Sittings · Document
DRAFT OPINION (2025/2081(INI)) 2025-09-29
On the impact of social media and the online environment on young people
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs · Rapporteur: Katarina Barley
AMENDMENTS
The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs submits the following to the Committee on Culture and Education, as the committee responsible :
Amendment 1
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| – Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications)1a, |
Or. en
Amendment 2
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| C. whereas social media exposes young users to a wide range of harmful content, including cyberbullying, sexualised material, disinformation, body image pressures, the promotion of self-harm, violence, extremism, non-consensual content and manipulative algorithm-driven advertising; | C. whereas although social media enables young users to exercise their freedom of expression and of information, it also exposes them to a wide range of harmful and/or illegal content, including cyberbullying, sexualised material, disinformation, body image pressures, the promotion of self-harm, violence, extremism, non-consensual content and manipulative algorithm-driven advertising; |
Or. en
Amendment 3
Motion for a resolution
Recital I a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| I a. whereas social media platforms’ pervasive tracking and profiling practices raise serious privacy and data protection concerns, as they expose young people, in particular, to heightened risks of manipulation and surveillance; |
Or. en
Amendment 4
Motion for a resolution
Recital I b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| I b. whereas the right to privacy, including the confidentiality of communications, is a fundamental right under EU law, and any erosion of this right would undermine trust in digital services and weaken protection for both children and adults; |
Or. en
Amendment 5
Motion for a resolution
Recital I c (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| I c. whereas end-to-end encryption plays a crucial role in ensuring children’s safety online by protecting them from exploitation and their personal communications from interception and being accessed without authorisation; |
Or. en
Amendment 6
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 1. Stresses that addressing the impact of social media on young people requires a unified strategy combining safety-by-design, algorithmic transparency, privacy-first age assurance, digital literacy, participatory governance and evidence-based evaluation to ensure equal protection and empowerment for all; | 1. Stresses that addressing the impact of social media on everyone, but especially young people, requires a unified strategy combining safety-by-design, algorithmic transparency, privacy-first age assurance, digital literacy, participatory governance and evidence-based evaluation to ensure equal protection and empowerment for all; |
Or. en
Amendment 7
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| Stresses the need for a uniform approach at EU level to avoid legal uncertainty and fragmentation through national laws overlapping with the EU’s legal framework and to achieve a uniform level of protection for minors online across the entire EU; |
Or. en
Amendment 8
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 1 b. Stresses that everyone, but especially young people, deserve a digital environment that is inclusive, safe, and respectful of their rights; recalls that Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter guarantee the right to privacy and the protection of personal data; notes that minors are particularly vulnerable to opaque personal data collection, targeted advertising, and algorithmic profiling; recalls that young users also face particular dangers online, such as being exposed to violence, pornography, gambling, as well as deceptive, manipulative and aggressive sales techniques; |
Or. en
Amendment 9
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 c (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| Stresses that the protection of personal data relating to minors, as well as data that can be inferred from their online behaviour, requires the highest level of safeguards, in line with the protections and conditions established by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR); recalls that children are entitled to specific protection of their data given their heightened vulnerability and limited awareness of the risks, consequences and safeguards involved in data processing; notes that this obligation extends not only to the direct collection of personal information but also to the indirect profiling, behavioural tracking, and inference of sensitive characteristics, which can expose minors to manipulation, commercial exploitation, or long-term harm and should therefore be banned; |
Or. en
Amendment 10
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 d (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| Stresses that it is essential to distinguish clearly between age assurance and age verification, as they involve very different levels of intrusiveness and implications for privacy; points out that age assurance is an umbrella term that refers to a range of methods for estimating or confirming a user’s age, including self-declaration, age verification and age estimation, which can rely on estimation based on artificial intelligence (AI), behavioural analysis, or device settings, whereas age verification, by contrast, refers specifically to identity-based systems that require hard proof of age mandated by law, typically through officially issued documents, digital identification, or biometric data; notes that these are significantly more invasive and raise serious privacy, data protection, and fundamental rights concerns; |
Or. en
Amendment 11
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 2. Stresses the need to ensure consistency across key EU legal instruments, such as the General Data Protection Regulation, the AVMSD, the DSA and the Artificial Intelligence Act, and the forthcoming Digital Fairness Act, to build a unified framework for protecting children online; | 2. Stresses the need to ensure consistency across key EU legal instruments, such as the GDPR, the AVMSD, the Directive on privacy and electronic communications, the DSA and the Artificial Intelligence Act, and the forthcoming Digital Fairness Act, to build a unified framework for protecting children online; |
Or. en
Amendment 12
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| Insists on the importance of safety and data protection by design as social media environments should be developed to be safe for young people from the outset by embedding protective mechanisms in system architectures and algorithms, and enabling by default the strongest possible privacy settings and ‘inner circles’, where only invited friends and family can interact, preventing contact with strangers; stresses that platforms should designate internal responsibility (e.g. a child safety officer) and complaints related to child safety should be prioritised; |
Or. en
Amendment 13
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| Requests that the findings of studies in several Member States highlighting the significant adverse effects of social media on children’s social and cognitive development be taken into account when evaluating the proportionality and appropriateness of the possibility of introducing age-based restrictions on the use of social media platforms; emphasises that such age limits should be considered on a case-by-case basis with a risk-based approach for social media platforms, as not all social media platforms exhibit or create the same risks, and as they do not mitigate such risks to the same extent; recalls that the Commission’s guidelines under Article 28 DSA emphasise that access restrictions and age assurance alone cannot be substitutes for other, more structural measures recommended in the guidelines; |
Or. en
Amendment 14
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 c (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| Underlines that the digital sphere, including social media platforms, is an important tool for young people to inform and express themselves; emphasises that online communities can provide a sense of belonging and support, particularly for young people who may face isolation offline; |
Or. en
Amendment 15
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 6 a. Considers that AI systems integrated into toys and smart devices (such as educational robots and smart speakers) should be classified as high-risk under the Artificial Intelligence Act; stresses that, since they interact with children in emotionally responsive ways, these systems are often used without an adequate understanding of risks; notes that where such AI is used, it must comply with strict requirements regarding transparency, data governance, safety and oversight; |
Or. en
Amendment 16
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 6 b. Stresses that generative AI tools, such as nudifiers and other tools able to reproduce synthetic child sexual abuse material (CSAM) or AI-manipulated content depicting minors in sexualised or exploitative ways, should be banned in the EU through them being listed in the prohibited practices under the Artificial Intelligence Act, and that harmful and illicit datasets should not be used in training; notes that this includes inter alia deepfake imagery, AI-generated avatars, and stylised representations of minors in inappropriate contexts – even where real children are not directly involved; |
Or. en
Amendment 17
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 7. Welcomes the July 2025 Commission guidelines pursuant to Article 28 DSA as a key step in strengthening child protection online, particularly on VSPs and social media, offering practical tools to help platforms and regulators apply the DSA rules effectively; | 7. Welcomes the July 2025 Commission guidelines pursuant to Article 28 DSA as a key step in strengthening child protection online, particularly on VSPs and social media, offering practical tools to help platforms and regulators apply the DSA rules effectively; urges online platforms to take greater responsibility for protecting minors from harmful or manipulative content, by ensuring moderation, default safety measures and algorithmic adjustments to prevent exposure to addictive or deceitful content; recalls Article 38 DSA, which requires VLOPs using AI recommender systems to provide at least one option for each of their recommender systems that is not based on profiling; |
Or. en
Amendment 18
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| Recalls that the GDPR forms the cornerstone of data protection in the EU, laying down strong safeguards and obligations for the processing of personal data, including important principles such as purpose limitation, data accuracy, and data minimisation and accountability, while granting children a particularly high level of protection; |
Or. en
Amendment 19
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| Stresses that when personal data is processed, the impact on children must be given particular consideration in the necessity and proportionality assessments, with specific attention paid to their fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter; recalls that the GDPR establishes age thresholds for valid consent between 13 and 16 years, determined nationally, and obliges service providers to implement privacy by design and by default, data minimisation and purpose limitation; underlines, furthermore, that these provisions are intended to prevent and mitigate risks, such as the risk of manipulation and exploitation; |
Or. en
Amendment 20
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 c (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| Regrets that, since the GDPR’s entry into force in 2018, many providers have inadequately implemented its requirements – such as the requirement for parental consent, which indirectly protects children from some risks associated with misuse of their data – potentially resulting in manipulation and exploitation; underlines the urgent need for stronger enforcement by Member States and the Commission to ensure the consistent and effective application of EU law, particularly the GDPR, so as to uphold the rights of children in the digital environment; |
Or. en
Amendment 21
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 d (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| Notes that the DSA pursues objectives distinct from, but complementary to, the GDPR, by aiming to establish a safe, predictable and trustworthy online environment that promotes innovation while protecting fundamental rights; points out that the European Data Protection Board has issued specific guidance (Guidelines 3/2025) in the form of 10 principles to be observed when processing personal data in the context of the Article 28 DSA Guidelines; recalls that platform providers subject to the Guidelines must also comply with the GDPR and highlights the importance of cooperation between all competent regulators and authorities; |
Or. en
Amendment 22
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 e (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| Recalls that everybody, but children in particular, are at risk of falling victim to digital addiction, deception, manipulation, dark patterns, and other unfair practices online; recalls that the recent Commission Fitness Check on digital fairness gives a clear indication of a lack of fairness for citizens in the digital world, especially for minors; calls therefore on the Commission to urgently propose a robust digital fairness act that ensures comprehensive protection for users in the online environment, safeguarding their rights, privacy, personal data and access to fair digital services; |
Or. en
Amendment 23
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 f (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| Recalls that tackling online sexual abuse and exploitation is essential to addressing the impact of social media on young people; stresses the importance of reinforcing the legal framework in this respect; strongly reiterates that it is vital to establish a solid set of permanent rules specifically aimed at preventing and combating child sexual abuse material online, while welcoming the progress made in the interinstitutional negotiations on the recast of Directive 2011/93/EU to combat child sexual abuse; notes that this permanent legal framework should establish harmonised rules for safety-by-design obligations, the filing of user reports, and the removal of CSAM, while protecting end-to-end encryption and respecting the fundamental right to privacy; |
Or. en
Amendment 24
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 g (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| Notes the ongoing implementation of the European Digital Identity Wallet (EUDI Wallet) under the revised Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing the European Digital Identity Framework (eIDAS Regulation)1a; recalls the need for the technical architecture to respect all the requirements laid down in the eIDAS Regulation, such as full transparency, unlinkability, unobservability, selective disclosure of attributes and the right to use pseudonyms; points out that there is a need for specific safeguards when these systems are applied to or used by minors, as children and adolescents must not be expected to navigate complex digital identity systems without support; urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure that the design and implementation of the EUDI Wallet includes robust, enforceable child protection measures, including data minimisation, age-appropriate consent measures, transparency obligations and safeguards against profiling, surveillance, or exclusion; notes that, while offering strong reliability, the use of these systems must be proportionate and their use can only be envisaged with the most high-risk platforms, in view of the concerns around data privacy, security and user anonymity; |
Or. en
Amendment 25
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 h (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| Insists that the use of the EUDI Wallet and similar age verification tools must never be a gateway to linking children’s user profiles to their legal identity, nor to profiling; recalls that processing a child’s personal data necessary for the provision of a service is permitted, but its use to provide targeted advertising should be banned; urges that strong technical and legal barriers, such as double-blind methods or cryptographic zero-knowledge proofs, must be in place to prevent platforms, in particular gatekeepers, or third parties from using digital identity credentials and tools to combine or infer sensitive information or behavioural patterns; |
Or. en
Amendment 26
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 i (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| Stresses that emerging third-party age assurance services, which can attest a user’s age, have the potential to protect privacy by limiting the amount of personal data processed; notes that under this approach, online platforms rely on a third-party provider to confirm the age of the user, for example through the issuance of age tokens specifying the exact age; notes, in particular, that a zero-knowledge proof method has been developed, though not yet deployed at scale, which allows individuals to selectively disclose a single attribute, such as proof of age, without revealing any other personal information; notes that in this privacy-friendly approach, an independent third-party exchange mediates between the platform and the age assurance provider, and immediately deletes the user’s data once the age confirmation has been transmitted; |
Or. en
Amendment 27
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 j (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| Calls for a comprehensive ban on targeted advertising, not limited to children but applying across the board, to eliminate a major driver of manipulative design and behavioural profiling; calls for the introduction of a prominent, easy-to-use ‘alert’ or ‘report’ button on all platforms accessible to children, enabling them to flag situations where they feel unsafe, threatened or harassed; notes that this feature should be designed in a child-friendly way and offer graduated response options, including an internal review by a trusted safety team, the possibility of peer support or mediation, and the option to escalate the issue to law enforcement where appropriate; highlights that reporting pathways should respect the child’s level of understanding, offer confidentiality and support their sense of control throughout the process; |
Or. en
Amendment 28
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 k (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| Calls for the establishment of mandatory ‘safe’ default settings for recommender systems, which would require platforms to avoid optimisation for engagement or virality unless a user actively chooses such settings, considering that recommender algorithms that maximise engagement often create echo chambers that reinforce bias, foster polarisation, and in some cases expose users to harmful or radicalising content with a lock-in effect that is difficult to escape; calls for enabling users, including minors or their guardians, to choose from a variety of recommender systems, including those built by more trustworthy, child-focused third parties; |
Or. en
Amendment 29
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 l (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| Considers that age assurance systems must be part of a broader set of measures, such as responsible content curation, a generally fair and non-exploitative design of digital environments, parental control, education about the risks of the online environment, and the development of digital skills for children; reiterates that the implementation of age assurance systems must remain proportionate and respect the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection; |
Or. en
Amendment 30
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 m (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| Recalls that the country-of-origin principle often renders unilateral attempts in digital regulation ineffective; urges the Member States to align possible age-based restrictions to ensure their effective and harmonised implementation across the EU; |
Or. en
Amendment 31
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 8 n (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| Recalls that Parliament’s mandate on the regulation laying down rules to prevent and combat CSAM proposed a risk-based approach and clear criteria for the use of age assessment systems; considers that age assessment techniques such as AI-driven or biometric categorisation/age estimation tools, including facial recognition and behavioural profiling, pose disproportionate risks to individuals’ right to privacy; recalls that age-verification methods relying solely on physical identity documents risk discriminating against users without access to such documents or with provisional status; calls on platform providers to offer alternative, privacy-preserving age-assurance options to ensure non-discriminatory access and inclusion; |
Or. en
Amendment 32
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 o (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| Notes that, depending on their technical design and implementation, age assurance systems can enable the tracking of users across the internet, thus creating risks for people whose safety is jeopardised when their online self is linked to their official identity (e.g. whistleblowers, human rights defenders, anti-corruption journalists) and who risk being tracked online, or who could simply suffer a data breach with far-ranging consequences (identity theft, fraud, with possible major economic loss); |
Or. en
Amendment 33
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 12 a. Calls on platform providers to ensure young users have access to well-functioning, transparent and child-friendly reporting mechanisms on online platforms and clear criteria for moderation decisions; highlights that parents should be informed if their child is reported, without having full access to the chat histories of their children; |
Or. en
Amendment 34
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 18. Highlights the key role of both formal and non-formal education in equipping young people with the digital skills and the critical thinking needed to navigate social media safely and effectively; | 18. Highlights the key role of both formal and non-formal education in equipping young people with the digital skills and the critical thinking needed to navigate social media safely and effectively; stresses that children and young people must be equipped with the knowledge and critical skills they need to recognise manipulation, resist harmful content, and navigate digital spaces safely and autonomously; emphasises that empowering children through education is a cornerstone of sustainable, rights-based online protection, and must go hand in hand with platform accountability and supportive parental engagement; |
Or. en
Amendment 35
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 19. Stresses the need for increased transparency around social media algorithmic systems, as opaque algorithms and content moderation hinder young users’ ability to comprehend why certain content is recommended, suppressed or removed, thus undermining their capacity to navigate online content intentionally; | 19. Stresses the need for increased transparency around social media algorithmic systems, as opaque algorithms and content moderation hinder young users’ ability to comprehend why certain content is recommended, suppressed or removed, thus undermining their capacity to navigate online content intentionally; stresses the need for the establishment of mandatory ‘safe’ default settings for recommender systems, which would require platforms to avoid optimisation for engagement or virality unless a user actively chooses such settings; |
Or. en
ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT
Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur for opinion declares that she included in her opinion input on matters pertaining to the subject of the file that she received, in the preparation of the draft opinion , prior to the adoption thereof in committee, from the following interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register1, or from the following representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies:
| 1. Interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register |
| HateAid gGmbH D64 |
| D64 - Zentrum für digitalen Fortschritt |
| Zentrum für digitalen Fortschritt BEUC |
The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur for opinion.
Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur for opinion declares that she has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.