Sittings · Document

OPINION (COM(2022)0761 – C90416/2022 – 2022/0406(COD)) 2023-09-20

On the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on multiple-vote share structures in companies that seek the admission to trading of their shares on an SME growth market

Committee on Legal Affairs · Rapporteur: René Repasi

PA_Legam

AMENDMENTS

The Committee on Legal Affairs calls on the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, as the committee responsible, to take the following into account:

Amendment 1

Proposal for a directive

Recital 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(1) To reinforce the attractiveness of SME growth markets and to reduce inequalities for companies seeking admission to trading in the single market, it is necessary to address obstacles to the access to such markets that stem from regulatory barriers. Companies should be able to choose governance structures that suit best their development stage, including by enabling controlling shareholders of those companies to retain control of the business after accessing SME growth markets, while enjoying the benefits associated to trading on those markets, as long as the rights of minority shareholders continue to be safeguarded.

(1) To reinforce the attractiveness of SME growth markets and to reduce inequalities for companies seeking admission to trading in the single market, it is necessary to address obstacles to the access to such markets that stem from regulatory barriers. Companies should be able, subject to appropriate safeguards, to choose governance structures that suit best their development stage, including by enabling controlling shareholders of those companies to retain control of the business after accessing SME growth markets, while enjoying the benefits associated to trading on those markets, as long as the rights of minority shareholders are continuously safeguarded.

Amendment 2

Proposal for a directive

Recital 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(2) Fear of losing control over a company constitutes one of the main deterrents for controlling shareholders to access SME growth markets. Admission to trading usually entails dilution of ownership for controlling shareholders, thus reducing their influence over important investment and operating decisions in the company. Maintaining control of the company may in particular be important for start-ups and companies with long-term projects that require significant upfront costs, because they may wish to pursue their vision without becoming too exposed to market fluctuations.

(2) Fear of losing control over a company constitutes one of the main deterrents for controlling shareholders to access capital and equity markets. Admission to trading usually entails dilution of ownership for controlling shareholders, thus reducing their influence over important investment, strategic and operating decisions in the company. Maintaining control of the company may in particular be important for start-ups and companies with long-term projects that require significant upfront costs, because they may wish to pursue their vision without becoming too exposed to market fluctuations.

Amendment 3

Proposal for a directive

Recital 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(3) Multiple-vote share structures are an effective mechanism to enable controlling shareholders to retain decision-making power in a company, while raising funds from the public. Multiple-vote share structures are a form of a control enhancement mechanism involving at least two distinct classes of shares with a different number of votes per share. Under such structures, at least one of the classes of shares has a lower votes per share than another class (or classes) of shares with voting rights. The share carrying the superior amount of votes is a multiple-vote share. Types of shares that qualify for multipe-vote share structures can differ in terms of design. The basic type of multiple-vote share contains a higher voting value at the moment of its issuance. Multiple-vote shares can also be characterized by an increase of the voting value over the time of the ownership of the share, where the increased voting value expires at the moment of the transfer of the ownership. A higher voting value can also be attached to shares, which qualify for a multiple-vote share, where the holder waives any distribution rights or receives only substantially restricted distribution rights in return.

Amendment 4

Proposal for a directive

Recital 4

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(4) There are other control enhancing mechanisms that allow leveraging voting power, apart from multiple-vote share structures. Such mechanisms may include non-voting shares, non-voting preference shares and voting right ceilings. However, those alternative control enhancing mechanisms, being more rigid in their set-up, are liable to constrain the amount of capital that a company can raise at the point of admission to trading on SME growth markets due to the lower disassociation between economic and voting rights.

(4) There are other control enhancing mechanisms that allow leveraging voting power, apart from multiple-vote share structures. Such mechanisms may include non-voting shares, non-voting preference shares and voting right ceilings. However, those alternative control enhancing mechanisms, being more rigid in their set-up, are liable to constrain the amount of capital that a company can raise at the point of admission to trading due to the lower disassociation between economic and voting rights.

Amendment 5

Proposal for a directive

Recital 5

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(5) Loyalty shares, like multiple-vote shares, confer superior voting rights to a shareholder. A shareholder may obtain additional voting rights attached to loyalty shares, holding the share for the designated time and complying with certain conditions. Loyalty shares are control-enhancing mechanisms that are designed to foster a more stable, long-term oriented ownership among shareholders thereby increasing the attractiveness of a long-term commitment. The common rules laid down in this Directive should also cover loyalty shares, where applicable. Shares with no or substantially restricted distribution rights serve a similar purpose by certifying the long-term engagement of respective shareholders. It is therefore appropriate to enable companies to confer superior voting rights to such shareholders, in particular if they hold their shares for the designated time.

Amendment 6

Proposal for a directive

Recital 5 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(5 a) Like multiple-vote share structures, employee participation schemes can also increase funding options, bring stability, development and growth to SMEs, and serve as an important addition to sustainable corporate governance, with benefits for both employees and companies. Employee Financial Participation schemes can also help companies, especially SMEs, with respect to restructuring and business continuity by addressing company succession and generational renewal problems. Favouring the development of employee participation schemes can thus contribute to the overall objectives of this Directive. Where a company has established an employee participation scheme, the introduction of a multiple-vote share structure should not reduce the voting and participation rights attached to the employee participation scheme in place.

Amendment 7

Proposal for a directive

Recital 7

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(7) Member States should provide companies with the possibility to adopt multiple-vote share structures to allow them to seek admission to trading on a SME growth market without their controlling shareholders having to relinquish control. While admission to trading on regulated markets is more suitable for larger and more mature companies, SME growth markets are generally more appropriate for SMEs. SME growth markets were originally designed as SME dedicated trading venues with a regulatory treatment that takes the particularities of SMEs into account. Not all companies with securities listed on SME growth markets are, however, SMEs. Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council39 requires that SMEs constitute at least 50 % of the issuers of financial instruments admitted to trading on SME growth markets. Companies other than SMEs generally have more liquid securities and hence their admission to SME growth markets enables those markets to generate higher trading fees to maintain profitability of their business model. Nevertheless, to ensure clarity for investors, all issuers on SME growth markets, irrespective of their size, are currently subject to the same rules. It is therefore appropriate that the introduction of the right to adopt multiple-vote share structures applies to all companies seeking admission of their shares on an SME growth market for the first time.

(7) Member States should provide companies with the possibility to adopt multiple-vote share structures to allow them to seek admission to trading on a regulated market or an SME growth market without their controlling shareholders having to relinquish control. While admission to trading on regulated markets is more suitable for larger and more mature companies, SME growth markets are generally more appropriate for SMEs. SME growth markets were originally designed as SME dedicated trading venues with a regulatory treatment that takes the particularities of SMEs into account. Not all companies with securities listed on SME growth markets are, however, SMEs. Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council39 requires that SMEs constitute at least 50 % of the issuers of financial instruments admitted to trading on SME growth markets. Companies other than SMEs generally have more liquid securities and hence their admission to SME growth markets enables those markets to generate higher trading fees to maintain profitability of their business model. Nevertheless, to ensure clarity for investors, all issuers on SME growth markets, irrespective of their size, are currently subject to the same rules. It is therefore appropriate that the introduction of the right to adopt multiple-vote share structures applies to all companies seeking admission of their shares on a regulated market or an SME growth market for the first time.

__________________

39 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 349).

Amendment 8

Proposal for a directive

Recital 9

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(9) Companies may adopt multiple-vote share structures through a new issuance of shares or through another type of corporate transaction, such as the conversion of already issued shares. Companies should have the flexibility to choose the most appropriate type of corporate transaction to adopt multiple vote share structures in compliance with national law. Furthermore, companies should also have the flexibility as to the timing of the adoption of multiple-vote share structures, provided they do so to seek a first time admission of shares to trading on a SME growth market. Member States should not prevent companies from adopting multiple-vote share structures at a point prior to the moment of the admission of shares to trading. Member States should, however, be allowed to lay down that the exercise of the enhanced voting rights, which represent additional voting rights attached to multiple-vote shares compared to voting rights of shares of other classes, is conditional upon the admission to trading of shares on an SME growth market in one or more Member States. In that case and until the admission to trading, multiple-vote shares should have the same voting rights as other classes of shares in the company. That would ensure that multiple vote shares specifically promote a first-time admission to trading on SME growth markets.

(9) Companies may adopt multiple-vote share structures through a new issuance of shares or through another type of corporate transaction, such as the conversion of already issued shares. Companies should have the flexibility to choose the most appropriate type of corporate transaction to adopt multiple vote share structures in compliance with national law. Moreover, Member States should ensure that it is also possible to adopt a multiple-vote share structure at the moment of the creation of a company in its articles of association. Furthermore, companies should also have the flexibility as to the timing of the adoption of multiple-vote share structures, provided they do so to seek a first time admission of shares to trading on a regulated market or SME growth market. Member States should not prevent companies from adopting multiple-vote share structures at a point prior to the moment of the admission of shares to trading. Member States should, however, be allowed to lay down that the exercise of the enhanced voting rights, which represent additional voting rights attached to multiple-vote shares compared to voting rights of shares of other classes, is conditional upon the admission to trading of shares in one or more Member States. In that case and until the admission to trading, multiple-vote shares should have the same voting rights as other classes of shares in the company. That would ensure that multiple vote shares specifically promote a first-time admission to trading on regulated markets or SME growth markets.

Amendment 9

Proposal for a directive

Recital 11

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(11) Member States that allow multiple-vote shares provide for safeguards to protect minority shareholders and the interests of the company. However, the existing safeguards vary between Member States due to national specificities and diverging company law systems. Having regard to the objectives of the internal market as set out in particular in Article 50(2), point (g) of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, Member States should ensure a coordinated approach in their national laws on multiple-vote share structures with respect to the protection of the interests of minority shareholders and of the company. This includes protection against decisions creating risks for or resulting in adverse human rights, climate change, and environmental consequences. Under that coordinated approach, all Member States should ensure that any decision to adopt a multiple-vote share structure, or to modify that structure where there is an impact on voting rights, is taken by a qualified majority at the general shareholders’ meeting. Furthermore, Member States should limit the voting weight of multiple-vote shares by introducing restrictions either on the design of the multiple-vote share structure or on the exercise of voting rights attached to multiple-vote shares for the adoption of certain decisions. The restriction on the exercise of voting rights may be implemented by requiring that an approval by qualified majority necessitates both a qualified majority of the votes cast at the general meeting of shareholders and of the share capital represented at the general meeting of shareholders.

(11) Member States that allow multiple-vote shares provide for safeguards to protect minority shareholders and the interests of the company. However, the existing safeguards vary between Member States due to national specificities and diverging company law systems. Having regard to the objectives of the internal market as set out in particular in Article 50(2), point (g) of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, Member States should ensure a coordinated approach in their national laws on multiple-vote share structures with respect to the protection of the interests of minority shareholders and of the company. This may include protection against decisions creating risks for or resulting in adverse human rights, climate change, and environmental consequences. Under that coordinated approach, all Member States should ensure that any decision to adopt a multiple-vote share structure, or to modify that structure where there is an impact on voting rights, is taken by a qualified majority at the general shareholders’ meeting. Furthermore, Member States should limit the voting weight of multiple-vote shares by introducing restrictions on the design of the multiple-vote share structure and on the exercise of voting rights attached to multiple-vote shares for the adoption of certain decisions excluding appointment and dismissal of directors. For the purpose of limiting the voting weight of multiple-vote shares, Member States should consider introducing a maximum weighted voting ratio of up to one-to-ten. The restriction on the exercise of voting rights may be implemented by requiring that an approval by qualified majority necessitates both a qualified majority of the votes cast at the general meeting of shareholders and of the share capital represented at the general meeting of shareholders.

Amendment 10

Proposal for a directive

Recital 12

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(12) Member States should be given discretion to introduce additional safeguards, where needed, to ensure adequate protection of minority shareholders’ interests and the interest of the company. Member States should assess the appropriateness of additional safeguards in light of their effectiveness in protecting the interests of minority shareholders and of the company, while ensuring that such safeguards do not defeat the purpose of multiple-vote share structures, i.e. the possibility for a company’s controlling shareholders to influence important decisions, including the appointment of directors.

(12) Member States should have discretion to introduce additional safeguards to ensure adequate protection of the interest of shareholders who do not hold multiple-vote shares. Member States should assess the appropriateness of such safeguards in light of their effectiveness in protecting the interests of those shareholders, while ensuring that the safeguards do not defeat the purpose of multiple-vote share structures, i.e. the possibility for a company’s controlling shareholders to influence important decisions, including the appointment and dismissal of directors. Those additional safeguards may include requirements to ensure that companies commit to enhanced corporate governance measures, requirements to ensure that the enhanced voting rights do not lead to the blockage of decisions by the general shareholders’ meeting aiming at preventing, reducing or eliminating adverse impacts on human rights and the environment related to the company’s operations and value chain, as well as provisions to avoid that the enhanced voting rights attached to multiple-vote shares are transferred to third parties (transfer-based sunset clause), or continue to exist after a designated period of time of up to ten years (time-based sunset clause) or upon the occurrence of a specified event (event-based sunset clause).

Amendment 11

Proposal for a directive

Recital 13

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(13) The disclosure of accurate, comprehensive and timely information about issuers strengthens investor confidence and allows for informed investment decision-making. Such informed investment decision-making enhances both investor protection and market efficiency. Member States should therefore require companies with multiple-vote share structures to publish detailed information on their share structure and corporate governance system at the moment of the admission to trading, as well as periodically in the annual financial report. Such information should mention whether there are any limitations on the holding of securities, including whether any transfer of securities requires the approval either of the company, or of other holders of securities. It should also mention whether there are any restrictions on voting rights, including limitations of the voting rights of holders of a given percentage or number of votes, deadlines for exercising voting rights, or systems whereby the financial rights attached to securities are separated from the holding of securities. Furthermore, those companies should disclose the identity of holders of multiple-vote shares as well as of the natural persons entitled to exercise voting rights on their behalf and of persons exercising special control rights to provide investors, as members of general public, with transparency on ultimate ownership and de facto influence on the company. This would allow investors to make informed decisions and thereby strengthen their confidence in well-functioning capital markets.

Amendment 12

Proposal for a directive

Recital 13 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(13 a) This Directive is without prejudice to the protection of personal data, in particular Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

Amendment 13

Proposal for a directive

Recital 15

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(15) To take account of market developments and developments in other areas of Union law or Member States’ experiences with the implementation of this Directive, the Commission should review this Directive 5 years following the date of transposition.

(15) To assess the implementation and impact of this Directive, in particular any negative impacts on all actors concerned, and to take account of market developments and developments in other areas of Union law or Member States’ experiences with the implementation of this Directive, the Commission should review this Directive 4 years following the date of transposition and every 3 years thereafter.

Amendment 14

Proposal for a directive

Article 1 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

This Directive lays down common rules on multiple-vote share structures in companies that seek the admission to trading of their shares on an SME growth market in one or more Member States and that do not have shares already admitted to trading on any trading venue.

This Directive lays down common rules on multiple-vote share structures in companies that seek the admission to trading of their shares on a regulated market or an SME growth market in one or more Member States and that do not have shares already admitted to trading on any trading venue.

Amendment 15

Proposal for a directive

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point a

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(a) ‘company’ means a legal entity incorporated as one of the types of companies listed in Annex I to Directive (EU) 2017/1132;

(a) ‘company’ means a legal entity incorporated as one of the types of companies listed in Annex I or Annex II to Directive (EU) 2017/1132, which may under national law issue shares and seek admission to trading of the shares on a regulated market or an SME growth market;

Amendment 16

Proposal for a directive

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) ‘multiple-vote shares’ means shares belonging to a distinct and separate class and that carry higher voting rights than another class of shares with voting rights on matters to be decided at the general meeting of shareholders;

(b) ‘multiple-vote shares’ means shares belonging to a distinct and separate class, which carry more votes per share or enhanced voting rights than another class of shares with voting rights on matters to be decided at the general meeting of shareholders;

Amendment 17

Proposal for a directive

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point d a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(d a) ‘regulated market’ means a regulated market as defined in Article 4(1), point (21), of Directive 2014/65/EU;

Amendment 18

Proposal for a directive

Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point d b (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(d b) ‘Multilateral Trading Facility’ or ‘MTF’ means an MTF as defined in Article 4(1), point (22) of Directive 2014/65/EU;

Amendment 19

Proposal for a directive

Article 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Article 3

deleted

Introduction or maintenance of national provisions on multiple-vote shares

Member States may introduce or maintain in force national provisions that allow companies to adopt multiple-vote share structures in situations not covered by this Directive.

Amendment 20

Proposal for a directive

Article 3 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Member States may introduce or maintain in force national provisions that allow companies to adopt multiple-vote share structures in situations not covered by this Directive.

deleted

Amendment 21

Proposal for a directive

Article 4 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. Member States shall ensure that companies that do not have shares that are admitted to trading on a trading venue have the right to adopt multiple-vote share structures for the admission to trading of shares on an SME growth market in one or more Member States. Member States shall not prevent the admission to trading of shares of a company on an SME growth market on the ground that the company has adopted a multiple-vote share structure.

1. Member States shall ensure that companies that do not have shares that are admitted to trading on a trading venue have the right to adopt multiple-vote share structures for the admission to trading of shares on a regulated market or an SME growth market in one or more Member States. Member States shall not prevent the admission to trading of shares of a company on a regulated market or on an SME growth market on the ground that the company has adopted a multiple-vote share structure.

Amendment 22

Proposal for a directive

Article 4 – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. The right referred to in paragraph 1 encompasses the right to adopt multiple-vote share structures in time prior to seeking the admission to trading of shares on an SME growth market.

2. The right referred to in paragraph 1 encompasses the right to adopt multiple-vote share structures in time prior to seeking the admission to trading of shares on a regulated market or on an SME growth market.

Amendment 23

Proposal for a directive

Article 4 – paragraph 2 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2 a. Member States may make the adoption of a multiple-vote share structure conditional upon an exclusion or substantial limitation of the distribution rights attached to a share that carries higher voting rights.

Amendment 24

Proposal for a directive

Article 4 – paragraph 2 b (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2 b. Member States shall ensure that, where a company has an employee participation scheme in place, the adoption of a multiple-vote share structure does not reduce the voting and participation rights attached to the employee participation scheme;

Amendment 25

Proposal for a directive

Article 4 – paragraph 2 c (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2 c. Member States shall ensure that employees’ rights to information, consultation and participation are respected in relation to the decision on and use of multiple vote shares, in accordance with Union and national law and practices.

Amendment 26

Proposal for a directive

Article 5 – title

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Safeguards for fair and non-discriminatory treatment of shareholders of a company

Safeguards for shareholders of companies that have adopted a multiple-vote share structure

Amendment 27

Proposal for a directive

Article 5 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. Member States shall ensure fair and non-discriminatory treatment of shareholders, as well as adequate protection of the interests of the shareholders who do not hold multiple-vote shares and of the company through appropriate safeguards. To that effect, Member States shall do all of the following:

1. Member States shall ensure that appropriate safeguards are in place to provide for fair and non-discriminatory treatment, as well as adequate protection of the interests of the shareholders who do not hold multiple-vote shares and of the company. To that effect, Member States shall do all of the following:

Amendment 28

Proposal for a directive

Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point a – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

For the purposes of this point, where there are several classes of shares, such decisions shall also be subject to a separate vote for each class of shareholders whose rights are affected;

For the purposes of this point, such decisions shall also be subject to a separate vote in each class of shareholders the rights of which are affected;

Amendment 29

Proposal for a directive

Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point b – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) limit the voting weight of multiple-vote shares on the exercise of other shareholders’ rights, in particular during general meetings, by introducing either of the following:

(b) introduce a maximum weighted voting ratio and a requirement on the maximum percentage of the outstanding share capital that the total amount of multiple-vote shares can represent;

Amendment 30

Proposal for a directive

Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point b – point i

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(i) a maximum weighted voting ratio and a requirement on the maximum percentage of the outstanding share capital that the total amount of multiple-vote shares can represent;

deleted

Amendment 31

Proposal for a directive

Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b a) introduce a restriction on the exercise of the enhanced voting rights attached to multiple-vote shares for voting on matters to be decided at the general meeting of shareholders and that require the approval by a qualified majority, excluding appointment and dismissal of directors.

Amendment 32

Proposal for a directive

Article 5 – paragraph 2 – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2. Member States may provide for further safeguards to ensure adequate protection of shareholders and of the interests of the company. Those safeguards may include in particular:

2. Member States may provide for further safeguards to ensure adequate protection of shareholders who do not hold multiple-vote shares and of the interests of the company.

Amendment 33

Proposal for a directive

Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point a

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(a) a provision to avoid that the enhanced voting rights attached to multiple-vote shares are transferred to third parties or continue to exist upon the death, incapacitation or retirement of the original holder of multiple-vote shares (transfer-based sunset clause);

deleted

Amendment 34

Proposal for a directive

Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b) a provision to avoid that the enhanced voting rights attached to multiple-vote shares continue to exist after a designated period of time (time-based sunset clause);

deleted

Amendment 35

Proposal for a directive

Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point c

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(c) a provision to avoid that the enhanced voting rights attached to multiple-vote shares continue to exist upon the occurrence of a specified event (event-based sunset clause);

deleted

Amendment 36

Proposal for a directive

Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point d

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(d) a requirement to ensure that the enhanced voting rights cannot be used to block the adoption of decisions by the general shareholders’ meeting aiming at preventing, reducing or eliminating adverse impacts on human rights and the environment related to the company’s operations.

deleted

Amendment 37

Proposal for a directive

Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point a

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(a) the structure of their capital, including securities which are not admitted to trading on an SME growth market in a Member State, with an indication of the different classes of shares and, for each class of shares, the rights and obligations attached to that class and the percentage of total share capital and total voting rights that such class represents;

(a) the structure of their capital, including securities which are not admitted to trading on a regulated market or an SME growth market in a Member State, with an indication of the different classes of shares and, for each class of shares, the rights and obligations attached to that class and the percentage of total share capital and total voting rights that such class represents;

Amendment 38

Proposal for a directive

Article 6 – paragraph 2 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

2 a. Member States shall ensure that companies with multiple-vote share structures whose shares are traded or are to be traded on a regulated market or an SME growth market shall be identified with a unique stock marker 'WVR' (Weighted Voting Rights) at the end of their stock name. National competent authorities, regulated markets and SME growth markets shall promote investor understanding and awareness of this marker.

Amendment 39

Proposal for a directive

Article 7 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

By [five years after the entry into force], the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation and effects of this Directive. To that effect by [four years after the entry into force], Member States shall provide the Commission with information in particular on the following:

By [four years after the entry into force] and every three years thereafter, the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation and effects of this Directive. To that effect by [three years after the entry into force] and every three years thereafter, Member States shall provide the Commission with all relevant information in particular on the following:

Amendment 40

Proposal for a directive

Article 7 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(c a) the convergences and divergences between the multiple-vote share structures in companies that seek the admission to trading of their shares on an SME growth market existing in Member States following the implementation of this Directive.

Amendment 41

Proposal for a directive

Article 7 – paragraph 1 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

The report shall take into account the information provided by relevant stakeholders.

Amendment 42

Proposal for a directive

Article 8 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. Member States shall bring into force the law, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 2 years after the date of entry into force of this Directive. They shall immediately inform the Commission thereof. When Member States adopt those measures, they shall contain a reference to this Directive or be accompanied by such a reference on the occasion of their official publication. The methods of making such reference shall be laid down by Member States.

1. Member States shall bring into force the law, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 18 months after the date of entry into force of this Directive. They shall immediately inform the Commission thereof. When Member States adopt those measures, they shall contain a reference to this Directive or be accompanied by such a reference on the occasion of their official publication. The methods of making such reference shall be laid down by Member States.

PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

Title

Multiple-vote share structures in companies that seek the admission to trading of their shares on an SME growth market

References

COM(2022)0761 – C9-0416/2022 – 2022/0406(COD)

Committee responsible

Date announced in plenary

ECON

1.2.2023

Opinion by

Date announced in plenary

JURI

1.2.2023

Associated committees - date announced in plenary

15.6.2023

Rapporteur for the opinion

Date appointed

René Repasi

11.5.2023

Discussed in committee

27.6.2023

3.7.2023

Date adopted

19.9.2023

Result of final vote

–:

Members present for the final vote

Pascal Arimont, Ilana Cicurel, Angel Dzhambazki, Pierre Karleskind, Maria-Manuel Leitão-Marques, Karen Melchior, Sabrina Pignedoli, Jiří Pospíšil, Adrián Vázquez Lázara, Axel Voss, Marion Walsmann, Tiemo Wölken, Javier Zarzalejos

Substitutes present for the final vote

Patrick Breyer, Pascal Durand, Agnes Jongerius, Angelika Niebler

Substitutes under Rule 209(7) present for the final vote

Catherine Griset

VOTE FINAL PAR APPEL NOMINAL EN COMMISSION SAISIE POUR AVIS

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