Sittings · Document

DRAFT REPORT (2025/2069(INI)) 2025-12-18

On the findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield

Special committee on the European Democracy Shield · Rapporteur: Tomas Tobé

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This is the rapporteur's draft report on the findings and recommendations of Parliament's Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield. It welcomes the joint communication setting up the Shield and calls for a European Centre for Democratic Resilience with a clear mandate, budget and legal basis by Q1 2027. It asks for full enforcement of digital laws, action against platforms and AI-driven manipulation, and stronger protection of media, journalists and civil society. It calls for stronger protection of critical infrastructure, cybersecurity, justice and home affairs cooperation, and an external dimension supporting candidate countries and partners against foreign information manipulation and interference. It demands stronger electoral resilience, wider use of sanctions, and EU-wide preparedness measures including a crisis-alert app, a household booklet and joint exercises.

Committee position. The rapporteur welcomes the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield but says its ambition is too limited. He proposes a concrete reform agenda: a fully operational European Centre for Democratic Resilience with a clear mandate and budget, stronger enforcement of digital rules, a reformed ECNE, better protection of critical infrastructure, and an ambitious preparedness and external agenda.

Key points

  1. Welcomes the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield and says its core mission should be to protect European democracy from external threats and Article 2 TEU values.
  2. Finds the threat landscape increasingly complex, names Russia as the primary external threat, and says the Shield's priorities must be funded in the upcoming multiannual financial framework.
  3. Welcomes the proposed European Centre for Democratic Resilience but says it lacks operational detail, budget, governance, mandate and timeline, and calls for a legal basis by Q1 2027.
  4. Calls for the Centre to integrate existing counter-disinformation structures by 2026, to have a clear mandate, and to be able to run EU grants; asks for a dedicated budget line and possible contributions from very large online platforms.
  5. Calls for full implementation of the Digital Services Act, political advertising rules and the Artificial Intelligence Act, and for platforms to adhere to the Code of Practice on Disinformation.
  6. Urges the Commission to conclude investigations into TikTok and Telegram, to expose AI-targeting campaigns such as the 'Pravda' network, and to address platform revenue redistribution to sanctioned entities.
  7. Says the Shield must uphold freedom of expression for people, not bots or AI, and must protect media freedom, journalists, fact-checkers and civil society, including through stable funding.
  8. Calls for protection of critical infrastructure against sabotage and hybrid attacks, for a sovereign EU digital infrastructure, and for alignment of cybersecurity rules and faster transposition of the NIS2 Directive.
  9. Supports an overhaul of Europol's mandate, a review of Europol and Eurojust mandates, and a strengthened Frontex mandate to counter hybrid threats and the instrumentalisation of migration.
  10. Calls for a robust external dimension: capacity-building for candidate countries and neighbours, FIMI training in CSDP missions, regional hubs, media literacy in pre-accession aid, and cooperation with international partners.
  11. Calls for stronger electoral resilience: implementation of Commission recommendations, national election networks, a reformed and better-resourced ECNE, and protection of election infrastructure and candidates.
  12. Calls for expanded and better enforced sanctions, including secondary sanctions and targeting of enablers, and for preparedness measures such as a crisis-alert app, a household booklet, joint exercises and a European Preparedness Day.

Who is affected

  • EU institutions and agencies: the Centre, Europol, Eurojust, Frontex, ENISA and the EPPO would gain new tasks or revised mandates.
  • Online platforms and very large online platforms: stricter enforcement, possible contributions to the Centre, and obligations on revenue redistribution.
  • Member States: asked to build national FIMI structures, transpose the NIS2 Directive, fund election authorities and protect candidates.
  • Media, journalists, fact-checkers and civil society: support, protection and funding are sought for them.
  • Candidate countries and neighbours, notably Ukraine, Moldova and the Western Balkans: capacity-building and election integrity assistance.

Figures and deadlines

  • EUR 120 million: fine imposed on the platform X for breaching Digital Services Act transparency obligations.
  • EUR 5.5 million: EU emergency funding approved for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
  • EUR 9 billion: anticipated budget of the proposed AgoraEU programme for 2028-2034.
  • 17 October 2024: deadline for transposing the NIS2 Directive, after which 23 Member States received letters of formal notice.
  • Q1 2027: deadline set for the Commission to propose a legal basis for the Centre.
  • 2026: deadline for integrating existing counter-FIMI structures into the Centre and for the Civil Society Platform to become operational.
  • 24 February: proposed date for a European Preparedness Day.
  • 10 %: recommended cybersecurity budget share of the overall ICT budget for EU entities.

Legal basis: Article 2, Article 10 and Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union; Article 114 and Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

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