the urgent need to address these vulnerabilities and calls on the Commission to extend supply chain security assessments systematically, across all critical infrastructure sectors, and to accelerate efforts to reduce such strategic dependencies;	7. Is concerned about the EU’s dependence on complex global supply chains for network-connected hardware and software; stresses that supply-chain security assessments should be based on objective, technical and risk-based criteria; stresses the urgent need to address these vulnerabilities and calls on the Council to agree on modalities to extend supply chain security assessments systematically, across all critical infrastructure sectors, and to accelerate efforts to reduce such strategic dependencies;

Or. en

Amendment 236

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 7 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	7a. Notes that hostile actors increasingly use energy infrastructure, energy markets and energy dependencies as instruments of hybrid warfare to exert political pressure; emphasises strategic importance of critical energy infrastructure as the key enabler for both defence and civil needs by providing the reliable and secure power supply necessary for societal function, industrial production and military operational readiness; highlights frequent and systematic attempts of hostile actors to damage critical energy infrastructure; urges the Commission and the EU Member States to establish EU legal and financial framework under the next MFF 2028-2034 which would ensure sufficient protection and resilience of critical energy infrastructure, giving a priority to Commission proposals for guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure (COM/2025/1006) and the Connecting Europe Facility (COM/2025/547);

Or. en

Amendment 237

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 7 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	7a. Calls for the development of sector-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centres (ISACs) across strategic sectors and critical infrastructure industries, including manufacturing, energy, transport and logistics, and economic and financial services, in order to enable trusted early warning, risk disclosure and exchange of threat and incident information across supply chains, while reflecting the specific vulnerabilities and operational realities of each subsector;

Or. en

Amendment 238

Angelika Niebler

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 7 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	7a. Underlines the role of highly specialised small and medium-sized enterprises for a diversified and robust defence industrial base; invites the Commission to ensure privileged access to EDF, EIC and IPCEI instruments and to speed up procurement procedures so that breakthrough innovations reach operational use more rapidly;

Or. en

Amendment 239

Elena Donazzan, Alberico Gambino, Cristian Terheş

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 7 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	7a. Stresses that reducing strategic dependencies in the technology, energy, industrial and critical raw materials sectors is a security and defence priority for the EU, as well as an economic one;

Or. it

Amendment 240

Elena Donazzan, Alberico Gambino, Cristian Terheş

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 7 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	7b. Emphasises that the ability to disrupt or condition logistics flows and global supply chains is today one of the main strategic leverage tools available to hostile actors for pursuing geopolitical objectives without resorting to open armed conflict and poses a direct challenge to the economic security, industrial competitiveness and strategic resilience of the European Union and its Member States;

Or. it

Amendment 241

Engin Eroglu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
8. Stresses that submarine cables represent a key strategic vulnerability; commends the 2024 Commission Recommendation on Secure and Resilient Submarine Cable Infrastructures6and the 2025 Joint Communication of the EU action plan on cable security as important first steps towards strengthening the security and resilience of submarine cables;	8. Stresses that submarine cables and other maritime critical infrastructure represent a key strategic vulnerability and are increasingly targeted by hybrid sabotage, espionage and influence operations by hostile state actors; commends the 2024 Commission Recommendation on Secure and Resilient Submarine Cable Infrastructures6 and the 2025 Joint Communication of the EU action plan on cable security as important first steps towards strengthening the security and resilience of submarine cables; stresses, however, that further measures are needed, in particular an improved common maritime situational picture, structured information exchange between armed forces, civilian authorities and operators of critical infrastructure, enhanced deterrence and surveillance capabilities in the maritime space, as well as clearer legal and operational responsibilities for responses to hybrid attacks below the threshold of armed conflict;
_________________	_________________
6 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024/779 of 26 February 2024 on Secure and Resilient Submarine Cable Infrastructures (OJ L, 2024/779, 8.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2024/779/oj).	6 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024/779 of 26 February 2024 on Secure and Resilient Submarine Cable Infrastructures (OJ L, 2024/779, 8.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2024/779/oj).

Or. de

Amendment 242

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
8. Stresses that submarine cables represent a key strategic vulnerability; commends the 2024 Commission Recommendation on Secure and Resilient Submarine Cable Infrastructures6 and the 2025 Joint Communication of the EU action plan on cable security as important first steps towards strengthening the security and resilience of submarine cables;	8. Stresses that submarine cables represent a key strategic vulnerability, due to their physical exposure and the potential for systemic disruption as they carry the vast majority of intercontinental internet traffic; commends the 2024 Commission Recommendation on Secure and Resilient Submarine Cable Infrastructures6 and the 2025 Joint Communication of the EU action plan on cable security as important first steps towards strengthening the security and resilience of submarine cable infrastructure; calls further for maritime domain awareness capabilities, integrating satellite, surface and subsea sensor data, to be deployed to detect, monitor and attribute physical threats to submarine cable and offshore energy infrastructure in strategic maritime areas, including the Baltic Sea, North Sea, and Arctic region;
_________________	_________________
6 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024/779 of 26 February 2024 on Secure and Resilient Submarine Cable Infrastructures (OJ L, 2024/779, 8.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2024/779/oj).	6 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024/779 of 26 February 2024 on Secure and Resilient Submarine Cable Infrastructures (OJ L, 2024/779, 8.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2024/779/oj).

Or. en

Amendment 243

Nathalie Loiseau, Helmut Brandstätter

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
8. Stresses that submarine cables represent a key strategic vulnerability; commends the 2024 Commission Recommendation on Secure and Resilient Submarine Cable Infrastructures6 and the 2025 Joint Communication of the EU action plan on cable security as important first steps towards strengthening the security and resilience of submarine cables;	8. Stresses that submarine cables represent a key strategic vulnerability; condemns any attack on undersea cables and connectors, which can be easily passed off as an accident or be carried out by vessels without direct links to the attack’s sponsor; notes in particular the vulnerability of undersea cables in the Baltic region; commends the 2024 Commission Recommendation on Secure and Resilient Submarine Cable Infrastructures6 and the 2025 Joint Communication of the EU action plan on cable security as important first steps towards strengthening the security and resilience of submarine cables; recommends strong criminal liability provisions to deter from such attacks as well as reduplicated systems to ensure resilience;
_________________	_________________
6 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024/779 of 26 February 2024 on Secure and Resilient Submarine Cable Infrastructures (OJ L, 2024/779, 8.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2024/779/oj).	6 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024/779 of 26 February 2024 on Secure and Resilient Submarine Cable Infrastructures (OJ L, 2024/779, 8.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2024/779/oj).

Or. en

Amendment 244

Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
8. Stresses that submarine cables represent a key strategic vulnerability; commends the 2024 Commission Recommendation on Secure and Resilient Submarine Cable Infrastructures6 and the 2025 Joint Communication of the EU action plan on cable security as important first steps towards strengthening the security and resilience of submarine cables;	8. Stresses that submarine cables represent a key strategic vulnerability; commends the 2024 Commission Recommendation on Secure and Resilient Submarine Cable Infrastructures6 and the 2025 Joint Communication of the EU action plan on cable security as important first steps towards strengthening the security and resilience of submarine cables; notes that several Member States are particularly exposed to hybrid threats and acts of sabotage targeting submarine cables, notably those located in the Baltic and the Mediterranean Sea regions; notes that the Spanish authorities have identified approximately 50 vessels from the Russian shadow fleet each week operating in proximity to its shores;
_________________	_________________
6 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024/779 of 26 February 2024 on Secure and Resilient Submarine Cable Infrastructures (OJ L, 2024/779, 8.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2024/779/oj).	6 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024/779 of 26 February 2024 on Secure and Resilient Submarine Cable Infrastructures (OJ L, 2024/779, 8.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2024/779/oj).

Or. en

Amendment 245

Vasile Dîncu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
8. Stresses that submarine cables represent a key strategic vulnerability; commends the 2024 Commission Recommendation on Secure and Resilient Submarine Cable Infrastructures6 and the 2025 Joint Communication of the EU action plan on cable security as important first steps towards strengthening the security and resilience of submarine cables;	8. Stresses that submarine cables represent a key strategic vulnerability; underlines the critical importance of protecting underwater connectivity, electricity grids, the gas pipelines, and the offshore extraction platforms in the Black Sea, confronted with intense and continuous Russian hybrid operations; commends the 2024 Commission Recommendation on Secure and Resilient Submarine Cable Infrastructures6 and the 2025 Joint Communication of the EU action plan on cable security as important first steps towards strengthening the security and resilience of submarine cables;
_________________	_________________
6 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024/779 of 26 February 2024 on Secure and Resilient Submarine Cable Infrastructures (OJ L, 2024/779, 8.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2024/779/oj).	6 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024/779 of 26 February 2024 on Secure and Resilient Submarine Cable Infrastructures (OJ L, 2024/779, 8.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2024/779/oj).

Or. en

Amendment 246

Marta Wcisło

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Calls for the establishment of a permanent EU maritime surveillance and critical seabed infrastructure protection mechanism in the Baltic Sea and North Sea, closely coordinated with NATO structures and involving real-time monitoring capabilities, autonomous surveillance systems and rapid repair capacities;

Or. en

Amendment 247

Urmas Paet, Lucia Yar, Petras Auštrevičius, Engin Eroglu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8 – point 1 (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	(1) Expresses concern about the growing security risks posed by Russia's shadow fleet and calls for enhanced monitoring, inspection and enforcement measures in European waters.

Or. en

Amendment 248

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Elena Donazzan, Michał Dworczyk

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	8a. Notes with concern the fragmented governance structure governing undersea infrastructure, involving private operators, Member State authorities, and international stakeholders, which leads to coordination deficits, limited situational awareness, and delayed response mechanisms; stresses the need for strengthened cooperation between NATO, Member States, and relevant private-sector actors in order to ensure coherent protection of undersea infrastructure; calls on NATO and Member States to enhance maritime domain awareness through improved surveillance, intelligence-sharing mechanisms, and integrated operational coordination;

Or. en

Amendment 249

Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius, Urmas Paet, Engin Eroglu, Lucia Yar

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	8a. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to establish a joint EU interpretation of UNCLOS to ensure the effective criminalisation and deterrence of hybrid activities and acts of sabotage in the EUs maritime areas; encourages the Commission and Member States to draw on the Australian example of establishing so-called cable protection zones, providing legal safeguards and criminalising damage to submarine cables beyond the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea limit, accompanied by active monitoring, surveillance and response in cooperation with relevant third-country partners;

Or. en

Amendment 250

Elena Donazzan, Alberico Gambino, Cristian Terheş

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	8a. Stresses the need to strengthen cooperation on maritime domain awareness and the protection of strategic maritime lines of communication, as well as maritime and undersea infrastructure, in order to contribute to regional stability and economic security; welcomes the possible creation of a European Defence Project of Common Interest (EDPCI) dedicated to integrated defence of the maritime environment and the seabed;

Or. it

Amendment 251

Michał Dworczyk, Cristian Terheş

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	8a. Stresses the growing vulnerability of critical energy infrastructure, including electricity transmission networks, substations, LNG terminals, gas storage facilities and cross-border energy interconnectors, to hybrid attacks and acts of sabotage; highlights the lessons learned from Russia’s systematic attacks against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and recognises the essential role of secure and resilient energy systems for the Union’s security, defence preparedness and societal resilience;

Or. en

Amendment 252

Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Rasa Juknevičienė

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	8a. Notes that space-based assets and services, including satellite communications, positioning and Earth observation systems, are increasingly essential for both civilian and military operations and should therefore be considered a strategic component of the Union's critical infrastructure resilience framework;

Or. en

Amendment 253

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Elena Donazzan, Michał Dworczyk

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	8b. Calls for the development and deployment of emerging technologies, including unmanned and autonomous systems, to support cost-effective monitoring, detection, and rapid response capabilities; cautions against an over-reliance on high-cost conventional naval deployments for continuous protection tasks, which may not be operationally or financially sustainable over the long term; calls instead for a comprehensive, multi-layered approach combining technological innovation, enhanced intelligence integration, improved attribution capabilities, and reinforced institutional cooperation between NATO, Member States, and private operators;

Or. en

Amendment 254

Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius, Urmas Paet, Engin Eroglu, Lucia Yar

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	8b. Stresses the need for the EU to step up its response to hybrid threats in maritime zones , including those posed by Russia's shadow fleet, encourages the Commission to explore the use of Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) mandate to board vessels linked to such shadow fleets, and calls on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to play a more active role in scrutinising flag-registry governance within its mutual evaluation and grey listing processes;

Or. en

Amendment 255

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	8b. Calls on the Member States and the European Defence Agency (EDA) to advance the PESCO projects Critical Seabed Infrastructure Protection (CSIP), Harbour & Maritime Surveillance and Protection (HARMSPRO), Integrated Multi-Layer Air and Missile Defence System (IMLAMD) and Counter Unmanned Aerial System (C-UAS) to enhance surveillance, detection and defence capabilities against airborne and maritime threats;

Or. en

Amendment 256

Vasile Dîncu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
9. Recognises that a significant share of critical infrastructure linked to essential public services and military capabilities is privately owned or operated; calls for permanent and structured public-private cooperation frameworks to be established, including for information sharing, contingency planning and coordinated crisis response; calls for defence requirements to be systematically integrated into civilian infrastructure planning, design and fundingas a condition for EU support;	9. Recognises that a significant share of critical infrastructure linked to essential public services and military capabilities is privately owned or operated; calls for permanent and structured public-private cooperation frameworks to be established, including for information sharing, contingency planning and coordinated crisis response; stresses that these public-private frameworks must include clear accountability mechanisms for private operators of critical infrastructure, ensuring high standards of cybersecurity and the protection and continuous training of their workforce against hybrid and kinetical threats; highlights also that these public-private frameworks should simultaneously incentivize the co-development of dual-use logistics and protect the regional manufacturing installations from supply-chain disruptions; calls for defence requirements to be systematically integrated into civilian infrastructure planning, design and fundingas a condition for EU support;

Or. en

Amendment 257

Rasa Juknevičienė

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
9. Recognises that a significant share of critical infrastructure linked to essential public services and military capabilities is privately owned or operated; calls for permanent and structured public-private cooperation frameworks to be established, including for information sharing, contingency planning and coordinated crisis response; calls for defence requirements to be systematically integrated into civilian infrastructure planning, design and fundingas a condition for EU support;	9. Recognises that a significant share of critical infrastructure linked to essential public services and military capabilities is privately owned or operated; calls for permanent and structured public-private cooperation frameworks to be established, including for information sharing, communication, contingency and functionality in crisis situation planning and coordinated crisis response; calls for defence requirements to be systematically integrated into civilian infrastructure planning, design and funding; insists that EU-funded infrastructure must comply with defence-relevant resilience standards as a condition for EU support; calls furthermore for defence technology developers and maritime security providers to be systematically involved in the early phases of critical infrastructure threat assessment and contingency planning, ensuring that available technological capabilities are reflected in national and EU resilience frameworks;

Or. en

Amendment 258

Alberico Gambino, Elena Donazzan

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
9. Recognises that a significant share of critical infrastructure linked to essential public services and military capabilities is privately owned or operated; calls for permanent and structured public-private cooperation frameworks to be established, including for information sharing, contingency planning and coordinated crisis response; calls for defence requirements to be systematically integrated into civilian infrastructure planning, design and fundingas a condition for EU support;	9. Recognises that a significant share of critical infrastructure linked to essential public services and military capabilities is privately owned or operated; calls for permanent and structured public-private cooperation frameworks to be established, including for information sharing, contingency planning and coordinated crisis response; calls for defence requirements to be systematically integrated into civilian infrastructure planning, design and funding as a condition for EU support; highlights that ports, logistics hubs, strategic transport corridors and maritime infrastructure constitute critical assets increasingly exposed to hybrid threats and should therefore be fully integrated into European resilience, protection and contingency-planning frameworks;

Or. en

Amendment 259

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
9. Recognises that a significant share of critical infrastructure linked to essential public services and military capabilities is privately owned or operated; calls for permanent and structured public-private cooperation frameworks to be established, including for information sharing, contingency planning and coordinated crisis response; calls for defence requirements to be systematically integrated into civilian infrastructure planning, design and fundingas a condition for EU support;	9. Recognises that a significant share of critical infrastructure linked to essential public services and military capabilities is privately owned or operated; calls for permanent and structured public-private cooperation frameworks to be established, including for information sharing, contingency planning and coordinated crisis response; stresses that, where private infrastructure supports essential services, sensitive data, critical infrastructure or military capabilities, public authorities must ensure effective regulatory and operational control; calls for defence requirements to be systematically integrated into civilian infrastructure planning, design and funding as a condition for EU support;

Or. en

Amendment 260

Elena Donazzan, Alberico Gambino, Cristian Terheş

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
9. Recognises that a significant share of critical infrastructure linked to essential public services and military capabilities is privately owned or operated; calls for permanent and structured public-private cooperation frameworks to be established, including for information sharing, contingency planning and coordinated crisis response; calls for defence requirements to be systematically integrated into civilian infrastructure planning, design and fundingas a condition for EU support;	9. Recognises that a significant share of critical infrastructure linked to essential public services and military capabilities is privately owned or operated; calls for permanent and structured public-private cooperation frameworks to be established, including for information sharing, contingency planning and coordinated crisis response; calls for defence requirements to be systematically integrated into civilian infrastructure planning, design and funding as a condition for EU support; stresses that the cross-cutting nature of hybrid threats requires the adoption of a whole-of-society approach in order to improve Europe’s ability to prevent, absorb and respond to hybrid threats;

Or. it

Amendment 261

Christophe Gomart

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
9. Recognises that a significant share of critical infrastructure linked to essential public services and military capabilities is privately owned or operated; calls for permanent and structured public-private cooperation frameworks to be established, including for information sharing, contingency planning and coordinated crisis response; calls for defence requirements to be systematically integrated into civilian infrastructure planning, design and fundingas a condition for EU support;	9. Recognises that a significant share of critical infrastructure linked to essential public services and military capabilities is privately owned or operated; calls for permanent and structured public-private cooperation frameworks to be established, including for information sharing, contingency planning and coordinated crisis response, whilst fully respecting the sovereign powers of Member States in matters of national security and safeguarding the confidentiality of national defence; calls for defence requirements to be systematically integrated into civilian infrastructure planning, design and funding as a condition for EU support;

Or. fr

Amendment 262

Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
9. Recognises that a significant share of critical infrastructure linked to essential public services and military capabilities is privately owned or operated; calls for permanent and structured public-private cooperation frameworks to be established, including for information sharing, contingency planning and coordinated crisis response; calls for defence requirements to be systematically integrated into civilian infrastructure planning, design and fundingas a condition for EU support;	9. Recognises that a significant share of critical infrastructure linked to essential public services and military capabilities is privately owned or operated; calls for permanent and structured public-private cooperation frameworks to be established, including for information sharing, contingency planning and coordinated crisis response; calls for defence requirements to be systematically integrated into civilian infrastructure planning, design and fundingas a condition for EU support; and supports the application of a security-by-design approach to future strategic infrastructure projects supported by the Union;

Or. en

Amendment 263

Christophe Bay, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
9. Recognises that a significant share of critical infrastructure linked to essential public services and military capabilities is privately owned or operated; calls for permanent and structured public-private cooperation frameworks to be established, including for information sharing, contingency planning and coordinated crisis response; calls for defence requirements to be systematically integrated into civilian infrastructure planning, design and fundingas a condition for EU support;	9. Recognises that a significant share of critical infrastructure linked to essential public services and military capabilities is privately owned or operated; calls for permanent and structured public-private cooperation frameworks to be established, under the authority of the Member States, including for information sharing, contingency planning and coordinated crisis response; calls for defence requirements to be systematically integrated into civilian infrastructure planning, design and funding as a condition for EU support;

Or. fr

Amendment 264

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Elena Donazzan

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	9a. Recommends the development of comprehensive national civil defence strategies to counter drone and other unmanned aerial system (UAS) threats, ensuring preparedness at national, regional, municipal, community and household levels, including robust early warning systems, clear public guidance on response measures, and the establishment of protected spaces for civilian populations and critical infrastructure; underlines the need for common Union-level guidelines for the development of national counter-unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS) strategies, in full respect of Member States’ sovereignty and taking into account the specific operational, geographic and threat environments in which such strategies are to be implemented;

Or. en

Amendment 265

Alexandr Vondra

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	9a. Acknowledges that defence industrial infrastructure and facilities, both publicly and privately owned, constitute a key components of Europe's overall defence infrastructure and an essential precondition of Europe's defence readiness; stresses that hybrid attacks against defence industry facilities, including acts of sabotage carried out by hostile state actors and their proxies, have been documented across the European Union; calls for the recognition of defence industrial infrastructure as critical to Europe's defence readiness; calls for the implementation of means and tools to prevent and mitigate hybrid threats to European defence industrial facilities;

Or. en

Amendment 266

Petras Auštrevičius

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	9a. Calls for enhanced investment in the protection of critical public digital infrastructure and sensitive state-managed data registers, in light of the recent large-scale data breach that took place in Lithuania, compromising the personal data of over 600,000 citizens; notes with concern that such incidents are not isolated, as evidenced by the 2024 data breach of the EP’s own HR recruitment system affecting up to 9,000 staff members, underlining the urgent need for robust data protection standards across all levels of institutional and public digital infrastructure;

Or. en

Amendment 267

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	9a. Stresses that European Digital Public Infrastructure should be recognised as a critical layer of Europe’s essential public services and democratic resilience, and therefore as a potential target of hybrid threats, given its role in digital identity, public administration, data governance, secure communications, access to essential services and the integrity of democratic processes;

Or. en

Amendment 268

Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Rasa Juknevičienė

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	9a. Recognises the contribution of SMEs, start-ups and innovative technology providers to the resilience and protection of critical infrastructure, and calls for their greater participation in relevant Union programmes, procurement schemes and public-private partnerships;

Or. en

Amendment 269

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	9b. Underlines that space-based infrastructure is a critical enabler of Europe’s security, defence, economy and essential services, as many civilian and military functions rely on satellite-enabled connectivity, navigation, timing and situational awareness; warns that hostile actors can target these capabilities through hybrid operations, including jamming, spoofing, cyber or physical attacks against space assets and ground infrastructure, or the exploitation of strategic dependencies; calls, therefore, for stronger resilience of EU space systems, including enhanced space situational awareness, protection of ground infrastructure, cybersecurity requirements, supply-chain security, regular exercises and alternative or backup PNT (Positioning, Navigation and Timing) capabilities;

Or. en

Amendment 270

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	9b. Calls on the Member States to urgently deliver the priority capabilities identified in the White Paper for European Defence, in particular air and missile defence, drones and counter-drone systems, military mobility, cyber, and electronic warfare and maritime capabilities;

Or. en

Amendment 271

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9 c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	9c. Highlights that the Union has a network of critical infrastructure that is performing as an interconnected system — including energy, water, transport, ports, airports, telecommunications, healthcare, public administration, space and defence— and cannot be protected in isolation; stresses that the more digitally connected the network is, the more vulnerabilities arise; recommends the Commission to explore the creation of European Defence Projects of Common Interest (EDPCIs) aimed at mapping out interdependencies, single points of failure and knock-on effects; as well as to develop and deploy large-scale cross-border technological solutions to protect critical infrastructure and trans-European networks against hybrid threats, including physical and cyber sabotage;

Or. en

Amendment 272

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9 c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	9c. Considers a resilient, competitive EU digital infrastructure – including secure local data centres, sovereign EU cloud, edge computing capacities, and gigabit networks as an important pillar of European Security; stresses the need to increase investment in secure, interoperable and resilient information-sharing systems and local data centres, which are not subject to extraterritorial legislation;

Or. en

Amendment 273

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9 d (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	9d. Underlines that the economic and financial sector is not only a target of hybrid threats, but also a potential enabler of hybrid operations; stresses that hostile actors can use economic coercion, energy pressure, supply disruptions and the exploitation of strategic dependencies to create leverage over Member States and influence political decision-making; warns that economic capture, strategic corruption, opaque patronage networks, manipulation of public procurement and risky foreign investments in sensitive sectors can undermine the Union’s security, public order and freedom of action;

Or. en

Amendment 274

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9 d (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	9d. Underlines that the space domain has become an increasingly important arena for hybrid warfare, with hostile actors targeting satellite-based communications, navigation and observation systems through cyber operations, jamming and spoofing; stresses that disruption of space assets can have significant consequences for Union's civil security, critical infrastructure, military mobility and crisis response capabilities; calls for the integration of the space domain into the Union's broader framework for countering hybrid threats;

Or. en

Amendment 275

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Subheading 3 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Economic and financial dimension

Or. en

Amendment 276

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9 e (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	9e. Highlights, in this regard, the importance of stronger EU screening of foreign investments in sensitive sectors such as defence, semiconductors, artificial intelligence, critical raw materials and financial services, in order to identify and address security and public order risks while preserving Europe’s openness to foreign capital; welcomes the strengthening of cooperation between national screening authorities and the Commission to better address cross-border security risks;

Or. en

Amendment 277

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9 f (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	9f. Expresses concern that illicit financial flows, including through cryptocurrencies, may be used to finance hostile influence operations, proxy networks, media capture, disinformation ecosystems and acts of sabotage; stresses the need to disrupt the financial infrastructure behind hybrid activities, including sanctions evasion, opaque ownership structures and the use of shadow fleets to preserve access to revenues, technologies and strategic goods; calls, therefore, for closer coordination between financial intelligence, sanctions authorities, law enforcement, investment screening mechanisms and EU economic security instruments;

Or. en

Amendment 278

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Subheading 3 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Whole-of-society resilience and preparedness

Or. en

Amendment 279

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9 g (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	9g. Recalls that hybrid threats target society as a whole, not only state institutions or military capabilities, as hostile actors exploit vulnerabilities across interconnected domains, services, communities and information spaces in order to generate cascading effects, undermine democratic decision-making and reduce the Union’s freedom of action;

Or. en

Amendment 280

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9 h (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	9h. Believes that trust and social cohesion are the cornerstone of the defence capabilities and the resilience ecosystem in their own right, since hostile actors seek to polarise societies, erode institutional trust, create fatigue and weaken collective resolve; underlines, therefore, that resilience against hybrid threats cannot be only military, technical or institutional, but must also strengthen democratic trust, reliable public services, public awareness and societal preparedness, as the basis for a new European security culture;

Or. en

Amendment 281

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9 i (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	9i. Highlights, in particular, that civil society, independent media and media literacy are central to resilience against hybrid threats and FIMI in particular, as a well-informed and critically engaged public is better able to detect manipulation, resist polarisation and respond to disinformation; stresses the need to support quality journalism, fact-checking, digital skills and pluralistic information ecosystems in full respect of fundamental rights and freedoms;

Or. en

Amendment 282

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9 j (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	9j. Warns that certain technological actors promote a model of society based on individualisation, behavioural manipulation and the concentration of digital power, in which collective decision-making risks being weakened or rendered secondary; expresses concern at technocratic and post-democratic visions that portray technological elites as superior to elected representatives and public institutions, using software, data and AI systems to shape social behaviour and accumulate global power; underlines that, in the context of hybrid threats, such trends can deepen societal fragmentation, distort the information space, amplify foreign interference and undermine democratic resilience; stresses that Europe must respond by building a human-centred, democratic and rights-based digital public infrastructure that strengthens social cohesion, pluralism, civic participation, public trust and collective reflection, ensuring that technology serves people and democracies rather than markets, monopolies or foreign powers;

Or. en

Amendment 283

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9 k (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	9k. Recalls that the integrity and resilience of electoral processes are at the core of the EU’s democratic foundations and constitute a key target of hybrid operations; underlines that FIMI and other hybrid activities tend to intensify during elections and that continued vigilance, preparedness and coordination are therefore essential to safeguard electoral integrity across the Union and in partner countries, including candidate countries and potential candidates; welcomes the Joint Communication “European Democracy Shield: Empowering Strong and Resilient Democracies” and the establishment of the European Centre for Democratic Resilience; stresses, however, that protecting elections requires going beyond fact-checking alone by strengthening a broader coalition for democracy, engaging civil society, independent media, local communities and often under-reached constituencies, and reinforcing societal resilience against manipulation, polarisation and foreign interference;

Or. en

Amendment 284

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9 l (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	9l. Calls on the Member States to adopt whole-of-government, whole-of-society and all-hazards approaches, prioritising resilience and preparedness as emphasised in the Niinistö report; urges the Member States and calls for the EU institutions to invest in democratic resilience; stresses that the European Democracy Shield presents a unique opportunity to establish and operationalise this approach; stresses, in this regard, the need for structured coordination rather than isolated responses, bringing together EU institutions, Member States, local authorities, the private sector, civil society, academia and independent media through trusted channels, common situational awareness, timely information-sharing and coordinated preparedness and response mechanisms across all relevant domains;

Or. en

Amendment 285

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9 m (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	9m. Welcomes, in this regard, the CORE model — Comprehensive Resilience Ecosystem — developed by the Hybrid CoE, which represents democratic society as an ecosystem composed of seven democratic foundations, thirteen domains, three spaces — civic, governance and services — and three layers — local, national and international; insists that resilience against hybrid threats cannot be built sector by sector alone, but must be developed systemically, taking into account dependencies and interdependencies across different parts of society; underlines that trust lies at the centre of the model, understood as the element that sustains healthy connections between institutions, citizens and services;

Or. en

Amendment 286

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9 n (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	9n. Notes that hybrid activities increasingly rely on civilian actors and that civilian and private capabilities have therefore become decisive, particularly in the cyber and cognitive domains, as demonstrated by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; further notes that technology facilitates a “democratisation” of the capacity to generate operational, cognitive and physical effects; highlights Ukraine as a source of best practices, where defence has largely relied on multilateralism, civil society participation and innovation, including cooperation with major technology companies and initiatives like the IT Army of Ukraine; stresses the need to further develop cooperation frameworks between civil society, private actors and public institutions in the defence of territorial integrity;

Or. en

Amendment 287

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9 o (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	9o. Calls on the EU institutions and the Member States to support in particular education, youth initiatives and research as key pillars of societal resilience against hybrid threats; stresses the need to invest in media literacy, civic education and critical thinking, with particular attention to education systems; calls for stronger support for researchers, universities, think tanks, fact-checkers, not-for-profit organisations and other public-interest actors working on disinformation and hybrid threat research; calls, in particular, for dedicated initiatives, such as youth bootcamps and training programmes on hybrid threats, to raise awareness, build practical skills and foster young people’s interest in security, resilience and democratic preparedness; recognises the efforts of initiatives like the EUISS (EU Institute for Security Studies), the ESDC (European Security and Defence College) and the Hybrid CoE in providing training, sharing knowledge and best practices to better respond to hybrid threats;

Or. en

Amendment 288

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Subheading 4

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
From fragmentation to coordinated and decisive response	From fragmentation to coordinated and decisive European response

Or. en

Amendment 289

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Michał Dworczyk

Motion for a resolution

Subheading 4 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Cultural Cleansing in Hybrid Warfare: Rewriting History and Destroying Heritage

Or. en

Amendment 290

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Michał Dworczyk

Motion for a resolution

Subheading 4 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Expresses concern about the use of historical revisionism, disinformation, active measures and the selective reinterpretation of historical events as tools deliberately employed to inflame societal divisions by deepening identity-based tensions, polarising public opinion and weakening the shared foundations of national and European cohesion; underlines that the manipulation of historical memory constitutes a serious threat to the foundations of the State, societal cohesion and democratic resilience; notes in this regard the long-standing efforts by the Russian Federation, through active measures, information manipulation and interference operations, to distort historical narratives related to the Soviet legacy, the Second World War and post-Soviet statehood in countries such as Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, including in temporarily occupied territories; stresses that such activities form part of a broader strategy aimed at undermining sovereignty, democratic institutions, social cohesion and the European aspirations of partner countries; recalls that these hostile influence operations constitute a significant threat to the security of the European Union and its Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 291

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Michał Dworczyk

Motion for a resolution

Subheading 4 c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Condemns the destruction, appropriation and ideological re-framing of cultural and historical heritage in areas affected by Russian occupation and military presence, in particular in Ukraine, as well as in Georgia’s Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia regions and Moldova’s Transnistria region, where cultural institutions, educational curricula and public historical narratives have been subject to political instrumentalisation; stresses that such practices form part of a broader hybrid strategy combining military, informational and cultural tools;

Or. en

Amendment 292

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Michał Dworczyk

Motion for a resolution

Subheading 4 d (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Underlines that Russian Federation’s ongoing aggressive actions, systemic looting of cultural and economic resources, and targeted destruction of sovereign infrastructure are not merely products of military conflict, but constitute a deliberate, structural objective of hybrid warfere to erode the national identity and sovereignty of independent nations; whereas the political leadership of the Russian Federation explicitly rejects the conventional definition of a nation-state, choosing instead to define itself as a distinct 'state-civilization' with self-ascribed, borderless spheres of influence, thereby posing a fundamental and permanent threat to the rules-based international order and European security;

Or. en

Amendment 293

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Michał Dworczyk

Motion for a resolution

Subheading 4 e (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Underlines that since the illegal, unprovoked, and unjustified invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the Russian armed forces have systematically targeted and destroyed Ukrainian cultural, historical, and religious assets, with UNESCO verifying damage to dozens of religious sites, museums, historic buildings, monuments, and libraries; underlines that the deliberate heavy bombing, shelling, and destruction of libraries, educational institutions, and heritage sites constitute a calculated campaign of cultural cleansing; further underlines that these actions are aimed at systematically erasing the historical identity, memory, and cultural sovereignty of the Ukrainian nation, serving Russia’s broader ideological objective to deny Ukraine’s right to exist as an independent nation-state and to absorb it into a self-defined, borderless 'state-civilisation'.

Or. en

Amendment 294

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Michał Dworczyk

Motion for a resolution

Subheading 4 f (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Expresses concern over the use of historical revisionism, disinformation and the retention of cultural property, archives and national treasures originating from European countries, including Romania and Poland, as tools of hybrid warfare aimed at undermining national identity, historical memory, societal cohesion and democratic resilience; calls on the Russian Federation to return cultural property from Romania, Poland and other countries retained in violation of international law;

Or. en

Amendment 295

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
10. Notes that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Member States are foundational principles of the EU; considers that the EU must move from a reactive to a proactive strategy that credibly raises the cost of hostile action; stresses that any violation of Member States’ sovereignty must be met with immediate retaliation; calls on the Commission and the Council to develop a cross-domain action plan against hybrid warfare, including calibrated EU retaliatory options proportionate to the severity of hostile activities and clear response chains complementing those of NATO; calls on the Member States, in coordination with NATO allies, to review rules of engagement across all threat domains in order to ensure timely and adequate responses to attacks on their sovereignty or critical infrastructure;	10. Notes that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Member States are foundational principles of the EU; stresses that any violation of Member States’ sovereignty must be met with immediate retaliation; considers that the EU must move from a reactive to a proactive strategy that credibly raises the cost of hostile action;

Or. en

Amendment 296

Alice Teodorescu Måwe

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
10. Notes that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Member States are foundational principles of the EU; considers that the EU must move from a reactive to a proactive strategy that credibly raises the cost of hostile action; stresses that any violation of Member States’ sovereignty must be met with immediate retaliation; calls on the Commission and the Council to develop a cross-domain action plan against hybrid warfare, including calibrated EU retaliatory options proportionate to the severity of hostile activities and clear response chains complementing those of NATO; calls on the Member States, in coordination with NATO allies, to review rules of engagement across all threat domains in order to ensure timely and adequate responses to attacks on their sovereignty or critical infrastructure;	10. Notes that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Member States are foundational principles of the EU; considers that the EU must move from a reactive to a proactive strategy that credibly raises the cost of hostile action; stresses that any violation of Member States’ sovereignty must be met with immediate retaliation; calls on the Commission to develop a common European framework for the classification of hostile state activities across the spectrum between peace and armed conflict; stresses that such a framework should establish clear categories of conflict and corresponding response mechanisms, enabling the Union and its Member States to attribute and respond proportionately and effectively to hostile actions against European security, sovereignty and democratic institutions, including through calibrated EU retaliatory options proportionate to the severity of hostile activities and with clear response chains complementing those of NATO; calls on the Member States, in coordination with NATO allies, to review rules of engagement across all threat domains in order to ensure timely and adequate responses to attacks on their sovereignty or critical infrastructure;

Or. en

Amendment 297

Engin Eroglu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
10. Notes that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Member States are foundational principles of the EU; considers that the EU must move from a reactive to a proactive strategy that credibly raises the cost of hostile action; stresses that any violation of Member States’ sovereignty must be met with immediate retaliation; calls on the Commission and the Council to develop a cross-domain action plan against hybrid warfare, including calibrated EU retaliatory options proportionate to the severity of hostile activities and clear response chains complementing those of NATO; calls on the Member States, in coordination with NATO allies, to review rules of engagement across all threat domains in order to ensure timely and adequate responses to attacks on their sovereignty or critical infrastructure;	10. Notes that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Member States are foundational principles of the EU; considers that the EU must move from a reactive to a proactive strategy that credibly raises the cost of hostile action and that is based on early attribution, enhanced resilience and credible deterrence; stresses that any violation of Member States’ sovereignty must be met with immediate and coordinated counter measures; calls on the Commission and the Council to develop a cross-domain action plan against hybrid warfare, including calibrated EU retaliatory options proportionate to the severity of hostile activities, clear response chains complementing those of NATO, as well as joint procedures for crisis response, information exchange and situational assessment; calls on the Member States, in coordination with NATO allies, to review rules of engagement across all threat domains in order to ensure timely and adequate responses to attacks on their sovereignty or critical infrastructure, including hybrid attacks below the threshold of armed conflict;

Or. de

Amendment 298

Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
10. Notes that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Member States are foundational principles of the EU; considers that the EU must move from a reactive to a proactive strategy that credibly raises the cost of hostile action; stresses that any violation of Member States’ sovereignty must be met with immediate retaliation; calls on the Commission and the Council to develop a cross-domain action plan against hybrid warfare, including calibrated EU retaliatory options proportionate to the severity of hostile activities and clear response chains complementing those of NATO; calls on the Member States, in coordination with NATO allies, to review rules of engagement across all threat domains in order to ensure timely and adequate responses to attacks on their sovereignty or critical infrastructure;	10. Notes that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Member States are foundational principles of the EU; considers that the EU must move from a reactive to a proactive strategy that credibly raises the cost of hostile action; stresses that any violation of Member States’ sovereignty must be met with immediate retaliation; calls on the Commission and the Council to develop a cross-domain action plan against hybrid warfare, including calibrated EU retaliatory options proportionate to the severity of hostile activities and clear response chains complementing those of NATO; calls on the Member States, in coordination with NATO allies, to review rules of engagement across all threat domains in order to ensure timely and adequate responses to attacks on their sovereignty or critical infrastructure; stresses, further, that such a strategy must take full account of the threats emanating from Europe’s southern flank, including those arising from instability in the Sahel, North Africa and the instrumentalisation of illegal immigration;

Or. es

Amendment 299

Nathalie Loiseau, Helmut Brandstätter

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
10. Notes that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Member States are foundational principles of the EU; considers that the EU must move from a reactive to a proactive strategy that credibly raises the cost of hostile action; stresses that any violation of Member States’ sovereignty must be met with immediate retaliation; calls on the Commission and the Council to develop a cross-domain action plan against hybrid warfare, including calibrated EU retaliatory options proportionate to the severity of hostile activities and clear response chains complementing those of NATO; calls on the Member States, in coordination with NATO allies, to review rules of engagement across all threat domains in order to ensure timely and adequate responses to attacks on their sovereignty or critical infrastructure;	10. Notes that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Member States, including their outermost regions and OCTs, are foundational principles of the EU; considers that the EU must move from a reactive to a proactive strategy that credibly raises the cost of hostile action; stresses that any violation of Member States’ sovereignty must be met with immediate retaliation; condemns in that respect the persistent occupation of the Northern part of the Island of Cyprus by Turkey; calls on the Commission and the Council to develop a cross-domain action plan against hybrid warfare, including calibrated EU retaliatory options proportionate to the severity of hostile activities and clear response chains complementing those of NATO while allowing the EU and the Member States to act alone should it be required by the circumstances; calls on the Member States to review rules of engagement across all threat domains in order to ensure timely and adequate responses to attacks on their sovereignty or critical infrastructure;

Or. en

Amendment 300

Rachel Blom

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
10. Notes that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Member States are foundational principles of the EU; considers that the EU must move from a reactive to a proactive strategy that credibly raises the cost of hostile action; stresses that any violation of Member States’ sovereignty must be met with immediate retaliation; calls on the Commission and the Council to develop a cross-domain action plan against hybrid warfare, including calibrated EU retaliatory options proportionate to the severity of hostile activities and clear response chains complementing those of NATO; calls on the Member States, in coordination with NATO allies, to review rules of engagement across all threat domains in order to ensure timely and adequate responses to attacks on their sovereignty or critical infrastructure;	10. Notes that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Member States are foundational principles of the EU; calls on the Council to develop a cross-domain action plan against hybrid warfare, including calibrated EU retaliatory options proportionate to the severity of hostile activities and clear response chains complementing those of NATO; calls on the Member States, in coordination with NATO allies, to review rules of engagement across all threat domains in order to ensure timely and adequate responses to attacks on their sovereignty or critical infrastructure;

Or. en

Amendment 301

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
10. Notes that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Member States are foundational principles of the EU; considers that the EU must move from a reactive to a proactive strategy that credibly raises the cost of hostile action; stresses that any violation of Member States’ sovereignty must be met with immediate retaliation; calls on the Commission and the Council to develop a cross-domain action plan against hybrid warfare, including calibrated EU retaliatory options proportionate to the severity of hostile activities and clear response chains complementing those of NATO; calls on the Member States, in coordination with NATO allies, to review rules of engagement across all threat domains in order to ensure timely and adequate responses to attacks on their sovereignty or critical infrastructure;	10. Notes that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Member States are foundational principles of the EU; recognises the work done by the Commission and the EEAS in implementing a strategic approach to countering Russia’s hybrid activities; considers that the EU must move from a reactive to a proactive strategy that credibly raises the cost of hostile action; stresses that any violation of Member States’ sovereignty must be met with timely, proportionate and coordinated retaliation measures; calls on the Commission, the High Representative and the Council to strengthen a cross-domain action plan against hybrid threats, including calibrated EU retaliatory options proportionate to the severity of hostile activities and clear response chains complementing those of NATO; calls on the Member States, in coordination with NATO allies, to review rules of engagement across all threat domains in order to ensure timely and adequate responses to attacks on their sovereignty or critical infrastructure;

Or. en

Amendment 302

Christophe Gomart

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
10. Notes that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Member States are foundational principles of the EU; considers that the EU must move from a reactive to a proactive strategy that credibly raises the cost of hostile action; stresses that any violation of Member States’ sovereignty must be met with immediate retaliation; calls on the Commission and the Council to develop a cross-domain action plan against hybrid warfare, including calibrated EU retaliatory options proportionate to the severity of hostile activities and clear response chains complementing those of NATO; calls on the Member States, in coordination with NATO allies, to review rules of engagement across all threat domains in order to ensure timely and adequate responses to attacks on their sovereignty or critical infrastructure;	10. Notes that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Member States are foundational principles of the EU; considers that the EU must move from a reactive to a proactive strategy that credibly raises the cost of hostile action; stresses that any violation of Member States’ sovereignty must be met with immediate retaliation; calls on the Commission and the Council to develop, in support of the Member States and without creating any new powers for the Union, a cross-domain action plan against hybrid warfare, including calibrated EU retaliatory options proportionate to the severity of hostile activities and clear response chains complementing those of NATO; calls on the Member States, in coordination with NATO allies, to review rules of engagement across all threat domains in order to ensure timely and adequate responses to attacks on their sovereignty or critical infrastructure;

Or. fr

Amendment 303

Christophe Bay, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, György Hölvényi

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
10. Notes that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Member States are foundational principles of the EU; considers that the EU must move from a reactive to a proactive strategy that credibly raises the cost of hostile action; stresses that any violation of Member States’ sovereignty must be met with immediate retaliation; calls on the Commission and the Council to develop a cross-domain action plan against hybrid warfare, including calibrated EU retaliatory options proportionate to the severity of hostile activities and clear response chains complementing those of NATO; calls on the Member States, in coordination with NATO allies, to review rules of engagement across all threat domains in order to ensure timely and adequate responses to attacks on their sovereignty or critical infrastructure;	10. Notes that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Member States are foundational principles of the EU; considers that the Member States, with the support of the Union where this provides added value, must move from a reactive to a proactive strategy that credibly raises the cost of hostile action; stresses that any violation of Member States’ sovereignty must be met with a swift response; stresses that the response to such operations must be firm, proportionate and measured, in order to avoid any direct military escalation with a nuclear power such as Russia; asks the Council, in conjunction with the Member States, to draw up a cross-domain action plan against hybrid warfare, comprising calibrated response options, including diplomatic, economic, cyber, judicial and, where appropriate, restrictive measures;

Or. fr

Amendment 304

Urmas Paet, Lucia Yar, Petras Auštrevičius

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10 – point 1 (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	(1) Stresses that effective deterrence requires timely public attribution of hybrid attacks and the systematic use of diplomatic, legal, economic and restrictive measures against perpetrators and their sponsors;

Or. en

Amendment 305

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	10a. Welcomes the progress made and the ongoing implementation of EU measures and initiatives supporting the detection, prevention, resilience, deterrence and response to hybrid threats, as well as the establishment, operationalisation and successful deployments of the EU Hybrid Rapid Response Teams; recognises their added value in supporting Member States, partners and CSDP missions and operations at their request; stresses, however, that the EU’s response remains fragmented across governments, EU institutions, private companies and regulatory bodies, each operating under different mandates, procedures and constraints, creating a patchwork of defensive activity against hybrid threats whose seams are frequently exploited by hostile actors; therefore calls for stronger European capabilities and common protocols to defend against, disrupt, deter and respond to hybrid threats across domains, in full complementarity with NATO;

Or. en

Amendment 306

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	10a. Stresses that effective deterrence requires the establishment of shared frameworks and methodologies to detect, identify, and attribute responsibility for attacks; calls on the Commission and the Council to develop a cross-domain action plan against hybrid warfare, including strengthened civil-military cooperation, operational playbooks and response protocols that enable collaborative and efficient responses, calibrated EU retaliatory options proportionate to the severity of hostile activities and clear response chains complementing those of NATO; calls for the designation of a single point of coordination at EU level, with the Commissioner for Defence and Space assuming a leading coordination role and responsible for establishing a genuine whole-of-Union approach to hybrid threats;

Or. en

Amendment 307

Engin Eroglu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	10a. Stresses further the need for the EU and its Member States to have credible capabilities for active cyber counter-measures and cyber-attacks in order to respond to serious hybrid and cyber-based attacks against critical infrastructure, state entities and democratic processes; calls on the Commission and the Member States to assess the legal and operational conditions for proportionate cyber-counterattacks that comply with international law and are based on sufficient attribution, and to develop common European procedures for their use;

Or. de

Amendment 308

Alberico Gambino, Elena Donazzan

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	10a. Stresses that effective deterrence against hybrid threats depends on the Union’s ability to prevent, detect and attribute hostile activities in a timely and credible manner; calls for strengthened intelligence-sharing, joint analysis and attribution mechanisms among Member States and relevant Union institutions in order to increase accountability and raise the costs for hostile actors;

Or. en

Amendment 309

Alice Teodorescu Måwe

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	10a. Stresses that effective deterrence requires the ability to rapidly identify and attribute non-armed attacks to the State or actors responsible; calls for enhanced European capacities for intelligence-sharing, forensic investigation and coordinated attribution in response to all types of aggression targeting the Union or its Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 310

Elena Donazzan, Alberico Gambino, Cristian Terheş

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	10a. Considers that deterrence in the hybrid domain must be based not only on responsive capability, but also on prevention, anticipation of emerging threats and continuous monitoring of strategic vulnerabilities, in order to render hostile actions ineffective before they produce systemic effects;

Or. it

Amendment 311

Marta Wcisło

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	10a. Calls on the Commission, the EEAS and the Council to develop a European Hybrid Threat Response Protocol establishing common activation criteria, response timelines, coordination mechanisms and operational procedures for responding to hybrid attacks;

Or. en

Amendment 312

Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Rasa Juknevičienė

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	10a. Calls on the Member States and the Commission to conduct regular Union-wide preparedness and resilience exercises covering hybrid attack scenarios affecting critical infrastructure, supply chains, energy systems and essential public services;

Or. en

Amendment 313

Alice Teodorescu Måwe

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	10b. Proposes the recognition of non-armed conflict as a distinct category within the European security framework, situated between peace and armed conflict, and defined as a condition in which a State, or actors acting on its behalf, employ hostile measures, including cyberattacks, sabotage, economic coercion, disinformation campaigns, political interference or other coercive activities, with the intent of weakening, coercing or undermining another State, while remaining below the threshold of open and recurring military violence; stresses that such actions should not be regarded as occurring in a state of peace and should be met with appropriate, proportionate and coordinated responses by the Union and its Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 314

Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Rasa Juknevičienė

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	10b. Stresses that the Union’s response to hybrid threats should be integrated into its broader economic security strategy, including measures aimed at strengthening resilience in critical sectors and reducing strategic vulnerabilities;

Or. en

Amendment 315

Marta Wcisło

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	10b. Stresses that the European Hybrid Threat Response Protocol should be agile by design, modular in structure and subject to regular review in order to adapt rapidly to evolving hostile tactics, technologies and methods of operation;

Or. en

Amendment 316

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	10b. New subsection title (paragraphs 11 to 14a, including new ones): Situational awareness and policymaking

Or. en

Amendment 317

Alice Teodorescu Måwe

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10 c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	10c. Calls for the creation of a European conflict-spectrum framework, which should distinguish between:
	(a) peace, characterised by relations conducted through diplomacy and normal state interaction;
	(b) non-armed conflict, characterised by the systematic use of hostile measures intended to inflict harm, exert coercion or undermine the security, sovereignty or democratic resilience of another State without the open and recurring use of military force;
	(c) armed conflict, characterised by the open and recurring use of military force between parties, and;
	(d) war, characterised by the large-scale mobilisation and employment of national instruments of power with the objective of defeating an adversary;

Or. en

Amendment 318

Marta Wcisło

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10 c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	10c. Calls for the operational integration and sequencing of existing EU instruments, including the Hybrid Toolbox, the FIMI Toolbox, the Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox, the Digital Services Act, the NIS2 Directive, the CER Directive and ProtectEU, in order to ensure coordinated and timely and proportionate responses to hybrid threats;

Or. en

Amendment 319

Rachel Blom

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
11. Highlights the EU’s unique added value in aggregating cross-border data to detect patterns of coordinated hybrid campaigns that no Member State can identify on its own; calls for this cross-border pattern-recognition function to be formally recognised as a core EU competence;insists that a permanent Russian crisis cell be established; believes that intelligence sharing needs to be urgently advanced;	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 320

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
11. Highlights the EU’s unique added value in aggregating cross-border data to detect patterns of coordinated hybrid campaigns that no Member State can identify on its own; calls for this cross-border pattern-recognition function to be formally recognised as a core EU competence;insists that a permanent Russian crisis cell be established; believes that intelligence sharing needs to be urgently advanced;	11. Stresses that hybrid threats require a shared threat picture, as frequently targeted sectors cannot respond effectively on the basis of isolated incident reports; Highlights the EU’s unique added value in aggregating cross-border data to detect patterns of coordinated hybrid campaigns that no Member State can identify on its own; stresses, in this regard, the need for interoperability protocols between existing EU and national platforms dealing with FIMI, cybersecurity, threat analysis, transnational crime and critical infrastructure, supported by a common cross-domain taxonomy able to recognise cognitive signals as operational indicators of hybrid threats; calls for this cross-border pattern-recognition function to be formally recognised as a core EU competence; insists that a permanent Russian crisis cell be established; believes that intelligence sharing needs to be urgently advanced;

Or. en

Amendment 321

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
11. Highlights the EU’s unique added value in aggregating cross-border data to detect patterns of coordinated hybrid campaigns that no Member State can identify on its own; calls for this cross-border pattern-recognition function to be formally recognised as a core EU competence;insists that a permanent Russian crisis cell be established; believes that intelligence sharing needs to be urgently advanced;	11. Highlights the EU’s unique added value in aggregating cross-border data to detect patterns of coordinated hybrid campaigns that no Member State can identify on its own as well as in coordinating the development of shared frameworks, methodologies, taxonomies, playbooks, and response protocols that would support operational cooperation between Member States; calls for these functions — cross-border pattern-recognition and the development of common operational standards — to be formally recognised as a core EU coordination and support functions, significantly increasing situational awareness;

Or. en

Amendment 322

Christophe Gomart

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
11. Highlights the EU’s unique added value in aggregating cross-border data to detect patterns of coordinated hybrid campaigns that no Member State can identify on its own; calls for this cross-border pattern-recognition function to be formally recognised as a core EU competence;insists that a permanent Russian crisis cell be established; believes that intelligence sharing needs to be urgently advanced;	11. Highlights the EU’s unique added value in aggregating cross-border data to detect patterns of coordinated hybrid campaigns that no Member State can identify on its own; calls for this cross-border pattern-recognition function to be formally recognised as a core EU competence; insists that a permanent Russian crisis cell be established; believes that intelligence sharing needs to be urgently advanced, whilst strictly respecting the sovereignty of Member States, the ‘need-to-know’ principle and the protection of classified national information;

Or. fr

Amendment 323

Nathalie Loiseau, Helmut Brandstätter

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
11. Highlights the EU’s unique added value in aggregating cross-border data to detect patterns of coordinated hybrid campaigns that no Member State can identify on its own; calls for this cross-border pattern-recognition function to be formally recognised as a core EU competence;insists that a permanent Russian crisis cell be established; believes that intelligence sharing needs to be urgently advanced;	11. Highlights the EU’s unique added value in aggregating cross-border data to detect patterns of coordinated hybrid campaigns that no Member State can identify on its own; calls for this cross-border pattern-recognition function to be formally recognised as a core EU competence;insists that a permanent Russian crisis cell be established; insists however that the EU needs a 360 approach and flexibility, including the ability to establish such cells whenever it is deemed necessary; believes that intelligence sharing needs to be urgently advanced;

Or. en

Amendment 324

Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Rasa Juknevičienė

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
11. Highlights the EU’s unique added value in aggregating cross-border data to detect patterns of coordinated hybrid campaigns that no Member State can identify on its own; calls for this cross-border pattern-recognition function to be formally recognised as a core EU competence;insists that a permanent Russian crisis cell be established; believes that intelligence sharing needs to be urgently advanced;	11. Highlights the EU’s unique added value in aggregating cross-border data to detect patterns of coordinated hybrid campaigns that no Member State can identify on its own; calls for this cross-border pattern-recognition function to be formally recognised as a core EU competence;insists that a permanent Russian crisis cell be established; believes that intelligence sharing needs to be urgently advanced; and calls for the gradual development of a stronger European culture of intelligence cooperation among Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 325

Christophe Bay, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, György Hölvényi, Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
11. Highlights the EU’s unique added value in aggregating cross-border data to detect patterns of coordinated hybrid campaigns that no Member State can identify on its own; calls for this cross-border pattern-recognition function to be formally recognised as a core EU competence;insists that a permanent Russian crisis cell be established; believes that intelligence sharing needs to be urgently advanced;	11. Stresses the added value of European cooperation in aggregating cross-border data to detect patterns of coordinated hybrid campaigns that Member States cannot always identify on their own; nevertheless underscores that intelligence is an essential national competence; calls for the sharing of information between Member States to be strengthened on a voluntary, secure and reciprocal basis, whilst respecting national defence confidentiality and data protection

Or. fr

Amendment 326

Villy Søvndal

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
11. Highlights the EU’s unique added value in aggregating cross-border data to detect patterns of coordinated hybrid campaigns that no Member State can identify on its own; calls for this cross-border pattern-recognition function to be formally recognised as a core EU competence;insists that a permanent Russian crisis cell be established; believes that intelligence sharing needs to be urgently advanced;	11. Highlights the EU’s unique added value in aggregating cross-border data to detect patterns of coordinated hybrid campaigns that no Member State can identify on its own; calls for this cross-border pattern-recognition function to be formally recognised as a core EU competence; insists that a permanent crisis cell dealing with Russia-related threats be established; believes that intelligence sharing needs to be urgently advanced;

Or. en

Amendment 327

Merja Kyllönen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
11. Highlights the EU’s unique added value in aggregating cross-border data to detect patterns of coordinated hybrid campaigns that no Member State can identify on its own; calls for this cross-border pattern-recognition function to be formally recognised as a core EU competence;insists that a permanent Russian crisis cell be established; believes that intelligence sharing needs to be urgently advanced;	11. Highlights the EU’s unique added value in aggregating cross-border data to detect patterns of coordinated hybrid campaigns that no Member State can identify on its own; calls for this cross-border pattern-recognition function to be formally recognised as a core EU competence;insists that a permanent Russian crisis cell be established; underlines that intelligence sharing needs to be urgently advanced;

Or. en

Amendment 328

Michał Dworczyk, Cristian Terheş

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
11. Highlights the EU’s unique added value in aggregating cross-border data to detect patterns of coordinated hybrid campaigns that no Member State can identify on its own; calls for this cross-border pattern-recognition function to be formally recognised as a core EU competence;insists that a permanent Russian crisis cell be established; believes that intelligence sharing needs to be urgently advanced;	11. Highlights the EU’s unique added value in aggregating cross-border data to detect patterns of coordinated hybrid campaigns that no Member State can identify on its own; calls for this cross-border pattern-recognition function to be formally recognised as a core EU capability; insists that a permanent Russian crisis cell be established; believes that intelligence sharing needs to be urgently advanced;

Or. en

Amendment 329

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	11a. Recalls that hybrid threats — including foreign interference, cyber operations, economic coercion and disinformation campaigns — blur the line between internal and external security and often affect domains where the Union has policy responsibility but limited intelligence capacity, while intelligence should be treated as an indispensable input to strategy and policymaking; calls, therefore, for significant investment in EU intelligence and information security to demonstrate credible protection of sensitive reporting while building trust that Member States’ contributions are protected, used responsibly and purposefully; stresses the need for data-driven intelligence-based assessments to be systematically integrated into EU planning, crisis management and policy development; indicates that twenty-three EU Member States are also NATO Allies and thus, the challenge is not access to intelligence but the absence of pathways to integrate existing insights into EU deliberations which can be delivered through discipline, leadership, and political commitment;

Or. en

Amendment 330

Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius, Urmas Paet, Engin Eroglu, Lucia Yar

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	11a. Calls to establish a 'Black Book of Hybrid Aggression by Russia and China’ in order to publicly document every hybrid operation from the past ten years available from open source against the European Union and its Member States; insists that the 'Black Book' be discussed in Council in order to impose further costs to the states in question; further insists that the Black Book be updated each year and to present it to the European Parliament on an annual basis;

Or. en

Amendment 331

Marta Wcisło

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	11a. Calls for the establishment of a permanent EU-level hybrid threat attribution mechanism bringing together relevant intelligence, law-enforcement, cyber-security and financial-investigation capacities in order to support timely and credible attribution of hostile activities;

Or. en

Amendment 332

Vasile Dîncu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	11a. Calls for the establishment of a European Centre for Democratic Resilience to support Member States in threat analysis, FIMI attribution, resilience training, democratic preparedness exercises and coordination with civil society and academic institutions;

Or. en

Amendment 333

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	11a. Calls for the establishment of a European hybrid-threat monitoring platform for unmanned systems, hosted by the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell and coordinated with the EUMS under the EU Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity;

Or. en

Amendment 334

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	11b. Urges the Member States to intensify intelligence-sharing with EU INTCEN and the EUMS Intelligence Directorate, and to strengthen SIAC and its Hybrid Fusion Cell by reinforcing their resources and capacity to gather, process and integrate relevant information in order to produce and disseminate intelligence-based assessments at EU level for situational awareness, strategic foresight and policymaking; underlines, in this regard, the specific role of the EU Satellite Centre (EU SatCen) in providing satellite imagery analysis and geospatial intelligence;

Or. en

Amendment 335

Marta Wcisło

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	11b. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to strengthen the monitoring of financial flows linked to hybrid operations, including the financing of proxy organisations, influence networks, disinformation campaigns and sabotage activities;

Or. en

Amendment 336

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11 c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	11c. Calls on the EU institutions, in cooperation with the Member States and the EEAS, to explore a secure — need-to-know and need-to-share — information-sharing system, whereby the EU would act as a facilitator connecting public authorities, relevant EU, national and international bodies, critical infrastructure operators, private companies, and trusted threat-information sources, in order to strengthen collective situational awareness while ensuring the utmost protection of sensitive information; believes that such a system would incentivise participating bodies to share information by enabling them to benefit from a more complete threat picture and higher-quality intelligence products, while progressively building the trust required for meaningful information-sharing; recalls, in this regard, the example of Europol’s SOCTA, which shows how an EU-level body can produce strategic threat assessments and a common analytical picture when relevant trusted stakeholders share structured information through a trusted process; believes that this logic could inspire a similar EU-level approach to hybrid threats, allowing the Union to detect cross-border patterns, connect isolated incidents and support better political and operational decision-making;

Or. en

Amendment 337

Villy Søvndal

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
12. Insists on the need to urgently advance towards a genuine European Defence Union, complementing NATO;	12. Deplores the reluctance of the Council and the EU Member States when it comes to the lack of ambition as regards cooperation in the defence domains at EU level; calls on the Member States to join forces and support a quantum leap towards a very ambitious and comprehensive European framework on defence; insists on the need to urgently define what is meant by a true European Defence Union, which should complement NATO;

Or. en

Amendment 338

Jorge Buxadé Villalba, György Hölvényi

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
12. Insists on the need to urgently advance towards a genuine European Defence Union, complementing NATO;	12. Insists on the need to ramp up cooperation between EU Member States on security and defence, in full complementarity with NATO and in full respect of national competences and Member States’ primary, unwaivable and irreplaceable responsibility with regard to defence and national security;

Or. es

Amendment 339

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
12. Insists on the need to urgently advance towards a genuine European Defence Union, complementing NATO;	12. Insists on the need to urgently advance towards a genuine European Defence Union, complementing NATO and going substantially beyond current frameworks; underlines that only through deeper integration and coordination, civil-military partnership, can the EU respond effectively to escalating hybrid and conventional threats;

Or. en

Amendment 340

Vasile Dîncu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
12. Insists on the need to urgently advance towards a genuine European Defence Union, complementing NATO;	12. Insists on the need to urgently advance towards a genuine European Defence Union, complementing NATO; stresses that this Union must eliminate cross-border bottlenecks in military mobility and foster a robust, coordinated European defense procurement strategies that enhance interoperability across allied nations;

Or. en

Amendment 341

Merja Kyllönen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
12. Insists on the need to urgently advance towards a genuine European Defence Union, complementing NATO;	12. Acknowledges that the Union was founded on the principles of peace and solidarity; notes the fundamental change in the security environment since the beginning of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine; insists on the need to urgently advance towards a genuine European Defence Union, complementing NATO;

Or. en

Amendment 342

Christophe Bay, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, György Hölvényi, Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
12. Insists on the need to urgently advance towards a genuine European Defence Union, complementing NATO;	12. Insists on the need to strengthen Member States’ defence capabilities, interoperability amongst European allies, Europe's defence industrial and technological base, and operational cooperation, whilst respecting national sovereignty and the specific characteristics of Member States’ defence policies;

Or. fr

Amendment 343

Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Rasa Juknevičienė

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
12. Insists on the need to urgently advance towards a genuine European Defence Union, complementing NATO;	12. Insists on the need to urgently advance towards a genuine European Defence Union, complementing NATO; and stresses that greater defence integration must be accompanied by enhanced preparedness, military mobility and operational readiness across the Union;

Or. en

Amendment 344

Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
12. Insists on the need to urgently advance towards a genuine European Defence Union, complementing NATO;	12. Insists on the need to urgently advance towards a genuine European Defence Union, completing NATO; invites Member States to advance on a more coordinated EU Defence policy involving the entire EDTIB as well as the relevant EU institutions and bodies;

Or. en

Amendment 345

Alexandr Vondra

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
12. Insists on the need to urgently advance towards a genuine European Defence Union, complementing NATO;	12. Insists on the need to strengthen European defence capabilities within NATO and in full complementarity with NATO, which remains the cornerstone of collective defence in Europe;

Or. en

Amendment 346

Nathalie Loiseau

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
12. Insists on the need to urgently advance towards a genuine European Defence Union, complementing NATO;	12. Insists on the need to urgently advance towards a genuine European Defence Union, as the European pilar of NATO, enabling the EU and the Member States to be on par with the United States and allowing them to act alone when it is necessary;

Or. en

Amendment 347

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
12. Insists on the need to urgently advance towards a genuine European Defence Union, complementing NATO;	12. Insists on the need to urgently advance towards a genuine European Defence Union, complementing NATO; insists on the need to establish a Europea security, intelligence and defence ecosystem, with a solid public-private cooperation;

Or. en

Amendment 348

Christophe Gomart

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
12. Insists on the need to urgently advance towards a genuine European Defence Union, complementing NATO;	12. Insists on the urgent need to strengthen European defence cooperation, whilst respecting the Member States’ exclusive prerogatives in matters of national defence and the intergovernmental nature of this policy;

Or. fr

Amendment 349

Engin Eroglu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
12. Insists on the need to urgently advance towards a genuine European Defence Union, complementing NATO;	12. Insists on the need to urgently advance towards a genuine European Defence Union, complementing NATO, including the creation of a genuine European single market for defence products;

Or. de

Amendment 350

Rachel Blom

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
12. Insists on the need to urgently advance towards a genuine European Defence Union, complementing NATO;	12. Insists on the need for the EU to concentrate on using its regulatory capacity on improving the internal market for the defence industry, in order to support the Member states and strengthen NATO;

Or. en

Amendment 351

Michał Dworczyk, Cristian Terheş

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
12. Insists on the need to urgently advance towards a genuine European Defence Union, complementing NATO;	12. Insists on the need to urgently strengthen European defence readiness and capabilities, in full complementarity with NATO, which remains the cornerstone of collective defence for its members;

Or. en

Amendment 352

Villy Søvndal

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 13

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
13. Stresses that a range of Russia’s hybrid activities against the EU amounts to state-sponsored terrorism; encourages the Member States to use all available legal tools to counter them, including the solidarity clause (Article 222 TFEU); regrets that while the solidarity clause has been operationalised, it has never been invoked, despite major terrorist attacks within the EU that could have warranted its activation;	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 353

Christophe Bay, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, György Hölvényi, Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 13

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
13. Stresses that a range of Russia’s hybrid activities against the EU amounts to state-sponsored terrorism; encourages the Member States to use all available legal tools to counter them, including the solidarity clause (Article 222 TFEU); regrets that while the solidarity clause has been operationalised, it has never been invoked, despite major terrorist attacks within the EU that could have warranted its activation;	13. Condemns hybrid activities, acts of sabotage, cyber-attacks and destabilisation operations attributable to foreign powers, including Russia; encourages the Member States to use all available legal tools to address them; stresses, however, that the activation of solidarity or assistance mechanisms must never automatically lead to a direct military escalation, nor should it take the place of each Member State’s sovereign assessment;

Or. fr

Amendment 354

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 13

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
13. Stresses that a range of Russia’s hybrid activities against the EU amounts to state-sponsored terrorism; encourages the Member States to use all available legal tools to counter them, including the solidarity clause (Article 222 TFEU); regrets that while the solidarity clause has been operationalised, it has never been invoked, despite major terrorist attacks within the EU that could have warranted its activation;	13. Stresses that a range of Russia’s hybrid activities against the EU amounts to state-sponsored terrorism; encourages the Member States to use all available legal tools to counter them, including the solidarity clause (Article 222 TFEU); notes that while the solidarity clause has been operationalised, it has never been invoked, despite major terrorist attacks within the EU that could have warranted its activation;

Or. en

Amendment 355

Alexandr Vondra

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 13 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	13a. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to address the deliberate instrumentalisation of irregular migration by hostile regimes as a form of hybrid warfare, including through enhanced border protection, strengthened Frontex support and closer cooperation with affected Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 356

Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 13 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	13a. Welcomes the recent Return Regulation as an essential component in reducing pull factors, therefore serving to dissuade or reduce the effectiveness of hostile actors using immigration as a hybrid attack tool;

Or. es

Amendment 357

Marta Wcisło

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 13 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	13a. Stresses that the cumulative effect of coordinated hybrid activities may constitute a severe threat to European security and should therefore be assessed on the basis of their combined strategic impact rather than as isolated incidents;

Or. en

Amendment 358

Rachel Blom

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
14. Calls for both the solidarity clause and the mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU) to be further operationalised in hybrid and armed aggression scenarios, including through regular exercises simulating their activation; calls on the Commission and the Council to issue guidelines clarifying the conditions and procedures for activating the mutual assistance clause; calls on the Commission, together with the Member States, to develop a decision-making playbook for severe crisis scenarios, setting out the catalogue of civil and military means and capabilities available to the Governments of the Member States under both clauses, as well as the activation thresholds and the EU institutional roles;	deleted

Or. en

Amendment 359

Michał Dworczyk, Cristian Terheş

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
14. Calls for both the solidarity clause and the mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU) to be further operationalised in hybrid and armed aggression scenarios, including through regular exercises simulating their activation; calls on the Commission and the Council to issue guidelines clarifying the conditions and procedures for activating the mutual assistance clause; calls on the Commission, together with the Member States, to develop a decision-making playbook for severe crisis scenarios, setting out the catalogue of civil and military means and capabilities available to the Governments of the Member States under both clauses, as well as the activation thresholds and the EU institutional roles;	14. Calls for both the solidarity clause and the mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU) to be further operationalised in hybrid and armed aggression scenarios, including through regular exercises simulating their activation, without prejudice to the national competences of Member States in matters of national defence and to NATO’s role as the cornerstone of collective defence for its members; calls on the Commission and the Council to issue guidelines clarifying the conditions and procedures for activating the mutual assistance clause; calls on the Commission, together with the Member States, to develop a decision-making playbook for severe crisis scenarios, setting out the catalogue of civil and military means and capabilities available to the Governments of the Member States under both clauses, as well as the activation thresholds and the EU institutional roles; stresses that these instruments must complement, and not replace or duplicate, NATO mechanisms, and must not be used in a manner that could weaken the transatlantic partnership or undermine NATO’s role in ensuring security and collective defence in Europe;

Or. en

Amendment 360

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
14. Calls for both the solidarity clause and the mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU) to be further operationalised in hybrid and armed aggression scenarios, including through regular exercises simulating their activation; calls on the Commission and the Council to issue guidelines clarifying the conditions and procedures for activating the mutual assistance clause; calls on the Commission, together with the Member States, to develop a decision-making playbook for severe crisis scenarios, setting out the catalogue of civil and military means and capabilities available to the Governments of the Member States under both clauses, as well as the activation thresholds and the EU institutional roles;	14. Calls for both the solidarity clause and the mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU) to be further operationalised in hybrid and armed aggression scenarios, including through regular and comprehensive cross sectoral exercises simulating their activation; recommends building on and further strengthening existing cooperation initiatives; calls on the Commission and the Council to issue guidelines clarifying the conditions and procedures for activating the mutual assistance clause; calls on the Commission, together with the Member States, to develop a decision-making playbook and crisis protocols to be used in severe crisis scenarios, setting out the catalogue of civil and military means and capabilities available to the Governments of the Member States under both clauses, as well as the activation thresholds and the EU institutional roles; calls for better alignment between EU and NATO preparedness frameworks, including through the alignment of NATO Baseline Requirements with EU minimum preparedness requirements;

Or. en

Amendment 361

Vasile Dîncu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
14. Calls for both the solidarity clause and the mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU) to be further operationalised in hybrid and armed aggression scenarios, including through regular exercises simulating their activation; calls on the Commission and the Council to issue guidelines clarifying the conditions and procedures for activating the mutual assistance clause; calls on the Commission, together with the Member States, to develop a decision-making playbook for severe crisis scenarios, setting out the catalogue of civil and military means and capabilities available to the Governments of the Member States under both clauses, as well as the activation thresholds and the EU institutional roles;	14. Calls for both the solidarity clause and the mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU) to be further operationalised in hybrid and armed aggression scenarios, including through regular exercises simulating their activation; calls on the Commission and the Council to issue guidelines clarifying the conditions and procedures for activating the mutual assistance clause; calls on the Commission, together with the Member States, to develop a decision-making playbook for severe crisis scenarios, setting out the catalogue of civil and military means and capabilities available to the Governments of the Member States under both clauses, as well as the activation thresholds and the EU institutional roles; stresses the need for rapid-response mechanisms tailored for border Member States which face immediate risks stemming from proximity to conflict zones and hybrid operations;

Or. en

Amendment 362

Alexandr Vondra

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
14. Calls for both the solidarity clause and the mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU) to be further operationalised in hybrid and armed aggression scenarios, including through regular exercises simulating their activation; calls on the Commission and the Council to issue guidelines clarifying the conditions and procedures for activating the mutual assistance clause; calls on the Commission, together with the Member States, to develop a decision-making playbook for severe crisis scenarios, setting out the catalogue of civil and military means and capabilities available to the Governments of the Member States under both clauses, as well as the activation thresholds and the EU institutional roles;	14. Calls for both the solidarity clause and the mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU) to be further operationalised in hybrid and armed aggression scenarios, including through regular exercises simulating their activation; calls on the Commission and the Council to issue guidelines clarifying the conditions and procedures for activating the mutual assistance clause; calls on the Commission, together with the Member States, to develop a decision-making playbook for severe crisis scenarios, setting out the catalogue of civil and military means and capabilities available to the Governments of the Member States under both clauses, as well as the activation thresholds and the EU institutional roles; stresses that the activation of Articles 42(7) TEU must remain subject to the sovereign decision of the affected Member State;

Or. en

Amendment 363

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
14. Calls for both the solidarity clause and the mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU) to be further operationalised in hybrid and armed aggression scenarios, including through regular exercises simulating their activation; calls on the Commission and the Council to issue guidelines clarifying the conditions and procedures for activating the mutual assistance clause; calls on the Commission, together with the Member States, to develop a decision-making playbook for severe crisis scenarios, setting out the catalogue of civil and military means and capabilities available to the Governments of the Member States under both clauses, as well as the activation thresholds and the EU institutional roles;	14. Calls for both the solidarity clause and the mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU) to be further operationalised in hybrid and armed aggression scenarios, including through regular exercises simulating their activation; calls on the Commission and the Council to issue guidelines clarifying the conditions and procedures for activating the mutual assistance clause; acknowledges, however, that Art 42.7 cannot be implemented without a EU Command and Control structure at least of strategic and operational levels; calls on the Member States, with the cooperation of the Commission and the High Representative, to develop a decision-making playbook for severe crisis scenarios, setting out the catalogue of civil and military means and capabilities available to the Governments of the Member States under both clauses, as well as the EU institutional roles;

Or. en

Amendment 364

Engin Eroglu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
14. Calls for both the solidarity clause and the mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU) to be further operationalised in hybrid and armed aggression scenarios, including through regular exercises simulating their activation; calls on the Commission and the Council to issue guidelines clarifying the conditions and procedures for activating the mutual assistance clause; calls on the Commission, together with the Member States, to develop a decision-making playbook for severe crisis scenarios, setting out the catalogue of civil and military means and capabilities available to the Governments of the Member States under both clauses, as well as the activation thresholds and the EU institutional roles;	14. Calls for both the solidarity clause and the mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU) to be further operationalised in hybrid and armed aggression scenarios, inter alia through regular exercises simulating their activation, including scenarios involving hybrid attacks falling below the threshold of armed conflict; calls on the Commission and the Council to issue guidelines clarifying the conditions and procedures for activating the mutual assistance clause; calls on the Commission, together with the Member States, to develop a decision-making playbook for severe crisis scenarios, setting out the catalogue of civil and military means and capabilities available to the Governments of the Member States under both clauses, as well as the activation thresholds, procedures for joint situational assessment and attribution, as well as the EU institutional roles;

Or. de

Amendment 365

Villy Søvndal

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
14. Calls for both the solidarity clause and the mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU) to be further operationalised in hybrid and armed aggression scenarios, including through regular exercises simulating their activation; calls on the Commission and the Council to issue guidelines clarifying the conditions and procedures for activating the mutual assistance clause; calls on the Commission, together with the Member States, to develop a decision-making playbook for severe crisis scenarios, setting out the catalogue of civil and military means and capabilities available to the Governments of the Member States under both clauses, as well as the activation thresholds and the EU institutional roles;	14. Calls for the mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU) to be further operationalised in hybrid and armed aggression scenarios, including through regular exercises simulating their activation; calls on the Commission and the Council to issue guidelines clarifying the conditions and procedures for activating the mutual assistance clause; calls on the Commission, together with the Member States, to develop a decision-making playbook for severe crisis scenarios, setting out the catalogue of civil and military means and capabilities available to the Governments of the Member States under both clauses, as well as the activation thresholds and the EU institutional roles;

Or. en

Amendment 366

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 14 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	14a. Recalls that any coordinated EU response to hybrid threats should be aligned with the EU Hybrid Toolbox and framed in full respect of Member States’ exclusive competences; recognises the value of further EU exercises related to hybrid threats in enhancing Member States’ preparedness and the Union’s capacity to respond; calls, in this regard, for frequent scenario-based exercises testing the use of the Hybrid Toolbox, mutual assistance under Article 42(7) TEU and mutual solidarity under Article 222 TFEU before a crisis occurs; calls on the Commission to explore the idea of convening a platform or task force for Member States to voluntarily coordinate national legislative responses and share best practices;

Or. en

Amendment 367

Christophe Bay, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 14 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	14a. Emphasises that hybrid threats are not limited to military, cyber or information-related dimensions, but may also take the form of economic and technological pressure exerted with a view to restricting access to essential digital infrastructure, platforms or services; stresses the need to strengthen European technological sovereignty and to reduce strategic dependencies that could be used as instruments of geopolitical coercion;

Or. fr

Amendment 368

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 14 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	14a. Calls on the Council to examine options for streamlining EU decision-making in the security and defence domain, including through expanded use of existing Treaty provisions that permit departure from unanimity requirements, with a view to eliminating structural latency in the Union's capacity to deter and respond;

Or. en

Amendment 369

Vasile Dîncu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 14 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	14a. Calls on the Commission and Member States to treat electoral infrastructure, including voter registers, electoral management systems, political advertising ecosystems and election-related information environments, as critical democratic infrastructure requiring dedicated protection measures;

Or. en

Amendment 370

Marta Wcisło

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 14 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	14a. Calls for regular EU and NATO exercises simulating hybrid attack scenarios, including sabotage against military mobility infrastructure, coordinated cyberattacks, large-scale FIMI campaigns, airspace violations and attacks on critical infrastructure;

Or. en

Amendment 371

Merja Kyllönen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 14 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	14a. Calls for the development of common EU frameworks for attribution, deterrence and coordinated response to hybrid attacks below the threshold of armed conflict;

Or. en

Amendment 372

Christophe Bay, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, György Hölvényi

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 14 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	14b. Emphasises that hybrid strategies can exploit environmental vulnerabilities and cause significant ecological damage, in particular through acts of sabotage, attacks on critical infrastructure or disruptions to energy systems;

Or. fr

Amendment 373

Marta Wcisło

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 14 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	14b. Calls on the Commission and the Council to develop practical guidance identifying indicators, thresholds and procedures that could support the activation of Article 42(7) TEU in the context of severe hybrid aggression;

Or. en

Amendment 374

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 14 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	14b. New subsection title (paragraphs 15 to 15b, including new ones): Economic security and deterrence

Or. en

Amendment 375

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
15. Deplores the fact that the EU sanctions framework is fragmented across different hybrid threat vectors, thereby reducing its deterrent effect; calls for the immediate establishment of a horizontal EU sanctions framework, specifically designed for hybrid threats; calls for the EU FIMI Toolbox to be strengthened;	15. Welcomes the work done under existing sanctions regimes enabling to tackle hybrid activities, including in particular the one on Russia’s destabilising activities established in October 2024 and the horizontal cyber sanctions regime established in 2019; Deplores the fact that the EU sanctions framework is fragmented across different hybrid threat vectors, thereby reducing its deterrent effect; calls for further strengthening the EU’s restrictive measure in response to hybrid threats, including the possible establishment of a horizontal EU sanctions framework, specifically designed for hybrid threats, to be able to fill the gaps in existing regimes and enhance the deterrent effect; notes the successful cases where industry attribution enabled sanctions designation but stresses, however, that sanctions must be part of a broader accountability toolkit to create genuine deterrence against state-sponsored hybrid attack; calls for the EU Hybrid, FIMI and Cyber Diplomacy Toolboxes to be further strengthened and used more effectively;

Or. en

Amendment 376

Engin Eroglu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
15. Deplores the fact that the EU sanctions framework is fragmented across different hybrid threat vectors, thereby reducing its deterrent effect; calls for the immediate establishment of a horizontal EU sanctions framework, specifically designed for hybrid threats; calls for the EU FIMI Toolbox to be strengthened;	15. Deplores the fact that the EU sanctions framework is fragmented across different hybrid threat vectors, thereby reducing its deterrent effect; calls for the immediate establishment of a horizontal EU sanctions framework, specifically designed for hybrid threats, including targeted measures against state and non-state actors involved in acts of sabotage against critical infrastructure, cyberattacks, foreign information manipulation and the use of proxy or so-called ‘disposable agent’ networks; calls for the EU FIMI Toolbox to be strengthened;

Or. de

Amendment 377

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
15. Deplores the fact that the EU sanctions framework is fragmented across different hybrid threat vectors, thereby reducing its deterrent effect; calls for the immediate establishment of a horizontal EU sanctions framework, specifically designed for hybrid threats; calls for the EU FIMI Toolbox to be strengthened;	15. Deplores the fact that the EU sanctions framework is complex and fragmented across different hybrid threat vectors; calls for the immediate establishment of a horizontal EU sanctions framework, specifically designed for hybrid threats, which would exist alongside the Russia hybrid sanctions regime to underscore Russia’s active engagement in hybrid operations globally while enabling faster and more systematic sanctioning of entities responsible for hybrid campaigns;

Or. en

Amendment 378

Christophe Bay, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
15. Deplores the fact that the EU sanctions framework is fragmented across different hybrid threat vectors, thereby reducing its deterrent effect; calls for the immediate establishment of a horizontal EU sanctions framework, specifically designed for hybrid threats; calls for the EU FIMI Toolbox to be strengthened;	15. Deplores the fact that the EU sanctions framework is fragmented across different hybrid threat vectors, thereby reducing its deterrent effect; calls for better coordination between existing arrangements; calls for the EU FIMI Toolbox to be strengthened;

Or. fr

Amendment 379

Nathalie Loiseau, Helmut Brandstätter

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
15. Deplores the fact that the EU sanctions framework is fragmented across different hybrid threat vectors, thereby reducing its deterrent effect; calls for the immediate establishment of a horizontal EU sanctions framework, specifically designed for hybrid threats; calls for the EU FIMI Toolbox to be strengthened;	15. Deplores the fact that the EU sanctions framework is fragmented across different hybrid threat vectors, thereby reducing its deterrent effect; calls for the immediate establishment of a horizontal EU sanctions framework, specifically designed for hybrid threats; calls for the EU FIMI Toolbox to be strengthened and more proactively used;

Or. en

Amendment 380

Urmas Paet, Lucia Yar, Petras Auštrevičius, Engin Eroglu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15 – point 1 (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	(1) Calls for the development of EU-level cyber deterrence measures, including coordinated attribution, sanctions and proportionate response options;

Or. en

Amendment 381

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	15a. Reiterates the need to ensure accountability for hybrid operations and for those responsible, including proxies acting on behalf of state actors, by making full use of existing and dedicated tools; calls on the EU and the Member States to take urgent action to halt and disrupt the financial flows that fund attacks on democracy, including by mobilising banking regulators, criminal investigators and sanctions authorities to trace and examine illicit sources of financing, including cryptocurrency; calls on the EU and the Member States to break the financial and algorithmic incentives that allow disinformation to thrive, including by addressing the links between illicit funding, advertising revenues, attention-driven platform business models and manipulative content;

Or. en

Amendment 382

Merja Kyllönen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	15a. Underlines the growing strategic significance of the Arctic region for European security, including the protection of critical infrastructure, freedom of navigation, satellite communications and emerging transport corridors; calls for enhanced surveillance and protection of critical maritime infrastructure in the Baltic Sea and Arctic regions, including subsea cables, energy pipelines and strategic ports;

Or. en

Amendment 383

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	15a. Welcomes the ongoing initiatives to strengthen operational capacity, including EU Hybrid Rapid Response Teams; welcomes the launch of the EU's Eastern Flank Watch and the European Drone Defence Initiative and calls for swift progress in their deployment;

Or. en

Amendment 384

Marta Wcisło

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	15a. Calls for the strengthening of the EU FIMI Toolbox through the introduction of predefined response options, accelerated attribution procedures and closer coordination with sanctions mechanisms;

Or. en

Amendment 385

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	15b. Reminds of the lack of progress in fulfilling the goal foreseen in the Strategic Compass and the Joint Paper by the High Representative and the Member States on Strengthening the EU Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (EEAS(2024) 2014), to strengthen SIAC by providing additional resources to in order to facilitate efficient provision of intelligence based situational awareness in the areas of cyber and hybrid threats to the EU; calls on the Commission, the High Representative and Member States to make a firm commitment to the effective strengthening of SIAC;

Or. en

Amendment 386

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	15b. Notes that the preparation of the next long-term EU budget offers an opportunity to explore dedicated support for Member States in countering hybrid threats more effectively; calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of a specific EU programme in this field, focused on research and innovation to strengthening critical infrastructure protection, societal and institutional resilience, situational awareness and analytical capabilities, while ensuring coherence with existing EU instruments and full respect for Member States’ competences;

Or. en

Amendment 387

Marta Wcisło

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	15b. Calls on the Council to ensure that individuals and entities responsible for conducting, facilitating or financing hybrid operations against the Union are systematically considered for inclusion in relevant EU sanctions regimes;

Or. en

Amendment 388

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15 c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	15c. Takes the view that all criminal law tools available at Member State and EU level should be applied and, where appropriate, further developed to prevent and counter illegal conduct aimed at undermining democratic institutions and processes; stresses the need for competent national authorities to be equipped with adequate tools and cooperation channels to prevent, investigate, detect and prosecute criminal offences related to foreign interference; considers that corruption and intimidation of elected and public officials by criminal networks should be addressed as part of the Union’s response to hybrid threats via strengthened cooperation between specialised anti-corruption agencies, law enforcement authorities and relevant Union bodies; asks the Commission to assess the added value of establishing in Union law minimum rules on the definition and sanctions for the criminal offence of knowingly participating in organised activities of interference on behalf of foreign powers; notes that the forthcoming revision of the mandates of Union justice and home affairs agencies provides an opportunity to strengthen the EU’s operational response capacity;

Or. en

Amendment 389

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15 c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	15c. Strongly condemns the instrumentalisation of migration by third countries or hostile non-state actors with the aim of destabilising a Member State or the Union; notes the specific provisions on the instrumentalisation of migration recently included in key pieces of EU legislation;

Or. en

Amendment 390

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15 c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	15c. Notes the Commission’s announced revision of the mandate of Frontex; underlines that the revision should provide for the necessary legal basis, analytical capabilities, and adequate human, financial and technical resources to enable effective assistance to Member States in the management and protection of the external borders in compliance with relevant Union law, including fundamental rights; stresses, in this context, the need to further strengthen the EU’s capacity to support Member States in matters related to Home Affairs under the 2028–2034 MFF, including in responding to threats of a hybrid threats nature;

Or. en

Amendment 391

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15 c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	15c. New subsection title (paragraphs 15d to 15f): Disruption, deterrence and offensive capabilities

Or. en

Amendment 392

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15 d (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	15d. Believes that, in order to defend democratic societies against a growing number of hostile actors, the Union and its Member States must move beyond a purely defensive mindset and incorporate a proactive dimension into Europe’s response, including credible capabilities to disrupt, deter and respond to hybrid threats, while ensuring that all measures remain proportionate, targeted, in line with international law and subject to democratic oversight; stresses that the Union and its Member States need to be ready to use asymmetric operations particularly in the kinetic, cyber and cognitive domains;

Or. en

Amendment 393

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15 e (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	15e. Insists that the EU can bring significant added value by acting as a facilitator and coordinator among Member States, helping to connect national capabilities, build common situational awareness and enable faster, more coherent responses to hybrid threats; recalls, in particular, that cyberspace is both a domain and an enabler of hybrid threats, and a grey zone of permanent confrontation; recommends that the Commission explore proposals for a more unified framework to support Member States in the planning, operational coordination and execution of cyber operations; takes note, in this regard, of national best practices involving dedicated response centres to protect public administrations, citizens and businesses, and the armed forces, while ensuring structured cooperation among them;

Or. en

Amendment 394

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15 f (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	15f. Stresses that cyber resilience and defensive measures alone are not sufficient to ensure credible deterrence against hybrid threats; recalls that the White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030 states that both defensive and offensive cyber capabilities are needed to ensure protection and freedom of manoeuvre in cyberspace; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Member States to explore the establishment of an EU Cyber Command, or a voluntary European cyber operations framework, to coordinate Member States’ cyber capabilities, support proportionate countermeasures against hybrid activities, strengthen Europe’s contribution to NATO cyber deterrence and ensure credible strategic communication, in full compliance with international law, democratic oversight and Member States’ competences;

Or. en

Amendment 395

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15 g (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	15g. New subsection title (paragraphs 16 to 17, including new ones): Geographical considerations

Or. en

Amendment 396

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Michał Dworczyk

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
16. Welcomes the Commission communication on the EU’s eastern regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, and its explicit recognition that the EU’s eastern border regions face structural and sustained threats from Russia and Belarus; calls on the Commission to translate this recognition into binding security obligations and dedicated funding streams under the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework;	16. Welcomes the Commission communication on the EU’s eastern regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, and its explicit recognition that the EU’s eastern border regions face structural and sustained threats from Russia and Belarus; calls on the Commission to translate this recognition into binding security obligations and dedicated funding streams under the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework; further underlines the importance of enhancing integrated border protection capabilities along the Union’s eastern flank, including advanced detection, monitoring and countermeasure systems against unmanned aerial systems (UAS), in particular to protect critical infrastructure such as airports, energy facilities, and transport hubs; calls for a coordinated EU framework to support Member States in deploying interoperable airspace awareness systems, electronic protection measures, and rapid incident response capacities, in close cooperation with relevant Union agencies and NATO where appropriate; stresses that such measures should be designed in a proportionate, defensive, and civilian-protection-oriented manner, ensuring continuity of essential services and freedom of movement within the Schengen area while strengthening resilience against hybrid threats;

Or. en

Amendment 397

Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
16. Welcomes the Commission communication on the EU’s eastern regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, and its explicit recognition that the EU’s eastern border regions face structural and sustained threats from Russia and Belarus; calls on the Commission to translate this recognition into binding security obligations and dedicated funding streams under the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework;	16. Welcomes the Commission communication on the EU’s eastern regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, and its explicit recognition that the EU’s eastern border regions face structural and sustained threats from Russia and Belarus; calls on the Commission to translate this recognition into binding security obligations and dedicated funding streams under the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework; calls, further, on the Commission to develop an equivalent approach for the EU’s southern flank regions, taking into account the specific challenges related to instability in North Africa and the Sahel, migratory pressure, jihadist terrorism, organised crime, the protection of external borders and the growing influence of hostile actors in the Mediterranean; considers that those priorities should also be reflected in the next multiannual financial framework and in European security and defence instruments;

Or. es

Amendment 398

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
16. Welcomes the Commission communication on the EU’s eastern regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, and its explicit recognition that the EU’s eastern border regions face structural and sustained threats from Russia and Belarus; calls on the Commission to translate this recognition into binding security obligations and dedicated funding streams under the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework;	16. Welcomes the Commission communication on the EU’s eastern regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, and its explicit recognition that the EU’s eastern border regions face structural and sustained threats from Russia and Belarus; calls on the Commission to translate this recognition into binding security obligations and dedicated funding streams under the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework, including dedicated funding for the modernization of physical and digital border surveillance infrastructure at the EU’s external land borders and ensuring that the Border Management and Visa Instrument and other related instruments incorporate security and resilience requirements compatible with NATO standards;

Or. en

Amendment 399

Petras Auštrevičius

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
16. Welcomes the Commission communication on the EU’s eastern regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, and its explicit recognition that the EU’s eastern border regions face structural and sustained threats from Russia and Belarus; calls on the Commission to translate this recognition into binding security obligations and dedicated funding streams under the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework;	16. Condemns Russia’s systematic drone incursions and cross-border provocations targeting EU Member States along its Eastern Flank, most notably the Baltic States, Finland and Romania, as a calculated campaign of intimidation against civilian populations; Welcomes the Commission communication on the EU’s eastern regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, and its explicit recognition that the EU’s eastern border regions face structural and sustained threats from Russia and Belarus; calls on the Commission to translate this recognition into binding security obligations and dedicated funding streams under the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework;

Or. en

Amendment 400

Vasile Dîncu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
16. Welcomes the Commission communication on the EU’s eastern regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, and its explicit recognition that the EU’s eastern border regions face structural and sustained threats from Russia and Belarus; calls on the Commission to translate this recognition into binding security obligations and dedicated funding streams under the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework;	16. Welcomes the Commission communication on the EU’s eastern regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, and its explicit recognition that the EU’s eastern border regions face structural and sustained threats from Russia and Belarus; calls on the Commission to translate this recognition into binding security obligations and dedicated funding streams under the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework; emphasises that these funds must actively support Member States at the EU’s external border in upgrading dual-use transport infrastructure, securing energy grids against cross-border disruptions, and enhancing civil-military cooperation;

Or. en

Amendment 401

Merja Kyllönen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
16. Welcomes the Commission communication on the EU’s eastern regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, and its explicit recognition that the EU’s eastern border regions face structural and sustained threats from Russia and Belarus; calls on the Commission to translate this recognition into binding security obligations and dedicated funding streams under the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework;	16. Highlights the strategic importance of Nordic-Baltic defence cooperation, including the protection of maritime infrastructure, energy interconnectors, subsea cables and Arctic supply routes; welcomes the Commission communication on the EU’s eastern regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, and its explicit recognition that the EU’s eastern border regions face structural and sustained threats from Russia and Belarus; calls on the Commission to translate this recognition into binding security obligations and dedicated funding streams under the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework;

Or. en

Amendment 402

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
16. Welcomes the Commission communication on the EU’s eastern regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, and its explicit recognition that the EU’s eastern border regions face structural and sustained threats from Russia and Belarus; calls on the Commission to translate this recognition into binding security obligations and dedicated funding streams under the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework;	16. Welcomes the Commission communication on the EU’s eastern regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, and its explicit recognition that the EU’s eastern border regions face structural and sustained threats from Russia and Belarus;

Or. en

Amendment 403

Rachel Blom

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
16. Welcomes the Commission communication on the EU’s eastern regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, and its explicit recognition that the EU’s eastern border regions face structural and sustained threats from Russia and Belarus; calls on the Commission to translate this recognition into binding security obligations and dedicated funding streams under the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework;	16. Welcomes the Commission communication on the EU’s eastern regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, and its explicit recognition that the EU’s eastern border regions face structural and sustained threats from Russia and Belarus;

Or. en

Amendment 404

Christophe Bay, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
16. Welcomes the Commission communication on the EU’s eastern regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, and its explicit recognition that the EU’s eastern border regions face structural and sustained threats from Russia and Belarus; calls on the Commission to translate this recognition into binding security obligations and dedicated funding streams under the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework;	16. Is pleased to see that the specific threats facing vulnerable border regions have been recognised; emphasises that the Union’s land, maritime, overseas and island border regions may face specific forms of hybrid pressure, particularly in terms of border control, infrastructure sabotage, cyber-attacks, trafficking, espionage, the exploitation of migration and information-related pressure; calls on the Commission to provide targeted financial support measures, without imposing uniform requirements that fail to take account of national and regional circumstances;

Or. fr

Amendment 405

Villy Søvndal

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
16. Welcomes the Commission communication on the EU’s eastern regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, and its explicit recognition that the EU’s eastern border regions face structural and sustained threats from Russia and Belarus; calls on the Commission to translate this recognition into binding security obligations and dedicated funding streams under the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework;	16. Welcomes the Commission communication on the EU’s eastern regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, and its explicit recognition that the EU’s eastern border regions face structural and sustained threats from Russia and Belarus; calls on the Commission to translate this recognition into binding security obligations and dedicated funding streams under the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework to counter these threats while protecting the rights and safety of vulnerable individuals;

Or. en

Amendment 406

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	16a. Underlines that recent developments, notably on the Union’s Eastern flank, have demonstrated the urgent need to develop and deploy multilayered defence systems integrating kinetic and non-kinetic counter-unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS) capabilities to protect critical infrastructure, strengthen territorial resilience, and ensure the continuity of essential civilian and military functions; whereas unmanned aerial systems (UAS) now perform a broad range of roles, including reconnaissance, decoy operations, targeting, electronic warfare support, and precision strikes, and their extensive combat use in Ukraine and other theatres has fundamentally reshaped air and missile defence requirements, force protection doctrines, and operational planning assumptions; underlines that unmanned systems have become a defining feature of modern hybrid warfare, acting as force multipliers that enhance situational awareness, accelerate decision-making cycles, and compress reaction times; notes with concern the rapid expansion of related domains, including unmanned ground, surface, and underwater systems, requires their full integration into EU defence planning and resilience frameworks and that this evolving threat environment requires the adaptation of European air and joint operational concepts, including integrated multi-domain command and control, enhanced interoperability between Member States’ armed forces, and strengthened cooperation with NATO;

Or. en

Amendment 407

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	16a. Recalls that hybrid threats affect the Union as a whole and manifest differently across its territories; underlines, in this regard, the exposure of the Baltic and Nordic-Baltic area to threats against maritime security; the vulnerability of Mediterranean and southern border regions to hybrid pressure at the external border and in wider Mediterranean information spaces; the exposure of south-eastern Europe to economic coercion, energy dependencies and coordinated information manipulation linked to neighbouring theatres; and the specific vulnerability of major urban and digital information spaces across the Union to cognitive warfare, polarisation and foreign interference; calls for EU and NATO attention to reflect this differentiated geography of hybrid threats while maintaining a Union-wide approach to resilience, preparedness and response;

Or. en

Amendment 408

Alberico Gambino, Elena Donazzan

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	16a. Stresses that hybrid threats increasingly affect not only the EU’s Eastern border regions but also the Southern Neighbourhood and the Mediterranean region, including threats targeting maritime infrastructure, energy networks, logistics corridors, strategic transport routes, disinformation campaigns and the instrumentalisation of migration flows; calls on the Commission and the Member States to integrate the Southern dimension more effectively into the Union’s strategy to counter hybrid threats and strengthen cooperation with Mediterranean partners.

Or. en

Amendment 409

Michał Dworczyk, Cristian Terheş

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	16a. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the current and future Multiannual Financial Frameworks provide adequate funding for the engineering preparation, physical infrastructure, technological capabilities, protection and resilience of border areas exposed to hybrid threats and conventional armed aggression by third countries, particularly along the EU’s eastern borders and in strategically important cross-border regions critical to the territorial integrity, military mobility and collective security of the Union and NATO;

Or. en

Amendment 410

Vasile Dîncu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	16a. Stresses that the Black Sea region has become a critical theatre in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and hybrid operations against the EU; calls for the development of a comprehensive EU Black Sea Security Strategy, including enhanced maritime surveillance, protection of offshore energy infrastructure, and closer coordination with NATO allies and partner countries;

Or. en

Amendment 411

Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	16a. Invites the Commission to present a dedicated communication on the security challenge of the EU’s Mediterranean region, in light of the growing threats posed by transnational criminal organisations when it comes to weaponization of migration, drug trafficking and illicit arms trafficking, recognising their potential impact on the Union’s security, stability and resilience;

Or. en

Amendment 412

Elena Donazzan, Alberico Gambino, Cristian Terheş

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	16a. Stresses that some hostile state actors deliberately instrumentalise migration flows as a lever to destabilise and a tool to exert pressure on European countries; emphasises that this practice constitutes a form of hybrid threat;

Or. it

Amendment 413

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	16b. Stresses that funding to counter hybrid threats should be based on strategic exposure, operational needs and demonstrated vulnerabilities, while recognising the specific and intensified pressure faced by the Union’s eastern border regions; underlines that hybrid threats affect the Union as a whole and therefore require support for all regions facing relevant risks to critical infrastructure, democratic processes, borders, information spaces and strategic interests abroad;

Or. en

Amendment 414

Christophe Bay, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, György Hölvényi, Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
17. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement of a new global EU security strategy and calls for hybrid warfare to be included in its scope;	17. Notes the Commission’s announcement of a new global EU security strategy and calls for hybrid warfare to be included in its scope; stresses that this strategy must strictly respect the division of competences between the Union and the Member States, particularly in the areas of national security, intelligence, defence, public order and border control; calls for the European Parliament to monitor this matter on a regular basis;

Or. fr

Amendment 415

Nathalie Loiseau, Helmut Brandstätter

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
17. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement of a new global EU security strategy and calls for hybrid warfare to be included in its scope;	17. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement of a new global EU security strategy and calls for hybrid warfare to be included in its scope as part of a continuum with the EU Democracy Shield;

Or. en

Amendment 416

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
17. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement of a new global EU security strategy and calls for hybrid warfare to be included in its scope;	17. Welcomes the Commission and High Representative’s announcement of a new global EU security strategy and calls for hybrid threats to be included in its scope;

Or. en

Amendment 417

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
17. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement of a new global EU security strategy and calls for hybrid warfare to be included in its scope;	17. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement of a new global EU security strategy and calls for hybrid threats to be included in its scope;

Or. en

Amendment 418

Marta Wcisło

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	17a. Calls for the forthcoming EU security strategy to include a dedicated chapter on grey-zone threats and hybrid warfare, including deterrence, resilience, attribution and response mechanisms;

Or. en

Amendment 419

Nathalie Loiseau

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 18

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
18. Reaffirms that NATO remains the cornerstone of collective defence for its members; calls for increased EU-NATO cooperation to strengthen European defence and deterrence;	18. Reaffirms that NATO remains the cornerstone of collective defence for its members; recalls in that regard that a stronger NATO requires a stronger European pillar on par with the American one and able to act alone whenever and for as long as necessary; calls for increased EU-NATO cooperation to strengthen European defence and deterrence; notes that a stronger European defence requires protecting the European Defence Technology Industrial Base, in particular through European preference;

Or. en

Amendment 420

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 18

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
18. Reaffirms that NATO remains the cornerstone of collective defence for its members; calls for increased EU-NATO cooperation to strengthen European defence and deterrence;	18. Reaffirms that NATO remains the cornerstone of collective defence for its members; calls for increased EU-NATO cooperation to strengthen European defence, resilience and deterrence; stresses that EU and NATO action in the hybrid domain must be complementary, mutually reinforcing, and operationally coordinated, while ensuring the Union’s capacity to act when required; reminds of the call of European leaders for establishing an EU-level European Security Council;

Or. en

Amendment 421

Vasile Dîncu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 18

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
18. Reaffirms that NATO remains the cornerstone of collective defence for its members; calls for increased EU-NATO cooperation to strengthen European defence and deterrence;	18. Reaffirms that NATO remains the cornerstone of collective defence for its members; calls for increased EU-NATO cooperation to strengthen European defence and deterrence; stresses the full strategic alignment between EU defense initiatives and NATO structures, ensuring that European funding mechanisms directly reinforce the operational capabilities of NATO's Eastern Flank;

Or. en

Amendment 422

Villy Søvndal

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 18

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
18. Reaffirms that NATO remains the cornerstone of collective defence for its members; calls for increased EU-NATO cooperation to strengthen European defence and deterrence;	18. Warns of the risks posed by the growing unpredictability, short-sighted isolationism and self-centredness in US foreign policy and its shifting relations with Russia and focus on Asia, acknowledges however that NATO remains the cornerstone of collective defence for its members; calls for increased EU-NATO cooperation to strengthen European defence and deterrence;

Or. en

Amendment 423

Alexandr Vondra

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 18

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
18. Reaffirms that NATO remains the cornerstone of collective defence for its members; calls for increased EU-NATO cooperation to strengthen European defence and deterrence;	18. Reaffirms that NATO remains the cornerstone of collective defence for its members; calls for substantially increased EU-NATO cooperation to strengthen European defence and deterrence and for the avoidance of unnecessary duplication of NATO structures and capabilities;

Or. en

Amendment 424

Christophe Bay, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, György Hölvényi, Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 18

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
18. Reaffirms that NATO remains the cornerstone of collective defence for its members; calls for increased EU-NATO cooperation to strengthen European defence and deterrence;	18. Notes that NATO remains the cornerstone of collective defence for its members; calls for pragmatic cooperation between the EU, the Member States and NATO;

Or. fr

Amendment 425

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 18 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	18a. Notes that NATO’s 2025 revised hybrid strategy marks a shift from resilience to active deterrence; welcomes the pre-agreed Military Response Options and expanded SACEUR’s authorities to enable faster action at the start of a hybrid attack, reducing delays between threat detection and response while preserving political oversight;

Or. en

Amendment 426

Marta Wcisło

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 18 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	18a. Calls for enhanced EU-NATO cooperation on the monitoring and analysis of hybrid campaigns, including systematic exchanges of lessons learned regarding sabotage, FIMI, airspace incidents and critical infrastructure protection;

Or. en

Amendment 427

Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Rasa Juknevičienė

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 18 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	18a. Encourages deeper EU-NATO cooperation in the fields of critical infrastructure protection, military mobility, cyber resilience and preparedness, while fully respecting the institutional autonomy of both organisations;

Or. en

Amendment 428

Merja Kyllönen

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 18 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	18a. Stresses that the protection of European critical infrastructure and territorial integrity requires full complementarity of EU defence policy and instruments with NATO’s collective defence structures;

Or. en

Amendment 429

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 19

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
19. Welcomes NATO’s Hybrid Tracking Mechanism, an intelligence aggregation tool updated monthly via NATO’s Joint Intelligence and Security Division, which provides allies with a consolidated threat picture, drawing on national intelligence services;	19. Welcomes NATO’s Hybrid Tracking Mechanism, an intelligence aggregation tool updated monthly via NATO’s Joint Intelligence and Security Division, which provides allies with a consolidated threat picture, drawing on national intelligence services; highlights, in this regard, the added value of the Hybrid CoE as a key EU-NATO-supported platform for analysis, training, exercises and best practices on hybrid threats; further welcomes the work of the EU-NATO Task Force on the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure, particularly in strengthening cooperation on energy, transport, digital infrastructure and undersea connectivity;

Or. en

Amendment 430

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 19

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
19. Welcomes NATO’s Hybrid Tracking Mechanism, an intelligence aggregation tool updated monthly via NATO’s Joint Intelligence and Security Division, which provides allies with a consolidated threat picture, drawing on national intelligence services;	19. Welcomes NATO’s Hybrid Tracking Mechanism, an intelligence aggregation tool via NATO’s Joint Intelligence and Security Division, which provides allies with a consolidated threat picture, drawing on national intelligence services; recognizes the ongoing cooperation between NATO and EU in the intelligence domain, and calls on the Commission and the EEAS to establish a structured interface within the Hybrid Fusion Cell with this mechanism so that EU situational awareness and NATO's hybrid threat picture are regularly and systematically aligned;

Or. en

Amendment 431

Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Rasa Juknevičienė

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 19 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	19a. Calls for a more systematic exchange of lessons learned from the war in Ukraine between the EU, NATO and Member States, particularly regarding resilience, civil preparedness, drone warfare and infrastructure protection;

Or. en

Amendment 432

Engin Eroglu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 20

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
20. Stresses the important role of NATO’s Baltic Sentry and Eastern Sentry in responding to hybrid threats within operationally relevant timeframes; notes that their effectiveness is constrained by the high cost of intercepting drones, gaps in situational awareness and the fragmentation of regulatory frameworks across the Member States; calls for the implementation of the EU action plan on drone and counter-drone security7to be accelerated and for its systematic alignment with NATO operational requirements, ensuring harmonised, adequately resourced counter-drone capabilities across the Member States;	20. Stresses the important role of NATO’s Baltic Sentry and Eastern Sentry in responding to hybrid threats within operationally relevant timeframes, in particular in protecting maritime critical infrastructure and monitoring hybrid activities in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea regions; notes that their effectiveness is constrained by the high cost of intercepting drones, gaps in situational awareness and the fragmentation of regulatory frameworks across the Member States; calls for the implementation of the EU action plan on drone and counter-drone security to be accelerated and for its systematic alignment with NATO operational requirements, ensuring harmonised, adequately resourced counter-drone capabilities across the Member States, including interoperable sensor technology, AI-supported situational assessment and joint early-warning mechanisms;
_________________
7 Commission communication of 11 February 2026 entitled ‘Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone Security’ (COM(2026)0081).

Or. de

Amendment 433

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 20

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
20. Stresses the important role of NATO’s Baltic Sentry and Eastern Sentry in responding to hybrid threats within operationally relevant timeframes; notes that their effectiveness is constrained by the high cost of intercepting drones, gaps in situational awareness and the fragmentation of regulatory frameworks across the Member States; calls for the implementation of the EU action plan on drone and counter-drone security7 to be accelerated and for its systematic alignment with NATO operational requirements, ensuring harmonised, adequately resourced counter-drone capabilities across the Member States;	20. Stresses the important role of NATO’s Baltic Sentry and Eastern Sentry as agile instruments in responding to hybrid threats within operationally relevant timeframes; notes that their effectiveness is constrained by the high cost of intercepting drones, gaps in situational awareness and the fragmentation of counter-drone regulatory frameworks across the Member States; calls for the implementation of the EU action plan on drone and counter-drone security7 to be accelerated, including dedicated funding for capabilities in frontline Member States to combat meteorological balloons and drones, and for its systematic alignment with NATO operational requirements, ensuring harmonised, adequately resourced counter-drone capabilities across the Member States;
_________________	_________________
7 Commission communication of 11 February 2026 entitled ‘Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone Security’ (COM(2026)0081).	7 Commission communication of 11 February 2026 entitled ‘Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone Security’ (COM(2026)0081).

Or. en

Amendment 434

Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Rasa Juknevičienė

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 20

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
20. Stresses the important role of NATO’s Baltic Sentry and Eastern Sentry in responding to hybrid threats within operationally relevant timeframes; notes that their effectiveness is constrained by the high cost of intercepting drones, gaps in situational awareness and the fragmentation of regulatory frameworks across the Member States; calls for the implementation of the EU action plan on drone and counter-drone security7 to be accelerated and for its systematic alignment with NATO operational requirements, ensuring harmonised, adequately resourced counter-drone capabilities across the Member States;	20. Stresses the important role of NATO’s Baltic Sentry and Eastern Sentry in responding to hybrid threats within operationally relevant timeframes; notes that their effectiveness is constrained by the high cost of intercepting drones, gaps in situational awareness and the fragmentation of regulatory frameworks across the Member States; calls for the implementation of the EU action plan on drone and counter-drone security7 to be accelerated and for its systematic alignment with NATO operational requirements, ensuring harmonised, adequately resourced counter-drone capabilities across the Member States; and supports greater cooperation in the development and deployment of cost-effective counter-drone technologies across the Union;
_________________	_________________
7 Commission communication of 11 February 2026 entitled ‘Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone Security’ (COM(2026)0081).	7 Commission communication of 11 February 2026 entitled ‘Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone Security’ (COM(2026)0081).

Or. en

Amendment 435

Christophe Bay, Pierre-Romain Thionnet

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 20

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
20. Stresses the important role of NATO’s Baltic Sentry and Eastern Sentry in responding to hybrid threats within operationally relevant timeframes; notes that their effectiveness is constrained by the high cost of intercepting drones, gaps in situational awareness and the fragmentation of regulatory frameworks across the Member States; calls for the implementation of the EU action plan on drone and counter-drone security7to be accelerated and for its systematic alignment with NATO operational requirements, ensuring harmonised, adequately resourced counter-drone capabilities across the Member States;	20. Emphasises the important role of NATO’s Baltic Sentry and Eastern Sentry in responding to hybrid threats within operationally relevant timeframes; notes that their effectiveness is constrained by the high cost of intercepting drones, gaps in situational awareness and the fragmentation of regulatory frameworks across the Member States; calls for the implementation of the EU action plan on drone and counter-drone security7 to be accelerated; underscores that alignment with NATO must not be automatic but must be tailored to the needs defined by each Member State;
_________________	_________________
7 Commission communication of 11 February 2026 entitled ‘Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone Security’ (COM(2026)0081).	7 Commission communication of 11 February 2026 entitled ‘Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone Security’ (COM(2026)0081).

Or. fr

Amendment 436

Villy Søvndal

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 20

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
20. Stresses the important role of NATO’s Baltic Sentry and Eastern Sentry in responding to hybrid threats within operationally relevant timeframes; notes that their effectiveness is constrained by the high cost of intercepting drones, gaps in situational awareness and the fragmentation of regulatory frameworks across the Member States; calls for the implementation of the EU action plan on drone and counter-drone security7 to be accelerated and for its systematic alignment with NATO operational requirements, ensuring harmonised, adequately resourced counter-drone capabilities across the Member States;	20. Stresses the important role of NATO’s Arctic Sentry, Baltic Sentry and Eastern Sentry in responding to hybrid threats within operationally relevant timeframes; notes that their effectiveness is constrained by the high cost of intercepting drones, gaps in situational awareness and the fragmentation of regulatory frameworks across the Member States; calls for the implementation of the EU action plan on drone and counter-drone security7 to be accelerated and for its systematic alignment with NATO operational requirements, ensuring harmonised, adequately resourced counter-drone capabilities across the Member States;
_________________	_________________
7 Commission communication of 11 February 2026 entitled ‘Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone Security’ (COM(2026)0081).	7 Commission communication of 11 February 2026 entitled ‘Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone Security’ (COM(2026)0081).

Or. en

Amendment 437

Christophe Bay, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 20 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	20a. Emphasises that drone intrusions, unauthorised flights over sensitive sites and the use of drones for reconnaissance, sabotage or disruption pose a growing threat to Member States; calls on Member States to strengthen their capabilities to detect, identify, jam, neutralise and intercept hostile drones, particularly around military bases, ports, airports, power stations, nuclear facilities, rail networks, sensitive industrial sites and strategic public buildings;

Or. fr

Amendment 438

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 20 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	20b. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to establish a coordinated, Union-wide interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in order to ensure coherent action against hybrid activities, acts of sabotage and violations of sovereign rights in the Union’s maritime areas, notably in the Baltic Sea, while recalling UNCLOS’s objective of ensuring the peaceful use of the seas;

Or. en

Amendment 439

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 20 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	20a. Welcomes the EU–NATO Parallel and Coordinated Exercises (PACE) framework as a valuable instrument for testing and improving joint response capacity, scale, and scope and for the systematic integration of lessons learned into EU policy, planning, and institutional arrangements;

Or. en

Amendment 440

Christophe Bay, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
21. Calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service and NATO to develop a common definition of hybrid warfare covering sabotage and related activities;	21. calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service, the Member States and, where appropriate, NATO, to work towards a common definition of hybrid warfare encompassing, in particular, sabotage, cyber-attacks, information interference, destabilisation operations, the weaponisation of migration, economic pressure, drone intrusions and attacks on critical infrastructure; emphasises that this definition must not cause legitimate political debate, democratic protest or the expression of minority views to be equated with hybrid threats;

Or. fr

Amendment 441

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
21. Calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service and NATO to develop a common definition of hybrid warfare covering sabotage and related activities;	21. Calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service, in close coordination with NATO and Member States, to develop a common definition of hybrid warfare covering a legal definition of sabotage and related activities; stresses that such a definition must treat hybrid warfare attacks as a systemic and multidimensional threat rather than isolated incidents, and should form the basis for establishing a coherent response mechanism for the EU and NATO;

Or. en

Amendment 442

Engin Eroglu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
21. Calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service and NATO to develop a common definition of hybrid warfare covering sabotage and related activities;	21. Calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service and NATO to develop a common definition of hybrid warfare covering sabotage and related activities, cyberattacks, foreign information manipulation and interference, maritime hybrid operations, and the use of proxy and ‘disposable agents’, explicitly taking into account hybrid activities below the threshold of armed conflict;

Or. de

Amendment 443

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
21. Calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service and NATO to develop a common definition of hybrid warfare covering sabotage and related activities;	21. Calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service and NATO to develop a common definition of hybrid threats covering sabotage and related activities;

Or. en

Amendment 444

Urmas Paet, Lucia Yar, Petras Auštrevičius, Engin Eroglu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21 – point 1 (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	(1) Recognises the valuable role played by specialised centres of excellence, including the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki and the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, in strengthening preparedness, resilience, cyber defence and counter-hybrid capabilities across Europe.

Or. en

Amendment 445

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	21a. Calls on Member States to harmonise their laws in closing the legal gaps preventing allied personnel from participating in below-threshold hybrid response operations; welcomes Estonia's proposed amendment to the Defence Forces Organisation Act as a concrete step in closing the legal gap that prevents allied personnel from participating in below-threshold hybrid response operations; notes that Lithuania, Finland and Poland have already established the legal basis for involvement of allied personnel in hybrid scenarios;

Or. en

Amendment 446

Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	21a. Considers that any common definition of hybrid warfare should cover sabotage, related activities and the instrumentalisation of migration flows by third states or hostile actors, in accordance with precedents already recognised by the EU institutions in relation to hybrid attacks against the EU’s external borders;

Or. es

Amendment 447

Villy Søvndal

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	21a. Calls for the EU and NATO actively coordinate in depth, particularly in the changing geopolitical realities in the Arctic and along NATO’s Eastern flank;

Or. en

Amendment 448

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Michał Dworczyk

Motion for a resolution

Subheading 6 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	Expresses deep concern over the sustained and increasingly sophisticated pattern of Russian malign and hybrid activities conducted in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood and the Western Balkans, which include a combination of FIMI, cyber operations, covert influence networks, energy coercion, corruption-based leverage, and the strategic amplification of divisive narratives aimed at undermining democratic institutions, societal cohesion, and the Union’s strategic interests; underlines that hybrid interference in Eastern Partnership countries and parts of the Western Balkans has included sustained disinformation campaigns targeting electoral processes, judicial independence, NATO and EU integration narratives, and public trust in democratic institutions, as well as coordinated efforts to amplify societal polarisation along identity-based fault lines; highlights that religious narratives and the Russian Orthodox Church and affiliated structures, have been leveraged as vectors of influence or legitimacy-building tools in support of state-aligned geopolitical narratives, thereby contributing to the shaping of public discourse, identity politics, and perceptions of foreign policy alignment; stresses that such dynamics require careful and context-sensitive analysis, while fully respecting freedom of religion and the autonomy of religious communities; recalls that hybrid operations in these regions form part of a broader long-term strategy of strategic contestation aimed at limiting EU and NATO enlargement prospects, constraining policy autonomy of partner countries, and maintaining spheres of influence through non-military coercive instruments; emphasises that the Western Balkans remain particularly exposed due to institutional fragmentation, unresolved bilateral disputes, and uneven resilience capacities, which are systematically exploited through disinformation campaigns, clandestine funding channels, and the amplification of identity-based and cultural-religious sensitivities; further notes that in Eastern Europe, particularly in Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine, hybrid pressure has been intensified in parallel with kinetic conflict dynamics, demonstrating the convergence of military and non-military tools within a single integrated strategic framework;

Or. en

Amendment 449

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	21a. Underlines that Russian hybrid operations beyond the EU aim to shift third countries’ foreign policy in line with Moscow’s interests, undermine the Union’s relationships with its partners and weaken international support for Ukraine; reiterates, therefore, the importance of close cooperation with international partners and organisations to enhance situational awareness and to prevent, deter and respond more effectively to hybrid threats; acknowledges the value of deepening bilateral sectoral dialogues and consultations with like-minded partners on hybrid threats, especially within the framework of Security and Defence Partnerships, while keeping Member States duly involved in their preparation and informed of their outcomes;

Or. en

Amendment 450

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	21b. Stresses that candidate countries and potential candidates are often primary targets of Russian information warfare and other hybrid activities, as demonstrated in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia; believes that, for the purposes of democratic defence and resilience, countries seeking accession should be closely associated with relevant EU communication campaigns, formal engagement with digital platforms and EU tools to expose and counter hostile information operations; underlines that this requires better alignment of strategies, budgets, mandates and legal authorities across EU institutions; expects candidate countries and potential candidates to fully align with the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including restrictive measures, as a key aspect of the EU integration process;

Or. en

Amendment 451

Vasile Dîncu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 22

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
22. Emphasises that strengthened cooperation with Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and the EU’s Western Balkan partners is a strategic necessity, as they act as primary testing grounds for Russia’s hybrid tactics; calls on the Member States to adopt lessons learned from these countries, including Ukraine’s capacity to maintain essential services and societal functioning under sustained attack; welcomes the EU’s active contribution to supporting their resilience to hybrid attacks;	22. Emphasises that strengthened cooperation with Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and the EU’s Western Balkan partners is a strategic necessity, as they act as primary testing grounds for Russia’s hybrid tactics; calls on the Member States to adopt lessons learned from these countries, including Ukraine’s capacity to maintain essential services and societal functioning under sustained attack; welcomes the EU’s active contribution to supporting their resilience to hybrid attacks; urges the establishment of continuous joint cyber-defense drills and mutual intelligence-sharing pathways with Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova to secure shared critical infrastructure corridors against Russia;

Or. en

Amendment 452

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 22

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
22. Emphasises that strengthened cooperation with Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and the EU’s Western Balkan partners is a strategic necessity, as they act as primary testing grounds for Russia’s hybrid tactics; calls on the Member States to adopt lessons learned from these countries, including Ukraine’s capacity to maintain essential services and societal functioning under sustained attack; welcomes the EU’s active contribution to supporting their resilience to hybrid attacks;	22. Emphasises that strengthened cooperation with Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and the EU’s Western Balkan partners is a strategic necessity, as they act as primary testing grounds for Russia’s hybrid tactics; calls on the Member States to adopt lessons learned from these countries, including Ukraine’s capacity to maintain essential services and societal functioning under sustained attack; welcomes the EU’s active contribution to supporting their resilience to hybrid attacks including making use of tools such as the Hybrid Risk Survey, the EU Hybrid Rapid Response Teams, civilian CSDP missions (e.g. EUPM Moldova) and other relevant Commission’s programmes;

Or. en

Amendment 453

Alexandr Vondra

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 22

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
22. Emphasises that strengthened cooperation with Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and the EU’s Western Balkan partners is a strategic necessity, as they act as primary testing grounds for Russia’s hybrid tactics; calls on the Member States to adopt lessons learned from these countries, including Ukraine’s capacity to maintain essential services and societal functioning under sustained attack; welcomes the EU’s active contribution to supporting their resilience to hybrid attacks;	22. Emphasises that strengthened cooperation with Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and the EU’s Western Balkan partners is a strategic necessity, as they act as primary testing grounds for Russia’s hybrid tactics; calls on the Member States to adopt lessons learned from these countries, including Ukraine’s capacity to maintain essential services and societal functioning under sustained attack; welcomes the EU’s active contribution to supporting their resilience to hybrid attacks;
	Reiterates its strong support for Ukraine's accession to NATO once the relevant conditions have been fulfilled;

Or. en

Amendment 454

Marta Wcisło

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 22

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
22. Emphasises that strengthened cooperation with Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and the EU’s Western Balkan partners is a strategic necessity, as they act as primary testing grounds for Russia’s hybrid tactics; calls on the Member States to adopt lessons learned from these countries, including Ukraine’s capacity to maintain essential services and societal functioning under sustained attack; welcomes the EU’s active contribution to supporting their resilience to hybrid attacks;	22. Emphasises that strengthened cooperation with Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and the EU’s Western Balkan partners is a strategic necessity, as they act as primary testing grounds for Russia’s hybrid tactics; calls on the Member States to adopt lessons learned from these countries, including Ukraine’s capacity to maintain essential services and societal functioning under sustained attack, societal resilience, continuity of government, protection of critical infrastructure and strategic communication; welcomes the EU’s active contribution to supporting their resilience to hybrid attacks;

Or. en

Amendment 455

Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 22

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
22. Emphasises that strengthened cooperation with Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and the EU’s Western Balkan partners is a strategic necessity, as they act as primary testing grounds for Russia’s hybrid tactics; calls on the Member States to adopt lessons learned from these countries, including Ukraine’s capacity to maintain essential services and societal functioning under sustained attack; welcomes the EU’s active contribution to supporting their resilience to hybrid attacks;	22. Emphasises that strengthened cooperation with Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and the EU’s Western Balkan partners is a strategic necessity, as they act as primary testing grounds for Russia’s hybrid tactics; calls on the Member States to adopt lessons learned from these countries, and to establish structured mechanisms for the systematic exchange of best practices and operational experience; including Ukraine’s capacity to maintain essential services and societal functioning under sustained attack; welcomes the EU’s active contribution to supporting their resilience to hybrid attacks;

Or. en

Amendment 456

Nathalie Loiseau, Helmut Brandstätter

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 22

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
22. Emphasises that strengthened cooperation with Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and the EU’s Western Balkan partners is a strategic necessity, as they act as primary testing grounds for Russia’s hybrid tactics; calls on the Member States to adopt lessons learned from these countries, including Ukraine’s capacity to maintain essential services and societal functioning under sustained attack; welcomes the EU’s active contribution to supporting their resilience to hybrid attacks;	22. Emphasises that strengthened cooperation with Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and the EU’s Western Balkan partners is a strategic necessity, as they face continuous attacks from Russia; whereas they are key testing grounds for Russia’s hybrid tactics and therefore needs continuous support; calls on the Member States to adopt lessons learned from these countries, including Ukraine’s capacity to maintain essential services and societal functioning under sustained attack; welcomes the EU’s active contribution to supporting their resilience to hybrid attacks;

Or. en

Amendment 457

Rasa Juknevičienė

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 22

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
22. Emphasises that strengthened cooperation with Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and the EU’s Western Balkan partners is a strategic necessity, as they act as primary testing grounds for Russia’s hybrid tactics; calls on the Member States to adopt lessons learned from these countries, including Ukraine’s capacity to maintain essential services and societal functioning under sustained attack; welcomes the EU’s active contribution to supporting their resilience to hybrid attacks;	22. Emphasises that strengthened cooperation with Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and the EU’s Western Balkan partners is a strategic necessity, as they act as primary testing grounds for Russia’s hybrid tactics; calls on the Member States to adopt lessons learned from these countries, including Ukraine’s capacity to maintain essential services and societal functioning under sustained attack;

Or. en

Amendment 458

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 22

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
22. Emphasises that strengthened cooperation with Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and the EU’s Western Balkan partners is a strategic necessity, as they act as primary testing grounds for Russia’s hybrid tactics; calls on the Member States to adopt lessons learned from these countries, including Ukraine’s capacity to maintain essential services and societal functioning under sustained attack; welcomes the EU’s active contribution to supporting their resilience to hybrid attacks;	22. Emphasises that strengthened cooperation with Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and the EU’s Western Balkan partners is a strategic necessity, as they act as primary testing grounds for Russia’s hybrid tactics; calls on the Member States to adopt lessons learned from these countries, including Ukraine’s capacity to maintain essential services and societal functioning under sustained attack; welcomes the EU’s active contribution to supporting their resilience to hybrid attacks;

Or. en

Amendment 459

Michał Dworczyk, Cristian Terheş

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 22

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
22. Emphasises that strengthened cooperation with Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and the EU’s Western Balkan partners is a strategic necessity, as they act as primary testing grounds for Russia’s hybrid tactics; calls on the Member States to adopt lessons learned from these countries, including Ukraine’s capacity to maintain essential services and societal functioning under sustained attack; welcomes the EU’s active contribution to supporting their resilience to hybrid attacks;	22. Emphasises that strengthened cooperation with Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and the EU’s Western Balkan partners is a strategic necessity, as they act as primary testing grounds for Russia’s hybrid tactics; calls on the Member States to adopt lessons learned from these countries, including Ukraine’s capacity to maintain essential services and societal functioning under sustained attack; welcomes the active contribution of the EU and its Member States to strengthening their resilience to hybrid attacks;

Or. en

Amendment 460

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 22 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	22a. Highlights the strategic importance of continuing and deepening hybrid resilience support to candidate and partner countries, whose resilience directly contributes to the security of the Union; welcomes the EU’s active contribution to supporting their resilience through Foreign Policy Instrument, strategic communications, Hybrid Rapid Response Teams and CSDP missions in partner countries including Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and Montenegro; notes with appreciation the coordinated EU-NATO response in Moldova, including the parallel deployment of an EU Hybrid Response Team and a NATO Counter Hybrid Support Team with complementary mandates;

Or. en

Amendment 461

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Elena Donazzan, Michał Dworczyk

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 22 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	22a. Underlines the importance of the experience of Gulf States, Jordan, and other relevant partners in addressing hybrid influence networks associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, including through governance, regulatory, and societal resilience approaches, and calls for structured exchange of best practices with these partners in order to strengthen the Union’s understanding of hybrid threats, improve policy responses, and enhance cooperation in countering foreign interference while respecting fundamental rights and the diversity of legal and political systems;

Or. en

Amendment 462

Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Rasa Juknevičienė

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 22 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	22a. Recognises that hybrid threats also affect the Union’s Southern neighbourhood and stresses the importance of strengthening resilience, a 360º security approach, institutional capacity and security cooperation with like-minded partners in the Mediterranean region;

Or. en

Amendment 463

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 23

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
23. CommendsMoldova’s whole-of-government response to Russian FIMI ahead of its 2025 elections as an operational model, including its use of law enforcement action against networks conducting hybrid operations on behalf of a foreign state power; calls on the Member States and the Commission to develop EU-level frameworks enabling comparable enforcement responses;	23. Commends Moldova’s whole-of-government response to Russian hybrid activities, particularly FIMI, ahead of its 2025 elections as an operational model, including its use of law enforcement action against networks conducting hybrid operations on behalf of a foreign state power; calls on the Member States and the Commission, in cooperation with the EEAS, to develop EU-level frameworks enabling comparable enforcement responses; welcomes the work of the EU Partnership Mission (EUPM) in Moldova in strengthening the country’s resilience against hybrid threats and invites the relevant EU institutions to draw lessons from this experience and explore how these can be implemented in assistance of other partners where relevant;

Or. en

Amendment 464

Vasile Dîncu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 23

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
23. CommendsMoldova’s whole-of-government response to Russian FIMI ahead of its 2025 elections as an operational model, including its use of law enforcement action against networks conducting hybrid operations on behalf of a foreign state power; calls on the Member States and the Commission to develop EU-level frameworks enabling comparable enforcement responses;	23. CommendsMoldova’s whole-of-government response to Russian FIMI ahead of its 2025 elections as an operational model, including its use of law enforcement action against networks conducting hybrid operations on behalf of a foreign state power; calls for a substantial and permanent increase in EU financial and operational assistance to the Republic of Moldova through the European Peace Facility and the EU Partnership Mission (EUPM) Moldova, recognizing that the security and stability of the Republic of Moldova is directly intertwined with the security of the EU’s Eastern flank; calls on the Member States and the Commission to develop EU-level frameworks enabling comparable enforcement responses;

Or. en

Amendment 465

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 23

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
23. CommendsMoldova’s whole-of-government response to Russian FIMI ahead of its 2025 elections as an operational model, including its use of law enforcement action against networks conducting hybrid operations on behalf of a foreign state power; calls on the Member States and the Commission to develop EU-level frameworks enabling comparable enforcement responses;	23. Commends Moldova’s and Armenia’s whole-of-government response to Russian FIMI ahead of their 2025 and 2026 elections as an operational model, including their use of law enforcement action against networks conducting hybrid operations on behalf of a foreign state power; calls on the Member States and the Commission to develop EU-level frameworks enabling comparable enforcement responses;

Or. en

Amendment 466

Christophe Bay, Pierre-Romain Thionnet

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 23

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
23. CommendsMoldova’s whole-of-government response to Russian FIMI ahead of its 2025 elections as an operational model, including its use of law enforcement action against networks conducting hybrid operations on behalf of a foreign state power; calls on the Member States and the Commission to develop EU-level frameworks enabling comparable enforcement responses;	23. Notes Moldova’s whole-of-government response to Russian FIMI ahead of its 2025 elections as an operational model, including its use of law enforcement action against networks conducting hybrid operations on behalf of a foreign state power; calls on the Member States and the Commission to develop EU-level frameworks enabling comparable enforcement responses;

Or. fr

Amendment 467

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 23 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	23a. Notes that the Republic of Azerbaijan has, in recent years, shown significant resilience in countering foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), including narratives originating from Russian sources, despite linguistic and historical media-space proximity that could facilitate such influence; underlines that this demonstrates that effective resistance to hybrid information threats depends primarily on institutional strength, information ecosystem resilience, strategic communication capacity and political decision-making rather than linguistic affiliation; stresses the importance of sharing good practices in countering FIMI and strengthening cooperation on resilience-building across the wider region;

Or. en

Amendment 468

Petras Auštrevičius

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 23 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	23a. Commends Armenia’s pro-European forces for their victory in the June 2026 parliamentary elections, demonstrating strong public resistance to Russia’s sustained year-long FIMI campaign against Armenia and its economic coercion; notes the important role played by Armenian civil society and independent media in rapid fact-checking of disinformation and the notably high level of public awareness of hybrid threats;

Or. en

Amendment 469

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 23 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	23a. Calls for reinforced cooperation on hybrid threats with like-minded non-EU partners, in particular the United Kingdom and Norway, as key European security partners, as well as Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, New Zealand and other like-minded partners, including through Security and Defence Partnerships, information-sharing, cyber, maritime security, space and resilience cooperation;

Or. en

Amendment 470

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 23 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	23a. Stresses that EEA/EFTA states and their defence industries should be fully included in EU hybrid resilience frameworks and capability development programmes, recognising their direct contribution to European security and their shared exposure to hybrid threats;

Or. en

Amendment 471

Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Rasa Juknevičienė

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 23 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	23a. Supports strengthening resilience-building programmes for candidate and aspiring candidate countries, particularly in the fields of cyber security, democratic resilience, critical infrastructure protection and strategic communications.

Or. en

Amendment 472

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 23 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	23b. Highlights that Russian influence operations in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean are not peripheral to European security, as they seek to undermine the Union’s partnerships, weaken support for Ukraine and undermine European diplomacy, security assistance and development cooperation; notes that in Africa these operations mostly rely on state media, cultural and religious fronts, while in Latin America and the Caribbean Russia has built a Spanish-language influence ecosystem that complements its anti-European messaging elsewhere; calls on the EU and the Member States to strengthen strategic communication, support independent and trusted local media, engage credible local voices and reinforce cooperation with partners in both regions to expose and counter hostile information operations;

Or. en

Amendment 473

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lena Düpont

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 24

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
24. Notes Taiwan’s extensive experience in defending itself against China’s hybrid attacks; calls for stronger cooperation, in this regard, on countering FIMI and the sabotage of undersea cables;	24. Notes Taiwan’s extensive experience in defending itself against China’s hybrid attacks and FIMI; calls for regular exchanges between the EU and its Taiwanese counterparts on relevant security issues, and for stronger cooperation, in this regard, on countering FIMI and cognitive warfare, protecting critical infrastructure and undersea cables, and strengthening whole-of-society resilience between the EU and Taiwan; calls on the EU to expand trade and industrial cooperation with Taiwan, particularly in high-tech components and strategic technologies critical to the resilience and security of essential infrastructure and supply chain, including semiconductors, 5G/6G telecommunications equipment, drones, and dual-use items;

Or. en

Amendment 474

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 24

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
24. Notes Taiwan’s extensive experience in defending itself against China’s hybrid attacks; calls for stronger cooperation, in this regard, on countering FIMI and the sabotage of undersea cables;	24. Notes Taiwan’s extensive experience in defending itself against China’s hybrid attacks; calls for stronger cooperation, in this regard, on countering FIMI and the sabotage of undersea cables; commends Taiwan’s comprehensive resilience model, including the establishment of a Whole-of-Society Defence Resilience Committee, large-scale civil defence training, cooperation with civil society organisations, digital resilience networks and public preparedness initiatives; underlines that Taiwan’s experience shows that societal resilience is not a secondary aspect of defence, but a central pillar of national security, particularly when hybrid pressure targets critical infrastructure, public trust, and social cohesion;

Or. en

Amendment 475

Elena Donazzan, Alberico Gambino, Cristian Terheş

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 24

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
24. Notes Taiwan’s extensive experience in defending itself against China’s hybrid attacks; calls for stronger cooperation, in this regard, on countering FIMI and the sabotage of undersea cables;	24. Notes Taiwan’s extensive experience in defending itself against China’s hybrid attacks, particularly in the areas of information resilience, countering disinformation, and protecting critical digital and submarine infrastructure; encourages, therefore, the exchange of good practices and lessons learned at international level and calls for stronger cooperation, in this regard, on countering FIMI and the sabotage of undersea cables;

Or. it

Amendment 476

Engin Eroglu

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 24

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
24. Notes Taiwan’s extensive experience in defending itself against China’s hybrid attacks; calls for stronger cooperation, in this regard, on countering FIMI and the sabotage of undersea cables;	24. Notes Taiwan’s extensive experience in defending itself against China’s hybrid attacks; calls for stronger cooperation, in this regard, on countering FIMI, algorithmic manipulation, cyberattacks and the sabotage of undersea cables as well as on protecting critical digital and maritime infrastructure, early warning mechanisms and attributing hybrid attacks;

Or. de

Amendment 477

Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Rasa Juknevičienė

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 24

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
24. Notes Taiwan’s extensive experience in defending itself against China’s hybrid attacks; calls for stronger cooperation, in this regard, on countering FIMI and the sabotage of undersea cables;	24. Notes Taiwan’s extensive experience in defending itself against China’s hybrid attacks; calls for stronger cooperation, in this regard, on countering FIMI and the sabotage of undersea cables; and encourages exchanges of expertise on supply-chain resilience and the protection of critical technologies.

Or. en

Amendment 478

Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius, Urmas Paet, Engin Eroglu, Lucia Yar

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 24

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
24. Notes Taiwan’s extensive experience in defending itself against China’s hybrid attacks; calls for stronger cooperation, in this regard, on countering FIMI and the sabotage of undersea cables;	24. Notes Taiwan’s extensive experience in defending itself against China’s hybrid attacks; calls for stronger cooperation, in this regard, on countering FIMI and the sabotage of undersea cables; also stresses the need to provide IRIS² to Taiwan and Ukraine;

Or. en

Amendment 479

Christophe Bay, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 24 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	24a. Emphasises that protecting underwater cables, ports, shipping lanes, offshore energy infrastructure and digital networks is particularly important for Member States with extensive coastlines and overseas territories; calls on the Union and the Member States to step up maritime surveillance, cooperation between national navies, coastguards, private operators and port authorities, and strengthen capacities to carry out rapid repairs to damaged cables and infrastructure;

Or. fr

Amendment 480

Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 24 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	24a. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to abolish the granting of funds, aid and credit to third countries that use or promote immigrant flows as a hybrid attack on any European nation;

Or. es

Amendment 481

Christophe Bay, Pierre-Romain Thionnet

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 24 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	24b. Stresses the need to protect Europe’s defence industrial and technological base against espionage, hostile takeovers, forced technology transfers, cyber-attacks, intellectual property theft and critical dependencies; calls on Member States to strengthen security checks around strategic companies, defence subcontractors, research laboratories and dual-use technologies;

Or. fr

Amendment 482

Christophe Bay, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 24 c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	24c. Points out that resilience to hybrid threats is also dependent on the continuity of essential services; calls on Member States to replenish strategic stocks, improve business continuity plans, rapid repair capabilities, crisis exercises and emergency communications, better protect energy and digital networks and enhance preparedness of local and regional authorities and emergency services;

Or. fr

Amendment 483

Christophe Bay, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Jorge Buxadé Villalba

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 24 d (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	24d. Emphasises that efforts to combat hybrid threats must not be used as a pretext for widespread surveillance of citizens or disproportionate restrictions on civil liberties; calls for security measures to be necessary, proportionate, finite where appropriate and subject to democratic scrutiny;

Or. fr

Amendment 484

José Cepeda, Elio Di Rupo, Tobias Cremer

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 25

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
25. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.	25. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the High Representative and the Commission;

Or. en

Amendment 485

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Michał Dworczyk

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 25 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	25a. Policy Recommendations

Or. en

Amendment 486

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 25 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	25b. Calls for the integration of cognitive-vulnerability mapping and resilience benchmarks into EU security and defence strategies, establishing a structured three-tier framework at strategic, operational and tactical levels; calls for the inclusion of cognitive resilience indicators in the EU Strategic Compass and national security and defence strategies, as well as the systematic integration of cognitive vulnerability assessments into hybrid threat analyses, crisis preparedness exercises and civilian-military planning; further calls for the development of a common EU Cognitive Security Framework to guide Member States in identifying, measuring and addressing cognitive threats; at the operational level, calls for the mainstreaming of a cognitive security lens across EU institutions and agencies, both civilian and military, and for the establishment of a Civil-Military Scientific Advisory Group on Cognitive Threats bringing together expertise from behavioural sciences, neuroscience, digital technologies and security studies to support evidence-based policy design and interinstitutional coordination; at the tactical level, calls for the creation of deployable cognitive defence capabilities, including specialised rapid-response teams able to assist Member States and partner countries in detecting, countering and recovering from hostile cognitive influence operations, including disinformation, data exposure and coordinated manipulation campaigns; further calls for sustained investment in national education and resilience programmes focused on critical thinking, media literacy, digital fluency and cognitive bias awareness, complementing existing EU initiatives such as the European Democracy Shield and the Digital Decade agenda, in order to strengthen long-term societal resilience against foreign information manipulation and cognitive interference;

Or. en

Amendment 487

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 25 c (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	25c. Calls for the strengthening of structured cooperation on countering hybrid threats, including foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), cyber threats, and other hybrid warfare tactics, through the exchange of good practices between EU Member States and partner countries with which the Union has established security and defence partnerships, as well as partner countries such as United States, Georgia, Türkiye and Azerbaijan; calls for the organisation of regular joint exercises, simulation scenarios and training programmes aimed at enhancing preparedness, improving rapid response capacities and fostering interoperability in addressing hybrid threats; underlines that such cooperation should contribute to building a shared understanding of hybrid risks, reinforcing societal resilience, and strengthening coordinated and collective responses across the wider European neighbourhood;

Or. en

Amendment 488

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Michał Dworczyk

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 25 d (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	25d. Calls for a shift in the Union’s analytical framework on FIMI, recognising that vulnerability is not only linguistic in nature or determined by geographic proximity, but must instead be assessed through a more comprehensive structural approach; underlines that hostile actors, including the Russian Federation, employ increasingly sophisticated and adaptive hybrid techniques that exploit societal fault lines, perceived grievances and historical narratives, requiring equally sophisticated analytical and monitoring tools; calls on the EEAS, including the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INTCEN) and the East StratCom Task Force, to prioritise indicators such as institutional resilience, socio-economic conditions and perceived standards of living, public trust in democratic institutions, levels of education, energy security, strength of regional security partnerships, domestic media governance, and societal cohesion, including levels of religious diversity and the role of religion in public and political life, as well as indicators related to political legitimacy, patterns of institutional trust, and the role of historical memory, typology of leaders preferred by the population, collective identity narratives and societal perceptions of past political and geopolitical turning points, when assessing exposure to hybrid threats;

Or. en

Amendment 489

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 25 e (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	25e. Calls for the establishment of a more flexible EU “counter-coercion” approach in external relations, recognising that some partner countries pursue multi-vector foreign policies for geopolitical and security reasons; underlines that EU engagement should support sovereignty, border security and supply chain resilience without imposing binary geopolitical alignment choices, thereby reducing opportunities for external actors to exploit divisions for hybrid destabilisation;

Or. en

Amendment 490

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 25 f (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	25f. Calls for the establishment of standardised pre-bunking and rapid-response mechanisms across the Union and with partner countries, including structured early-warning communication channels; encourages the development of proactive strategic communication tools capable of warning populations in advance about likely disinformation tactics, narrative patterns and fabricated content ahead of critical events such as elections, energy negotiations or security crises;

Or. en

Amendment 491

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 25 g (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	25g. Calls for an upgrade of EU support for information resilience, moving beyond traditional fact-checking and media literacy initiatives towards sustained support for independent investigative journalism and transparency reporting; stresses in particular the importance of exposing financial networks, illicit funding channels and domestic proxy structures used by foreign actors to exert covert influence;

Or. en

Amendment 492

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Michał Dworczyk

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 25 h (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	25h. Calls on the Commission, the EEAS and relevant EU agencies, including EU INTCEN and ENISA, to create a common attribution methodology handbook under EEAS / EU INTCEN to establish harmonised procedures and minimum methodological standards for attribution assessments, including criteria for evidentiary thresholds, confidence levels and inter-agency validation processes; stresses the importance of strengthening information-sharing mechanisms between Member States and EU institutions to ensure rapid exchange of intelligence and analytical assessments relevant to attribution, while safeguarding classified information and operational security; underlines the need to enhance cooperation with NATO and like-minded partners to develop interoperable attribution methodologies and shared situational awareness tools, in order to reinforce collective resilience and coordinated responses to hybrid threats;

Or. en

Amendment 493

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 25 i (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	25i. Calls for the immediate and total closure of all overland and maritime transit routes through the territories of the Russian Federation and Belarus for European-bound and European-origin cargo, with an explicit prohibition on the use of the Northern Corridor; stresses that reliance on transit routes controlled by hostile state actors poses a severe vulnerability to European supply chain security; urges the Commission to rapidly scale up financial and structural investments into the Middle Corridor (Trans-Caspian International Transport Route) by streamlining customs procedures, digitizing logistics, and expanding infrastructure partnerships with trusted regional partners in the South Caucasus and Central Asia;

Or. en

Amendment 494

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Michał Dworczyk

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 25 j (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	25j. Demands the urgent strengthening of EU-wide compliance frameworks by making the 'No-Russia' clause mandatory for all contracts involving sensitive and dual-use technologies;

Or. en

Amendment 495

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Michał Dworczyk

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 25 k (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	25k. Calls on the Commission to introduce robust secondary sanctions targeting third-country entities and jurisdictions that facilitate the re-export of European goods to the Russian Federation, thereby eliminating the financial and material avenues fueling Russia's hybrid aggression;

Or. en

Amendment 496

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Elena Donazzan, Michał Dworczyk

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 25 l (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	25l. Rigorously audit transnational NGOs and holding companies linked to the Muslim Brotherhood’s financial network, freezing assets where a direct link to political destabilization or radicalization can be proven;

Or. en

Amendment 497

Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 25 m (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	25m. Calls for the establishment of an Interfaith and Faith-Based Diplomacy and Resilience Training Unit, to be created within the European External Action Service (EEAS) Strategic Communications Task Force, mandated to train EU diplomats, officials, and Member State representatives in interfaith engagement, faith-based diplomacy, and resilience against foreign interference in religious and faith-based spaces, including the identification of financial influence, organizational capture risks, and information manipulation that may undermine democratic cohesion, social trust, and intercommunal relations within the European Union;

Or. en