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OPINION (COM(2025)0547 – C100167/2025 – 2025/0221(COD))

On the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Connecting Europe Facility for the period 2028-2034, amending Regulation (EU) 2024/1679 and repealing Regulation (EU) 2021/1153

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Committee on Security and Defence · Rapporteur: Petras Auštrevičius

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The Committee on Security and Defence gives its opinion on the proposed Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) regulation for 2028-2034, which funds transport, energy and digital networks. It proposes amendments to make military mobility a central objective, with dual-use infrastructure, protection of critical infrastructure and cooperation with NATO. The amendments add military mobility to the programme's general objectives, require transport and energy infrastructure to meet defence needs, and extend corridors to Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and the Western Balkans. They require cybersecurity, physical protection and resilience measures for critical infrastructure, restrictions on high-risk suppliers, and priority for projects on the four EU military mobility corridors. They also ask for faster permitting, reporting to Parliament, and support for military fuels and energy infrastructure in the eastern border regions.

Committee position. The Committee on Security and Defence proposes amendments to the CEF regulation to strengthen military mobility, dual-use infrastructure, protection of critical infrastructure and cooperation with NATO and partner countries, and submits them to the lead committees ITRE and TRAN.

Key points

  1. The opinion says military mobility is an urgent priority for EU security and defence, to be pursued in complementarity with NATO and in support of Ukraine.
  2. It proposes adding to the CEF regulation's objectives the building, protection and resilience of transport and energy networks, including dual-use infrastructure for rapid military movement, with focus on the EU's eastern flank and external borders.
  3. It calls for enhancing physical and cyber protection of critical infrastructure along the four EU military mobility corridors, in cooperation with NATO, and for counter-mobility infrastructure planning.
  4. It asks to extend military transport corridors into Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and the Western Balkans to deter future aggression.
  5. It proposes that transport actions take into account military requirements such as load-bearing capacity, clearance profiles and interoperability with Union and NATO standards.
  6. It calls for synergies with defence funding instruments such as EDIP, EDIRPA and the European Competitiveness Fund.
  7. It proposes that actions with digital components meet minimum cybersecurity requirements, and that military mobility actions require a cyber risk assessment and security-by-design architecture.
  8. It proposes eligibility restrictions on high-risk suppliers for security reasons, with additional assessment criteria for military mobility actions including defence readiness and supply chain security.
  9. It proposes that grants for dual-use infrastructure give priority to projects on the four EU military mobility corridors, and that co-financing rates may rise to 75% for projects enhancing resilience and cross-border cooperation.
  10. It proposes that grant agreements for military mobility include obligations on physical security, cybersecurity, risk management and business continuity, with possible reduction, suspension or termination for non-compliance.
  11. It proposes accelerated permitting procedures with binding deadlines for priority corridors and military mobility actions.
  12. It proposes that the Commission provide Parliament and the Council with draft work programmes, a dashboard of the four military mobility corridors, and an annual report on the military mobility component.

Who is affected

  • EU member states, especially those on the eastern border, which would benefit from infrastructure upgrades and protection.
  • NATO and partner countries such as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and the Western Balkans, whose transport links would be extended.
  • Small and medium-sized enterprises in defence and dual-use technology, which the opinion says need dedicated EU funding.
  • High-risk suppliers, which would face eligibility restrictions for security reasons.
  • The Commission, which would have to report to Parliament and maintain a dashboard on military mobility corridors.

Figures and deadlines

  • The CEF budget is proposed to rise from €33.71 billion to €81.4 billion.
  • Military mobility is proposed to receive €17.6 billion, a tenfold increase over the previous CEF.
  • The estimated investment need for addressing 500 hotspots is at least EUR 100 billion.
  • The core network of the trans-European transport network is to be completed by 2030 and the extended core network by 2040.
  • Union financial support for works under the transport objective shall not exceed 50% of total eligible cost, or 75% for member states with per capita GNI below 90% of the Union GNI.
  • Co-financing rates may be increased to a maximum of 75% for certain projects enhancing resilience and cross-border cooperation.