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OPINION (2023/2072(INI))

On the security and defence implications of China’s influence on critical infrastructure in the European Union

INTA-AD-750148

Committee on International Trade · Rapporteur: Iuliu Winkler

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✦ In short · AI summary of this text, generated 26 Sept 2026

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The Committee on International Trade suggests amendments to the Committee on Foreign Affairs' motion for a resolution on China's influence on EU critical infrastructure. It asks the Commission to raise EU trade concerns with China, to fully use the EU trade toolbox, and to strengthen foreign investment screening. It calls for a rapid response mechanism for dual use or misuse of Chinese-owned EU infrastructure, and for ending research funding to Chinese companies in critical areas. It asks the Commission to report to Parliament on dual use of strategic infrastructure and on respect for EU trade law, and to share an analysis of trade risks in key technologies.

Committee position. The Committee on International Trade asks the Committee on Foreign Affairs to incorporate its suggestions into its motion for a resolution, covering trade balance concerns, investment screening, protection of critical infrastructure and technology risks.

Key points

  1. Notes China was the EU's second largest goods trade partner in 2022 and the EU had a record trade deficit of EUR 396 billion; asks the Commission to raise concerns over China's managed trade practices.
  2. Notes Chinese investment in Europe fell to a 10-year low of EUR 7.9 billion in 2022 and shifted towards greenfield investments and strategic areas; welcomes undistorted investment but calls for adequate screening.
  3. Points to ambiguity over the interests behind Chinese investments because of the mix of private, state and party-linked actors.
  4. Calls for a fair, transparent, reciprocal and rules-based trade relationship with China, and for China to support reform of the World Trade Organization.
  5. Calls on the Commission to fully implement the EU trade toolbox, including trade defence instruments, FDI screening, the anti-coercion instrument and the European economic security strategy.
  6. Calls on the Commission and member states to screen with particular attention China's acquisitions of critical infrastructure in the Western Balkans and EU neighbourhood countries, and asks China for transparency on Belt and Road projects.
  7. Welcomes the 'de-risking' approach of the European economic security strategy and calls on the Commission and member states to deliver on open strategic autonomy where the EU risks overdependence on China.
  8. Urges the Commission and member states to protect transport, energy and telecommunications infrastructure, and calls on the Commission to report periodically to Parliament on dual use of strategic infrastructure and on respect for EU trade legislation.
  9. Calls on the Commission and member states to design a rapid response mechanism for dual use or misuse of EU infrastructure under Chinese ownership, participation or concession.
  10. Calls for stronger FDI screening, an ambitious revised Regulation and evaluation of a screening mechanism for outbound investments based on an impact assessment.
  11. Calls on the Commission and member states to strengthen strategic autonomy through diversified supply chains and action on research, critical raw materials, reindustrialisation and new infrastructure, and to protect 5G and 6G networks.
  12. Calls for an end to EU research funding for Chinese companies in critical areas, and for the Commission to assess risks in semiconductors, quantum computing, blockchains, space, artificial intelligence and biotechnologies.

Who is affected

  • The Commission, which is asked to raise concerns with China, implement trade measures and report to Parliament.
  • Member states, which are asked to screen investments and protect critical infrastructure.
  • Chinese companies and investors in EU critical infrastructure, research and technology.
  • EU businesses, which the text says face blackmail, industrial espionage, sabotage and data theft.

Figures and deadlines

  • EUR 396 billion: the EU's record trade deficit with China in 2022.
  • EUR 230 billion: the combined value of EU exports to China in 2022.
  • EUR 7.9 billion: Chinese investment in Europe in 2022, a 10-year low.
  • 29 and 30 June 2023: the European Council meeting whose conclusions on China are acknowledged.
  • 20 June 2023: the date of the proposed European economic security strategy.