Role of trade in strengthening the EU’s economic security

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

Role of trade in strengthening the EU’s economic security

(2025/2113(INI))

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union (FDI Screening Regulation),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/694 (Chips Act),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/2675 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 November 2023 on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s net-zero technology manufacturing ecosystem and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1724,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/2747 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2024 establishing a framework of measures related to an internal market emergency and to the resilience of the internal market and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2679/98 (Internal Market Emergency and Resilience Act),

– having regard to the Commission recommendation of 3 October 2023 on critical technology areas for the EU’s economic security for further risk assessment with Member States (COM(2023)6689),

– having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2025/63 of 15 January 2025 on reviewing outbound investments in technology areas critical for the economic security of the Union,

– having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2025/683 of 8 April 2025 on coordination of national control lists,

– having regard to the Council recommendation of 23 May 2024 on enhancing research security,

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 24 January 2024 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the screening of foreign investments in the Union and repealing Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council (COM(2024)0023),

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 11 March 2025 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying a framework for strengthening the availability and security of supply of critical medicinal products as well as the availability of, and accessibility of, medicinal products of common interest, and amending Regulation (EU) 2024/795 (COM(2025)0102),

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 20 January 2026 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), the European cybersecurity certification framework, and ICT supply chain security and repealing Regulation (EU) 2019/881 (The Cybersecurity Act 2) (COM(2026)0011),

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 21 January 2026 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on digital networks, amending Regulation (EU) 2015/2120, Directive 2002/58/EC and Decision No 676/2002/EC and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1971, Directive (EU) 2018/1972 and Decision No 243/2012/EU (Digital Networks Act) (COM(2026)0016),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on ‘European Economic Security Strategy’ (JOIN (2023)0020),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 3 December 2025 entitled ‘Strengthening EU economic security’ (JOIN(2025)0977),

– having regard to the report by Enrico Letta of April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

– having regard to the Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029 of 18 July 2024,

– having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

– having regard to the Mission Letter of 17 September 2024 from the President of the Commission to the Commissioner-designate for Trade and Economic Security and for Interinstitutional Relations and Transparency,

– having regard to the Union list of critical medicines established and maintained by the European Medicines Agency to address vulnerabilities and shortages in the supply of essential medicinal products,

– having regard to the Commission White Paper of 24 January 2024 on export controls (COM(2024)0025),

– having regard to the Commission White Paper of 24 January 2024 on outbound investments (COM(2024)0024),

– having regard to the Commission White Paper of 24 January 2024 on options for enhancing support for research and development involving technologies with dual-use potential (COM(2024)0027),

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade (A100000/2026),

A. whereas the EU’s openness to trade and investment remains a cornerstone of its prosperity, competitiveness and global influence;

B. whereas the international economic environment has undergone a structural shift characterised by rising geopolitical rivalry, systemic competition and the increasing use of economic instruments for strategic purposes;

C. whereas a credible economic security strategy must preserve the integrity of the internal market, legal certainty for economic operators and the EU’s commitment to a rules-based international order;

I. The evolving economic security risk landscape

1. Welcomes the joint communication of 3 December 2025 as a necessary step to strengthen the EU’s common approach to economic security;

2. Acknowledges that the EU’s high degree of integration into global markets has increased its exposure to disruptions, coercive practices and strategic leverage by third countries, exercised through supply chains, access to critical inputs and dependence on key physical and digital infrastructure;

3. Underlines that recent crises – including the COVID-19 pandemic, disruptions to energy supplies following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, recurring tensions affecting global transport and logistics routes and coercive restrictions on access to critical materials – have shown how economic dependencies can rapidly translate into shortages, inflation, production stoppages and concrete constraints on Europe’s economic activity and the EU’s ability to respond effectively to external shocks; emphasises that these vulnerabilities are structural rather than temporary, as they result from concentrations and monopolies that have developed over time;

4. Concludes that reinforcing the EU’s economic security is key to safeguarding the resilience of supply chains and protecting Europe’s strategic autonomy;

II. Prevention through diversification and competitiveness

5. Reaffirms that openness to trade and investment, combined with the diversification of partners, suppliers and transport routes, must remain the EU’s primary means of reducing structural vulnerability to external shocks, disruptions and coercive practices;

6. Calls on the Commission to actively pursue a new wave of ambitious trade agreements and sectorial partnerships with reliable partners as a central element of its diversification strategy; stresses that economic security cannot be achieved through autarky or protectionism, and that multiple, diversified interdependencies with reliable partners constitute the most robust and sustainable basis for resilience;

7. Warns that measures that weaken business competitiveness, such as overregulation, discourage investment and innovation and undermine the EU’s economic resilience and security objectives;

8. Stresses that a fully functioning single market is a pillar of economic security; underlines that deeper integration is essential for Europe’s long-term competitiveness and security;

III. Managing and mitigating identified risks

9. Acknowledges that certain economic exposures, by virtue of their scale, concentration, strategic importance or irreversibility, may require targeted mitigating measures; underlines that, in such cases, measures may legitimately include restrictions on market access, economic activity or investment flows from third countries in order to safeguard the EU’s essential interests;

10. Stresses that such measures should be proportionate and tailored to the severity and persistence of the risk, be based on clearly defined risk thresholds, objective and verifiable criteria and prior impact assessments, and be subject to continuous monitoring and review;

11. Emphasises that existing EU instruments designed to address structural vulnerabilities, market distortions and non-market behaviour should be deployed coherently and decisively, and that fragmented, hesitant or inconsistent use of such instruments undermines their deterrent effect;

12. Considers that the development of additional tools should be avoided unless a clear and demonstrable gap in the effectiveness of existing EU instruments has been identified; calls for streamlining existing and future legislation and initiatives relevant to economic security;

IV. Trade policy instruments, enforcement and deterrence

13. Stresses that deterrence is weakened where enforcement action is delayed, inconsistent or perceived as uncertain; calls, therefore, on the Commission to ensure timely decision-making, clear activation criteria and predictable consequences once the presence of economic security risks or unfair practices has been established;

14. Underlines that the systematic enforcement of current trade rules constitutes the EU’s primary and most proportionate response to non-compliance;

15. Emphasises that where enforcement and engagement fail to change behaviour, the EU’s response should follow a gradual, proportionate and reversible escalation approach, allowing pressure to be increased in a controlled manner while maintaining legal certainty and credible options for de-escalation;

16. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the application of enforcement, trade defence and anti-coercion instruments is coordinated within a coherent operational framework, in coordination with the Member States and economic operators;

17. Insists on the crucial role of Parliament, and in particular the Committee on International Trade, in the democratic scrutiny of economic security-related measures with trade and investment implications, including at all stages of their design, implementation and review in order to ensure transparency, accountability and informed parliamentary oversight;

V. Investment, capital flows and strategic exposure

18. Recalls that cross-border investment and capital flows are important drivers of growth, innovation and competitiveness in the EU, but may also create exposure where control, influence, or access to sensitive assets, technologies or critical infrastructure become concentrated in third countries;

19. Stresses the importance of the FDI Screening Regulation as a core preventive economic security instrument, and calls for its consistent, effective and rigorous application across all Member States, including through comprehensive national screening mechanisms, clear timelines, and strengthened cooperation and information-sharing between national authorities and the Commission, and for effective follow-up where risks are identified;

20. Underlines that investments affecting critical infrastructure require heightened vigilance, as changes in ownership, governance or operational control can directly affect security and the continuity of supply, including, in particular, major transport and logistics hubs that are critical for external trade and military mobility, as well as energy generation, transmission, distribution and storage infrastructure;

21. Stresses that economic security risks also arise where outbound investment, strategic partnerships or corporate restructuring enable the transfer, development or scaling-up of sensitive technologies, production capabilities or technical know-how outside the EU, including through greenfield investments, joint ventures, licensing arrangements, contract manufacturing, or the relocation of key research and development and manufacturing activities; stresses that such transfers may weaken the EU’s long-term industrial base or technological leadership;

22. Emphasises that, to safeguard its economic security, the EU must maintain its effective control, decision-making capacity and operational autonomy over critical technologies, including, in particular, advanced semiconductors and microelectronics, AI and high-performance computing, quantum technologies, advanced robotics, space-based and satellite systems, cybersecurity and encryption technologies, and key energy-related technologies; calls on the Commission to ensure that investment-related risks in these areas are assessed and addressed in a targeted and confidential manner;

VI. Multilateral engagement and partnerships

23. Reaffirms the EU’s commitment to a rules-based multilateral trading system, with the World Trade Organization (WTO) at its core, as the most developed framework for managing global economic interdependence and addressing economic security risks in a predictable and non-discriminatory manner;

24. Stresses that meaningful WTO reform, including the restoration of a fully functioning dispute settlement system, is essential to address systemic risks, curb unfair practices and prevent the escalation of trade disputes; acknowledges that, pending such reform, the EU must strengthen its own capacity to act autonomously and respond effectively to economic security risks;

25. Encourages closer and more structured cooperation with trusted partners and like-minded economies to build networked resilience against disruptions to trade and supply, including through coordinated preparedness, mutual support arrangements, and complementary approaches to stockpiling, responding to crises and protecting critical supply chains; calls on the Commission to ensure that the experiences of partners that have been subject to economic security risks are systematically reflected in the EU’s economic security assessments, preparedness planning and external coordination;

26. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

The European Union’s prosperity, social model and global influence are founded on openness, competitiveness and deep integration into the world economy. Trade and investment have long been engines of growth, innovation and stability. At the same time, recent years have demonstrated that economic interdependence can be weaponised, disrupted or exploited in ways that directly affect Europe’s security, resilience and strategic autonomy.

The COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, repeated disruptions to global transport routes, and the increasing use of economic coercion have exposed structural vulnerabilities in supply chains, access to critical inputs and key infrastructure. These developments reflect a lasting transformation of the international environment, characterised by intensified geopolitical rivalry and systemic competition. In this context, economic security has become an essential dimension of the Union’s overall security and foreign policy.

This own-initiative report sets out the European Parliament’s position in light of the Joint Communication of December 2025 on Strengthening EU economic security. It aims to respond to this evolving risk landscape by reaffirming that openness to trade and investment remains the Union’s primary source of strength, rejecting protectionism and economic isolation as automatic responses to geopolitical uncertainty. Instead, it promotes diversification, competitiveness and deeper integration within the single market as the most effective and sustainable foundations for resilience. Multiple, balanced and rules-based interdependencies with reliable partners are essential to reducing strategic vulnerabilities while preserving economic dynamism.

Trade agreements and strategic partnerships play a central role in this approach. Beyond their traditional market access function, they are increasingly instruments for promoting supply-chain transparency, fair competition, access to critical raw materials and regulatory cooperation. The report therefore calls for an ambitious and coherent trade agenda that supports resilience while maintaining high standards and legal certainty for economic operators.

At the same time, the report recognises that diversification alone is not sufficient to address certain high-risk dependencies and strategic exposures. In certain cases, targeted mitigating measures are necessary to safeguard essential Union interests. Such measures must remain proportionate, evidence-based and subject to continuous review. Similarly, avoiding fragmentation, overregulation and unnecessary administrative burdens is crucial to preserving Europe’s competitiveness and investment attractiveness.

Effective economic security also depends on the credible enforcement of existing rules. Delayed or inconsistent application of trade defence, enforcement and other instruments weakens deterrence and undermines confidence. The report therefore stresses the need for timely, predictable and coordinated enforcement, combined with a gradual and reversible escalation framework that preserves legal certainty and room for de-escalation.

Investment flows are another key dimension of economic security. While foreign and outbound investment are vital drivers of innovation and growth, they may also generate strategic risks when sensitive technologies, infrastructure or decision-making capacities become vulnerable to external influence. The report highlights the importance of robust and harmonised implementation of the EU’s foreign direct investment screening framework, as well as systematic risk assessments related to outbound investment and technology transfers. Particular attention is given to advanced digital, industrial, space and energy technologies that underpin the Union’s long-term competitiveness.

The report further underlines that economic security cannot be achieved in isolation. A strong, predictable and rules-based multilateral trading system remains the ideal framework for managing global interdependence. The European Union must continue to lead efforts to reform and strengthen the World Trade Organization. However, fostering closer cooperation with trusted partners is essential to building networked resilience, enhancing preparedness and sharing best practices against economic coercion.

Finally, the report emphasises the importance of democratic accountability and transparency. Economic security measures often involve far-reaching implications for businesses, workers and consumers. The European Parliament, and particularly the Committee on International Trade, must therefore play a central role in scrutinising their design, implementation and impact. Effective parliamentary oversight is essential to ensure that economic security policies remain balanced, proportionate and consistent with the Union’s values and legal framework.

This report seeks to contribute to a coherent European approach that strengthens economic security without compromising openness, competitiveness and the rules-based international order. It promotes a pragmatic, risk-based and forward-looking strategy that reinforces Europe’s resilience while preserving the foundations of its prosperity and global engagement.

ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that he included in his report input on matters pertaining to the subject of the file that he received, in the preparation of the draft report, from the following interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register, or from the following representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies:

1. Interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register

Konrad Adenauer Stiftung

Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies

ASML

EFPIA

Vestas

ACS Group

VDA

Spanish Chamber of Commerce

Naturgy

Navantia

CEOE

2. Representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies

Embassy of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union

Embassy of the People’s Republic of China to the Kingdom of Spain

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that he has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.