Sittings · Document
OPINION (2025/2061(INI)) 2025-11-06
On the implementation of the rule of law conditionality regime
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs · Rapporteur: Michał Wawrykiewicz
AMENDMENTS
The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs submits the following to the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Budgetary Control, as the committees responsible :
Amendment 1
Motion for a resolution
Citation 10 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| – having regard to the Commission proposal of 16 July 2025 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Fund for economic, social and territorial cohesion, agriculture and rural, fisheries and maritime, prosperity and security for the period 2028-2034 and amending Regulation (EU) 2023/955 and Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 (COM(2025)0565) (draft NRPF regulation), |
Amendment 2
Motion for a resolution
Citation 12 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| – having regard to its resolution of 24 April 2024 on ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Hungary to strengthen the rule of law and its budgetary implications1a, | |
| _________________ | |
| 1a OJ C, C/2025/3705, 17.9.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/3705/oj. |
Amendment 3
Motion for a resolution
Citation 12 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| – having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation in Hungary and frozen EU funds1a, | |
| _________________ | |
| 1a OJ C, C/2024/5742, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5742/oj. |
Amendment 4
Motion for a resolution
Citation 14 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| – having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the proposal for a Council decision determining, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded1a, | |
| _________________ | |
| 1a OJ C 125, 5.4.2023, p. 463. |
Amendment 5
Motion for a resolution
Citation 14 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| – having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2022 on the rule of law and the consequences of the ECJ ruling1a, | |
| _________________ | |
| 1a OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 168. |
Amendment 6
Motion for a resolution
Citation 15 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| – having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2020 on the establishment of an EU Mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights1a, | |
| _________________ | |
| 1a OJ C 395, 29.9.2021, p. 2. |
Amendment 7
Motion for a resolution
Citation 15 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| – having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded1a, | |
| _________________ | |
| 1a OJ C 433, 23.12.2019, p. 66. |
Amendment 8
Motion for a resolution
Citation 17 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| – having regard to its resolution of 5 May 2022 on ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Poland and Hungary1a, | |
| _________________ | |
| 1a OJ C 465, 6.12.2022, p. 147. |
Amendment 9
Motion for a resolution
Citation 17 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| – having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on the breaches of the Rule of Law and fundamental rights in Hungary and frozen EU funds1a, | |
| _________________ | |
| 1a OJ C, C/2023/1223, 21.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1223/oj. |
Amendment 10
Motion for a resolution
Citation 19 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| – having regard to the action brought by Parliament against the Commission on 25 March 2024 in Case C-225/24 requesting that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) annul Commission Implementing Decision C(2023)9014 of 13 December 20231a, | |
| _________________ | |
| 1a OJ C, C/2024/3063, 13.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/3063/oj. |
Amendment 11
Motion for a resolution
Citation 21
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| – having regard to the observations of its Committee on Budgetary Control’s fact-finding missions to Hungary from 15 to 17 May 2023 and to Slovakia from 26 to 28 May 2025, | – having regard to the observations of its Committee on Budgetary Control’s fact-finding missions to Hungary from 15 to 17 May 2023 and to Slovakia from 26 to 28 May 2025, and of its Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs’ fact-finding mission to Hungary from 14 to 16 April 2025 and of the fact-finding mission of its Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights Monitoring Group (DRFMG) to Slovakia from 2 to 3 June 2025, |
Amendment 12
Motion for a resolution
Citation 29 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| – having regard to the study requested by its Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs entitled ‘Enforcement of EU law in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’1a, published by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies in January 2024, | |
| _________________ | |
| 1a Study – ‘Enforcement of EU law in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, January 2024. |
Amendment 13
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| A. whereas the EU is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, as set out in Article 2 TEU; whereas these values are reflected in the fundamental rights spelled out in the Charter, such as equality between women and men, non-discrimination, and the right of collective bargaining and action, in accordance with EU law and national laws and practices, and embedded in international human rights treaties; whereas adherence to these shared values constitutes the foundation of the rights enjoyed by those living in the EU; | A. whereas the EU is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, as set out in Article 2 TEU; whereas these values are common to the Member States and are reflected and embedded in international human rights treaties; whereas democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights are mutually reinforcing values, which, when undermined, pose a systemic threat to the rights and freedoms of the people living in the EU; |
Amendment 14
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| D. whereas the Conditionality Regulation empowers the EU to adopt proportionate financial measures to safeguard its financial interests where breaches of the rule of law in a Member State affect, or seriously risk affecting, the sound financial management of the EU budget; whereas it was adopted as part of the package on the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), following long and difficult negotiations between the co-legislators, notably due to attempts by some of the Member States to link the negotiations on the MFF with the negotiations on the rule of law conditionality mechanism; whereas it has been binding for all Member States since its entry into force on 1 January 2021; | D. whereas the Conditionality Regulation empowers the Council to adopt, based on a Commission proposal and while informing Parliament, proportionate financial measures to protect the EU budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in a Member State that affect, or seriously risk affecting, the EU’s sound financial management of the EU budget or the financial interests of the EU; whereas it was adopted as part of the package on the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), following long and difficult negotiations between the co-legislators, notably due to attempts by some of the Member States to link the negotiations on the MFF with the negotiations on the rule of law conditionality mechanism; whereas it has been binding for all Member States since its entry into force on 1 January 2021; whereas the 2028-2034 MFF should ensure that any new mechanism is designed in a manner that is consistent with the rule of law conditionality; |
Amendment 15
Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| F a. whereas constitutional changes that weaken the independence of the media or freedom of expression, and erode checks and balances, constitute a direct threat to the values laid down in Article 2 TEU and have a concrete impact on the protection of the EU budget by degrading the environment for transparent oversight of EU funds; |
Amendment 16
Motion for a resolution
Recital F b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| F b. whereas, in December 2022, the Conditionality Regulation was triggered for the first time in relation to Hungary, leading to a suspension of EUR 6.3 billion in cohesion funds and a prohibition on entering into new legal commitments with Hungarian public interest trusts and entities maintained by them, due to systemic breaches of the rule of law that risked jeopardising the EU budget and the EU’s financial interests, including limitations to the independence of the judiciary and public prosecution, and risks related to corruption and deficiencies in the implementation of EU funds, particularly concerning public procurement and the role of the aforementioned public interest trusts; |
Amendment 17
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| G. whereas the Commission issued a report in January 2024, pursuant to Article 9 of the Conditionality Regulation, to take stock of the application of the legislation; whereas the Commission’s analysis of the only available case confirmed the effectiveness of the protective measures adopted and their potential going forward, but the Commission found that it was too early to draw definitive conclusions, and that more extensive case practice would allow to better identify possible improvements; | G. whereas the Commission issued a report in January 2024, pursuant to Article 9 of the Conditionality Regulation, to take stock of the application of the legislation; whereas the Commission’s analysis of the only available case confirmed the effectiveness of the protective measures adopted and their potential going forward, but the Commission found that it was too early to draw definitive conclusions, and that more extensive case practice would allow to better identify possible improvements; whereas the evaluation carried out by the Commission attests that, under the Conditionality Regulation, the time limits for the Commission allow for little flexibility and are in certain phases particularly challenging; whereas, in the case of Hungary, the report welcomes at length the progress achieved under the Conditionality Regulation, yet fails to sufficiently underline the extent to which the challenges remain unresolved; |
Amendment 18
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| I. whereas the purpose of this report is to scrutinise the implementation of the Conditionality Regulation, according to Parliament’s role as laid down in the Regulation, by pointing to the benefits and shortcomings of its application, and by issuing recommendations for its future implementation; | I. whereas the purpose of this report is to scrutinise the implementation of the Conditionality Regulation, according to Parliament’s role as laid down in the Regulation, by pointing to the benefits and shortcomings of its application, and by issuing recommendations for its future implementation, as well as assessing the coherence and effectiveness of the conditionality regime together with other instruments in the rule of law toolbox, such as the Common Provisions Regulation and the rule of law-related ‘super milestones’ under the RRF; |
Amendment 19
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 3. Welcomes the affirmation by the CJEU that respect for the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU is an ongoing obligation after EU accession and a pre-condition for enjoying all Treaty rights and benefits deriving from EU membership, including access to EU funds; instructs the Commission to highlight this point in its communication and enforcement activities; | 3. Welcomes the confirmation by the CJEU that respect for the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU is an ongoing obligation for all Member States and a pre-condition for enjoying all Treaty rights and benefits deriving from EU membership, including access to EU funds; instructs the Commission to highlight this point in its communication and enforcement activities1a; underlines that this should be recalled more frequently, as it reinforces the credibility of the EU, and stresses that the impacts of non-compliance must also be consistently underlined; |
| _________________ | |
| 1a Principle of non-regression; opinion of Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona delivered on 2 December 2021 in Case C-156/21, Hungary v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:C:2021:974, paragraph 214. |
Amendment 20
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 3 a. Welcomes the fact that the CJEU has highlighted that the EU budget is a key tool for realising the principle of solidarity enshrined in Article 2 TEU – one of the EU’s fundamental principles1a; reiterates that solidarity is achieved by sharing financial resources and depends on mutual trust among the Member States, which presupposes that each Member State uses common funds responsibly and remains committed to fulfilling its obligations under EU law, including upholding the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, notably the rule of law; | |
| _________________ | |
| 1a CJEU Case C-156/21, cited above, paragraph 129. |
Amendment 21
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4. Stresses that these financing instruments must not be regarded as substitutes for the Treaty-based mechanisms for safeguarding the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, and recalls that the suspension of voting rights under Article 7(2) TEU remains an option in cases of persistent and serious breaches of the rule of law; | 4. Stresses that the Conditionality Regulation and other budgetary instruments must not be regarded as substitutes for the Treaty-based mechanisms for safeguarding the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, and recalls that the suspension of rights derived from the application of the Treaties, including but not limited to voting rights, under Article 7(2) TEU remains an option in cases of persistent and serious breaches of the rule of law, and that this mechanism therefore does not ‘circumvent’ the Article 7 TEU procedure, but should be seen as complementing it; |
Amendment 22
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 5. Recalls that the Commission’s ‘rule of law toolbox’ has considerably evolved over the last decade, with the inclusion of multiple instruments to protect the rule of law, including the annual rule of law report covering all 27 Member States, the horizontal enabling condition on the Charter under the Common Provisions Regulation, and the so-called super milestones related to the rule of law under the RRF; | 5. Recalls that the Commission’s ‘rule of law toolbox’ has considerably evolved over the last decade, with the inclusion of multiple instruments to protect the rule of law, including the annual rule of law report covering all 27 Member States, the horizontal enabling condition on the Charter under the Common Provisions Regulation, and the so-called super milestones related to the rule of law under the RRF; underlines that, while the evolvement of the toolbox has brought some progress, it has not yet delivered sufficiently tangible results, largely because of the limited political will to use it to its fullest extent; |
Amendment 23
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 6. Stresses that the conditionality regime is budgetary in nature, as it aims to safeguard the sound financial management of EU funds and the EU’s financial interests, and it only applies where a rule of law breach affects or seriously risks affecting the EU budget; emphasises that it differs from the Article 7 TEU procedure, which penalises serious and persistent violations of the values set out in Article 2 TEU; | 6. Stresses that the conditionality regime is budgetary in nature, as it aims to safeguard the sound financial management of EU funds and the EU’s financial interests, and it only applies where a rule of law breach affects or seriously risks affecting the EU budget; emphasises that it differs from the Articles 7(1) and (2) TEU, which address situations where there is a clear risk of a serious breach or a serious and persistent breach of the values set out in Article 2 TEU, enable the EU to identify and respond to such risks, including by addressing recommendations to the Member State concerned under Article 7(1) TEU and, where appropriate, by adopting sanctions under Article 7(2) and (3) TEU; |
Amendment 24
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 7. Underlines that infringement actions under Article 258 TFEU and Article 6 of the Financial Regulation remain complementary tools for systemic breaches of Article 2 TEU values; | 7. Underlines that infringement actions under Articles 258 and 260 TFEU and Article 6 of the Financial Regulation remain complementary tools for systemic breaches of Article 2 TEU values; notes, moreover, that the pending judgment of the CJEU in Case C-769/22, Commission v Hungary (Union values), could establish Article 2 TEU as an autonomous legal basis, thereby strengthening infringement procedures; |
Amendment 25
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 8. Commends the CJEU judgments of 16 February 2022 in Cases C-156/21 and C-157/21, which dismissed in their entirety the actions by Hungary and Poland for the annulment of the Conditionality Regulation and unequivocally confirmed the validity, legal basis and compatibility with the Treaty of the Regulation, as well as the EU’s competences concerning the rule of law in the Member States; | 8. Takes note of the fact that the CJEU judgments of 16 February 2022 in Cases C-156/21 and C-157/21 dismissed in their entirety the actions by Hungary and Poland for the annulment of the Conditionality Regulation and unequivocally confirmed the validity, legal basis and compatibility with the Treaty of the Regulation, as well as the EU’s competences concerning the rule of law in the Member States; further notes that in those same judgments, the CJEU confirmed that the values expressed in Article 2 TEU contain legally binding obligations for the Member States; |
Amendment 26
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 9. Takes note of the additional clarifications on the process provided by the Commission in the 2022 Guidelines on the Conditionality Regulation, and the review of its practical application in the Commission’s 2024 application report; regrets, however, that the Guidelines were adopted over a year after the entry into force of the Regulation, and that this contributed to a de facto delay in its application; | 9. Takes note of the additional clarifications on the process provided by the Commission in the 2022 Guidelines on the Conditionality Regulation, and the review of its practical application in the Commission’s 2024 application report; regrets, however, that the Commission unlawfully paused the application of the Conditionality Regulation for more than a year after it had entered into force, thereby following European Council conclusions which were incompatible with the Conditionality Regulation and which were not binding on the Commission; reiterates its regret that the Commission adopted guidelines for the application of the Conditionality Regulation when a need for such guidelines had not been demonstrated; |
Amendment 27
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 10 a. Notes that the Conditionality Regulation is the only instrument that requires an assessment of whether other tools could more effectively protect the EU’s financial interests in cases of rule of law breaches; considers that it could be useful to reflect on the practical relevance and proportionality of this requirement in its implementation; |
Amendment 28
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 10 b. Notes that, while the Member States have different national identities and traditions, the rule of law is a value common to the EU and the Member States, and forms part of the very foundations of the EU and its legal order1a; notes that the rule of law can be defined through six principles, as recognised by the CJEU and the European Court of Human Rights and developed by the Council of Europe, namely: (i) legality, implying a transparent, accountable, democratic and pluralistic process for enacting laws, (ii) legal certainty, (iii) prohibition of the arbitrary exercise of executive power, (iv) effective judicial protection by independent and impartial courts, with effective judicial review including respect for fundamental rights, (v) separation of powers and (vi) equality before the law; | |
| _________________ | |
| 1a CJEU Case C-156/21, cited above, paragraph 128. |
Amendment 29
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 11. Notes that potential rule of law breaches are brought to the Commission’s attention through a wide evidence base, including reports by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the ECA, as well as submissions from civil society organisations, businesses and whistle-blowers; deeply regrets the lack of transparency as regards Commission assessments that do not lead to the proposal of measures, or that lead to the choice of another instrument; | 11. Notes that potential rule of law breaches are brought to the Commission’s attention through a wide evidence base, including Parliament’s resolutions, reports by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the ECA, as well as submissions from civil society organisations, businesses and whistle-blowers; deeply regrets the lack of transparency as regards Commission assessments that do not lead to the proposal of measures, or that lead to the choice of another instrument; |
Amendment 30
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 12. Notes that, to date, only a very limited number of stakeholders have used the Commission’s standard complaint form annexed to the 2022 Guidelines; recommends that the Commission accept complaints in any written form; calls, moreover, for the establishment of a confidential reporting portal through which stakeholders can signal non-compliance, thereby enabling swift remedial action; | 12. Notes that, to date, only a very limited number of stakeholders have used the Commission’s standard complaint form annexed to the 2022 Guidelines; recommends that the Commission accept complaints in any written form, promptly acknowledge the receipt of any such complaint while attributing a clear reference number to it, and provide the complainant with an update on the follow-up no later than one year after the submission of the complaint; calls, moreover, for the establishment of a confidential reporting portal through which stakeholders can signal non-compliance, thereby enabling swift remedial action; underlines the importance of increasing awareness and visibility of the mechanism; considers, furthermore, that upon receiving a complaint, the Commission could take a more supportive and facilitative approach to help ensure that the complaint contains the elements necessary for its proper assessment; |
Amendment 31
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 13. Regrets that, despite successive worrying findings in the Commission’s annual rule of law reports, and by OLAF and the EPPO, pointing to budgetary risks in several Member States, only two formal notifications have been sent and measures decided in a single case under the Conditionality Regulation; | 13. Regrets that, despite successive worrying findings in the Commission’s annual rule of law reports as well as submissions from civil society organisations, and by OLAF and the EPPO, pointing to budgetary risks in several Member States, only two formal notifications have been sent and measures decided in a single case under the Conditionality Regulation; stresses the need for a more institutionalised and structured cooperation between the relevant bodies in this regard, in order to ensure the effective use of the Conditionality Regulation; notes in particular, in this context, the fact that serious findings – of which the EPPO informed the Commission in respect of Poland in 2022 and in respect of Slovakia in 2023 – did not lead to any action under the Conditionality Regulation; |
Amendment 32
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14. Stresses that the Conditionality Regulation must be applied consistently across all Member States; urges the Commission and, where relevant, the Council, to act expeditiously and in full transparency if a link has been established between rule of law breaches and risks to the EU budget and the Member State concerned does not act to address the situation effectively and sustainably; insists that lengthy informal dialogues must not become a substitute for decisive action, and that political deadlock or blackmailing must be avoided; | 14. Stresses that the Conditionality Regulation must be applied consistently across all Member States; urges the Commission and, where relevant, the Council, to act expeditiously and in full transparency if a link has been established between rule of law breaches and risks to the EU budget and the Member State concerned does not act to address the situation effectively and sustainably; insists that lengthy informal dialogues must not become a substitute for decisive action, and that political deadlock or brinkmanship must be avoided; reiterates that under no circumstances can the rule of law be ever considered subject to political trade-offs; |
Amendment 33
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 15. Emphasises that Commission assessments must be impartial and fair, take account of all available facts, and respect the principles of objectivity, non-discrimination and equality of the Member States before the Treaties; underlines that the choice and scale of budget-protection measures must respect the principle of proportionality laid down in Article 5 of the Conditionality Regulation, taking into account the seriousness, duration and recurrence of the breach, the cooperation of the Member State concerned and the concrete financial risk, as well as the impact on legitimate final recipients and beneficiaries, in particular smaller ones; invites the Commission to disclose the quantitative risk-scoring methodology it already applies internally, as recommended by the ECA; | 15. Emphasises that Commission assessments must be impartial and fair, take account of all available facts, and respect the principles of objectivity, non-discrimination and equality of the Member States before the Treaties; underlines that the choice and scale of budget-protection measures must respect the principle of proportionality laid down in Article 5 of the Conditionality Regulation, taking into account the seriousness, duration and recurrence of the breach, the cooperation of the Member State concerned and the concrete financial risk, as well as the impact on legitimate final recipients and beneficiaries, in particular smaller ones; invites the Commission to disclose the quantitative risk-scoring methodology it already applies internally, as recommended by the ECA; recalls the worrying findings of the ECA in its special report 03/2024, notably that political considerations play a major role in decisions not to block or release funds, which has been specifically demonstrated by the fact that the Commission did not, in the past, make use of the Conditionality Regulation in respect of Poland and has not made use of it in respect of Slovakia, even where it found budget-related rule of law breaches in respect of those Member States in the context of other instruments; |
Amendment 34
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 16. Understands that some aspects of the Conditionality Regulation make it difficult to trigger the mechanism, in particular the requirement to demonstrate a sufficiently direct link between breaches of the rule of law and a serious risk of an adverse effect on the EU budget; stresses, however, that such requirements should not be used as a justification for not triggering the mechanism; | 16. Understands that some aspects of the Conditionality Regulation make it difficult to trigger the mechanism, in particular the requirement to demonstrate a sufficiently direct link between breaches of the rule of law and a serious risk of an adverse effect on the EU budget; stresses, however, that such requirements should not be used as a justification for not triggering the mechanism; regrets, in this context, that the Commission applies the narrowest interpretation of the Regulation, whereby it excludes even serious breaches affecting EU funds from its application; reiterates that the Regulation clearly establishes that endangering the independence of the judiciary and limiting the availability and effectiveness of legal remedies, including through restrictive procedural rules and lack of implementation of judgments, constitute a breach of the principles of the rule of law1a; |
| _________________ | |
| 1a OJ C 465, 6.12.2022, p. 147. |
Amendment 35
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 16 a. Underlines that even where rule of law deficiencies are general in nature and affect the legal system of a Member State as a whole, such as breaches of the independence of the judiciary, prosecutorial effectiveness, supreme audit institutions or media pluralism, these deficiencies can affect the EU budget in a direct and severe manner by removing systemic safeguards against fraudulent and other unlawful activities; emphasises that the notion of a direct effect on the EU budget must not be interpreted as restricting the scope of the Conditionality Regulation solely to issues specifically related to the implementation of the budget, such as public procurement legislation, as that approach would only motivate bad-faith actors to erode rule of law safeguards more broadly; |
Amendment 36
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 16 b. Recalls that ineffective or delayed cooperation of a Member State with the EPPO or with OLAF constitutes grounds for action under the Conditionality Regulation; stresses, furthermore, the need to develop more concrete forms of cooperation with the relevant EU bodies and agencies to ensure the effective protection of the EU’s financial interests; calls, in addition, for accession to the EPPO to be established as a condition for candidate countries seeking to join the EU, so as to prevent situations in which some Member States refuse to take part in this mechanism; |
Amendment 37
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 c (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 16 c. Stresses that, as part of its efforts to ensure the most efficient protection of its financial interests, the EU has initiated preparatory work to review its anti-fraud architecture, with a view to enhancing efficiencies among the relevant actors and avoiding duplication at every stage of the anti-fraud cycle, including prevention, detection, investigation, correction and the recovery of amounts concerned; underlines that this work should be closely linked with the implementation of the Conditionality Regulation, so as to ensure consistency and complementarity in safeguarding the EU budget; |
Amendment 38
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 d (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 16 d. Notes that, according to the Commission’s evaluation in 2024, the procedure under the Conditionality Regulation is relatively swift, but that the time limits for the Commission allow for little flexibility and are in certain phases particularly challenging; stresses that, as highlighted in the Commission’s report, the effectiveness of the procedure could be improved if, when submitting its observations to the Commission, the Member State also put forward the views, if any, of the government entities concerned by the measures, thereby allowing for a more granular assessment of the issues at stake and of the measures that would be most effective; stresses that, if it is considered pertinent, there should at least be clarity on how this requirement is to be understood and applied; |
Amendment 39
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 17. Notes that the Council has decided to suspend 55 % of budgetary commitments for three operational programmes under the cohesion policy for Hungary; points to the legal analysis17 demonstrating that the systemic and persistent nature of breaches of the rule of law in Hungary should have led to a significantly higher suspension of EU funding, in order to protect the EU budget in line with the proportionality principle; notes that the Commission’s December 2023 and December 2024 reassessments of the situation in Hungary both concluded that the situation that led to the adoption of measures has not been remedied; calls on the Commission to assess and address rule of law backsliding either by proposing additional measures or by updating existing ones; | 17. Notes that the Council has decided to suspend 55 % of budgetary commitments for three operational programmes under the cohesion policy for Hungary and to prohibit entering into new legal commitments with Hungarian public interest trusts and entities maintained by them; points to the legal analysis17 demonstrating that the systemic and persistent nature of breaches of the rule of law in Hungary should have led to a significantly higher suspension of EU funding, in order to protect the EU budget in line with the proportionality principle; notes that the Commission’s December 2023 and December 2024 reassessments of the situation in Hungary both concluded that the situation that led to the adoption of measures has not been remedied; calls on the Commission to assess and address rule of law backsliding either by proposing additional measures or by updating existing ones to bring them in line with the aforementioned legal analysis; |
| _________________ | _________________ |
| 17 Study requested by Daniel Freund, MEP in the Greens/EFA group – Lane Scheppele, K., Kelemen, R. D., Morijn, J., ‘Freezing all EU funds to Hungary: A legal analysis of why a 100 % suspension is “proportionate” and “appropriate” under Regulation 2020/2092 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget’, May 2022. | 17 Study requested by Daniel Freund, MEP in the Greens/EFA group – Lane Scheppele, K., Kelemen, R. D., Morijn, J., ‘Freezing all EU funds to Hungary: A legal analysis of why a 100 % suspension is “proportionate” and “appropriate” under Regulation 2020/2092 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget’, May 2022. |
Amendment 40
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 20. Recalls that the Conditionality Regulation expressly states that it complements existing budget-protection tools and is to be applied ‘where other procedures set out in Union legislation would not allow the Union budget to be protected more effectively’; regrets the Commission’s interpretation that, on the basis of this wording, the instrument should be used only as a measure of last resort; notes with concern that rule of law monitoring inside the Commission is split between different services, resulting at times in inconsistent and delayed action; | 20. Recalls that the Conditionality Regulation expressly states that it complements existing budget-protection tools and is to be applied ‘where other procedures set out in Union legislation would not allow the Union budget to be protected more effectively’; regrets the Commission’s interpretation that, on the basis of this wording, the instrument should be used only as a measure of last resort; notes with concern that rule of law monitoring within the Commission is split between different services, resulting at times in inconsistent and delayed action or no action at all; |
Amendment 41
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 21. Deems it to be unclear how the Conditionality Regulation interacts with other instruments from the rule of law toolbox in practice, in particular the horizontal enabling condition on the Charter under the Common Provisions Regulation and the rule of law-related ‘super milestones’ under the RRF; regrets that in December 2023 the Commission assessed that Hungary had fulfilled the horizontal enabling condition on judicial independence, while maintaining the measures imposed under the Conditionality Regulation; underlines that this lack of coherence hampers the democratic scrutiny of their application; | 21. Deems it to be unclear how the Conditionality Regulation interacts with other instruments from the rule of law toolbox in practice, in particular the horizontal enabling condition on the Charter under the Common Provisions Regulation and the rule of law-related ‘super milestones’ under the RRF; regrets that in December 2023 the Commission assessed that Hungary had fulfilled the horizontal enabling condition on judicial independence, while maintaining the measures imposed under the Conditionality Regulation; further notes, by way of example, that in Poland certain funds were not released because a horizontal enabling condition had not been fulfilled or because ‘super milestones’ had not been reached, while the reasons for not applying the Conditionality Regulation were not documented; underlines that this lack of coherence hampers the democratic scrutiny of their application; reiterates its position that the Commission’s decision is illegal, as alleged in Parliament’s pending action against the Commission in Case C-225/24, in particular due to the infringement of multiple substantive provisions of the Common Provisions Regulation, and of the Commission’s duty to state reasons for its decision as well as its misuse of power in the form of a political trade-off for Hungary’s lifting of its veto over certain urgent decisions which required unanimity in the European Council; |
Amendment 42
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 23. Warns that the reallocation or reshuffling of frozen appropriations to other programmes or objectives would signal to non-compliant governments that losses can be offset elsewhere; urges the Commission, therefore, to reject any transfer requests to other programmes or priorities under the same programme that would lead to a circumvention of suspensions under the Conditionality Regulation; requests that the Commission transmit to Parliament the full text of any such transfer request so that democratic scrutiny can precede, not follow, the Commission decision; | 23. Stresses that no transfers, changes to programmes, or reshuffles, including of commitments and payments, should be used to offset the measures under the Conditionality Regulation or the Common Provisions Regulation; urges the Commission, therefore, to reject any transfer requests to other programmes or priorities under the same programme that would lead to a circumvention of suspensions under the Conditionality Regulation and Common Provisions Regulation; requests that the Commission transmit to Parliament the full text of any such transfer request so that democratic scrutiny can precede, not follow, the Commission decision; recalls the commitment made by the Commission during the adoption of the revised cohesion policy package to ensure that the new flexibility mechanisms cannot be used to circumvent measures adopted under the Conditionality Regulation or the Common Provisions Regulation; calls on the Commission and the Member States to fully uphold this commitment in practice, so as to preserve the deterrent effect and integrity of the rule-of-law conditionality framework; stresses that such transfers should be considered impermissible as a matter of law; calls on the Commission to ensure that legal safeguards to this effect are in place, including in the framework of the 2028-2034 MFF; |
Amendment 43
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 23 a. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal to strengthen the link between the recommendations of the rule of law report and financial support under the 2028-2034 MFF and to generalise, as regards the rule of law, the ‘reform-for-funds’ blueprint developed under the post-COVID-19 RRF under the national and regional partnership plans; stresses that the evaluation of rule of law conditions and benchmarks under the 2028-2034 MFF must be based on impartial subject-matter expertise rather than political deals, and that this objective must be ensured and safeguarded in the procedure for carrying out that evaluation and drawing appropriate conclusions from its outcome; notes, in this context, that decisions addressed to Member States regarding compliance with the principles of the rule of law and fundamental rights should be adopted by the Commission as the guardian of the Treaties rather than the Council, which may be reluctant to take action that would have an adverse effect on the Member States; points out that the delegated act procedure allows for swift action by the Commission, while ensuring political scrutiny by the Parliament and the Council; |
Amendment 44
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 25. Reiterates that Parliament takes its scrutiny role concerning the implementation of the Conditionality Regulation very seriously; acknowledges that the Commission has complied with its legal obligation to inform Parliament immediatelyof any measures proposed, adopted or lifted; regrets that the Commission only provided the bare minimum information, without key details, and, even upon Parliament’s request, did not share the full documentation; stresses that timely, comprehensive and proactive information-sharing is essential for Parliament to exercise its budgetary and oversight responsibilities effectively; | 25. Reiterates that Parliament takes its scrutiny role concerning the implementation of the Conditionality Regulation very seriously and recalls that, pursuant to Article 8 of the Regulation, the Commission shall immediately inform Parliament of any measures proposed, adopted or lifted pursuant to Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the Regulation; acknowledges that the Commission has complied with its legal obligation to inform Parliament immediately of any measures proposed, adopted or lifted; regrets that the Commission only provided the bare minimum information, without key details, and, even upon Parliament’s request, did not share the full documentation; stresses that timely, comprehensive and proactive information-sharing is essential for Parliament to exercise its budgetary and oversight responsibilities effectively; |
Amendment 45
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 27. Urges the Commission to agree on a secure communication channel to ensure access to such information for the Parliament bodies responsible, while safeguarding its confidentiality; | deleted |
Amendment 46
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 28 a. Believes, more generally, that EU-level interinstitutional dialogue and cooperation on the rule of law should be strengthened; regrets the fact that the Commission and the Council have so far rejected its offer to enter into an interinstitutional agreement on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; reaffirms its willingness to resume talks on such an agreement; |
Amendment 47
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 28 b. Recalls that, according to Article 9 of the Conditionality Regulation, the Commission shall report by 12 January 2024 to Parliament and the Council on its application, in particular on the effectiveness of the measures adopted; notes that the Commission has duly carried out this reporting exercise; urges that the Commission – given that the Regulation is intended to apply without a limitation in time – present such a report once a year; |
Amendment 48
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 29. Recalls the specific provisions in the Conditionality Regulation and the 2022 Guidelines that oblige the EU to safeguard the legitimate interests of final recipients and beneficiaries from the financial consequences of sanctions imposed on their governments; recalls, in particular, the obligation of the Member States subject to measures under the Regulation to continue to honour all commitments towards final recipients and beneficiaries; | 29. Recalls the specific provisions in the Conditionality Regulation and the 2022 Guidelines that oblige the EU to safeguard the legitimate interests of final recipients and beneficiaries from the financial consequences of sanctions imposed on their governments; expresses concern that the suspension of EU funds could be misused as a political weapon against civil society and local authorities; recalls, in particular, the obligation of the Member States subject to measures under the Regulation to continue to honour all commitments towards final recipients and beneficiaries; |
Amendment 49
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 30. Regrets that, in practice, the safeguards envisaged remain largely theoretical, since procedures for the direct payment or rerouting of funds are cumbersome, and communication to final recipients and beneficiaries is sporadic; acknowledges that more needs to be done at EU level to improve the protection of the legitimate interests of final recipients and beneficiaries and to ensure their access to EU funding; | 30. Regrets that, in practice, the safeguards envisaged remain largely theoretical, since procedures for the direct payment or rerouting of funds are cumbersome, and communication to final recipients and beneficiaries is sporadic; welcomes the Commission’s stated intention in its proposal for the 2028–2034 MFF to strengthen the protection of final recipients and beneficiaries; underlines, however, that this commitment must translate into effective safeguards in practice, and stresses that, given the shortcomings observed in the current framework, clear and concrete mechanisms will need to be defined to ensure that beneficiaries are genuinely protected; expresses concern that the proposed structure of the 2028-2034 MFF might make it even more difficult to protect final recipients and beneficiaries, as it would give Member State governments more control over the management of EU funds; acknowledges that more needs to be done at EU level to improve the protection of the legitimate interests of final recipients and beneficiaries and to ensure their access to EU funding; takes note of Article 15(4) of the draft NRPF regulation and stresses that there should be an obligation to make available the appropriations corresponding to decommitments under the conditionality regime for use under other EU instruments or programmes implemented under direct or indirect management, in particular those contributing to supporting Europe’s democracy, civil society, EU values or the fight against corruption, and at least partly within the Member State where the rule of law breaches occurred; |
Amendment 50
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 31. Observes with concern that in some Member States, kleptocratic oligarchic structures are systematically taking over strategically important sectors, such as banking, retail, food, pharmacy, construction and technology, which may pose risks to the protection of the EU budget, for instance when such structures apply for EU funds; underlines the importance of guaranteeing equal opportunities for all applicants to access both EU funding, and impartial and effective complaints mechanisms; | 31. Observes with concern that in some Member States, kleptocratic oligarchic structures are systematically taking over strategically important sectors, such as banking, retail, food, pharmacy, construction and technology, which may pose risks to the protection of the EU budget, for instance when such structures apply for EU funds; underlines the importance of guaranteeing equal opportunities for all applicants to access both EU funding, and impartial and effective complaints mechanisms; urges the Commission to conduct systematic audits of the distribution of EU funds to prevent conflicts of interest, political instrumentalisation or opacity in fund allocation at national level; |
Amendment 51
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 32. Considers, based on the limited experience, that the conditionality regime has been an effective tool for protecting the EU’s financial interests against risks deriving from breaches of the rule of law; insists, therefore, that the regime continues to be applied to the entire EU budget, including performance-based instruments, so that no line of EU expenditure escapes effective rule of law scrutiny; urges the Commission to ensure that the Conditionality Regulation is consistently applied to the EU budget, irrespective of its financing model; | 32. Considers that it may be too early to make definitive statements on the effectiveness of this tool for protecting the EU’s financial interests against risks deriving from breaches of the rule of law and stresses that, like any instrument, it remains open to improvement; insists, however, that the regime continues to be applied to the entire EU budget, including performance-based instruments, so that no line of EU expenditure escapes effective rule of law scrutiny; urges the Commission to ensure that the Conditionality Regulation is consistently applied to the EU budget, irrespective of its financing model; |
Amendment 52
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 34. Calls on the Commission to urgently revise the 2022 Guidelines so as to: address the risk of fund diversion or reallocation more directly; publish a step-by-step methodology showing how proportionality is calculated; define a ‘sufficiently direct link’ between a rule of law breach and a budgetary risk; require clearer links between breaches and measures adopted, including through more precise standards of those breaches; and provide clear solutions and practical steps for when reversals occur; | 34. Calls on the Commission to urgently revise the 2022 Guidelines so as to: address the risk of fund diversion or reallocation more directly; publish a step-by-step methodology showing how proportionality, and also the effectiveness of corrective measures, are estimated or calculated; define a ‘sufficiently direct link’ between a rule of law breach and a budgetary risk, including practical examples; require clearer links between breaches and measures adopted, including through more precise standards of those breaches and clarifications of the requirements for proactive monitoring; and provide clear solutions and practical steps for when reversals occur; |
Amendment 53
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 35. Invites the Commission, in this context, to review its interpretation of the Conditionality Regulation as a last resort instrument and to be more proactive in it use, including the application of Article 6(4), while respecting the principle of proportionality; | 35. Invites the Commission, in this context, to elaborate on its assessment of the respective added value and limitations of the various budgetary conditionality tools, to review its interpretation of the Conditionality Regulation as a last resort instrument and to be more proactive in it use, including the application of Article 6(4), while respecting the principle of proportionality; |
Amendment 54
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 36. Requests that the Commission, in its proportionality assessment, systematically consider the consequences for final beneficiaries, specifically smaller ones such as, but not limited to, universities, small and medium-sized enterprises, and civil society organisations, and to reflect that analysis in the dossier transmitted to Parliament under Article 8 of the Conditionality Regulation; | 36. Requests that the Commission, in its proportionality assessment, systematically consider the consequences for final beneficiaries, specifically smaller ones such as, but not limited to, universities, small and medium-sized enterprises, and civil society organisations, and to reflect that analysis in the dossier transmitted to Parliament under Article 8 of the Conditionality Regulation, while ensuring that the required changes are effectively implemented in reality for all these actors, and not only in a theoretical manner; |
Amendment 55
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 37. Invites the Commission to review how it can effectively fulfil its obligation to safeguard the legitimate financial interests of final recipients and beneficiaries, particularly those who suffer the consequences of rule of law deficiencies, including by enforcing the relevant provisions of the Conditionality Regulation as regards the Member States’ obligations to make payments; stresses that any measures taken to ensure that legitimate final recipients and beneficiaries can continue to access EU funding should not weaken the application of the Conditionality Regulation; expects to be fully involved in this process; | 37. Invites the Commission to review how it can effectively fulfil its obligation to safeguard the legitimate financial interests of final recipients and beneficiaries, particularly those who suffer the consequences of rule of law deficiencies, including by enforcing the relevant provisions of the Conditionality Regulation as regards the Member States’ obligations to make payments; invites the Commission to find ways of bringing the affected funds under direct management or of making them available under other EU instruments or programmes implemented under direct management or indirect management, ensuring in any case that local governments, civil society organisations and small and medium-sized enterprises do not suffer the consequences of funding suspensions caused by the actions of their national government, and, should it conclude that this option is not feasible, to clearly explain the reasons for that conclusion; stresses that any measures taken to ensure that legitimate final recipients and beneficiaries can continue to access EU funding should not weaken the application of the Conditionality Regulation; expects to be fully involved in this process; |
Amendment 56
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 38. Calls on the Commission to make systematic cross-references between infringement proceedings and measures adopted pursuant to Article 6 of the Financial Regulation and pending conditionality screenings, so that the Member States cannot exploit procedural silos and that the EU’s financial interests are protected, regardless of the legal instrument used; | 38. Calls on the Commission to make systematic cross-references between infringement proceedings and measures adopted pursuant to Article 6 of the Financial Regulation and the Conditionality Regulation, the Common Provisions Regulation, the RRF Regulation and the future conditionality regime of the 2028-2034 MFF, as well as any other relevant tool, so that the Member States cannot exploit procedural silos and that the EU’s financial interests are protected, regardless of the legal instrument used; |
Amendment 57
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 39. Believes that remedial actions should be accompanied by safeguards to prevent, where relevant, the occurrence of similar situations in the future; | 39. Believes that remedial actions should be accompanied by safeguards to prevent, where relevant, the occurrence of similar situations or further rule of law backsliding in the future; |
Amendment 58
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 40. Expects the Commission to take concrete action to strengthen the links between the recommendations of its annual rule of law reports and financial support from the EU budget, as outlined in the 2024 mission letters to the Commissioners responsible for Budget and for the Rule of Law; invites the Commission to translate the country-specific recommendations from its annual rule of law reports into concrete milestones to be systematically acted upon by the Member States and, where appropriate, to serve as evidence to justify the activation of the Conditionality Regulation; | 40. Expects the Commission to take concrete action to strengthen the links between the recommendations of its annual rule of law reports and financial support from the EU budget, as outlined in the 2024 mission letters to the Commissioners responsible for Budget and for the Rule of Law; invites the Commission to translate the country-specific recommendations from its annual rule of law reports into concrete milestones to be systematically acted upon by the Member States and, where appropriate, to serve as evidence to justify the activation of the Conditionality Regulation and other tools; underlines that such milestones should be accompanied by clear deadlines, and calls for the development of corresponding indicators; |
Amendment 59
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 41. Stresses that the annual rule of law report is currently structured around four pillars, namely: the justice system, the anti-corruption framework, media pluralism, and other institutional issues related to checks and balances; acknowledges that a single market dimension has been included in the 2025 Rule of Law Report to address rule of law issues affecting companies and workers; stresses that a functioning justice system, a strong anti-corruption framework, media pluralism, adequate checks and balances, and a functioning single market are intrinsically linked to the rule of law; | 41. Stresses that the annual rule of law report is currently structured around four pillars, namely: the justice system, the anti-corruption framework, media pluralism, and other institutional issues related to checks and balances; welcomes the fact that a single market dimension has been included in the 2025 Rule of Law Report to address rule of law issues affecting companies and workers; stresses that a functioning justice system, a strong anti-corruption framework, media pluralism, adequate checks and balances are all preconditions for a functioning single market; underlines that these pillars are complemented by sub-pillars which should be further developed where necessary; |
Amendment 60
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 41 a. Stresses that the annual rule of law report, and in particular its recommendations, should be designed in such a way as to be fully operational and directly usable for determining whether the activation of the Conditionality Regulation is warranted; further calls on the Commission to clarify the threshold at which shortcomings identified in the report, and the corresponding recommendations, are considered sufficiently serious to justify recourse to a financial instrument such as the Conditionality Regulation; |
Amendment 61
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 42. Notes that systematic rule of law breaches, identified under the pillars of the annual rule of law report, that have a sufficiently direct link to the protection of the EU budget should lead to the triggering of the conditionality mechanism, notably in cases such as violation, manipulation or favouritism in calls for tender and applications involving EU funding, as well as administrative harassment breaching the equal treatment of local and regional authorities, companies or other final recipients and beneficiaries, and their access to EU funds; | 42. Notes that systematic rule of law breaches, identified under the pillars of the annual rule of law report, that have a sufficiently direct link to the protection of the EU budget should lead to the triggering of the conditionality mechanism, notably in cases such as systemic violations of judicial independence, an ineffective anti-corruption framework, including the political capture of a public prosecutor’s services or supreme audit institutions, the lack of implementation of judgments or violation, manipulation or favouritism in calls for tender and applications involving EU funding, as well as administrative harassment breaching the equal treatment of local and regional authorities, companies or other final recipients and beneficiaries, and their access to EU funds; |
Amendment 62
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 44
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 44. Insists that Parliament’s scrutiny prerogatives be safeguarded by empowering it to monitor consistency in the (non-)application of the conditionality regime, thereby preventing political instrumentalisation or opacity; invites the Commission to transmit to Parliament a consolidated annual inventory of all conditionality-related decisions across budget headings in the context of the annual budgetary procedure; | 44. Insists that Parliament’s scrutiny prerogatives be safeguarded by empowering it to monitor consistency in the (non-)application of the conditionality regime under current and future tools, thereby preventing political instrumentalisation or opacity; invites the Commission to transmit to Parliament a consolidated annual inventory of all conditionality-related decisions across budget headings in the context of the annual budgetary procedure; |
Amendment 63
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 45 a. Urges the Commission to agree on a secure communication channel with the Parliament bodies responsible in order to ensure full access to documentation, including the full text of written notifications and the exchanges between the Commission’s services and the Member State in question, in a timely, comprehensive and proactive manner, while safeguarding its confidentiality; |
Amendment 64
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 46
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 46. Calls on the Council to keep the process fact-based and objective, and to stick as closely as possible to the Commission’s proposals; urges the Council, furthermore, not to transform the process leading to the adoption of measures into a bargaining chip; | 46. Calls on the Council to keep the process fact-based and objective, and to stick as closely as possible to the Commission’s proposals, and in the event of deviating from them, to provide sufficient justification for doing so; urges the Council, furthermore, not to transform the process leading to the adoption of measures into a political deal-making exercise, which would allow a Member State subject to this process to leverage its veto over urgent decisions that require unanimity in the European Council; considers that it should be possible under the current Regulation to adopt new measures for the protection of the EU budget in a simplified way within the same procedure, if the situation leading to the adoption of measures has not been remedied or has deteriorated, while ensuring that the same substantive criteria and safeguards continue to apply; |
Amendment 65
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 47
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 47. Asks the Commission to set up an interactive portal which would enable citizens, final recipients and beneficiaries, and economic operators, to follow the whole life cycle of conditionality cases from notification to eventual lifting of measures, in order to enhance transparency and prevent misinformation; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to publish fact sheets featuring every future action under the Conditionality Regulation, setting out the type and assessment of breaches, the impact on the EU budget, and, where relevant, the proportionality of its proposed measures; invites the Commission to ensure that the relevant information is disseminated to the final recipients and beneficiaries concerned and to the wider public; | 47. Asks the Commission to set up an interactive portal which would enable citizens, civil society organisations, final recipients and beneficiaries, and economic operators, to follow the whole life cycle of conditionality cases from notification to eventual lifting of measures, in order to enhance transparency and prevent misinformation; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to publish fact sheets featuring every future action under the Conditionality Regulation, setting out the type and assessment of breaches, the impact on the EU budget, and, where relevant, the proportionality of its proposed measures; invites the Commission to ensure that the relevant information is disseminated to the final recipients and beneficiaries concerned and to the wider public; |
Amendment 66
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 49
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 49. Calls on the Commission to reinforce its investigative capacity by establishing a standing roster of specialised experts capable of assessing complex rule of law breaches, thereby ensuring swifter, technically robust decisions, and to develop an IT system that enables the detection of patterns or similarities in reports received; | 49. Considers that the Commission has not yet fully developed the necessary administrative capacity for the implementation of the Regulation; stresses that the EU institutions must ensure that the Commission is provided with the adequate means to enforce it effectively; on that basis, calls on the Commission to therefore allocate appropriate human resources to the enforcement of the Regulation and to reinforce the Commission’s investigative capacity by establishing a standing roster of specialised experts capable of assessing complex rule of law breaches, thereby ensuring swifter, technically robust decisions, and to develop an IT system that enables the detection of patterns or similarities in reports received; underlines the need for close and structured cooperation between the relevant Directorates-General in the Commission, in particular its Directorate-General for Budget and its Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, to ensure coherence and complementarity in the application of the Regulation; |
Amendment 67
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 51 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 51 a. Reiterates its proposal to establish an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, building on Parliament’s 2020 proposal; underlines that this mechanism should be governed by an interinstitutional agreement between Parliament, the Commission and the Council, consisting of an annual monitoring cycle on EU values covering all aspects of Article 2 TEU, and applying equally, objectively and fairly to all Member States and EU candidate countries, supported by a panel of independent experts preparing recommendations and linking them to budgetary and other enforcement tools, and enhancing Parliament’s oversight; emphasises that while the rule of law toolbox available to the EU has been significantly expanded, its effectiveness depends on the coherent and consistent application across all EU institutions; stresses the need to establish, in the meantime, a European Rule of Law Semester, featuring a clear structure with fixed milestones and active contributions from all EU institutions; underlines that, while initially focused on the rule of law, this European Rule of Law Semester should be designed in a way that allows it to be progressively extended to cover all the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, ensuring a comprehensive and coherent approach to the protection of EU values; underlines that this annual cycle must be based on solid, objective indicators and make clear that breaches of the rule of law are never trivial, and that any concerning findings should lead to real consequences, mirroring the European Semester mechanism applied in the field of public finances; |
ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT
The rapporteur for opinion in his capacity as rapporteur for opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not include in his opinion input from interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register1, or from representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies, to be listed in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.
INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION
| Date adopted | 5.11.2025 |
| Result of final vote | + : 52 - : 21 0 : 1 |
| Members present for the final vote | Abir Al-Sahlani, Giuseppe Antoci, Jaume Asens Llodrà, Malik Azmani, Pernando Barrena Arza, Nicolas Bay, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Krzysztof Brejza, Saskia Bricmont, Jorge Buxadé Villalba, Jaroslav Bžoch, Mélissa Camara, Susanna Ceccardi, Caterina Chinnici, Alessandro Ciriani, Paulo Cunha, Lena Düpont, Marieke Ehlers, Estrella Galán, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Evin Incir, Paolo Inselvini, Marina Kaljurand, Mariusz Kamiński, Assita Kanko, Fabienne Keller, Mary Khan, Moritz Körner, András László, Murielle Laurent, Fabrice Leggeri, Jeroen Lenaers, Erik Marquardt, Michael McNamara, Ana Catarina Mendes, Verena Mertens, Nadine Morano, Matjaž Nemec, Ana Miguel Pedro, Emil Radev, Ilaria Salis, Birgit Sippel, Petra Steger, Cecilia Strada, Tineke Strik, Tomas Tobé, Milan Uhrík, Tom Vandendriessche, Kristian Vigenin, Charlie Weimers, Sophie Wilmès, Alessandro Zan, Javier Zarzalejos |
| Substitutes present for the final vote | Anja Arndt, Konstantinos Arvanitis, David Casa, Kinga Gál, Geadis Geadi, Nikola Minchev, Dolors Montserrat, Javier Moreno Sánchez, Leoluca Orlando, Maria Walsh, Maciej Wąsik |
| Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote | Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Robert Biedroń, Henrik Dahl, Elisabetta Gualmini, Martine Kemp, Stefan Köhler, Judita Laššáková, Miriam Lexmann, André Rodrigues, Marjan Šarec |