Sittings · Document

DRAFT OPINION (2025/2061(INI)) 2025-09-11

On the implementation of the rule of law conditionality regime

Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs · Rapporteur: Michał Wawrykiewicz

AMENDMENTS

The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs submits the following to the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Budgetary Control, as the committees responsible :

Amendment 1

Motion for a resolution

Citation 12 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to its resolution of 24 April 2024 on ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Hungary to strengthen the rule of law and its budgetary implications1a,
	_________________
	1a Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0367.

Or. en

Amendment 2

Motion for a resolution

Citation 12 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation in Hungary and frozen EU funds1a,
	_________________
	1a OJ C, C/2024/5742, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5742/oj.

Or. en

Amendment 3

Motion for a resolution

Citation 14 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the proposal for a Council decision determining, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded1a,
	_________________
	1a OJ C 125, 5.4.2023, p. 463.

Or. en

Amendment 4

Motion for a resolution

Citation 14 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2022 on the rule of law and the consequences of the ECJ ruling1a,
	_________________
	1a OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 168.

Or. en

Amendment 5

Motion for a resolution

Citation 15 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2020 on the establishment of an EU Mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights1a,
	_________________
	1a OJ C 395, 29.9.2021, p. 2.

Or. en

Amendment 6

Motion for a resolution

Citation 15 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded1a,
	_________________
	1a OJ C 433, 23.12.2019, p. 66.

Or. en

Amendment 7

Motion for a resolution

Citation 17 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to its resolution of 5 May 2022 on ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Poland and Hungary1a,
	_________________
	1a OJ C 465, 6.12.2022, p. 147.

Or. en

Amendment 8

Motion for a resolution

Citation 17 b (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on the breaches of the Rule of Law and fundamental rights in Hungary and frozen EU funds1a,
	_________________
	1a OJ C, C/2023/1223, 21.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1223/oj.

Or. en

Amendment 9

Motion for a resolution

Citation 19 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the action brought by Parliament against the Commission on 25 March 2024 in Case C-225/24 requesting that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) annul Commission Implementing Decision C(2023)9014 of 13 December 20231a,
	_________________
	1a OJ C, C/2024/3063, 13.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/3063/oj.

Or. en

Amendment 10

Motion for a resolution

Citation 21

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
– having regard to the observations of its Committee on Budgetary Control’s fact-finding missions to Hungary from 15 to 17 May 2023 and to Slovakia from 26 to 28 May 2025,	– having regard to the observations of its Committee on Budgetary Control’s fact-finding missions to Hungary from 15 to 17 May 2023 and to Slovakia from 26 to 28 May 2025, and of its Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs’ fact-finding mission to Hungary from 14 to 16 April 2025,

Or. en

Amendment 11

Motion for a resolution

Citation 29 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	– having regard to the study requested by its Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs entitled ‘Enforcement of EU law in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’1a, published in January 2024,
	_________________
	1a https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/IPOL_STU(2024)755914.

Or. en

Amendment 12

Motion for a resolution

Recital A

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
A. whereas the EU is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, as set out in Article 2 TEU; whereas these values are reflected in the fundamental rights spelled out in the Charter, such as equality between women and men, non-discrimination, and the right of collective bargaining and action, in accordance with EU law and national laws and practices, and embedded in international human rights treaties; whereas adherence to these shared values constitutes the foundation of the rights enjoyed by those living in the EU;	A. whereas the EU is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, as set out in Article 2 TEU; whereas these values are common to the Member States and are reflected and embedded in international human rights treaties; whereas democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights are mutually reinforcing values, which, when undermined, pose a systemic threat to the rights and freedoms of the people living in the EU;

Or. en

Amendment 13

Motion for a resolution

Recital D

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
D. whereas the Conditionality Regulation empowers the EU to adopt proportionate financial measures to safeguard its financial interests where breaches of the rule of law in a Member State affect, or seriously risk affecting, the sound financial management of the EU budget; whereas it was adopted as part of the package on the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), following long and difficult negotiations between the co-legislators, notably due to attempts by some of the Member States to link the negotiations on the MFF with the negotiations on the rule of law conditionality mechanism; whereas it has been binding for all Member States since its entry into force on 1 January 2021;	D. whereas the Conditionality Regulation empowers the Council to adopt, based on a Commission proposal and while informing Parliament, proportionate financial measures to safeguard the EU’s financial interests where breaches of the rule of law in a Member State affect, or seriously risk affecting, the sound financial management of the EU budget; whereas it was adopted as part of the package on the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), following long and difficult negotiations between the co-legislators, notably due to attempts by some of the Member States to link the negotiations on the MFF with the negotiations on the rule of law conditionality mechanism; whereas it has been binding for all Member States since its entry into force on 1 January 2021;

Or. en

Amendment 14

Motion for a resolution

Recital F a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	F a. whereas in December 2022, the Conditionality Regulation was triggered for the first time in relation to Hungary, leading to a suspension of EUR 6.3 billion in cohesion funds and a prohibition on entering into new legal commitments with Hungarian public interest trusts and entities maintained by them, due to systemic breaches of the rule of law that risked jeopardising the EU budget and the EU’s financial interests, including limitations to the independence of the judiciary and public prosecution, and risks related to corruption and deficiencies in the implementation of EU funds, particularly concerning public procurement and the role of the aforementioned public interest trusts;

Or. en

Amendment 15

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 3

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
3. Welcomes the affirmation by the CJEU that respect for the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU is an ongoing obligation after EU accession and a pre-condition for enjoying all Treaty rights and benefits deriving from EU membership, including access to EU funds; instructs the Commission to highlight this point in its communication and enforcement activities;	3. Welcomes the confirmation by the CJEU that respect for the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU is an ongoing obligation after EU accession and a pre-condition for enjoying all Treaty rights and benefits deriving from EU membership, including access to EU funds; instructs the Commission to highlight this point in its communication and enforcement activities1a;
	_________________
	1a Principle of non-regression; opinion of Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona delivered on 2 December 2021 in Case C-156/21, Hungary v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:C:2021:974, paragraph 214.

Or. en

Amendment 16

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 3 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	3 a. Welcomes the fact that the CJEU has highlighted that the EU budget is a key tool for realising the principle of solidarity enshrined in Article 2 TEU – one of the EU’s fundamental principles1a; reiterates that solidarity is achieved by sharing financial resources and depends on mutual trust among the Member States, which presupposes that each Member State uses common funds responsibly and remains committed to fulfilling its obligations under EU law, including upholding the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, notably the rule of law;
	_________________
	1a CJEU Case C-156/21, cited above, paragraph 129.

Or. en

Amendment 17

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 6

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
6. Stresses that the conditionality regime is budgetary in nature, as it aims to safeguard the sound financial management of EU funds and the EU’s financial interests, and it only applies where a rule of law breach affects or seriously risks affecting the EU budget; emphasises that it differs from the Article 7 TEU procedure, which penalises serious and persistent violations of the values set out in Article 2 TEU;	6. Stresses that the conditionality regime is budgetary in nature, as it aims to safeguard the sound financial management of EU funds and the EU’s financial interests, and it only applies where a rule of law breach affects or seriously risks affecting the EU budget; emphasises that it differs from the Article 7(1) and (2) TEU procedures, which aim to address recommendations to Member States where there is a clear risk they might seriously breach the values set out in Article 2 TEU, and to penalise serious and persistent breaches of those values;

Or. en

Amendment 18

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 7

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
7. Underlines that infringement actions under Article 258 TFEU and Article 6 of the Financial Regulation remain complementary tools for systemic breaches of Article 2 TEU values;	7. Underlines that infringement actions under Articles 258 and 260 TFEU and Article 6 of the Financial Regulation remain complementary tools for systemic breaches of Article 2 TEU values;

Or. en

Amendment 19

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
8. Commends the CJEU judgments of 16 February 2022 in Cases C-156/21 and C-157/21, which dismissed in their entirety the actions by Hungary and Poland for the annulment of the Conditionality Regulation and unequivocally confirmed the validity, legal basis and compatibility with the Treaty of the Regulation, as well as the EU’s competences concerning the rule of law in the Member States;	8. Takes note of the fact that the CJEU judgments of 16 February 2022 in Cases C-156/21 and C-157/21 dismissed in their entirety the actions by Hungary and Poland for the annulment of the Conditionality Regulation and unequivocally confirmed the validity, legal basis and compatibility with the Treaty of the Regulation, as well as the EU’s competences concerning the rule of law in the Member States; further notes that in those same judgments, the CJEU confirmed that the values expressed in Article 2 TEU contain legally binding obligations for the Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 20

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
9. Takes note of the additional clarifications on the process provided by the Commission in the 2022 Guidelines on the Conditionality Regulation, and the review of its practical application in the Commission’s 2024 application report; regrets, however, that the Guidelines were adopted over a year after the entry into force of the Regulation, and that this contributed to a de facto delay in its application;	9. Takes note of the additional clarifications on the process provided by the Commission in the 2022 Guidelines on the Conditionality Regulation, and the review of its practical application in the Commission’s 2024 application report; regrets, however, that the Commission unlawfully paused the application of the Conditionality Regulation for more than a year after it had entered into force, thereby following European Council conclusions which were incompatible with the Conditionality Regulation and which were not binding on the Commission; reiterates its regret that the Commission adopted guidelines for the application of the Conditionality Regulation when a need for such guidelines had not been demonstrated;

Or. en

Amendment 21

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	10 a. Notes that, while the Member States have different national identities and traditions, the rule of law is a value common to the EU and the Member States, and forms part of the very foundations of the EU and its legal order1a; notes that the rule of law can be defined through six principles, as recognised by the CJEU and the European Court of Human Rights and developed by the Council of Europe, namely: (i) legality, implying a transparent, accountable, democratic and pluralistic process for enacting laws, (ii) legal certainty, (iii) prohibition of the arbitrary exercise of executive power, (iv) effective judicial protection by independent and impartial courts, with effective judicial review including respect for fundamental rights, (v) separation of powers and (vi) equality before the law;
	_________________
	1a CJEU Case C-156/21, cited above, paragraph 128.

Or. en

Amendment 22

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
12. Notes that, to date, only a very limited number of stakeholders have used the Commission’s standard complaint form annexed to the 2022 Guidelines; recommends that the Commission accept complaints in any written form; calls, moreover, for the establishment of a confidential reporting portal through which stakeholders can signal non-compliance, thereby enabling swift remedial action;	12. Notes that, to date, only a very limited number of stakeholders have used the Commission’s standard complaint form annexed to the 2022 Guidelines; recommends that the Commission accept complaints in any written form, promptly acknowledge the receipt of any such complaint while attributing a clear reference number to it, and provide the complainant with an update on the follow-up no later than one year after the submission of the complaint; calls, moreover, for the establishment of a confidential reporting portal through which stakeholders can signal non-compliance, thereby enabling swift remedial action;

Or. en

Amendment 23

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 13

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
13. Regrets that, despite successive worrying findings in the Commission’s annual rule of law reports, and by OLAF and the EPPO, pointing to budgetary risks in several Member States, only two formal notifications have been sent and measures decided in a single case under the Conditionality Regulation;	13. Regrets that, despite successive worrying findings in the Commission’s annual rule of law reports, and by OLAF and the EPPO, pointing to budgetary risks in several Member States, only two formal notifications have been sent and measures decided in a single case under the Conditionality Regulation; notes in particular, in this context, the fact that serious findings – of which the EPPO informed the Commission in respect of Poland in 2022 and in respect of Slovakia in 2023 – did not lead to any action under the Conditionality Regulation;

Or. en

Amendment 24

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
15. Emphasises that Commission assessments must be impartial and fair, take account of all available facts, and respect the principles of objectivity, non-discrimination and equality of the Member States before the Treaties; underlines that the choice and scale of budget-protection measures must respect the principle of proportionality laid down in Article 5 of the Conditionality Regulation, taking into account the seriousness, duration and recurrence of the breach, the cooperation of the Member State concerned and the concrete financial risk, as well as the impact on legitimate final recipients and beneficiaries, in particular smaller ones; invites the Commission to disclose the quantitative risk-scoring methodology it already applies internally, as recommended by the ECA;	15. Emphasises that Commission assessments must be impartial and fair, take account of all available facts, and respect the principles of objectivity, non-discrimination and equality of the Member States before the Treaties; underlines that the choice and scale of budget-protection measures must respect the principle of proportionality laid down in Article 5 of the Conditionality Regulation, taking into account the seriousness, duration and recurrence of the breach, the cooperation of the Member State concerned and the concrete financial risk, as well as the impact on legitimate final recipients and beneficiaries, in particular smaller ones; invites the Commission to disclose the quantitative risk-scoring methodology it already applies internally, as recommended by the ECA; recalls the worrying findings of the ECA in its special report 03/2024, notably that political considerations play a major role in decisions not to block or release funds, which has been specifically demonstrated by the fact that the Commission did not, in the past, make use of the Conditionality Regulation in respect of Poland and has not made use of it in respect of Slovakia, even where it found budget-related rule of law breaches in respect of those Member States in the context of other instruments;

Or. en

Amendment 25

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
16. Understands that some aspects of the Conditionality Regulation make it difficult to trigger the mechanism, in particular the requirement to demonstrate a sufficiently direct link between breaches of the rule of law and a serious risk of an adverse effect on the EU budget; stresses, however, that such requirements should not be used as a justification for not triggering the mechanism;	16. Understands that some aspects of the Conditionality Regulation make it difficult to trigger the mechanism, in particular the requirement to demonstrate a sufficiently direct link between breaches of the rule of law and a serious risk of an adverse effect on the EU budget; stresses, however, that such requirements should not be used as a justification for not triggering the mechanism; regrets, in this context, that the Commission applies the narrowest interpretation of the Regulation whereby it excludes even serious breaches affecting EU funds from its application; reiterates that the Regulation clearly establishes that endangering the independence of the judiciary constitutes a breach of the principles of the rule of law1a;
	_________________
	1a OJ C 465, 6.12.2022, p. 147.

Or. en

Amendment 26

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	16 a. Underlines that even where rule of law deficiencies are general in nature and affect the legal system of a Member State as a whole, such as breaches of the independence of the judiciary, these deficiencies can affect the EU budget in a direct and severe manner by removing systemic safeguards against fraudulent and other unlawful activities; emphasises that the notion of a direct effect on the EU budget must not be interpreted as restricting the scope of the Conditionality Regulation solely to issues specifically related to the implementation of the budget, such as public procurement legislation, as that approach would only motivate bad-faith actors to erode rule of law safeguards more broadly;

Or. en

Amendment 27

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
17. Notes that the Council has decided to suspend 55 % of budgetary commitments for three operational programmes under the cohesion policy for Hungary; points to the legal analysis17 demonstrating that the systemic and persistent nature of breaches of the rule of law in Hungary should have led to a significantly higher suspension of EU funding, in order to protect the EU budget in line with the proportionality principle; notes that the Commission’s December 2023 and December 2024 reassessments of the situation in Hungary both concluded that the situation that led to the adoption of measures has not been remedied; calls on the Commission to assess and address rule of law backsliding either by proposing additional measures or by updating existing ones;	17. Notes that the Council has decided to suspend 55 % of budgetary commitments for three operational programmes under the cohesion policy for Hungary and to prohibit entering into new legal commitments with Hungarian public interest trusts and entities maintained by them; points to the legal analysis17 demonstrating that the systemic and persistent nature of breaches of the rule of law in Hungary should have led to a significantly higher suspension of EU funding, in order to protect the EU budget in line with the proportionality principle; notes that the Commission’s December 2023 and December 2024 reassessments of the situation in Hungary both concluded that the situation that led to the adoption of measures has not been remedied; calls on the Commission to assess and address rule of law backsliding either by proposing additional measures or by updating existing ones to bring them in line with the aforementioned legal analysis;
_________________	_________________
17 Study requested by Daniel Freund, MEP in the Greens/EFA group – Lane Scheppele, K., Kelemen, R. D., Morijn, J., ‘Freezing all EU funds to Hungary: A legal analysis of why a 100 % suspension is “proportionate” and “appropriate” under Regulation 2020/2092 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget’, May 2022.	17 Study requested by Daniel Freund, MEP in the Greens/EFA group – Lane Scheppele, K., Kelemen, R. D., Morijn, J., ‘Freezing all EU funds to Hungary: A legal analysis of why a 100 % suspension is “proportionate” and “appropriate” under Regulation 2020/2092 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget’, May 2022.

Or. en

Amendment 28

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 20

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
20. Recalls that the Conditionality Regulation expressly states that it complements existing budget-protection tools and is to be applied ‘where other procedures set out in Union legislation would not allow the Union budget to be protected more effectively’; regrets the Commission’s interpretation that, on the basis of this wording, the instrument should be used only as a measure of last resort; notes with concern that rule of law monitoring inside the Commission is split between different services, resulting at times in inconsistent and delayed action;	20. Recalls that the Conditionality Regulation expressly states that it complements existing budget-protection tools and is to be applied ‘where other procedures set out in Union legislation would not allow the Union budget to be protected more effectively’; regrets the Commission’s interpretation that, on the basis of this wording, the instrument should be used only as a measure of last resort; notes with concern that rule of law monitoring within the Commission is split between different services, resulting at times in inconsistent and delayed action or no action at all;

Or. en

Amendment 29

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
21. Deems it to be unclear how the Conditionality Regulation interacts with other instruments from the rule of law toolbox in practice, in particular the horizontal enabling condition on the Charter under the Common Provisions Regulation and the rule of law-related ‘super milestones’ under the RRF; regrets that in December 2023 the Commission assessed that Hungary had fulfilled the horizontal enabling condition on judicial independence, while maintaining the measures imposed under the Conditionality Regulation; underlines that this lack of coherence hampers the democratic scrutiny of their application;	21. Deems it to be unclear how the Conditionality Regulation interacts with other instruments from the rule of law toolbox in practice, in particular the horizontal enabling condition on the Charter under the Common Provisions Regulation and the rule of law-related ‘super milestones’ under the RRF; regrets that in December 2023 the Commission assessed that Hungary had fulfilled the horizontal enabling condition on judicial independence, while maintaining the measures imposed under the Conditionality Regulation; underlines that this lack of coherence hampers the democratic scrutiny of their application; reiterates that the Commission’s decision is illegal, as alleged in Parliament’s pending action against the Commission in Case C-225/24, in particular due to the infringement of multiple substantive provisions of the Common Provisions Regulation, and of the Commission’s duty to state reasons for its decision as well as its misuse of power in the form of a political trade-off for Hungary’s lifting of its veto over certain urgent decisions which required unanimity in the European Council;

Or. en

Amendment 30

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 22 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	22 a. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal to strengthen the link between the recommendations of the rule of law report and financial support under the 2028-2034 MFF and to generalise the ‘reform-for-funds’ blueprint developed under the post-COVID-19 RRF; stresses that the evaluation of rule of law conditions and benchmarks under the 2028-2034 MFF must be based on impartial subject-matter expertise rather than political deals, and that this objective must be ensured and safeguarded in the procedure for carrying out that evaluation and drawing appropriate conclusions from its outcome; notes, in this context, that decisions addressed to Member States should be adopted by the Commission as the guardian of the Treaties rather than the Council, which may be reluctant to take action that would have an adverse effect on the Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 31

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 23

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
23. Warns that the reallocation or reshuffling of frozen appropriations to other programmes or objectives would signal to non-compliant governments that losses can be offset elsewhere; urges the Commission, therefore, to reject any transfer requests to other programmes or priorities under the same programme that would lead to a circumvention of suspensions under the Conditionality Regulation; requests that the Commission transmit to Parliament the full text of any such transfer request so that democratic scrutiny can precede, not follow, the Commission decision;	23. Warns that the reallocation or reshuffling of frozen appropriations to other programmes or objectives would signal to non-compliant governments that losses can be offset elsewhere; urges the Commission, therefore, to reject any transfer requests to other programmes or priorities under the same programme that would lead to a circumvention of suspensions under the Conditionality Regulation; requests that the Commission transmit to Parliament the full text of any such transfer request so that democratic scrutiny can precede, not follow, the Commission decision; stresses that such transfers should be considered impermissible as a matter of law; calls on the Commission to ensure that legal safeguards to this effect are in place, including in the framework of the 2028-2034 MFF;

Or. en

Amendment 32

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 27

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
27. Urges the Commission to agree on a secure communication channel to ensure access to such information for the Parliament bodies responsible, while safeguarding its confidentiality;	deleted
	(Moved to paragraph 45a under recommendations.)

Or. en

Amendment 33

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 28 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	28 a. Believes, more generally, that EU-level interinstitutional dialogue and cooperation on the rule of law should be strengthened; regrets the fact that the Commission and the Council have so far rejected its offer to enter into an interinstitutional agreement on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; reaffirms its willingness to resume talks on such an agreement;

Or. en

Amendment 34

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 30

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
30. Regrets that, in practice, the safeguards envisaged remain largely theoretical, since procedures for the direct payment or rerouting of funds are cumbersome, and communication to final recipients and beneficiaries is sporadic; acknowledges that more needs to be done at EU level to improve the protection of the legitimate interests of final recipients and beneficiaries and to ensure their access to EU funding;	30. Regrets that, in practice, the safeguards envisaged remain largely theoretical, since procedures for the direct payment or rerouting of funds are cumbersome, and communication to final recipients and beneficiaries is sporadic; expresses concern that the proposed structure of the 2028-2034 MFF might make it even more difficult to protect final recipients and beneficiaries by giving Member State governments more control over the management of EU funds; acknowledges that more needs to be done at EU level to improve the protection of the legitimate interests of final recipients and beneficiaries and to ensure their access to EU funding;

Or. en

Amendment 35

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 32

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
32. Considers, based on the limited experience, that the conditionality regime has been an effective tool for protecting the EU’s financial interests against risks deriving from breaches of the rule of law; insists, therefore, that the regime continues to be applied to the entire EU budget, including performance-based instruments, so that no line of EU expenditure escapes effective rule of law scrutiny; urges the Commission to ensure that the Conditionality Regulation is consistently applied to the EU budget, irrespective of its financing model;	32. Considers that it may be too early to make definitive statements on the effectiveness of this tool for protecting the EU’s financial interests against risks deriving from breaches of the rule of law; insists, however, that the regime continues to be applied to the entire EU budget, including performance-based instruments, so that no line of EU expenditure escapes effective rule of law scrutiny; urges the Commission to ensure that the Conditionality Regulation is consistently applied to the EU budget, irrespective of its financing model;

Or. en

Amendment 36

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 35

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
35. Invites the Commission, in this context, to review its interpretation of the Conditionality Regulation as a last resort instrument and to be more proactive in it use, including the application of Article 6(4), while respecting the principle of proportionality;	35. Invites the Commission, in this context, to elaborate on its assessment of the respective added value and limitations of the various budgetary conditionality tools, to review its interpretation of the Conditionality Regulation as a last resort instrument and to be more proactive in it use, including the application of Article 6(4), while respecting the principle of proportionality;

Or. en

Amendment 37

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 37

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
37. Invites the Commission to review how it can effectively fulfil its obligation to safeguard the legitimate financial interests of final recipients and beneficiaries, particularly those who suffer the consequences of rule of law deficiencies, including by enforcing the relevant provisions of the Conditionality Regulation as regards the Member States’ obligations to make payments; stresses that any measures taken to ensure that legitimate final recipients and beneficiaries can continue to access EU funding should not weaken the application of the Conditionality Regulation; expects to be fully involved in this process;	37. Invites the Commission to review how it can effectively fulfil its obligation to safeguard the legitimate financial interests of final recipients and beneficiaries, particularly those who suffer the consequences of rule of law deficiencies, including by enforcing the relevant provisions of the Conditionality Regulation as regards the Member States’ obligations to make payments; invites the Commission in particular to reconsider the option of temporarily bringing the affected funds under direct management and, should it conclude that this option is not feasible, to clearly explain the reasons for that conclusion; stresses that any measures taken to ensure that legitimate final recipients and beneficiaries can continue to access EU funding should not weaken the application of the Conditionality Regulation; expects to be fully involved in this process;

Or. en

Amendment 38

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 41

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
41. Stresses that the annual rule of law report is currently structured around four pillars, namely: the justice system, the anti-corruption framework, media pluralism, and other institutional issues related to checks and balances; acknowledges that a single market dimension has been included in the 2025 Rule of Law Report to address rule of law issues affecting companies and workers; stresses that a functioning justice system, a strong anti-corruption framework, media pluralism, adequate checks and balances, and a functioning single market are intrinsically linked to the rule of law;	41. Stresses that the annual rule of law report is currently structured around four pillars, namely: the justice system, the anti-corruption framework, media pluralism, and other institutional issues related to checks and balances; welcomes the fact that a single market dimension has been included in the 2025 Rule of Law Report to address rule of law issues affecting companies and workers; stresses that a functioning justice system, a strong anti-corruption framework, media pluralism, adequate checks and balances, and a functioning single market are intrinsically linked to the rule of law;

Or. en

Amendment 39

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 42

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
42. Notes that systematic rule of law breaches, identified under the pillars of the annual rule of law report, that have a sufficiently direct link to the protection of the EU budget should lead to the triggering of the conditionality mechanism, notably in cases such as violation, manipulation or favouritism in calls for tender and applications involving EU funding, as well as administrative harassment breaching the equal treatment of local and regional authorities, companies or other final recipients and beneficiaries, and their access to EU funds;	42. Notes that systematic rule of law breaches, identified under the pillars of the annual rule of law report, that have a sufficiently direct link to the protection of the EU budget should lead to the triggering of the conditionality mechanism, notably in cases such as systemic violations of judicial independence, an ineffective anti-corruption framework, including the political capture of a public prosecutor’s services or supreme audit institutions, or violation, manipulation or favouritism in calls for tender and applications involving EU funding, as well as administrative harassment breaching the equal treatment of local and regional authorities, companies or other final recipients and beneficiaries, and their access to EU funds;

Or. en

Amendment 40

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 45 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	45 a. Urges the Commission to agree on a secure communication channel with the Parliament bodies responsible in order to ensure full access to documentation, including the full text of written notifications and the exchanges between the Commission’s services and the Member State in question, in a timely, comprehensive and proactive manner, while safeguarding its confidentiality;

Or. en

Amendment 41

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 46

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
46. Calls on the Council to keep the process fact-based and objective, and to stick as closely as possible to the Commission’s proposals; urges the Council, furthermore, not to transform the process leading to the adoption of measures into a bargaining chip;	46. Calls on the Council to keep the process fact-based and objective, and to stick as closely as possible to the Commission’s proposals; urges the Council, furthermore, not to transform the process leading to the adoption of measures into a political deal-making exercise, which would allow a Member State subject to this process to leverage its veto over urgent decisions that require unanimity in the European Council;

Or. en

Amendment 42

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 51 a (new)

Motion for a resolution	Amendment
	51 a. Reiterates its proposal to establish an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, building on Parliament’s 2020 proposal; underlines that this mechanism should be governed by an interinstitutional agreement between the three institutions, consisting of an annual monitoring cycle on EU values covering all aspects of Article 2 TEU, and applying equally, objectively and fairly to all Member States and candidate countries, supported by a panel of independent experts preparing recommendations and linking them to budgetary and other enforcement tools; calls on the other institutions, in the meantime, to at least explore further cooperation in the context of the proposed interinstitutional pilot on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, which would help build trust among the institutions in a practical way, in particular by sharing monitoring, dialogue and meeting practices;

Or. en