On the escalation of Houthi attacks and implications for regional security

European Parliament resolution on the escalation of Houthi attacks and implications for regional security

(2026/2939(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Iran and the security situation in the Red Sea,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 16 October 2026,

– having regard to the statements by the President of the European Council of 4 September 2026 and of 12 October 2026, by the President of the Commission of 9 October 2026, and by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR),

– having regard to the remarks by the VP/HR following the Foreign Affairs Council meeting of 12 October 2026,

– having regard to the statement by the High Representative of 23 July 2026 on Houthi threats against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and freedom of navigation in the region,

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/583 of 8 February 2024 on a European Union maritime security operation to safeguard freedom of navigation in relation to the Red Sea crisis (EUNAVFOR ASPIDES), and to Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/778 of 30 March 2026 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/583 on a European Union maritime security operation to safeguard freedom of navigation in relation to the Red Sea crisis (EUNAVFOR ASPIDES), which amended the mandate of the EUNAVFOR ASPIDES and extended it until 28 February 2027,

– having regard to Council Decision 2014/932/CFSP of 18 December 2014 and Council Regulation (EU) No 1352/2014 of 18 December 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Yemen,

– having regard to the joint statement of the European Parliament – Gulf Cooperation Council Speakers’ Conference of 16 October 2026,

– having regard to the statement by the G7 foreign ministers and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 22 September 2026 on Bab al-Mandab and Navigational Rights and Freedoms,

– having regard to UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000), 1747 (2007), 2140 (2014), 2216 (2015), 2722 (2024), 2801 (2025), 2813 (2026), 2817 (2026) and 2826 (2026),

– having regard to the statement by the UN Secretary-General of 10 October 2026 on the Houthi attack on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh,

– having regard to the statements by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights of 24 September 2026 on the deepening conflict in Yemen and of 12 October 2026 on the recent attacks in Saudi Arabia,

– having regard to the final report of the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen of 17 October 2025,

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations,

– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

– having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 and its Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict of 2000,

– having regard to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

– having regard to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment, and to the Arms Trade Treaty,

– having regard to the EU Guidelines on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law,

– having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the Houthi movement (Ansar Allah) seized the Yemeni capital Sana’a in 2014 and ousted the internationally recognised government, which led to the intervention of a Saudi-led international coalition in 2015 and to a prolonged conflict that has killed and displaced hundreds of thousands of people, including many children;

B. whereas the Houthis are an Iran-backed political and military movement widely considered to be part of the Iran-led ‘axis of resistance’, alongside Hezbollah and Hamas;

C. whereas a UN-brokered truce in April 2022 brought four years of relative calm and fragile de-escalation between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis; whereas this truce collapsed in July 2026 amid the fallout of the wider regional war involving Iran, turning the Yemen conflict into a broader regional security crisis;

D. whereas the conflict in Yemen reignited in July 2026 and the attacks launched by the Houthi militias have since killed people and caused mass displacement; whereas the International Committee of the Red Cross has warned that the escalation is taking a devastating toll on civilians, with casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure increasing at an alarming rate, including in Aden and Sana’a, and that further escalation could have catastrophic consequences for tens of millions of civilians across the region;

E. whereas the latest escalation has displaced more than 200 000 people since August 2026, the highest level of new displacement since the 2022 truce, in addition to some 5.2 million internally displaced persons;

F. whereas on 13 July 2026 the Houthis launched a ballistic missile attack on southern Saudi Arabia following an airstrike by Yemeni Government forces on Sana’a International Airport, and on 20 July 2026 announced a maritime and aerial embargo against Saudi Arabia, including a naval blockade of Saudi shipping; whereas the Houthis have declared Saudi airspace to be within their area of operations and have warned international airlines against flying over it;

G. whereas since mid-July 2026, the Houthis have launched dozens of ballistic missile, cruise missile and drone attacks against the territory of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, deliberately and repeatedly targeting civilians, civilian infrastructure, economic assets and energy facilities in at least 10 cities and regions, namely Riyadh, Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jazan, Najran, Taif, Yanbu, the Eastern Province, Mecca and Medina; whereas the targets have included King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, Abha International Airport, a school in Najran and residential areas in Asir, Jazan and Najran;

H. whereas energy infrastructure has been repeatedly hit, including the Jazan oil refinery on 9 August 2026, energy facilities in Riyadh, Khurais and Rabigh, an Aramco facility near Riyadh on 3 October 2026 and the Aramco headquarters in Dhahran on 15 October 2026; whereas on 10 September 2026, an Iran-backed militia in Iraq struck Saudi Arabia’s East-West crude oil pipeline; whereas the recent Houthi strikes are not an isolated incident, but rather part of a long-standing, systematic pattern of cross-border aggression conducted by the Houthi militia against Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states and Israel;

I. whereas on 8 September 2026, attacks on four southern Saudi cities reportedly wounded 73 people; whereas on 18 September 2026, the Houthis fired a ballistic missile at Riyadh and a Houthi attack struck an Italian Eurofighter stationed at a Saudi air base in Taif;

J. whereas King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh has been targeted on 20 separate occasions since 1 October 2026; whereas the strike of 10 October 2026 alone killed at least 13 people and injured more than 300, including Saudi nationals and citizens of Bangladesh, the United States, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Palestine and Sudan, and a second missile on 11 October 2026 killed one person and injured 11; whereas the attacks on Saudi airports in October 2026 have killed at least 20 civilians and injured more than 300; whereas King Khalid International Airport suspended its operations until 17 October 2026 and many international airlines, including European carriers, have suspended flights to Saudi Arabia;

K. whereas the Houthis have also attempted drone and missile strikes targeting Mecca, raising serious concerns about the protection of religious sites, and claim to have shot down a Saudi F-15 fighter jet; whereas they have vowed to continue their attacks on Saudi airports and oil facilities;

L. whereas on 15 October 2026, the Houthis fired ballistic missiles at the Al-Maashiq Presidential Palace in Aden, the seat of the internationally recognised government, killing five people, and on 19 October 2026, attacked a government security forces training camp in Shabwa province, killing at least 53 people and injuring 200;

M. whereas on 4 October 2026, the Houthis captured Turbah, a town linking Taiz, Yemen’s third-largest city, to the port of Aden; whereas renewed fighting around Taiz has severely restricted the movement of civilians and humanitarian supplies, cutting off life-saving assistance to approximately 800 000 people;

N. whereas the escalation has also included renewed airstrikes by Saudi Arabia, in coalition with Yemeni Government forces, on Houthi-controlled territory and intensified ground fighting, which have reportedly caused civilian casualties, including children, and damage to civilian infrastructure;

O. whereas all parties to the conflict are bound by international humanitarian law and international human rights law, including the principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack; whereas attacks intentionally directed against civilians or civilian objects, and indiscriminate attacks, are prohibited and may constitute war crimes;

P. whereas the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen has documented serious violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law committed by all parties to the conflict, with close to no accountability or access to justice for victims;

Q. whereas over the past three years, the Houthis have attacked more than 100 commercial vessels in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait, through which 12-15 % of global maritime trade passes each year; whereas these attacks began in late 2023 and prompted US and UK strikes on Houthi targets from January 2024, before a US-Houthi ceasefire was reached, mediated by Oman; whereas since 22 July 2026, the Houthis have been attacking Saudi oil tankers in the Red Sea;

R. whereas in September 2026 the Houthis seized the port of Mokha, the coastal town of Dhubab, the strategic island of Perim (Mayyun) and other islands near the Bab al-Mandab Strait, claiming control of Yemen’s entire Red Sea coastline; whereas in October 2026, the Yemeni Government launched Operation Dawn of Yemen and Saudi-backed forces have since recaptured key areas around the strait, which the Houthis deny;

S. whereas the Red Sea has become the main alternative route for Saudi oil exports and international trade while navigation through the Strait of Hormuz is disrupted by Iran; whereas Saudi Arabia’s East-West crude oil pipeline transports oil to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, bypassing the Strait of Hormuz;

T. whereas the simultaneous disruption of the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Strait of Hormuz affects the two main maritime corridors linking Europe with the Gulf and Asia; whereas the price of Brent crude rose above USD 100 a barrel following the attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure; whereas rerouting and rising freight and insurance costs have direct consequences for EU energy prices, inflation, industrial supply chains, the purchasing power of European consumers at the onset of winter and the competitiveness of European, and in particular Mediterranean, ports;

U. whereas the Red Sea is also a critical digital chokepoint, with an estimated 90 % of the undersea fibre-optic cables connecting Europe and Asia passing through the region;

V. whereas disruptions in the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz are driving up the prices of imported grain, fuel and fertiliser across Africa; whereas, according to the World Food Programme, the Middle East conflict has pushed an additional 6.1 million people into acute food insecurity, with another 45 million at risk of acute hunger; whereas growing ties between the Houthis and al-Shabaab since early 2025, involving arms shipments and training, threaten to spread instability to the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden;

W. whereas attacks on vessels, ports and energy infrastructure create risks of oil spills, marine pollution and transboundary environmental harm to the fragile Red Sea ecosystem; whereas Yemen is particularly vulnerable to climate change, water scarcity and extreme weather events;

X. whereas EUNAVFOR ASPIDES has been operating since February 2024 as a defensive operation to protect commercial shipping; whereas in March 2026, the Council expanded the operation’s mandate to include maritime information-sharing, cooperation with the Yemeni Coast Guard and training for Djiboutian maritime forces, and extended the operation until 28 February 2027; whereas on 23 September 2026, the Council agreed to double EU support to the Djibouti Armed Forces through the European Peace Facility;

Y. whereas on 19 September 2026, the VP/HR wrote to the Member States warning that Houthi control over Mokha, Perim Island and the Hanish Islands poses a serious threat to maritime security and European interests, and calling for substantially more naval and air assets, including enhanced close-protection capabilities; whereas EUNAVFOR ASPIDES relies on three core vessels provided by Italy and Greece and on rotating contributions from France, Germany, Belgium, Spain and the Netherlands, despite the fact that according to assessments carried out upon the operation’s launch it was deemed to require at least 10 vessels; whereas merchant vessels are waiting for escort and only two additional vessels have been offered; whereas on 8 October 2026, the VP/HR announced the expansion of the operation;

Z. whereas the Iranian regime provides the Houthis with financial, military and technical support, including weapons, missile and drone technology and training, in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1747 (2007), 2140 (2014) and 2216 (2015), as also stated by the G7 foreign ministers and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on 22 September 2026; whereas this support threatens not only neighbouring Arab states but also the security, energy supply and trade interests of the EU and its partners; whereas the Houthis have also received training and expertise from Hezbollah and Iraqi specialists to expand domestic drone manufacturing and diversify their weapons supply chains;

AA. whereas UN Security Council Resolution 2624 (2022) described the Houthis as a terrorist group;

AB. whereas Iran-backed armed groups, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and militias in Iraq and Syria, coordinate their actions and share weapons supply chains originating in Iran; whereas the proliferation of non-state armed groups operating outside state control undermines the sovereignty and stability of states across the region and is one of the main drivers of regional escalation; whereas the simultaneous disruption of the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Strait of Hormuz serves Iran’s wider geopolitical interests;

AC. whereas reports indicate that the Houthis are attempting to produce advanced medium-range ballistic missiles derived from the Iranian Kheibar Shekan missile, and that commercial artificial intelligence tools have been misused to develop missile software;

AD. whereas on 14 March 2022, the Council added the Houthis to the EU sanctions list relating to the situation in Yemen, freezing their funds and economic resources; whereas EU restrictive measures also include an arms embargo in line with UN Security Council Resolutions 2140 (2014) and 2216 (2015); whereas the EU has listed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the military wing of Hezbollah as terrorist organisations, but has not yet listed the Houthis under Common Position 2001/931/CFSP; whereas the United States has designated the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and the Yemeni Government has approved a draft law designating them as a terrorist group;

AE. whereas restrictive measures must be implemented in line with international law and with robust humanitarian exemptions, since over-compliance and financial de-risking can impede the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the import of food, medicines and fuel;

AF. whereas Yemen, ranked by the International Monetary Fund as the poorest country in the world, faces one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises; whereas in 2026, an estimated 22.3 million people in Yemen require humanitarian assistance and protection, at least 18.3 million people are acutely food insecure, more than 2.2 million children under five are acutely malnourished and 17.8 million people lack access to basic healthcare; whereas the health system is close to collapse;

AG. whereas access to food, healthcare, water and essential services in Yemen has deteriorated owing to the conflict, economic collapse, restrictions imposed by parties to the conflict and cuts in international humanitarian funding; whereas an estimated 70-80 % of Yemen’s population live in Houthi-controlled territory, where the Houthis have obstructed and diverted humanitarian aid;

AH. whereas the EU has contributed almost EUR 1.6 billion to the response to the crisis in Yemen since 2015, including over EUR 1 billion in humanitarian aid, and allocated EUR 120 million in humanitarian funding in 2025;

AI. whereas the Houthis continue to arbitrarily detain 71 UN staff members, as well as staff of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil society organisations and diplomatic missions, with reports of torture, enforced disappearances and denial of legal counsel; whereas at least eight of them face espionage charges that carry the death penalty; whereas the Houthis have forcibly entered and seized UN premises;

AJ. whereas, according to the Yemeni Ministry of Human Rights, the Houthis recruited 100 children in September 2026 alone; whereas children in Yemen continue to face grave violations, including recruitment, killing and maiming, attacks on schools and hospitals and exposure to mines;

AK. whereas women and girls in Yemen face heightened risks of gender-based violence and restrictions on freedom of movement and access to healthcare and education, while Yemeni women peacebuilders and human rights defenders play an essential role in peacebuilding;

AL. whereas the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission and the VP/HR have expressed the EU’s full solidarity with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf partners, stated that targeting civilian infrastructure is unacceptable and called on Iran’s proxies to stop their reckless and violent actions; whereas on 11 October 2026, the VP/HR reaffirmed to the Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs the EU’s condemnation of the attack on King Khalid International Airport;

AM. whereas the UN Secretary-General, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Special Envoy for Yemen have condemned the attacks, the latter describing the attack on Riyadh airport as a serious escalation posing a grave threat to regional security; whereas the United Kingdom, the United States, India, Pakistan, Türkiye, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Arab League have also condemned the attacks; whereas on 11 October 2026, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan and Türkiye issued a joint statement pledging support for all legitimate measures taken by Saudi Arabia, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law;

AN. whereas the Gulf states have responded by diversifying their defence partnerships, including through the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye, which was invoked for the first time in October 2026, and by seeking closer defence-industrial cooperation with Europe; whereas EU Member States, alongside the United Kingdom, have affirmed their commitment to the security and territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia, and at least two Member States have deployed a defensive military presence there to protect critical energy infrastructure;

AO. whereas the security of the GCC countries is closely connected to European security and to global trade; whereas bilateral EU-GCC trade reached EUR 165.6 billion in 2025 and mutual investment stock exceeds EUR 350 billion; whereas Saudi Arabia is a key bilateral and regional partner for the EU; whereas the second EU-GCC Summit, planned for 24 October 2026 in Riyadh, has been postponed owing to the escalation;

AP. whereas a durable political settlement requires an inclusive, Yemeni-led and Yemeni-owned process involving Yemen’s diverse political and regional actors, including southern representatives, women, young people and civil society, with respect for Yemen’s sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity;

AQ. whereas renewed hostilities risk further destabilising Yemen and the wider Middle East; whereas there can be no sustainable military solution to the conflict, and renewed diplomatic efforts under the auspices of the United Nations are essential to achieving a lasting ceasefire and an inclusive political settlement; whereas addressing regional insecurity requires taking into account the broader political context;

AR. whereas Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP establishes legally binding criteria for arms exports, including the risk that equipment might be used to commit serious violations of international humanitarian law;

AS. whereas the EU Middle East strategy was included in the Commission work programme 2026 and has not yet been presented;

1. Condemns in the strongest possible terms the unprecedented missile and drone attacks carried out by the Houthis against the territory of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in particular the deliberate targeting of King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh and other civilian airports, energy infrastructure, schools and residential areas; condemns the attacks and violence perpetrated by the Houthis in Yemen, which have killed and displaced large numbers of Yemeni civilians and further deepened the country’s humanitarian crisis; stresses that such attacks constitute flagrant violations of international law and international humanitarian law;

2. Expresses its deepest condolences to the families of the victims and wishes those injured a swift recovery, including the foreign nationals affected; expresses its full and unwavering solidarity with the people and the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and reaffirms its commitment to the security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia and Yemen; extends its solidarity to all civilian victims of the conflict in Yemen and the wider region;

3. Strongly condemns the Houthi attacks of 15 October 2026 against the Al-Maashiq Presidential Palace in Aden and of 19 October 2026 against a training camp in Shabwa province, and the Houthis’ continued military offensive in Yemen, including the capture of Turbah, which threatens the delivery of food and humanitarian aid to Taiz;

4. Demands that the Houthis immediately cease all hostilities and attacks inside and outside Yemen, abandon any territorial ambitions, end all attacks against shipping and acts of repression against the Yemeni population, and comply with international law, as reflected in UNCLOS, and with UN Security Council Resolutions 2216 (2015), 2722 (2024) and 2826 (2026); urges all parties to the conflict to fully abide by their obligations under international humanitarian law and to protect civilians and civilian objects;

5. Calls on all parties to ensure the protection of hospitals, schools, medical and humanitarian personnel, water and sanitation facilities, ports, airports and roads essential for humanitarian assistance; recalls that the use of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited under international humanitarian law;

6. Welcomes the statements by the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission and the VP/HR, as well as the condemnations by Member States, the UN, the GCC, the Arab League, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan and Türkiye and numerous other governments; welcomes the European Council conclusions condemning the attacks and setting out a common EU response;

7. Expresses its solidarity with and support for the legitimate Government of Yemen; urges all parties to end hostilities, agree on an immediate and nationwide ceasefire and return to negotiations; reiterates its support for the UN Special Envoy for Yemen and for a UN-led, inclusive, Yemeni-led and Yemeni-owned political settlement, based on the agreed references and the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, as the only lasting path to peace;

8. Stresses that a sustainable peace requires the full, equal, meaningful and safe participation of women, young people, civil society and Yemen’s diverse political and regional constituencies, including southern representatives, in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000);

9. Calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to intensify coordinated diplomatic engagement with the UN, the GCC countries and other regional partners in order to address the root causes of the conflict, de-escalate tensions and restore channels for dialogue; calls for a coherent EU approach combining maritime security, conflict prevention, humanitarian assistance and diplomatic engagement, and for the EU to play an active role in supporting mediation efforts;

10. Strongly condemns the destabilising role of the Iranian regime, which continues to constitute the largest and most substantial threat to the security and stability of the broader region and provides the Houthis with weapons, missile and drone technology, training and financing in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1747 (2007), 2140 (2014) and 2216 (2015), and which compromises freedom of navigation and threatens maritime security and international trade; reiterates its condemnation of Iran’s malign activities and interference across the region; calls on Iran to end immediately all transfers to and support for the Houthis;

11. Condemns the coordination between the Houthis, Hezbollah and other Iran-backed armed groups; stresses that lasting stability in the Middle East requires the disarmament and demobilisation of all militias and non-state armed groups and the restoration of the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force; calls on the Council, the Commission and the Member States to adopt a comprehensive approach to reduce Iran’s destabilising influence and to work with regional partners to cut off the supply routes of weapons to Iran-backed groups;

12. Calls on the Council, following a proposal from the VP/HR, to include without further delay the Houthi movement – both its military and political wings, including its leadership and its military and security apparatus – on the EU list of terrorist organisations under Common Position 2001/931/CFSP and Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001;

13. Insists that any designation and restrictive measures must be targeted and accompanied by robust and clearly defined humanitarian exemptions, in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2664 (2022), so as not to impede the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the import of essential goods or ongoing peace efforts; calls on the Commission, the Council and the Member States to address barriers arising from financial de-risking and over-compliance;

14. Calls for the dismantling of all channels of financing for the Houthi movement, including oil and commodity smuggling and illicit money transfers; calls on the Council and the Member States to freeze all funds and economic resources of the Houthis and their facilitators and to ensure close cooperation between financial intelligence units, Europol and Eurojust; calls on the Commission to assess the inclusion of Houthi-linked financing in the EU’s anti-money laundering framework;

15. Calls on the Council to extend restrictive measures to all persons and entities involved in the supply of weapons and components to the Houthis; calls for the EU and its Member States, with international and regional partners, to strengthen the monitoring and enforcement of the UN arms embargo, including under UN Security Council Resolution 2216 (2015); calls on the Member States to ensure rigorous and transparent assessments of arms exports and the strict and consistent implementation of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and of their obligations under the Arms Trade Treaty;

16. Strongly condemns the declared Houthi naval blockade of Saudi Arabia and the attacks on energy and commercial shipping in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait, which threaten the safety of seafarers; recalls that freedom of navigation is a fundamental principle of international law, as reflected in UNCLOS, and rejects any coercive or unilateral action seeking to undermine it; reiterates the key importance of freedom of navigation through both the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Strait of Hormuz; calls on the Houthis to release all persons unlawfully detained in connection with attacks on shipping;

17. Expresses grave concern about the impact on the EU of the simultaneous disruption of navigation through the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Strait of Hormuz, which is driving up energy prices, shipping and insurance costs and market volatility, to the detriment of European households, businesses and competitiveness; expresses concern at Iran’s attempts to engineer a global energy crisis through a ‘dual chokepoint’ strategy; supports preventive efforts to address this strategy; calls on the Commission to urgently assess the consequences for EU energy security, inflation, supply chains, maritime transport and European ports, and to present contingency measures, including the diversification of energy supplies and the reduction of the EU’s dependence on imported fossil fuels; calls on the Commission and the Member States to put forward measures providing targeted support to households and small and medium-sized enterprises and to accelerate the EU’s energy independence;

18. Highlights that the disruption of global logistics flows has become an instrument of strategic pressure used by hostile actors; stresses that the crisis is aggravating security challenges in the Mediterranean, along NATO’s southern flank and in the Horn of Africa, including threats to critical maritime and subsea infrastructure such as undersea fibre-optic cables;

19. Stresses the vital role of the defensive operation EUNAVFOR ASPIDES and welcomes its expanded mandate; regrets that it remains well below the minimum of 10 vessels deemed necessary upon its launch; calls on the Member States to respond without delay to the VP/HR’s request of 19 September 2026 by committing additional suitably equipped naval and air assets, in particular frigates with air defence and counter-drone capabilities and maritime patrol aircraft, and calls on those not yet contributing to do so; calls on the Council to assess, in the forthcoming strategic review, whether the mandate and rules of engagement of the operation remain adequate, and to extend the operation beyond 28 February 2027; stresses that all maritime security measures, including EUNAVFOR ASPIDES, must comply fully with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations;

20. Calls for enhanced cooperation between the EU and its Gulf partners in security and defence, notably by strengthening operational synergies between EUNAVFOR ASPIDES and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA and through coordination with the Saudi-led Multinational Maritime Defence Coalition and partnerships in air defence, critical infrastructure protection, cybersecurity and counter-drone systems, in full respect of international law and the EU’s commitments; supports the efforts by the Member States and the United Kingdom to provide air defence support in the region, including France’s support in securing the Yanbu oil terminal; calls for close coordination with NATO allies;

21. Calls on the VP/HR, the Council and the Member States to commit to a diplomatic initiative to establish a negotiated maritime safety arrangement for the Red Sea;

22. Expresses grave concern about the catastrophic humanitarian situation in Yemen, aggravated by the renewed fighting; calls on all parties to allow and facilitate full, safe, rapid and unhindered humanitarian access; calls for the EU and its Member States to increase humanitarian aid, to address shortfalls caused by cuts in international funding, including through the forthcoming Global Europe instrument, and to support economic recovery and basic services; commends the UN and humanitarian workers for their efforts;

23. Expresses concern about the growing number of internally displaced persons and people fleeing Yemen; calls for their protection in accordance with international law; calls for the EU and the international community to step up humanitarian and development support for affected communities along the Red Sea and in the wider Horn of Africa;

24. Condemns the arbitrary detention of UN, NGO, civil society and diplomatic personnel and the seizure of UN premises by the Houthis; demands the immediate and unconditional release of all detainees and an end to all prosecutions against them; calls on the European External Action Service and the Member States to use their diplomatic leverage to that end;

25. Strongly condemns the recruitment and use of children by the Houthis and by all armed forces and armed groups; strongly condemns attacks on schools and hospitals; calls for the release and reintegration of children associated with armed groups and for stronger EU support for child protection and education in emergencies;

26. Condemns the systematic violations of women’s rights in Yemen, including restrictions on freedom of movement and gender-based violence;

27. Expresses concern about the environmental consequences of attacks on vessels, ports and energy infrastructure, including the risk of oil spills in the Red Sea; calls for EU support for environmental monitoring and emergency preparedness;

28. Calls for accountability for serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law committed in the conflict in Yemen; supports the independent documentation and preservation of evidence and calls for the use of the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime against those responsible;

29. Calls on the UN Security Council to consider referring the situation in Yemen for an independent and impartial investigation and to ensure that those responsible for international crimes are brought to justice through competent national or international mechanisms;

30. Considers that the EU-GCC partnership is a lasting anchor of stability in the region; calls for the swift conclusion of ambitious Strategic Partnership Agreements with the GCC countries, with a strong security and defence pillar and a parliamentary dimension, grounded in a common commitment to the rules-based international order and human rights; calls for the postponed second EU-GCC Summit to be held as soon as conditions allow and for stronger people-to-people contacts;

31. Regrets the delay in the presentation of a comprehensive EU Middle East strategy and calls on the Commission and the VP/HR to present it urgently, with the full involvement of Parliament;

32. Calls on the VP/HR and the Commission to regularly inform Parliament of developments in Yemen and the Red Sea, including diplomatic efforts towards de-escalation, the implementation of restrictive measures and the objectives, activities and results of EUNAVFOR ASPIDES;

33. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High-Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the UN Secretary-General, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, the Government and the Shura Council of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Government of Yemen and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.