Sittings · Document
Draft report (2025/2069(INI)) 2026-02-12
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
Amendment 1407
Kim Van Sparrentak, Hannah Neumann
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 55
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 55. Underlines the need for the European Democracy Shield to have a robust external dimension; welcomes the inclusion in the joint communication of specific actions aimed at supporting countries beyond EU borders, in particular by facilitating capacity-building to improve candidate and potential candidate countries’ resilience to FIMI and hybrid interference, and by supporting independent media and journalism, and increasing their ability to monitor disinformation on social media before and during elections; | 55. Underlines the need for the European Democracy Shield to have a robust external dimension; welcomes the inclusion in the joint communication of specific actions aimed at supporting countries beyond EU borders, in particular by facilitating capacity-building to improve candidate and potential candidate countries’ resilience to FIMI and hybrid interference, and by supporting independent media and journalism, and increasing their ability to monitor disinformation on social media before and during elections; notes that transnational repression should be included in the list; Underlines that capacity and commitment may vary among candidate countries or potential candidate countries and therefore calls for a the need for a differentiated and context-sensitive approach in the implementation of the European Democracy Shield reflecting varying levels of institutional capacity, expertise and political commitment; points out that regardless of this clear benchmarks linked to EU values need to be maintained; |
Or. en
Amendment 1408
Jaroslav Bžoch
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 55
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 55. Underlines the need for the European Democracy Shield to have a robust external dimension; welcomes the inclusion in the joint communication of specific actions aimed at supporting countries beyond EU borders, in particular by facilitating capacity-building to improve candidate and potential candidate countries’ resilience to FIMI and hybrid interference, and by supporting independent media and journalism, and increasing their ability to monitor disinformation on social media before and during elections; | 55. highlights that, upon request, the Union should be ready to support candidate countries in addressing disinformation related to electoral processes, including through information exchange and knowledge sharing; underlines the need for the European Democracy Shield to have a robust external dimension; welcomes the inclusion in the joint communication of specific actions aimed at supporting countries beyond EU borders, in particular by facilitating capacity-building to improve candidate and potential candidate countries’ resilience to FIMI and hybrid interference, and by supporting independent media and journalism, and increasing their ability to monitor disinformation on social media before and during elections; |
Or. en
Amendment 1409
Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 55
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 55. Underlines the need for the European Democracy Shield to have a robust external dimension; welcomes the inclusion in the joint communication of specific actions aimed at supporting countries beyond EU borders, in particular by facilitating capacity-building to improve candidate and potential candidate countries’ resilience to FIMI and hybrid interference, and by supporting independent media and journalism, and increasing their ability to monitor disinformation on social media before and during elections; | 55. Underlines the need for the European Democracy Shield to have a robust external dimension; welcomes the inclusion in the joint communication of specific actions aimed at supporting countries beyond EU borders, in particular by facilitating capacity-building to improve candidate and potential candidate countries’ resilience to FIMI and hybrid interference, and by supporting independent media and journalism, and increasing their ability to monitor disinformation on social media before and during elections; insist on the need to have proper funding, including core funding, for instance via the Global Europe mechanism, to support independent media in neighbouring countries; |
Or. en
Amendment 1410
Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 55
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 55. Underlines the need for the European Democracy Shield to have a robust external dimension; welcomes the inclusion in the joint communication of specific actions aimed at supporting countries beyond EU borders, in particular by facilitating capacity-building to improve candidate and potential candidate countries’ resilience to FIMI and hybrid interference, and by supporting independent media and journalism, and increasing their ability to monitor disinformation on social media before and during elections; | 55. Highlights that, upon request, the Union should be ready to support candidate countries in addressing disinformation related to electoral processes through information exchange and knowledge sharing; notes the inclusion in the joint communication of specific actions aimed at supporting countries beyond EU borders, in particular by facilitating capacity-building to improve candidate and potential candidate countries’ resilience to FIMI and hybrid interference, and increasing their ability to monitor disinformation on social media before and during elections; |
Or. en
Amendment 1411
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 55
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 55. Underlines the need for the European Democracy Shield to have a robust external dimension; welcomes the inclusion in the joint communication of specific actions aimed at supporting countries beyond EU borders, in particular by facilitating capacity-building to improve candidate and potential candidate countries’ resilience to FIMI and hybrid interference, and by supporting independent media and journalism, and increasing their ability to monitor disinformation on social media before and during elections; | 55. Underlines the need for the European Democracy Shield to have primarily a robust external dimension; welcomes the inclusion in the joint communication of specific actions aimed at supporting countries beyond EU borders, in particular by facilitating capacity-building to improve candidate and potential candidate countries’ resilience to FIMI and hybrid interference, and by supporting independent media and journalism, and increasing their ability to monitor disinformation on social media before and during elections; |
Or. en
Amendment 1412
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 55 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 55 a. Stresses that the objectives and protective scope of the European Democracy Shield should explicitly extend to candidate countries, with the need for a differentiated and context-sensitive approach, in view of their heightened exposure to foreign information manipulation and interference, hybrid threats and attempts to undermine democratic institutions; underlines that strengthening democratic resilience in these countries is not only essential for the credibility of the EU enlargement process, but also for the security and democratic stability of the Union as a whole; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to ensure that candidate countries are systematically included in relevant actions, support mechanisms and capacity-building measures under the external dimension of the European Democracy Shield; calls on the Commission to encourage and facilitate the active participation of candidate countries in all relevant instruments and initiatives under the European Democracy Shiel; |
Or. en
Amendment 1413
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 55 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 55 a. Notes that a long-standing objective of Moscow has been to weaken the transatlantic bond and push the United States out of Europe, and expresses concern over any initiatives that could undermine cooperation between Europe and the United States; |
Or. en
Amendment 1414
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 55 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 55 b. Calls on the Commission to support candidate countries and potential candidates in the development and implementation of the EU digital and media rulebooks, facilitating exchanges with Member State authorities, in order to prevent regulatory loopholes and cross-border spill-over effects; Stresses the need for structured engagement by the Commission with online platforms in candidate countries, particularly in the context of elections, to ensure platform accountability, risk mitigation and compliance, rather than ad hoc or crisis-driven measures; |
Or. en
Amendment 1415
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 55 c (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 55 c. Notes Taiwan’s leading role in high-tech development, and its extensive experience in defending itself against China’s hybrid attacks and FIMI, which should be a foremost consideration when assessing the possibilities of strengthening multilateral exchanges and cooperation; calls for regular exchanges between the EU and its Taiwanese counterparts on relevant security issues, and for stronger cooperation on countering FIMI and the sabotage of undersea cables; |
Or. en
Amendment 1416
Petar Volgin, Christine Anderson
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 56
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 56. Supports the idea of leveraging diplomatic channels to strengthen capacity in priority regions; considers the role of EU Delegations and EU Member States’ embassies to be key, in terms of gaining a better understanding of local circumstances that may lead to foreign interference, and of delivering a tailored response; notes the possibility for EU Delegations and Member States’ embassies to support the organisation of awareness-raising campaigns in host countries; highlights the importance of involving common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions and operations in the actions envisaged in the joint communication; calls on the Member States and the EEAS to integrate capacity-building activities and training on hybrid threats into the individual mandates of missions and operations, in order to increase the preparedness of national counterparts; | 56. Supports the idea of leveraging diplomatic channels to strengthen diplomatic capacity in priority regions; considers the role of EU Delegations and EU Member States’ embassies to be key, in terms of gaining a better understanding of local circumstances; |
Or. en
Amendment 1417
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 56
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 56. Supports the idea of leveraging diplomatic channels to strengthen capacity in priority regions; considers the role of EU Delegations and EU Member States’ embassies to be key, in terms of gaining a better understanding of local circumstances that may lead to foreign interference, and of delivering a tailored response; notes the possibility for EU Delegations and Member States’ embassies to support the organisation of awareness-raising campaigns in host countries; highlights the importance of involving common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions and operations in the actions envisaged in the joint communication; calls on the Member States and the EEAS to integrate capacity-building activities and training on hybrid threats into the individual mandates of missions and operations, in order to increase the preparedness of national counterparts; | 56. Supports the idea of leveraging diplomatic channels to strengthen capacity in priority regions; considers the role of EU Delegations and EU Member States’ embassies to be key, in terms of gaining a better understanding of local circumstances that may lead to foreign interference, and of delivering a tailored response; notes the possibility for EU Delegations and Member States’ embassies to support the organisation of awareness-raising campaigns in host countries, provided that such activities remain strictly factual, security-oriented and respectful of local political and societal contexts; highlights the importance of involving common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions and operations in the actions envisaged in the joint communication; calls on the Member States and the EEAS to integrate capacity-building activities and training on hybrid threats into the individual mandates of missions and operations, where relevant and appropriate, in full respect of their civilian or military nature, their primary security objectives, in order to increase the preparedness of national counterparts; |
Or. en
Amendment 1418
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 56
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 56. Supports the idea of leveraging diplomatic channels to strengthen capacity in priority regions; considers the role of EU Delegations and EU Member States’ embassies to be key, in terms of gaining a better understanding of local circumstances that may lead to foreign interference, and of delivering a tailored response; notes the possibility for EU Delegations and Member States’ embassies to support the organisation of awareness-raising campaigns in host countries; highlights the importance of involving common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions and operations in the actions envisaged in the joint communication; calls on the Member States and the EEAS to integrate capacity-building activities and training on hybrid threats into the individual mandates of missions and operations, in order to increase the preparedness of national counterparts; | 56. Considers the role of EU Delegations and EU Member States’ embassies to be key, in terms of gaining a better understanding of local circumstances that may lead to foreign interference, and of delivering a tailored response; notes the possibility for EU Delegations and Member States’ embassies to support the organisation of awareness-raising campaigns in host countries; calls on the Member States and the EEAS to ensure that training on hybrid threats is integrated into the individual mandates of missions and operations, in the view to increase the preparedness of national counterparts; |
Or. en
Amendment 1419
Kim Van Sparrentak
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 56
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 56. Supports the idea of leveraging diplomatic channels to strengthen capacity in priority regions; considers the role of EU Delegations and EU Member States’ embassies to be key, in terms of gaining a better understanding of local circumstances that may lead to foreign interference, and of delivering a tailored response; notes the possibility for EU Delegations and Member States’ embassies to support the organisation of awareness-raising campaigns in host countries; highlights the importance of involving common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions and operations in the actions envisaged in the joint communication; calls on the Member States and the EEAS to integrate capacity-building activities and training on hybrid threats into the individual mandates of missions and operations, in order to increase the preparedness of national counterparts; | 56. Supports the idea of leveraging diplomatic channels to strengthen capacity in priority regions; considers the role of EU Delegations and EU Member States’ embassies to be key, in terms of gaining a better understanding of local circumstances that may lead to foreign interference, and of delivering a tailored response; notes the possibility for EU Delegations and Member States’ embassies to support the organisation of awareness-raising campaigns in host countries; is therefore concerned by the reports regarding risk of possible down-sizing of the EU delegations and their staffing in particular in the context of the growing international challenges and geopolitical tensions; highlights the importance of involving common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions and operations in the actions envisaged in the joint communication; calls on the Member States and the EEAS to integrate capacity-building activities and training on hybrid threats into the individual mandates of missions and operations, in order to increase the preparedness of national counterparts; |
Or. en
Amendment 1420
Fabrice Leggeri, Virginie Joron, Marieke Ehlers
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 56
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 56. Supports the idea of leveraging diplomatic channels to strengthen capacity in priority regions; considers the role of EU Delegations and EU Member States’ embassies to be key, in terms of gaining a better understanding of local circumstances that may lead to foreign interference, and of delivering a tailored response; notes the possibility for EU Delegations and Member States’ embassies to support the organisation of awareness-raising campaigns in host countries; highlights the importance of involving common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions and operations in the actions envisaged in the joint communication; calls on the Member States and the EEAS to integrate capacity-building activities and training on hybrid threats into the individual mandates of missions and operations, in order to increase the preparedness of national counterparts; | 56. Supports the idea of leveraging diplomatic channels to strengthen capacity in priority regions; considers the role of EU Member States’ embassies to be key, in terms of gaining a better understanding of local circumstances that may lead to foreign interference, and of delivering a tailored response; notes the possibility for Member States’ embassies to support the organisation of awareness-raising campaigns in host countries; calls on the Member States and the EEAS to integrate capacity-building activities and training on hybrid threats into the individual mandates of missions and operations, in order to increase the preparedness of national counterparts; |
Or. en
Amendment 1421
Tomáš Zdechovský
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 56
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 56. Supports the idea of leveraging diplomatic channels to strengthen capacity in priority regions; considers the role of EU Delegations and EU Member States’ embassies to be key, in terms of gaining a better understanding of local circumstances that may lead to foreign interference, and of delivering a tailored response; notes the possibility for EU Delegations and Member States’ embassies to support the organisation of awareness-raising campaigns in host countries; highlights the importance of involving common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions and operations in the actions envisaged in the joint communication; calls on the Member States and the EEAS to integrate capacity-building activities and training on hybrid threats into the individual mandates of missions and operations, in order to increase the preparedness of national counterparts; | 56. Supports the idea of leveraging diplomatic channels to strengthen capacity in priority regions; considers the role of EU Delegations and EU Member States’ embassies to be key, in terms of gaining a better understanding of local circumstances that may lead to foreign interference, and of delivering a tailored response; notes the possibility for EU Delegations and Member States’ embassies to support the organisation of awareness-raising campaigns in host countries; highlights the importance of involving common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions and operations in the actions envisaged in the joint communication; calls on the Member States and the EEAS to integrate capacity-building activities and training on hybrid threats into the individual mandates of missions and operations, in order to increase the preparedness of national counterparts as well as to make use of Frontex's involvement in the third countries; |
Or. en
Amendment 1422
Danilo Della Valle, Konstantinos Arvanitis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 56
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 56. Supports the idea of leveraging diplomatic channels to strengthen capacity in priority regions; considers the role of EU Delegations and EU Member States’ embassies to be key, in terms of gaining a better understanding of local circumstances that may lead to foreign interference, and of delivering a tailored response; notes the possibility for EU Delegations and Member States’ embassies to support the organisation of awareness-raising campaigns in host countries; highlights the importance of involving common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions and operations in the actions envisaged in the joint communication; calls on the Member States and the EEAS to integrate capacity-building activities and training on hybrid threats into the individual mandates of missions and operations, in order to increase the preparedness of national counterparts; | 56. Supports the idea of leveraging diplomatic channels to strengthen capacity in priority regions; considers the role of EU Delegations and EU Member States’ embassies to be key, in terms of gaining a better understanding of local circumstances that may lead to foreign interference, and of delivering a tailored response; notes the possibility for EU Delegations and Member States’ embassies to support the organisation of awareness-raising campaigns in host countries; highlights the importance of involving common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions and operations in the actions envisaged in the joint communication; calls on the Member States and the EEAS to integrate capacity-building activities and training, in order to increase the preparedness of national counterparts; |
Or. en
Amendment 1423
Kim Van Sparrentak
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 56 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 56 a. Points out that experts from candidate and potential candidate countries can provide a unique expertise and viewpoint on foreign interference and implementation of democracy initiatives; in this regard; calls on the Commission to actively encourage and facilitate the participation of candidate and potential candidate countries in all instruments and initiatives under the European Democracy Shield, including voluntary mechanisms, and to ensure the systematic inclusion of representatives from these countries in all foreseen independent expert networks and cooperation formats; |
Or. en
Amendment 1424
Petar Volgin, Christine Anderson
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 57
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 57. Calls for the development of a comprehensive strategy whereby EU Delegations and CSDP missions and operations, in close coordination with the diplomatic missions of the EU Member States, can serve more effectively as a first line of defence against hybrid attacks, including cyber and FIMI operations; considers that enhanced strategic communication and public diplomacy capacities within EU Delegations – with a focus on promoting fact-based narratives, civic engagement and trust-building, particularly among young people and educators – are of vital importance; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Council to include disinformation monitoring and response teams within CSDP missions, ensure FIMI training for all mission staff, and strengthen coordination between civilian and military operations to counter hybrid influence; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 1425
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 57
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 57. Calls for the development of a comprehensive strategy whereby EU Delegations and CSDP missions and operations, in close coordination with the diplomatic missions of the EU Member States, can serve more effectively as a first line of defence against hybrid attacks, including cyber and FIMI operations; considers that enhanced strategic communication and public diplomacy capacities within EU Delegations – with a focus on promoting fact-based narratives, civic engagement and trust-building, particularly among young people and educators – are of vital importance; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Council to include disinformation monitoring and response teams within CSDP missions, ensure FIMI training for all mission staff, and strengthen coordination between civilian and military operations to counter hybrid influence; | 57. Calls for the development of a comprehensive strategy whereby EU Delegations and CSDP missions and operations, in close coordination with the diplomatic missions of the EU Member States, can serve more effectively as a first line of defence against hybrid attacks, including cyber and FIMI operations; considers that enhanced strategic communication and public diplomacy capacities within EU Delegations – with a focus on promoting fact-based narratives, civic engagement and trust-building, particularly among young people and educators – are of vital importance; calls for the strategic communication of CSDP missions and operations around the world, especially in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood and candidate countries; calls for enhancing the visibility and strategic communication of the benefits, presence and role of the CSDP missions and operations; underlines that the CSDP missions and operations offer the most tangible external projection of the EU’s force, and as such are a critical component of the EU’s strategic tools; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Council to include disinformation monitoring and response teams within CSDP missions, ensure FIMI training for all mission staff, and strengthen coordination between civilian and military operations to counter hybrid influence; highlights the importance of strengthening cooperation with NATO, its Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence and the European cybersecurity network to combat disinformation and cyberattacks; |
Or. en
Amendment 1426
Fabrice Leggeri, Virginie Joron, Marieke Ehlers
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 57
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 57. Calls for the development of a comprehensive strategy whereby EU Delegations and CSDP missions and operations, in close coordination with the diplomatic missions of the EU Member States, can serve more effectively as a first line of defence against hybrid attacks, including cyber and FIMI operations; considers that enhanced strategic communication and public diplomacy capacities within EU Delegations – with a focus on promoting fact-based narratives, civic engagement and trust-building, particularly among young people and educators – are of vital importance; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Council to include disinformation monitoring and response teams within CSDP missions, ensure FIMI training for all mission staff, and strengthen coordination between civilian and military operations to counter hybrid influence; | 57. calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Council to include disinformation monitoring and response teams within CSDP missions, ensure FIMI training for all mission staff, and strengthen coordination between civilian and military operations to counter hybrid influence; |
Or. en
Amendment 1427
Jaroslav Bžoch, Virginie Joron
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 57
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 57. Calls for the development of a comprehensive strategy whereby EU Delegations and CSDP missions and operations, in close coordination with the diplomatic missions of the EU Member States, can serve more effectively as a first line of defence against hybrid attacks, including cyber and FIMI operations; considers that enhanced strategic communication and public diplomacy capacities within EU Delegations – with a focus on promoting fact-based narratives, civic engagement and trust-building, particularly among young people and educators – are of vital importance; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Council to include disinformation monitoring and response teams within CSDP missions, ensure FIMI training for all mission staff, and strengthen coordination between civilian and military operations to counter hybrid influence; | 57. Calls for the development of a comprehensive strategy whereby EU Delegations and missions, in close coordination with the diplomatic missions of the EU Member States, can serve more effectively as a first line of defence against hybrid attacks, including cyber and FIMI operations; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Council to ensure FIMI training for all mission staff, and strengthen coordination between civilian and military operations to counter hybrid influence; |
Or. en
Amendment 1428
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 57
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 57. Calls for the development of a comprehensive strategy whereby EU Delegations and CSDP missions and operations, in close coordination with the diplomatic missions of the EU Member States, can serve more effectively as a first line of defence against hybrid attacks, including cyber and FIMI operations; considers that enhanced strategic communication and public diplomacy capacities within EU Delegations – with a focus on promoting fact-based narratives, civic engagement and trust-building, particularly among young people and educators – are of vital importance; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Council to include disinformation monitoring and response teams within CSDP missions, ensure FIMI training for all mission staff, and strengthen coordination between civilian and military operations to counter hybrid influence; | 57. Calls for the development of a comprehensive strategy whereby EU Delegations and CSDP missions and operations, in close coordination with the diplomatic missions of the EU Member States, can serve more effectively as a first line of defence against hybrid attacks, including cyber and FIMI operations; considers that enhanced strategic communication and public diplomacy capacities within EU Delegations should remain strictly factual, security-oriented and non-partisan – with a focus on promoting fact-based narratives, civic engagement and trust-building, particularly among young people and educators – are of vital importance; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Council to include disinformation monitoring and response teams within CSDP missions, ensure FIMI training for all mission staff, and strengthen coordination between civilian and military operations to counter hybrid influence; |
Or. en
Amendment 1429
Cristian Terheş
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 57 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 57 a. Underlines the importance of strengthening faith-based engagement and dialogue as part of the Union’s broader resilience strategy, promoting structured and transparent cooperation between the EU, the Member States and legitimate religious actors in order to counter hybrid threats, disinformation and the instrumentalisation of religion, while fully respecting freedom of religion or belief and pluralism; calls for the development of coherent EU-level strategies to support local interfaith initiatives, enhance media and information literacy within faith communities, and reinforce safeguards against the foreign exploitation of religious institutions and narratives for political or destabilising purposes; |
Or. en
Amendment 1430
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 57 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 57 a. Calls for a comprehensive investigation into the political, economic and institutional drivers behind past “reset” policies towards the Russian Federation, and into the damage caused by such naïve or short-sighted approaches; stresses that repeated attempts to normalise relations without addressing the underlying nature of the Russian state and its imperial strategic objectives have contributed to increased instability, weakened deterrence, and undermined European and global security; |
Or. en
Amendment 1431
Cristian Terheş
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 57 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 57 b. Expresses serious concern over reports by Moldovan authorities and independent security assessments indicating that, during the 2025 parliamentary elections in the Republic of Moldova, structures associated with the Metropolis of Chisinau and All Moldova under the Moscow Patriarchate were instrumentalised within a broader Russian-linked hybrid influence campaign aimed at spreading disinformation, influencing voters and shaping public opinion in favour of pro-Russian political forces; recalls that Moldovan electoral authorities documented instances of Orthodox clergy part of Metropolis of Chisinau and All Moldova engaging in political campaign, and that expert analyses identified this involvement as one of several influence vectors — alongside coordinated bot activity, fake media outlets and alleged vote-buying — deployed to undermine democratic processes and impede Moldova’s European integration; |
Or. en
Amendment 1432
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 57 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 57 b. Expresses the view that, whether under the Tsarist, Soviet, or current Putinist system, the Russian state has consistently posed a threat to its neighbours, to international law, and to the rules-based international order, as evidenced by a long pattern of military aggression, coercion, and violations of sovereignty; Underlines that future EU and Member State policies must be based on a realistic assessment of this historical continuity, prioritising deterrence, resilience, and the security of countries in Russia’s neighbourhood over short-term economic or political considerations; |
Or. en
Amendment 1433
Konstantinos Arvanitis, Danilo Della Valle
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 58
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 58. Welcomes the strengthened commitment in the joint communication to developing an offensive information operations capacity; notes that such a commitment requires dedicated resources and long-term planning; stresses that the objective should include the EU’s strengthening, in its neighbourhood, of proactive information measures to counter Russia’s destabilising efforts; highlights the need to disseminate factual and trustworthy information to the populations living in authoritarian regimes, notably Russia, in order to reveal their rulers’ destructive governance practices, which pose danger to freedom and peace not only in neighbouring countries, but primarily inside their own country; calls for every possible use of the digital and cyber space and its borderless nature to achieve this goal; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 1434
Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 58
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 58. Welcomes the strengthened commitment in the joint communication to developing an offensive information operations capacity; notes that such a commitment requires dedicated resources and long-term planning; stresses that the objective should include the EU’s strengthening, in its neighbourhood, of proactive information measures to counter Russia’s destabilising efforts; highlights the need to disseminate factual and trustworthy information to the populations living in authoritarian regimes, notably Russia, in order to reveal their rulers’ destructive governance practices, which pose danger to freedom and peace not only in neighbouring countries, but primarily inside their own country; calls for every possible use of the digital and cyber space and its borderless nature to achieve this goal; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 1435
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 58
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 58. Welcomes the strengthened commitment in the joint communication to developing an offensive information operations capacity; notes that such a commitment requires dedicated resources and long-term planning; stresses that the objective should include the EU’s strengthening, in its neighbourhood, of proactive information measures to counter Russia’s destabilising efforts; highlights the need to disseminate factual and trustworthy information to the populations living in authoritarian regimes, notably Russia, in order to reveal their rulers’ destructive governance practices, which pose danger to freedom and peace not only in neighbouring countries, but primarily inside their own country; calls for every possible use of the digital and cyber space and its borderless nature to achieve this goal; | 58. Welcomes the strengthened commitment in the joint communication to developing an offensive information operations capacity; notes that such a commitment requires dedicated resources and long-term planning; stresses that the objective should include the EU’s strengthening, in its neighbourhood, of proactive information measures to counter Russia’s destabilising efforts; highlights the need to disseminate factual and trustworthy information to the populations living in authoritarian regimes, notably Russia, in order to reveal their rulers’ destructive governance practices, which pose danger to freedom and peace not only in neighbouring countries, but primarily inside their own country; notes that Russian imperialism is deeply rooted not only in the institutions of Tsarist, Soviet and Putin-era Russia, but also in Russian society; calls for every possible use of the digital and cyber space and its borderless nature to achieve this goal; notes that flawed, naïve and, in some areas, harmful policies of the EU and certain Member States towards Russia were driven by particular interests placed above the legitimate security concerns of partners and allies; stresses the need to draw clear lessons from these failures in shaping a more realistic, principled and security-oriented policy; |
Or. en
Amendment 1436
Jaroslav Bžoch, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 58
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 58. Welcomes the strengthened commitment in the joint communication to developing an offensive information operations capacity; notes that such a commitment requires dedicated resources and long-term planning; stresses that the objective should include the EU’s strengthening, in its neighbourhood, of proactive information measures to counter Russia’s destabilising efforts; highlights the need to disseminate factual and trustworthy information to the populations living in authoritarian regimes, notably Russia, in order to reveal their rulers’ destructive governance practices, which pose danger to freedom and peace not only in neighbouring countries, but primarily inside their own country; calls for every possible use of the digital and cyber space and its borderless nature to achieve this goal; | 58. Express concerns about the implementation and realisation of the commitment in the joint communication to developing an offensive information operations capacity, and about how it is to be implemented in practice, as this may lead to a deterioration in international relations and credible accusations of foreign interference by the EU; |
Or. en
Amendment 1437
Ana Miguel Pedro
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 58
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 58. Welcomes the strengthened commitment in the joint communication to developing an offensive information operations capacity; notes that such a commitment requires dedicated resources and long-term planning; stresses that the objective should include the EU’s strengthening, in its neighbourhood, of proactive information measures to counter Russia’s destabilising efforts; highlights the need to disseminate factual and trustworthy information to the populations living in authoritarian regimes, notably Russia, in order to reveal their rulers’ destructive governance practices, which pose danger to freedom and peace not only in neighbouring countries, but primarily inside their own country; calls for every possible use of the digital and cyber space and its borderless nature to achieve this goal; | 58. Welcomes the strengthened commitment in the joint communication to developing an offensive information operations capacity; notes that such a commitment requires dedicated resources and long-term planning; stresses that the objective should include the EU’s strengthening, in its neighbourhood, of proactive information measures to counter Russia’s destabilising efforts as well as other hostile state and state-sponsored information manipulation and cognitive warfare operations; highlights the need to disseminate factual and trustworthy information to the populations living in authoritarian regimes, notably Russia, in order to reveal their rulers’ destructive governance practices, which pose danger to freedom and peace not only in neighbouring countries, but primarily inside their own country; calls for every possible use of the digital and cyber space and its borderless nature to achieve this goal; |
Or. en
Amendment 1438
Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 58
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 58. Welcomes the strengthened commitment in the joint communication to developing an offensive information operations capacity; notes that such a commitment requires dedicated resources and long-term planning; stresses that the objective should include the EU’s strengthening, in its neighbourhood, of proactive information measures to counter Russia’s destabilising efforts; highlights the need to disseminate factual and trustworthy information to the populations living in authoritarian regimes, notably Russia, in order to reveal their rulers’ destructive governance practices, which pose danger to freedom and peace not only in neighbouring countries, but primarily inside their own country; calls for every possible use of the digital and cyber space and its borderless nature to achieve this goal; | 58. Welcomes the strengthened commitment in the joint communication to developing an offensive information operations capacity; notes that such a commitment requires dedicated resources and long-term planning; stresses that the objective should include the EU’s strengthening, in its neighbourhood, of proactive information measures to counter destabilising efforts and coordinated information manipulation and hostile influence campaigns by authoritarian or malign actors; highlights the need to disseminate factual and trustworthy information to the populations living in authoritarian regimes, notably Russia, in order to reveal their rulers’ destructive governance practices, which pose danger to freedom and peace not only in neighbouring countries, but primarily inside their own country; calls for every possible use of the digital and cyber space and its borderless nature to achieve this goal; |
Or. en
Amendment 1439
Ana Catarina Mendes, Evin Incir, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 58
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 58. Welcomes the strengthened commitment in the joint communication to developing an offensive information operations capacity; notes that such a commitment requires dedicated resources and long-term planning; stresses that the objective should include the EU’s strengthening, in its neighbourhood, of proactive information measures to counter Russia’s destabilising efforts; highlights the need to disseminate factual and trustworthy information to the populations living in authoritarian regimes, notably Russia, in order to reveal their rulers’ destructive governance practices, which pose danger to freedom and peace not only in neighbouring countries, but primarily inside their own country; calls for every possible use of the digital and cyber space and its borderless nature to achieve this goal; | 58. Welcomes the strengthened commitment in the joint communication to developing an offensive information operations capacity; notes that such a commitment requires dedicated resources and long-term planning; stresses that the objective should include the EU’s strengthening, in its neighbourhood, of proactive and reinforced information measures to counter Russia’s destabilising efforts; highlights the need to disseminate factual and trustworthy information to the populations living in authoritarian regimes, notably Russia and Belarus, in order to reveal their rulers’ destructive governance practices, which pose danger to freedom and peace not only in neighbouring countries, but primarily inside their own country; calls for every possible use of the digital and cyber space and its borderless nature to achieve this goal; |
Or. en
Amendment 1440
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 58 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 58 a. Stresses that Russia’s destabilisation efforts also operate within the Union through the exploitation of political influence networks; notes with grave concern that, in certain Member States, government actions and strategic decisions have repeatedly served Russian interests; recalls, in this context, the case of the Hungarian government, which has repeatedly failed to duly report and investigate the Russian state-linked cyber actors’ intrusion affecting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has concluded long-term gas contracts with Russia at prices significantly above market levels, has systematically obstructed Union assistance to Ukraine, and has consistently aligned itself with Russian positions in key Union foreign and security policy decisions, including during Várhelyi's term as Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement; underlines that such conduct undermines the Union’s unity, credibility and security and contributes to the effectiveness of Russia’s destabilisation strategy; calls, therefore, for increased vigilance, enhanced monitoring and the full use of Union instruments to protect the Union against internal vectors of foreign influence and interference; |
Or. en
Amendment 1441
Petar Volgin, Christine Anderson
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 59
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 59. Recognises that the EU’s immediate neighbours, including the Western Balkans, Moldova and Ukraine, face serious foreign interference; calls for the funding of regional coordination hubs for countering FIMI, boosting support for investigative journalism and media regulators and scaling up fact-based strategic communications via EU Delegations to counter anti-EU disinformation; underlines the need for a specific focus on election integrity assistance in the countries that are candidates for EU membership; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 1442
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 59
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 59. Recognises that the EU’s immediate neighbours, including the Western Balkans, Moldova and Ukraine, face serious foreign interference; calls for the funding of regional coordination hubs for countering FIMI, boosting support for investigative journalism and media regulators and scaling up fact-based strategic communications via EU Delegations to counter anti-EU disinformation; underlines the need for a specific focus on election integrity assistance in the countries that are candidates for EU membership; | 59. Recognises that the EU’s immediate neighbours, including the Western Balkans, Moldova and Ukraine, face serious foreign and domestic information manipulation interference and hybrid threats; calls on the Commission and EEAS to move from ad hoc support to systematic, long-term assistance aimed at building institutional, legal and civic resilience; Emphasizes that the EU has an immense amount to learn from the resilience of Moldova and Ukraine; calls for the European Democracy Shield to serve as a two-way mechanism for expertise, where the Union integrates the successful rapid-response models, civil-military cooperation frameworks, and real-time detection techniques developed by these frontline partners who are currently navigating the 'living laboratory' of Russian aggression. ; calls for the funding of regional coordination hubs for countering threats to online information integrity and FIMI, boosting support for investigative journalism and media regulators and scaling up fact-based strategic communications via EU Delegations to counter anti-EU disinformation; underlines the need for a specific focus on election integrity assistance in the countries that are candidates for EU membership; |
Or. en
Amendment 1443
Andrey Kovatchev
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 59
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 59. Recognises that the EU’s immediate neighbours, including the Western Balkans, Moldova and Ukraine, face serious foreign interference; calls for the funding of regional coordination hubs for countering FIMI, boosting support for investigative journalism and media regulators and scaling up fact-based strategic communications via EU Delegations to counter anti-EU disinformation; underlines the need for a specific focus on election integrity assistance in the countries that are candidates for EU membership; | 59. Recognises that the EU’s immediate neighbours, including the Western Balkans, Moldova and Ukraine, face serious foreign interference; notes that candidate and potential candidate countries and the EU’s neighbourhood have been a clear focal point of Russian FIMI operations, with one of the aims being to discredit the EU and diminish the perceived value of EU integration; calls for the funding of regional coordination hubs for countering FIMI, boosting support for investigative journalism and media regulators and scaling up fact-based strategic communications via EU Delegations to counter anti-EU disinformation; calls on the Commission and EEAS to deepen cooperation with vulnerable enlargement countries, on information resilience, cybersecurity and hybrid threats; calls on the EEAS and EU Delegations in third countries to strengthen further their respective capacities in fighting and countering disinformation and propaganda against the EU’s CFSP, including by investing in communication campaigns to fight foreign influence; underlines the need for a specific focus on election integrity assistance in the countries that are candidates for EU membership; |
Or. en
Amendment 1444
Kim Van Sparrentak
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 59
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 59. Recognises that the EU’s immediate neighbours, including the Western Balkans, Moldova and Ukraine, face serious foreign interference; calls for the funding of regional coordination hubs for countering FIMI, boosting support for investigative journalism and media regulators and scaling up fact-based strategic communications via EU Delegations to counter anti-EU disinformation; underlines the need for a specific focus on election integrity assistance in the countries that are candidates for EU membership; | 59. Recognises that the EU’s immediate neighbours, including the Western Balkans countries, Moldova and Ukraine, face serious foreign and domestic information manipulation and hybrid threats; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to move from ad hoc support to systematic, long-term assistance aimed at building institutional, legal and civic resilience; calls for the continuation the EU’ support for the these countries in the area of building resilience and countering FIMI, including by funding of regional coordination hubs for countering FIMI, boosting support for investigative journalism and media regulators and scaling up fact-based strategic communications via EU Delegations to counter anti-EU disinformation; underlines the need for a specific focus on election integrity assistance in the countries that are candidates for EU membership including in the context of the USAID funding withdrawal and with a particular focus on regions that have received comparatively less support, notably the Western Balkans; |
Or. en
Amendment 1445
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 59
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 59. Recognises that the EU’s immediate neighbours, including the Western Balkans, Moldova and Ukraine, face serious foreign interference; calls for the funding of regional coordination hubs for countering FIMI, boosting support for investigative journalism and media regulators and scaling up fact-based strategic communications via EU Delegations to counter anti-EU disinformation; underlines the need for a specific focus on election integrity assistance in the countries that are candidates for EU membership; | 59. Recognises that the EU’s immediate neighbours, including the Western Balkans, Moldova and Ukraine, face serious foreign interference; |
Or. en
Amendment 1446
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 59
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 59. Recognises that the EU’s immediate neighbours, including the Western Balkans, Moldova and Ukraine, face serious foreign interference; calls for the funding of regional coordination hubs for countering FIMI, boosting support for investigative journalism and media regulators and scaling up fact-based strategic communications via EU Delegations to counter anti-EU disinformation; underlines the need for a specific focus on election integrity assistance in the countries that are candidates for EU membership; | 59. Recognises that the EU’s immediate neighbours, including the Western Balkans, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia and Georgia face serious foreign interference and domestic information manipulation and hybrid threats; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to move from ad hoc support to systematic, long-term assistance aimed at building institutional, legal and civic resilience ; calls for the funding of regional coordination hubs for countering FIMI, boosting support for investigative journalism and media regulators and scaling up fact-based strategic communications via EU Delegations to counter anti-EU disinformation; underlines the need for a specific focus on election integrity assistance in the countries that are candidates or potential candidates for EU membership; |
Or. en
Amendment 1447
Fredis Beleris
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 59
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 59. Recognises that the EU’s immediate neighbours, including the Western Balkans, Moldova and Ukraine, face serious foreign interference; calls for the funding of regional coordination hubs for countering FIMI, boosting support for investigative journalism and media regulators and scaling up fact-based strategic communications via EU Delegations to counter anti-EU disinformation; underlines the need for a specific focus on election integrity assistance in the countries that are candidates for EU membership; | 59. Recognises that the EU’s immediate neighbours, including the Western Balkans, Moldova and Ukraine, face serious foreign interference; calls for the funding of regional coordination hubs for countering FIMI, boosting support for investigative journalism and media regulators and scaling up fact-based strategic communications via EU Delegations to counter anti-EU disinformation; underlines the need for a specific focus on election integrity assistance in the countries that are candidates for EU membership; underlines that efforts by the European Union to support candidate countries in strengthening their resilience against foreign interference must be accompanied by proven implementation of relevant reforms and tangible results on their part; |
Or. en
Amendment 1448
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 59
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 59. Recognises that the EU’s immediate neighbours, including the Western Balkans, Moldova and Ukraine, face serious foreign interference; calls for the funding of regional coordination hubs for countering FIMI, boosting support for investigative journalism and media regulators and scaling up fact-based strategic communications via EU Delegations to counter anti-EU disinformation; underlines the need for a specific focus on election integrity assistance in the countries that are candidates for EU membership; | 59. Recognises that the EU’s immediate neighbours, including the Western Balkans, Moldova and Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia, face serious foreign interference; calls for the funding of regional coordination hubs for countering FIMI, boosting support for investigative journalism and media regulators and scaling up fact-based strategic communications via EU Delegations to counter anti-EU disinformation; underlines the need for a specific focus on election integrity assistance in the countries that are candidates for EU membership; |
Or. en
Amendment 1449
Cristian Terheş
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 59 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 59 a. Notes with concern that, ahead of the 2026 parliamentary elections, Armenia is facing an intensification of Russian-linked hybrid threats aimed at undermining its democratic processes, social cohesion and peacebuilding efforts, including malign cyber activities, coordinated information manipulation and the activation of influence networks; recalls that the Armenian Foreign Intelligence Service has reported the use of overt and covert information operations, distortive narratives and efforts to manipulate public discourse in ways detrimental to Armenia’s national interests, and stresses that such hybrid pressure may involve both state and non-state actors connected to broader Russian influence strategies in the region1a; |
Or. en
Amendment 1450
Eugen Tomac
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 59 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 59 a. Calls on the Commission, the EEAS and the European Centre for Democratic Resilience to provide enhanced, targeted and sustained support to the Republic of Moldova, as an EU candidate country facing persistent and coordinated foreign information manipulation and interference, including state-sponsored disinformation and hybrid influence operations, aimed at undermining democratic institutions, electoral integrity and public trust in the EU accession process; stresses the need for rapid-response mechanisms, strengthened strategic communication, close coordination with online platforms, and increased support for independent media and civil society, in particular in the context of electoral periods; |
Or. en
Amendment 1451
Fredis Beleris
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 59 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 59 a. Calls on the European Commission to apply a rigorous approach in its examination of candidate countries’ progress under accession chapters relating to fundamental rights, the rule of law, and democratic resilience; Stresses that shortcomings in acknowledging and addressing key issues such as corruption, lack of independent media, violations of human rights, and weaknesses in democratic processes undermine citizens' trust in national and European institutions, thereby creating Eurosceptic narratives that may be exploited by third countries and actors engaged in FIMI; |
Or. en
Amendment 1452
Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 59 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 59 a. Stresses that democracy-support and resilience initiatives by Union institutions, particularly in electoral contexts within the Union and in neighbouring countries, must remain strictly neutral, transparent and limited to technical support, so as to avoid any perception of institutional involvement in political competition or electoral outcomes; |
Or. en
Amendment 1453
Vasile Dîncu
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 59 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 59 a. Recognises that Ukraine is an integral part of Europe’s security environment; calls for the systematic inclusion of Ukraine in EU resilience-building, counter-FIMI and preparedness initiatives, as a strategic partner contributing to European security; |
Or. en
Amendment 1454
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 59 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 59 a. Calls on the Commission to establish a dedicated regional hub of the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) to cover the Western Balkans, bearing in mind that such a hub already exists for Moldova; |
Or. en
Amendment 1455
Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 59 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 59 b. Emphasises that cooperation with third countries and candidate countries under the external dimension of the European Democracy Shield must remain focused on strengthening institutional resilience, transparency and rule-of-law safeguards against clearly identifiable foreign interference, and must not result in the export of governance models centred on content monitoring, narrative intervention or administrative coordination with platforms; |
Or. en
Amendment 1456
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, António Tânger Corrêa, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 60
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 60. Calls on the Commission to make media literacy programmes a permanent part of pre-accession assistance and the European Neighbourhood Instrument, with dedicated EU grants for supporting investigative journalism in vulnerable regions; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 1457
Kim Van Sparrentak
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 60
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 60. Calls on the Commission to make media literacy programmes a permanent part of pre-accession assistance and the European Neighbourhood Instrument, with dedicated EU grants for supporting investigative journalism in vulnerable regions; | 60. Highlights that the removal of the thematic programmes and financial allocations for Human Rights and Democracy, and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) leave significant uncertainty on how these EU Treaty-based obligations will be effectively mainstreamed, operationalised and monitored; Reiterates its call on the Commission to strengthen and ringfence the programmes aimed at meaningfully engaging and supporting civil society, human rights defenders, journalists, and investigative media in third countries; stresses that these actors are essential for protecting civic space, ensuring democratic transparency, and resisting authoritarian drift; insists that the new MFF provide sustainable, accessible, and flexible funding that allows rapid responses to threats against fundamental freedoms and supports local initiatives; calls on the Commission to make media literacy programmes a permanent part of pre-accession assistance and the European Neighbourhood Instrument, as well as to put forward with dedicated EU grants for supporting investigative journalism in vulnerable regions; |
Or. en
Amendment 1458
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 60
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 60. Calls on the Commission to make media literacy programmes a permanent part of pre-accession assistance and the European Neighbourhood Instrument, with dedicated EU grants for supporting investigative journalism in vulnerable regions; | 60. Calls on the Commission to make media literacy programmes a permanent part of pre-accession assistance and the European Neighbourhood Instrument, with dedicated EU grants for supporting investigative journalism in vulnerable regions; stresses that cultural cooperation should be integral components of these instruments, strengthening societal cohesion, shared values and people-to-people engagement in accession and neighbouring countries; |
Or. en
Amendment 1459
Petar Volgin, Christine Anderson
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 60
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 60. Calls on the Commission to make media literacy programmes a permanent part of pre-accession assistance and the European Neighbourhood Instrument, with dedicated EU grants for supporting investigative journalism in vulnerable regions; | 60. Calls on the Commission to support investigative journalism; |
Or. en
Amendment 1460
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 60
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 60. Calls on the Commission to make media literacy programmes a permanent part of pre-accession assistance and the European Neighbourhood Instrument, with dedicated EU grants for supporting investigative journalism in vulnerable regions; | 60. Calls on the Commission to make media literacy programmes a permanent part of pre-accession assistance and the European Neighbourhood Instrument, in full respect of national competences and local contexts, with dedicated EU grants for supporting investigative journalism in vulnerable regions; |
Or. en
Amendment 1461
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 60
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 60. Calls on the Commission to make media literacy programmes a permanent part of pre-accession assistance and the European Neighbourhood Instrument, with dedicated EU grants for supporting investigative journalism in vulnerable regions; | 60. Calls on the Commission to make media literacy programmes a permanent part of pre-accession assistance and the European Neighbourhood Instrument, with dedicated EU grants for supporting public interest journalism in vulnerable regions; |
Or. en
Amendment 1462
Petar Volgin, Christine Anderson
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 61
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 61. Calls for strengthening current EU efforts to support partner countries in its neighbourhood, as well as in priority countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America, in building resilience to FIMI, strengthening democratic processes, and ensuring electoral integrity; underlines, in particular, the need to continue developing the flagship project EUvsDisinfo; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 1463
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, António Tânger Corrêa, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 61
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 61. Calls for strengthening current EU efforts to support partner countries in its neighbourhood, as well as in priority countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America, in building resilience to FIMI, strengthening democratic processes, and ensuring electoral integrity; underlines, in particular, the need to continue developing the flagship project EUvsDisinfo; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 1464
Ana Miguel Pedro
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 61
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 61. Calls for strengthening current EU efforts to support partner countries in its neighbourhood, as well as in priority countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America, in building resilience to FIMI, strengthening democratic processes, and ensuring electoral integrity; underlines, in particular, the need to continue developing the flagship project EUvsDisinfo; | 61. Calls for strengthening current EU efforts to support partner countries in its neighbourhood, as well as in priority countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America, in building resilience to FIMI, strengthening democratic processes, and ensuring electoral integrity; underlines that Russia and China increasingly cooperate in amplifying revisionist narratives about alleged Western decline and “neo-colonialism” in these regions, revealing a strategic communication gap that undermines the Union’s credibility and influence; notes with concern that, in many of these contexts, independent media have been constrained or expelled and that Western public diplomacy often remains inconsistent, under-resourced and insufficiently adapted to local languages and cultures, which limits its effectiveness in countering such narratives; stresses, in particular, the need to continue developing the flagship project EUvsDisinfo; |
Or. en
Amendment 1465
Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 61
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 61. Calls for strengthening current EU efforts to support partner countries in its neighbourhood, as well as in priority countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America, in building resilience to FIMI, strengthening democratic processes, and ensuring electoral integrity; underlines, in particular, the need to continue developing the flagship project EUvsDisinfo; | 61. Calls for strengthening current EU efforts to support partner countries in its neighbourhood, as well as in priority countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America, in building resilience to FIMI, strengthening democratic processes, and ensuring electoral integrity; emphasises especially that transformations unfolding in North Africa and the Sahel region have a direct impact on the EU’s security and democratic resilience, and notes that these regions are particularly vulnerable to FIMIs, notably due to political instability and fragile information ecosystems; underlines, in particular, the need to continue developing targeted FIMI-resilience measures for these regions, including support for independent media, civil society, digital literacy, strategic communication, and enhanced monitoring and response mechanisms, such as the flagship project EUvsDisinfo; |
Or. en
Amendment 1466
Kim Van Sparrentak
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 61
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 61. Calls for strengthening current EU efforts to support partner countries in its neighbourhood, as well as in priority countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America, in building resilience to FIMI, strengthening democratic processes, and ensuring electoral integrity; underlines, in particular, the need to continue developing the flagship project EUvsDisinfo; | 61. Calls urgently for strengthening current EU efforts to support partner countries in its neighbourhood, as well as in priority countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America, in building resilience to FIMI, strengthening democratic processes, and ensuring electoral integrity including through a dedicated funding under the next MFF; underlines, in particular, the need to continue developing the flagship project EUvsDisinfo; |
Or. en
Amendment 1467
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 61
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 61. Calls for strengthening current EU efforts to support partner countries in its neighbourhood, as well as in priority countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America, in building resilience to FIMI, strengthening democratic processes, and ensuring electoral integrity; underlines, in particular, the need to continue developing the flagship project EUvsDisinfo; | 61. Calls for strengthening current EU efforts to support partner countries in its eastern and southern neighbourhood, as well as in priority countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America, in building resilience to FIMI, strengthening democratic processes, and ensuring electoral integrity; underlines, in particular, the need to continue developing the flagship project EUvsDisinfo; |
Or. en
Amendment 1468
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 61 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 61 a. Recognises that financially-motivated actors engaged in inauthentic online activities reside mainly in regions outside the EU, and that shifts to or cessation of platform monetisation services risk cutting off the livelihoods for cohorts of actors whose income depends on exploiting said monetisation services; recognises that these actors have know-how and infrastructure at their disposal that they may turn to disinformation-for-hire or scam activities that could directly target the EU; calls for a global investment in the elaboration of something resembling a “disarmament strategy” to mitigate the risk of previously monetized actors reconverting to disinformation-for-hire or other scam activities; |
Or. en
Amendment 1469
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 61 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 61 a. Stresses that transnational repression constitutes a serious external threat to democratic freedoms, fundamental rights and the rule of law within the EU itself; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to explicitly address transnational repression as part of the external dimension of the European Democracy Shield, including through coordinated diplomatic responses, protection and support mechanisms for targeted individuals, and closer monitoring of third-country practices that seek to silence dissent beyond their borders; |
Or. en
Amendment 1470
Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 61 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 61 a. Stresses that preparedness and crisis-response mechanisms under the European Democracy Shield must remain exceptional, clearly defined and time-limited in nature, and must not result in the normalisation of permanent surveillance, continuous risk monitoring of lawful discourse, or pre-emptive intervention in democratic debate; |
Or. en
Amendment 1471
Petar Volgin, Christine Anderson
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 62
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 62. Acknowledges the establishment of EUPM Moldova as a successful example of how the EU can play a decisive role in supporting a partner country’s crisis management structures and enhancing its resilience against hybrid, cyber and FIMI threats; considers that EUPM Moldova should serve as a model for including the countering of hybrid threats in the mandate of existing missions, or the establishment of similar missions in other partner countries; takes note of the parliamentary election held in Moldova on 28 September 2025 and the strong victory of the pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS); | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 1472
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 62
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 62. Acknowledges the establishment of EUPM Moldova as a successful example of how the EU can play a decisive role in supporting a partner country’s crisis management structures and enhancing its resilience against hybrid, cyber and FIMI threats; considers that EUPM Moldova should serve as a model for including the countering of hybrid threats in the mandate of existing missions, or the establishment of similar missions in other partner countries; takes note of the parliamentary election held in Moldova on 28 September 2025 and the strong victory of the pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS); | 62. Takes note of the parliamentary election held in Moldova on 28 September 2025 and the strong victory of the pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS); |
Or. en
Amendment 1473
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 62
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 62. Acknowledges the establishment of EUPM Moldova as a successful example of how the EU can play a decisive role in supporting a partner country’s crisis management structures and enhancing its resilience against hybrid, cyber and FIMI threats; considers that EUPM Moldova should serve as a model for including the countering of hybrid threats in the mandate of existing missions, or the establishment of similar missions in other partner countries; takes note of the parliamentary election held in Moldova on 28 September 2025 and the strong victory of the pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS); | 62. Acknowledges the establishment of EUPM Moldova as a successful example of how the EU can play a decisive role in supporting a partner country’s crisis management structures and enhancing its resilience against hybrid, cyber and FIMI threats; considers that EUPM Moldova should serve as a model for including the countering of hybrid threats in the mandate of existing missions, or the establishment of similar missions in other partner countries; takes note of the parliamentary elections held in Moldova on 28 September 2025, as well as the presidential election on 3 November 2024, and of the strong victory of pro-European forces, despite significant efforts and resources deployed by Russia to destabilise the situation in Moldova and divert it from its European and Euro-Atlantic path; |
Or. en
Amendment 1474
Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 62
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 62. Acknowledges the establishment of EUPM Moldova as a successful example of how the EU can play a decisive role in supporting a partner country’s crisis management structures and enhancing its resilience against hybrid, cyber and FIMI threats; considers that EUPM Moldova should serve as a model for including the countering of hybrid threats in the mandate of existing missions, or the establishment of similar missions in other partner countries; takes note of the parliamentary election held in Moldova on 28 September 2025 and the strong victory of the pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS); | 62. Acknowledges the establishment of EUPM Moldova as a successful example of how the EU can play a decisive role in supporting a partner country’s crisis management structures and enhancing its resilience against hybrid, cyber and FIMI threats; considers that EUPM Moldova should serve as a model for including the countering of hybrid threats in the mandate of existing missions, or the establishment of similar missions in other partner countries; considers that such agreements should be prioritised with countries whose internal instability directly affects the security of the European Union, such as those in the Sahel region; takes note of the parliamentary election held in Moldova on 28 September 2025 and the strong victory of the pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS); |
Or. en
Amendment 1475
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 62
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 62. Acknowledges the establishment of EUPM Moldova as a successful example of how the EU can play a decisive role in supporting a partner country’s crisis management structures and enhancing its resilience against hybrid, cyber and FIMI threats; considers that EUPM Moldova should serve as a model for including the countering of hybrid threats in the mandate of existing missions, or the establishment of similar missions in other partner countries; takes note of the parliamentary election held in Moldova on 28 September 2025 and the strong victory of the pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS); | 62. Acknowledges the establishment of EUPM Moldova as a successful example of how the EU can play a decisive role in supporting a partner country’s crisis management structures and enhancing its resilience against hybrid, cyber and FIMI threats; considers that EUPM Moldova should serve as a model for including the countering of hybrid threats in the mandate of existing missions, or the establishment of similar missions in other partner countries; takes note of the parliamentary election held in Moldova on 28 September 2025 and the strong victory of the pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS); reiterates the need to support Armenia in combating Russian interference ahead of its June 2026 parliamentary elections; |
Or. en
Amendment 1476
Danilo Della Valle, Konstantinos Arvanitis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 62
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 62. Acknowledges the establishment of EUPM Moldova as a successful example of how the EU can play a decisive role in supporting a partner country’s crisis management structures and enhancing its resilience against hybrid, cyber and FIMI threats; considers that EUPM Moldova should serve as a model for including the countering of hybrid threats in the mandate of existing missions, or the establishment of similar missions in other partner countries; takes note of the parliamentary election held in Moldova on 28 September 2025 and the strong victory of the pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS); | 62. Acknowledges the establishment of EUPM Moldova as a successful example of how the EU can play a decisive role in supporting a partner country’s crisis management structures and enhancing its resilience against cyber, FIMI and other threats; considers that EUPM Moldova should serve as a model for including the countering of hybrid threats in the mandate of existing missions, or the establishment of similar missions in other partner countries; takes note of the parliamentary election held in Moldova on 28 September 2025 and the strong victory of the pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS); |
Or. en
Amendment 1477
Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 62 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 62 a. Recalls that the next parliamentary elections scheduled in Armenia are due to be held on 7 June 2026; insists on the need to provide immediate and sufficient support to the country in order to counter Russian interference and Russian proxies within the country, either by adapting the mandate of EUAM Armenia or via an ad hoc mission; insists on the fact that this support can take the form of the strengthening of administrative capacity as well as core funding to ensure the country has the tool to respond; |
Or. en
Amendment 1478
Petar Volgin, Christine Anderson
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 63
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 63. Welcomes the deployment of EU Hybrid Rapid Response Teams, as illustrated by the recent example of Moldova, as a useful instrument in building capacity and resilience in countries targeted by hybrid, cyber and FIMI attacks, on the basis of the specific know-how and expertise of the EU and its Member States; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 1479
Jaroslav Bžoch, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 63
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 63. Welcomes the deployment of EU Hybrid Rapid Response Teams, as illustrated by the recent example of Moldova, as a useful instrument in building capacity and resilience in countries targeted by hybrid, cyber and FIMI attacks, on the basis of the specific know-how and expertise of the EU and its Member States; | 63. Notes that, based on the specific know-how and expertise of the EU and its Member States, the EU's actions during the recent elections in Moldova proved to be effective; notes in this regard that an EU team was deployed, with the consent of Moldova, to help defend against disinformation and foreign manipulation; |
Or. en
Amendment 1480
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 63 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 63 a. Recognises that financially-motivated actors engaged in inauthentic online activities reside mainly in regions outside the EU, and that shifts to or cessation of platform monetisation services risk cutting off the livelihoods for cohorts of actors whose income depends on exploiting said monetisation services. Recognises that these actors have know-how and infrastructure at their disposal that they may turn to disinformation-for-hire or scam activities that could directly target the EU; calls for a global investment in the elaboration of something resembling a “disarmament strategy” to mitigate the risk of previously monetized actors reconverting to disinformation-for-hire or other scam activities; |
Or. en
Amendment 1481
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 63 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 63 a. Affirms NATO’s primary role in countering hybrid warfare targeting the political institutions of the collective West, shaping public opinion and undermining the security of Allied citizens; emphasises that, following the accession of Finland and Sweden, 23 of the 27 EU Member States are also NATO Allies; recalls that NATO has developed dedicated instruments and strategies to counter hybrid threats; insists that the EU’s role must remain strictly complementary and supportive, avoiding duplication, institutional expansion or the creation of parallel structures; |
Or. en
Amendment 1482
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 63 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 63 b. stresses that the speed, scale and intensity of hybrid threats, facilitated by rapid technological change and global interconnectivity, require transatlantic coordination rather than the duplication of structures at EU level; |
Or. en
Amendment 1483
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 63 c (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 63 c. Expresses serious concern over the deepening strategic partnerships between hostile regimes in Moscow and Minsk and other authoritarian actors, including China, Iran, North Korea, Cuba and Nicaragua; considers that the EU’s inconsistent and politically selective approach has weakened its credibility; points in particular to the case of Cuba, with which the EU maintains the PDCA, which the communist regime has used to secure financial reinforcement and political legitimisation, despite systematically violating the core principles and commitments enshrined therein, including through severe repression of civil society and the deployment of Cuban personnel abroad in support of authoritarian regimes; |
Or. en
Amendment 1484
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 64
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 64. Underlines the importance of prioritising the principles and objectives of the European Democracy Shield in international cooperation with like-minded partners, such as the G7, NATO, the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe; welcomes the steps already taken within the framework of bilateral and multilateral engagement, notably the UN Code of Conduct for Information Integrity on Digital Platforms, the commitment of Council of Europe member states in the Reykjavik Declaration to safeguard electoral systems against foreign interference, the Security and Defence Partnerships and the continued efforts of the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism to foresee and develop collective responses to FIMI; | 64. Underlines the importance of prioritising the principles and objectives of the European Democracy Shield in international cooperation with like-minded partners, such as the G7, NATO, the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe; welcomes the steps already taken within the framework of bilateral and multilateral engagement, notably the UN Code of Conduct for Information Integrity on Digital Platforms, the commitment of Council of Europe member states in the Reykjavik Declaration to safeguard electoral systems against foreign interference, the Security and Defence Partnerships and the continued efforts of the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism to foresee and develop collective responses to FIMI; highlights the importance of strengthening cooperation with NATO, its Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence and the European cybersecurity network to combat disinformation and cyberattacks; calls on the Commission to, where possible, work together with national authorities and civil society organisations from like-minded third countries, dealing with the fight against disinformation and FIMI; |
Or. en
Amendment 1485
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 64
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 64. Underlines the importance of prioritising the principles and objectives of the European Democracy Shield in international cooperation with like-minded partners, such as the G7, NATO, the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe; welcomes the steps already taken within the framework of bilateral and multilateral engagement, notably the UN Code of Conduct for Information Integrity on Digital Platforms, the commitment of Council of Europe member states in the Reykjavik Declaration to safeguard electoral systems against foreign interference, the Security and Defence Partnerships and the continued efforts of the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism to foresee and develop collective responses to FIMI; | 64. Underlines the importance of prioritising the principles and objectives of the European Democracy Shield in international cooperation with like-minded partners, such as the G7, NATO, Taiwan, the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe; welcomes the steps already taken within the framework of bilateral and multilateral engagement, notably the UN Code of Conduct for Information Integrity on Digital Platforms, the commitment of Council of Europe member states in the Reykjavik Declaration to safeguard electoral systems against foreign interference, the Security and Defence Partnerships and the continued efforts of the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism to foresee and develop collective responses to FIMI; encourages the further development of shared open source standards, data models, methodologies, and taxonomies among like-minded partners to enable more effective collaboration; |
Or. en
Amendment 1486
Tomáš Zdechovský
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 64
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 64. Underlines the importance of prioritising the principles and objectives of the European Democracy Shield in international cooperation with like-minded partners, such as the G7, NATO, the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe; welcomes the steps already taken within the framework of bilateral and multilateral engagement, notably the UN Code of Conduct for Information Integrity on Digital Platforms, the commitment of Council of Europe member states in the Reykjavik Declaration to safeguard electoral systems against foreign interference, the Security and Defence Partnerships and the continued efforts of the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism to foresee and develop collective responses to FIMI; | 64. Underlines the importance of prioritising the principles and objectives of the European Democracy Shield in international cooperation with like-minded partners, such as the G7, NATO, the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe; welcomes the steps already taken within the framework of bilateral and multilateral engagement, notably the UN Code of Conduct for Information Integrity on Digital Platforms, the commitment of Council of Europe member states in the Reykjavik Declaration to safeguard electoral systems against foreign interference, the Security and Defence Partnerships and the continued efforts of the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism to foresee and develop collective responses to FIMI; encourages the further development of shared open source standards, data models, methodologies, and taxonomies among like-minded partners to enable more effective collaboration; |
Or. en
Amendment 1487
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 64
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 64. Underlines the importance of prioritising the principles and objectives of the European Democracy Shield in international cooperation with like-minded partners, such as the G7, NATO, the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe; welcomes the steps already taken within the framework of bilateral and multilateral engagement, notably the UN Code of Conduct for Information Integrity on Digital Platforms, the commitment of Council of Europe member states in the Reykjavik Declaration to safeguard electoral systems against foreign interference, the Security and Defence Partnerships and the continued efforts of the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism to foresee and develop collective responses to FIMI; | 64. Underlines the importance of prioritising the principles and objectives of the European Democracy Shield in international cooperation with like-minded partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan and Taiwan, as well as with organisations such as the G7, NATO, the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe; welcomes the steps already taken within the framework of bilateral and multilateral engagement, notably the UN Code of Conduct for Information Integrity on Digital Platforms, the commitment of Council of Europe member states in the Reykjavik Declaration to safeguard electoral systems against foreign interference, the Security and Defence Partnerships, and the continued efforts of the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism to foresee and develop collective responses to FIMI. |
Or. en
Amendment 1488
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 64
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 64. Underlines the importance of prioritising the principles and objectives of the European Democracy Shield in international cooperation with like-minded partners, such as the G7, NATO, the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe; welcomes the steps already taken within the framework of bilateral and multilateral engagement, notably the UN Code of Conduct for Information Integrity on Digital Platforms, the commitment of Council of Europe member states in the Reykjavik Declaration to safeguard electoral systems against foreign interference, the Security and Defence Partnerships and the continued efforts of the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism to foresee and develop collective responses to FIMI; | 64. Notes that, in international cooperation with like-minded partners, such as the G7, NATO, the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe the steps have already been taken within the framework of bilateral and multilateral engagement, notably the UN Code of Conduct for Information Integrity on Digital Platforms, the commitment of Council of Europe member states in the Reykjavik Declaration to safeguard electoral systems against foreign interference, the Security and Defence Partnerships and the continued efforts of the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism to foresee, consider and develop collective responses to FIMI; stresses, however, that the sovereignty of Member States must always be respected and that any steps taken must be subject to consultation with the Member States concerned; |
Or. en
Amendment 1489
Stefano Cavedagna
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 64 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 64 a. Calls for the future architecture of the Democracy Shield to include specific risk indicators relating to the instrumental use of trade, development aid and sovereign debt as tools of political pressure by authoritarian regimes, particularly towards candidate countries, the neighbourhood and the so-called Global South, in order to strengthen the Union’s external action in safeguarding democratic integrity; |
Or. en
Amendment 1490
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 65
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 65. Welcomes the establishment of a Security and Defence Partnership between the EU and the UK in May 2025; welcomes its focus on, among other things, cooperation in countering cyber issues, hybrid threats and FIMI, and on protecting critical infrastructure; | 65. Welcomes the establishment of a Security and Defence Partnership between the EU and the UK in May 2025; welcomes its focus on, among other things, cooperation in countering cyber issues, hybrid threats and FIMI, and on protecting critical infrastructure; appreciates the UK's engagement and contribution to Europe's security; |
Or. en
Amendment 1491
Danilo Della Valle, Konstantinos Arvanitis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 65
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 65. Welcomes the establishment of a Security and Defence Partnership between the EU and the UK in May 2025; welcomes its focus on, among other things, cooperation in countering cyber issues, hybrid threats and FIMI, and on protecting critical infrastructure; | 65. Welcomes the establishment of a Security and Defence Partnership between the EU and the UK in May 2025; welcomes its focus on, among other things, cooperation in countering cyber issues and FIMI, and on protecting critical infrastructure; |
Or. en
Amendment 1492
Tomas Tobé, Mika Aaltola, Tomáš Zdechovský, Sandra Kalniete, Lena Düpont, Lukas Mandl, Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Ana Miguel Pedro, Andrey Kovatchev
on behalf of the PPE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 65 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 65 a. Reiterates its concerns about the fact that certain elements of the new US National Security Strategy fall significantly short in adequately addressing the threat posed by Russia, notably for European and hence also American security; regrets, furthermore, the National Security Strategy’s flawed assessment of the EU as a political system; considers the National Security Strategy to further reinforce the imperative for Europe to advance strategic autonomy, reduce dependencies, and diversify partnerships; |
Or. en
Amendment 1493
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 65 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 65 a. Recalls that Member States are the primary actors as regards intelligence and diplomatic services; |
Or. en
Amendment 1494
Tomáš Zdechovský
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 66
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 66. Underlines that a core objective of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect the integrity of elections at local, regional, national and EU levels; calls on the Commission and the Member States to work together, with full respect for the principle of subsidiarity, to implement reforms aimed at strengthening the resilience of electoral processes in Europe, with a particular focus on measures to prevent foreign interference; | 66. Underlines that a core objective of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect the integrity of elections at local, regional, national and EU levels; calls on the Commission and the Member States to work together, with full respect for the principle of subsidiarity, to implement reforms aimed at strengthening the resilience of electoral processes in Europe, with a particular focus on measures to prevent foreign interference; proposes that the Democracy Shield should support convening, coordinating, and resourcing European election integrity efforts at local, regional national, and European levels, online and offline, including aspects of financing hybrid threats, cyber threats, and information manipulation; |
Or. en
Amendment 1495
Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 66
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 66. Underlines that a core objective of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect the integrity of elections at local, regional, national and EU levels; calls on the Commission and the Member States to work together, with full respect for the principle of subsidiarity, to implement reforms aimed at strengthening the resilience of electoral processes in Europe, with a particular focus on measures to prevent foreign interference; | 66. Recalls that the organisation, conduct and supervision of elections fall within the exclusive responsibility of the Member States and rejects any interpretation that would extend EU competences into this core area of national democratic sovereignty; |
Or. en
Amendment 1496
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 66
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 66. Underlines that a core objective of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect the integrity of elections at local, regional, national and EU levels; calls on the Commission and the Member States to work together, with full respect for the principle of subsidiarity, to implement reforms aimed at strengthening the resilience of electoral processes in Europe, with a particular focus on measures to prevent foreign interference; | 66. Expresses concerned that the Commission states that a core objective of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect the integrity of elections at local, regional, national and EU levels ; calls on the Commission to comply with the Treaties and with the principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality and to respect Member States' competences in the sensitive field of elections; highlights serious concerns regarding censorship and undue, restrictions on freedom of speech, as well as the right to information and freedom of expression; |
Or. en
Amendment 1497
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 66
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 66. Underlines that a core objective of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect the integrity of elections at local, regional, national and EU levels; calls on the Commission and the Member States to work together, with full respect for the principle of subsidiarity, to implement reforms aimed at strengthening the resilience of electoral processes in Europe, with a particular focus on measures to prevent foreign interference; | 66. Underlines that a core objective of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect the integrity of elections at local, regional, national and EU levels; stresses that primary responsibility for the organisation, conduct and supervision of elections lies with the Member States; calls on the Commission and the Member States to cooperate , in full respect for the principle of subsidiarity, in supporting efforts to strengthen the resilience of electoral processes in Europe, with a particular focus on measures to prevent foreign interference; |
Or. en
Amendment 1498
Stefano Cavedagna
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 66
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 66. Underlines that a core objective of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect the integrity of elections at local, regional, national and EU levels; calls on the Commission and the Member States to work together, with full respect for the principle of subsidiarity, to implement reforms aimed at strengthening the resilience of electoral processes in Europe, with a particular focus on measures to prevent foreign interference; | 66. Underlines that a core objective of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect the integrity of elections at local, regional, national and EU levels; calls on the Commission and the Member States to work together, with full respect for the principle of subsidiarity and national sovereignty, as provided for by EU treaties, to implement reforms aimed at strengthening the resilience of electoral processes in Europe, with a particular focus on measures to prevent foreign interference; |
Or. en
Amendment 1499
Fredis Beleris
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 66
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 66. Underlines that a core objective of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect the integrity of elections at local, regional, national and EU levels; calls on the Commission and the Member States to work together, with full respect for the principle of subsidiarity, to implement reforms aimed at strengthening the resilience of electoral processes in Europe, with a particular focus on measures to prevent foreign interference; | 66. Underlines that a core objective of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect the integrity of elections at local, regional, national and EU levels; calls on the Commission and the Member States to work together, with full respect for the principle of subsidiarity, also in cooperation with candidate countries, to implement reforms aimed at strengthening the resilience of electoral processes in Europe, with a particular focus on measures to prevent foreign interference; |
Or. en
Amendment 1500
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 66
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 66. Underlines that a core objective of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect the integrity of elections at local, regional, national and EU levels; calls on the Commission and the Member States to work together, with full respect for the principle of subsidiarity, to implement reforms aimed at strengthening the resilience of electoral processes in Europe, with a particular focus on measures to prevent foreign interference; | 66. Underlines that a core objective of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect the integrity of elections at local, regional, national and EU levels; calls on the Commission and the Member States to work together, with full respect for the principle of subsidiarity, to implement reforms aimed at strengthening the resilience of electoral processes in Europe, with a particular focus on measures to prevent foreign interference and algorithms’ manipulation; |
Or. en
Amendment 1501
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 66 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 66 a. Strongly condemns any action by the European Commission, its services or agencies that directly or indirectly interferes with electoral processes, political debate or the free formation of voters’ opinions; stresses that influencing content moderation, information flows or political discourse in the context of elections constitutes an unacceptable interference incompatible with democratic principles, the Treaties and the Commission’s duty of institutional neutrality; recalls that the protection of democracy cannot be achieved by administrative or regulatory influence over political speech; calls on the Commission to investigate its potential wrongdoings in full transparency and to refrain in future from any practices that may be perceived as election interference or as the promotion of a politically preferred narrative, to ensure full transparency of its contacts and exchanges with online platforms, and to strictly respect Member States’ competences and citizens’ fundamental rights, in particular freedom of expression and political pluralism; |
Or. en
Amendment 1502
Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 66 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 66 a. Identifies in electoral contexts recurring strategic patterns in foreign information manipulation and interference operations: the artificial promotion or discrediting of specific candidates or political parties; the deliberate erosion of trust in electoral procedures and in the institutions responsible for guaranteeing democratic integrity; the instrumentalisation and amplification of polarising societal issues in order to intensify divisions within society; and coordinated efforts to undermine the credibility of established media outlets while steering audiences towards controlled or unreliable sources of information, thereby weakening informed voter choice and public confidence in democratic systems; |
Or. en
Amendment 1503
Fidias Panayiotou
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 66 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 66 a. Stresses that the integrity of electoral processes must be safeguarded throughout the entire electoral cycle, both offline and online; underlines that threats to elections increasingly combine physical, digital and information-based attacks; calls for a coordinated Union approach addressing these dimensions simultaneously . |
Or. en
Amendment 1504
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 66 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 66 a. Believes that the Democracy Shield should support convening, coordinating, and resourcing European election integrity efforts at local, regional national, and European levels, online and offline, including aspects of financing hybrid threats, cyber threats, and information manipulation; |
Or. en
Amendment 1505
Fidias Panayiotou
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 66 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 66 b. Calls on the Commission and Member States to strengthen both the physical and cyber security of election technologies, including voter registration systems, voting machines, vote-counting infrastructure and result-transmission systems; stresses the need for: minimum Union-wide security standards; regular independent security audits and penetration testing; secure supply chains and protection against foreign influence or ownership; contingency planning and rapid response mechanisms in the event of cyber or physical incidents. |
Or. en
Amendment 1506
Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 67
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 67. Calls on the Member States to step up efforts to implement the Commission’s recommendations on inclusive, robust and resilient electoral processes within the EU; underlines, in particular, the importance of establishing national election networks to help national authorities and expert bodies to work in synergy; | 67. Calls on the Member States to step up efforts to implement the Commission’s recommendations on inclusive, robust and resilient electoral processes within the EU; underlines, in particular, the importance of establishing national election networks to help national authorities and expert bodies to work in synergy; calls for the systematic development and expansion of election-focused stress-testing exercises, drawing on practical experience and lessons learned from previous electoral cycles, in order to better anticipate, simulate and mitigate risks linked to information manipulation, cyber interference and platform-driven amplification; |
Or. en
Amendment 1507
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 67
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 67. Calls on the Member States to step up efforts to implement the Commission’s recommendations on inclusive, robust and resilient electoral processes within the EU; underlines, in particular, the importance of establishing national election networks to help national authorities and expert bodies to work in synergy; | 67. Calls on the Member States to step up efforts, on a voluntary basis, to take into account the Commission’s recommendations on inclusive, stresses that such recommendations are non-binding and must be adapted to national constitutional, legal and electoral traditions; underlines the importance of establishing or strengthening national election networks where appropriate to help national authorities and expert bodies to work in synergy without EU- level oversight or harmonisation of electoral systems; |
Or. en
Amendment 1508
Jaroslav Bžoch
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 67
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 67. Calls on the Member States to step up efforts to implement the Commission’s recommendations on inclusive, robust and resilient electoral processes within the EU; underlines, in particular, the importance of establishing national election networks to help national authorities and expert bodies to work in synergy; | 67. Calls on the Member States to step up their efforts to defend against disinformation and foreign interference; calls on the Commission and the Union institutions to provide advice and to share resources, including human and technological capacities, as well as experience, expertise and relevant information with the Member States, in order to strengthen the resilience of make electoral processes in the Union; |
Or. en
Amendment 1509
Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 67 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 67 a. Stresses that strengthening electoral resilience requires meaningful and timely access to relevant platform data for independent researchers, civil-society organisations and accredited academic institutions, in full compliance with data-protection and privacy rules; |
Or. en
Amendment 1510
Tomáš Zdechovský, Dan-Ştefan Motreanu, Lukas Mandl, Sandra Kalniete, Tomas Tobé, Mika Aaltola, Marta Wcisło, Fredis Beleris, Andrey Kovatchev
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 68
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 68. Calls on the Member States to ensure that election authorities or equivalent bodies in charge of well-functioning, free and fair elections are sufficiently funded and equipped with the proper tools to allow them to carry out their functions, be this in terms of providing personnel training and the necessary digital tools, or in terms of ensuring sufficient investment in electoral bodies and election infrastructure; | 68. Calls on the Member States to ensure that election authorities or equivalent bodies in charge of well-functioning, free and fair elections are sufficiently funded and equipped with the proper tools to allow them to carry out their functions, be this in terms of providing personnel training and the necessary digital tools, or in terms of ensuring sufficient investment in electoral bodies and election infrastructure; notes that attacks on election integrity are multi-faceted, integrated, and long-term, as part of an ecosystem of threats that need to be tackled through a whole-of-society approach; underlines that election integrity efforts must take a holistic approach, countering threats in a coordinated manner, including FIMI and disinformation campaigns, cyber threats, and criminal action; highlights that such efforts must be effectively funded and resourced, not just in the immediate run up to an election, but on an ongoing basis before and after; emphasises the need for investment in Open Source Intelligence research and analysis networks, and their role in countering influence operations, FIMI, and hybrid threats; highlights that efforts to counter disinformation, FIMI, and influence operation broadly need to focus on systematically disrupting these threats by addressing tactics, threat actors, and systemic risks; Notes that programmes for countering information manipulation should focus on active disruption of information threats; |
Or. en
Amendment 1511
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 68
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 68. Calls on the Member States to ensure that election authorities or equivalent bodies in charge of well-functioning, free and fair elections are sufficiently funded and equipped with the proper tools to allow them to carry out their functions, be this in terms of providing personnel training and the necessary digital tools, or in terms of ensuring sufficient investment in electoral bodies and election infrastructure; | 68. Calls on the Member States to ensure that election authorities or equivalent bodies in charge of well-functioning, free and fair elections are sufficiently funded and equipped with the proper tools to allow them to carry out their functions, be this in terms of providing personnel training and the necessary digital tools, or in terms of ensuring sufficient investment in electoral bodies and election infrastructure; acknowledges in this regard that these issues are exclusive competences of Member States; |
Or. en
Amendment 1512
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 68 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 68 a. Notes that attacks on election integrity are multi-faceted, integrated, and long-term, as part of an ecosystem of threats that need to be tackled through a whole-of-soceity approach; |
Or. en
Amendment 1513
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 68 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 68 b. Underscores that election integrity efforts must take a holistic approach, countering threats in a coordinated manner, including FIMI and disinformation campaigns, cyber threats, and criminal action; highlights that such efforts must be effectively funded and resourced, not just in the immediate run up to an election, but on an ongoing basis before and after; |
Or. en
Amendment 1514
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 69
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 69. Considers that hate campaigns and violence that make it difficult for candidates to participate in the public debate, or interact with voters, constitute a threat to democracy; underlines that such threats can be fuelled by non-EU countries’ attempts to destabilise the EU; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s commitment to presenting recommendations on safety in politics; calls on the Member States to step up their efforts to protect candidates standing for election and elected representatives; | 69. Considers that hate campaigns and violence that make it difficult for candidates to participate in the public debate, or interact with voters, constitute a threat to democracy; recalls in that regard recent hate campaign in Poland directed against the conservative government, consisting of vulgar slogan disguised in eight stars; underlines that such threats can be fuelled by non-EU countries’ attempts to destabilise the EU; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s commitment to presenting non-binding recommendations on safety in politics; calls on the Member States to step up their efforts to protect candidates standing for election and elected representatives; |
Or. en
Amendment 1515
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 69
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 69. Considers that hate campaigns and violence that make it difficult for candidates to participate in the public debate, or interact with voters, constitute a threat to democracy; underlines that such threats can be fuelled by non-EU countries’ attempts to destabilise the EU; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s commitment to presenting recommendations on safety in politics; calls on the Member States to step up their efforts to protect candidates standing for election and elected representatives; | 69. Considers that hate campaigns and violence that make it difficult for candidates to participate in the public debate, or interact with voters, constitute a threat to democracy; underlines that such threats can also be fuelled by third countries’; calls on the Member States to step up their efforts to protect candidates standing for election and elected representatives; |
Or. en
Amendment 1516
Fabrice Leggeri, Virginie Joron, Marieke Ehlers
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 69
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 69. Considers that hate campaigns and violence that make it difficult for candidates to participate in the public debate, or interact with voters, constitute a threat to democracy; underlines that such threats can be fuelled by non-EU countries’ attempts to destabilise the EU; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s commitment to presenting recommendations on safety in politics; calls on the Member States to step up their efforts to protect candidates standing for election and elected representatives; | 69. Considers that hate campaigns and violence that make it difficult for candidates to participate in the public debate, or interact with voters, constitute a threat to democracy; underlines that such threats can also be fuelled by third countries and militant organisations; calls on the Member States to step up their efforts to protect candidates standing for election and elected representatives; |
Or. en
Amendment 1517
Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 69
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 69. Considers that hate campaigns and violence that make it difficult for candidates to participate in the public debate, or interact with voters, constitute a threat to democracy; underlines that such threats can be fuelled by non-EU countries’ attempts to destabilise the EU; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s commitment to presenting recommendations on safety in politics; calls on the Member States to step up their efforts to protect candidates standing for election and elected representatives; | 69. Considers that hate campaigns, intimidation and violence that make it difficult for candidates to participate in the public debate, or interact with voters, constitute a threat to democracy; underlines that such threats can be fuelled by non-EU countries’ attempts to destabilise the EU; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s commitment to presenting recommendations on safety in politics; calls on the Member States to step up their efforts to protect candidates standing for election and elected representatives; |
Or. en
Amendment 1518
Kim Van Sparrentak
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 69 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 69 a. Highlights that the safety and security of women in political life constitute a prerequisite for achieving equal representation and for safeguarding a resilient and inclusive democracy; condemns the deployment of online disinformation campaigns to harass, threaten and intimidate women candidates, frequently relying on misogynistic narratives to challenge their competence, credibility and moral integrity; points to the interference documented during electoral processes in Moldova and other European countries, where women leaders were disproportionately targeted by such hybrid tactics, with the objective of discouraging women’s political participation and destabilising democratic institutions; calls on the Member States and the Commission to adopt targeted measures for the monitoring, prevention and countering of gendered disinformation within their election integrity and democratic resilience strategies; |
Or. en
Amendment 1519
Kim Van Sparrentak
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 69 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 69 b. Condemns the impersonation and misappropriation of the identity of politicians, journalists and other public figures in fraudulent advertisements; warns that, although the primary purpose of such scams is financial gain, the unauthorised use of a public figure’s image and likeness constitutes a source of reputational harm, contributes to the erosion of the boundary between authentic information and fabricated content, and further undermines public trust in democratic processes and political actors; calls upon the Commission to investigate the compliance of online platforms as regards their removal processes of illegal advertisements; |
Or. en
Amendment 1520
Fabrice Leggeri, Virginie Joron, Marieke Ehlers, António Tânger Corrêa
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 70
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 70. Underlines the key role of the ECNE in ensuring the exchange of best practices with regard to electoral resilience in the EU and its Member States; notes, however, the current limitations of its activities; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to strengthening the ECNE, including reforms such as putting in place a repository of common references and standards for electoral processes; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 1521
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 70
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 70. Underlines the key role of the ECNE in ensuring the exchange of best practices with regard to electoral resilience in the EU and its Member States; notes, however, the current limitations of its activities; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to strengthening the ECNE, including reforms such as putting in place a repository of common references and standards for electoral processes; | 70. Underlines the key role of the ECNE in ensuring the exchange of best practices with regard to electoral resilience in the EU and its Member States; notes, however, the current limitations of its activities; |
Or. en
Amendment 1522
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 70
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 70. Underlines the key role of the ECNE in ensuring the exchange of best practices with regard to electoral resilience in the EU and its Member States; notes, however, the current limitations of its activities; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to strengthening the ECNE, including reforms such as putting in place a repository of common references and standards for electoral processes; | 70. Underlines the key role of the ECNE in ensuring the exchange of best practices with regard to electoral resilience in the EU and its Member States; notes, however, the current limitations of its activities; notes the Commission’s commitment to strengthening the ECNE, including reforms such as putting in place a repository of common references and standards for electoral processes; |
Or. en
Amendment 1523
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 71
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 71. Calls on the Commission to raise its level of ambition with regard to reforming the ECNE, including by reviewing its resources and permanent staff and by further developing the joint mechanism for electoral resilience; stresses the importance of implementing concrete measures to strengthen the involvement of candidate countries in the ECNE’s operations; calls on the Commission, within the framework of the ECNE, to establish a permanent monitoring group responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Commission’s recommendations on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the EU, and the forthcoming recommendations on the safety of political actors; considers that such a monitoring group should also be mandated to develop proposals for future updates of these recommendations; | 71. Calls on the Commission to review the ECNE and its activities and results to date; |
Or. en
Amendment 1524
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 71
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 71. Calls on the Commission to raise its level of ambition with regard to reforming the ECNE, including by reviewing its resources and permanent staff and by further developing the joint mechanism for electoral resilience; stresses the importance of implementing concrete measures to strengthen the involvement of candidate countries in the ECNE’s operations; calls on the Commission, within the framework of the ECNE, to establish a permanent monitoring group responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Commission’s recommendations on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the EU, and the forthcoming recommendations on the safety of political actors; considers that such a monitoring group should also be mandated to develop proposals for future updates of these recommendations; | 71. Stresses the importance of implementing concrete measures to strengthen the involvement of candidate countries in the ECNE’s operations; |
Or. en
Amendment 1525
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 71 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 71 a. Stresses the need for continued and structured engagement by the Commission with online platforms operating in candidate and potential candidate countries, particularly in the context of elections, in order to ensure platform accountability, risk mitigation and compliance with relevant commitments, rather than relying on one-off or crisis-driven interventions; |
Or. en
Amendment 1526
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 72
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 72. Calls on the Commission to include Parliament and the Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations (APPF) as permanent partners in all meetings of the ECNE; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 1527
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 72
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 72. Calls on the Commission to include Parliament and the Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations (APPF) as permanent partners in all meetings of the ECNE; | 72. Calls on the Commission to include Parliament and the Authority for European Political Parties and the competent authorities of the Member States as permanent partners in all meetings of the ECNE; |
Or. en
Amendment 1528
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 73
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 73. Welcomes the Commission’s objective of strengthening the protection of election-related infrastructure through existing legislation and tools; calls on the Commission to complement these efforts with a targeted revision of the Resilience of Critical Entities Directive, with a view to including electoral infrastructure in the Directive’s list of essential public administration services; | 73. Stresses that electoral infrastructure is a fundamental component of the Union’s democratic resilience and must be effectively protected against growing threats of physical and cyber nature; Welcomes therefore the Commission’s objective of strengthening the protection of election-related infrastructure through existing legislation and tools; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that electoral infrastructure is treated as critical within the EU acquis, by formally including it among the critical entities under the CER Directive and by explicitly covering it as an essential or important entity under the NIS2 Directive, in order to guarantee a high common level of security and resilience for electoral processes across the Union; |
Or. en
Amendment 1529
Tomas Tobé, Mika Aaltola, Tomáš Zdechovský, Sandra Kalniete, Lena Düpont, Lukas Mandl, Eszter Lakos, Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Ana Miguel Pedro, Fredis Beleris, Andrey Kovatchev
on behalf of the PPE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 73
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 73. Welcomes the Commission’s objective of strengthening the protection of election-related infrastructure through existing legislation and tools; calls on the Commission to complement these efforts with a targeted revision of the Resilience of Critical Entities Directive, with a view to including electoral infrastructure in the Directive’s list of essential public administration services; | 73. Welcomes the Commission’s objective of strengthening the protection of election-related infrastructure through existing legislation and tools; calls on the Commission to complement these efforts with a targeted revision of the Resilience of Critical Entities Directive, with a view to including electoral infrastructure in the Directive’s list of essential public administration services; calls on the Commission, in cooperation with ENISA and the Member States, to develop and adopt EU-wide cybersecurity standards for electoral infrastructure, ensuring that critical democratic systems meet mandatory high assurance certification requirements and supply chain security obligations before the 2029 European Parliament elections; |
Or. en
Amendment 1530
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 73
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 73. Welcomes the Commission’s objective of strengthening the protection of election-related infrastructure through existing legislation and tools; calls on the Commission to complement these efforts with a targeted revision of the Resilience of Critical Entities Directive, with a view to including electoral infrastructure in the Directive’s list of essential public administration services; | 73. Welcomes the Commission’s objective of strengthening the protection of election-related infrastructure through existing legislation and tools; |
Or. en
Amendment 1531
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 73
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 73. Welcomes the Commission’s objective of strengthening the protection of election-related infrastructure through existing legislation and tools; calls on the Commission to complement these efforts with a targeted revision of the Resilience of Critical Entities Directive, with a view to including electoral infrastructure in the Directive’s list of essential public administration services; | 73. Welcomes the Commission’s objective of strengthening the protection of election-related infrastructure through existing legislation and tools; underlines that exclusive competences in organising and protecting their electoral processes lies within Member States; calls on the Member States to step up their efforts to ensure the integrity and security of electoral infrastructure and to recognise it as critical infrastructure; |
Or. en
Amendment 1532
Kim Van Sparrentak
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 74
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 74. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to address the issue of foreign actors’ involvement in the party political landscape in Europe; notes with concern various examples of non-EU-country funding of extremist movements within the EU; considers that financial transparency is an important tool for shedding light on this issue and calls for enhanced exchange between private and public entities in this regard; stresses, in particular, the need to combat covert political communication, including opaque funding structures and hidden sponsors, in order to safeguard democratic integrity and ensure transparency for citizens; | 74. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to address the issue of foreign actors’ involvement in the party political landscape in Europe; notes with concern various examples of non-EU-country funding of extremist movements and parties within the EU; considers that financial transparency is an important tool for shedding light on this issue and calls for enhanced exchange between private and public entities in this regard; is concerned by continued deficiencies with the functioning registers of Ultimate Beneficial Owners in the Member States including the quality of data or risk of overly restricted access to the UBO registers for persons with legitimate interests such as journalists or civil society organisations; Urges Member States to fully and faithfully transpose the Directive (EU) 2024/1640 ("AMLD VI") which harmonises the rules to access to beneficial ownership registers, including by presuming a legitimate interest for journalists and CSOs; Calls on the Commission to launch infringement procedures in case of Member States falling to transpose AMLD VI; stresses, in particular, the need to combat covert political communication, including opaque funding structures and financial flows and hidden sponsors, in order to safeguard democratic integrity and ensure transparency for citizens; calls on the Commission to propose EU legislation on campaigning and party funding; calls on the Member States to implement a ban on foreign donations, including both in-kind and cash contributions or benefits, and a limit on donations to political parties and candidates; considers that political actors who have been offered and/or accepted a financial or in-kind contribution by a foreign actor must be obliged to report it to the competent authorities and this information should be reported in turn at EU level to allow for EU-wide monitoring; invites in this sense the Commission and Member State to look into the options available for improving cooperation between the anti-corruption authorities and the independent election commission in the Member States; |
Or. en
Amendment 1533
Tomáš Zdechovský, Dan-Ştefan Motreanu, Eszter Lakos, Lukas Mandl, Sandra Kalniete, Sander Smit, Marta Wcisło, Andrey Kovatchev
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 74
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 74. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to address the issue of foreign actors’ involvement in the party political landscape in Europe; notes with concern various examples of non-EU-country funding of extremist movements within the EU; considers that financial transparency is an important tool for shedding light on this issue and calls for enhanced exchange between private and public entities in this regard; stresses, in particular, the need to combat covert political communication, including opaque funding structures and hidden sponsors, in order to safeguard democratic integrity and ensure transparency for citizens; | 74. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to transparently address the issue of foreign actors’ involvement in the party political landscape in Europe; notes with concern various examples of non-EU-country funding of extremist movements within the EU; considers that financial transparency is an important tool for shedding light on this issue and calls for enhanced exchange between private and public entities in this regard; stresses that political advertising and political communication in the online environment must be subject to full transparency regarding the ultimate source of funding; calls for an explicit ban on proxy financing, intermediary funding structures and other schemes designed to conceal the real sponsor, including the use of shell entities, influencers or third-party advertising networks; |
Or. en
Amendment 1534
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 74
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 74. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to address the issue of foreign actors’ involvement in the party political landscape in Europe; notes with concern various examples of non-EU-country funding of extremist movements within the EU; considers that financial transparency is an important tool for shedding light on this issue and calls for enhanced exchange between private and public entities in this regard; stresses, in particular, the need to combat covert political communication, including opaque funding structures and hidden sponsors, in order to safeguard democratic integrity and ensure transparency for citizens; | 74. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to address the issue of foreign actors’ involvement in political landscape in Europe; notes with concern various examples of non-EU-country funding of EU political actors, including in the European Parliament; considers that financial transparency is an important tool for shedding light on this issue and calls for enhanced exchange between private and public entities in this regard; stresses, in particular, the need to combat covert political communication, including opaque funding structures and hidden sponsors, in order to safeguard democratic integrity and ensure transparency for citizens; calls for transparency in the funding of civil society, in particular as regards to so-called “political NGOs”; |
Or. en
Amendment 1535
Konstantinos Arvanitis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 74
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 74. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to address the issue of foreign actors’ involvement in the party political landscape in Europe; notes with concern various examples of non-EU-country funding of extremist movements within the EU; considers that financial transparency is an important tool for shedding light on this issue and calls for enhanced exchange between private and public entities in this regard; stresses, in particular, the need to combat covert political communication, including opaque funding structures and hidden sponsors, in order to safeguard democratic integrity and ensure transparency for citizens; | 74. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to address the issue of foreign actors’ involvement in the party political landscape in Europe, in terms of both rhetorical and financial endorsement; notes with concern various examples of non-EU-country funding of extremist movements within the EU; considers that financial transparency is an important tool for shedding light on this issue and calls for enhanced exchange between private and public entities in this regard; stresses, in particular, the need to combat covert political communication, including opaque funding structures and hidden sponsors, in order to safeguard democratic integrity and ensure transparency for citizens; |
Or. en
Amendment 1536
Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 74 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 74a. Recalls that historically, and long before the creation of the Open Society Foundations, many pro-Brussels organisations, including Jean Monnet's committee, were covertly funded by foreign entities, directly or indirectly, and did not disclose this to the people of Europe; |
Or. fr
Amendment 1537
Tomáš Zdechovský
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 75
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 75. Notes with concern the growing evidence of foreign interference and espionage within Europe’s political system; welcomes the investigative efforts across the Member States that have led to convictions and ongoing proceedings related to bribery, espionage and the promotion of foreign state interests; underlines the serious risks posed by inadequate safeguards in the recruitment of staff and associates with close links to authoritarian regimes; | 75. Notes with concern the growing evidence of foreign interference and espionage within Europe’s political system; stresses that such espionage has been identified not only at the the Member States' level, but also within EU institutions themselves, including those tasked with shaping and representing European democracy, such as the European Parliament and other EU bodies; welcomes the investigative efforts across the Member States that have led to convictions and ongoing proceedings related to bribery, espionage and the promotion of foreign state interests; underlines the serious risks posed by inadequate safeguards in the recruitment of staff and associates with close links to authoritarian regimes, as well as by the use of high-risk software and hardware supplied by non-EU entities, including vendors in the field of cybersecurity, in light of credible concerns regarding their links to foreign state intelligence services and their role in espionage and information operations, exposing EU institutions to risks of unauthorised access, surveillance and data leakage; |
Or. en
Amendment 1538
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 75
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 75. Notes with concern the growing evidence of foreign interference and espionage within Europe’s political system; welcomes the investigative efforts across the Member States that have led to convictions and ongoing proceedings related to bribery, espionage and the promotion of foreign state interests; underlines the serious risks posed by inadequate safeguards in the recruitment of staff and associates with close links to authoritarian regimes; | 75. Notes with concern the growing evidence of foreign interference and espionage within Europe’s political system; welcomes the investigative efforts across the Member States that have led to convictions and ongoing proceedings related to bribery, espionage and the promotion of foreign state interests; underlines the serious risks posed by inadequate safeguards in the recruitment of staff; |
Or. en
Amendment 1539
Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 75 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 75 a. Expresses grave concern over serious and well-documented allegations that Hungarian intelligence services have conducted espionage activities targeting the EU institutions, including the reported surveillance of European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) investigators during fact-finding missions in Hungary, and more recent allegations of attempts to recruit EU officials in Brussels in order to obtain confidential information and advance warnings on sensitive procedures; stresses that such acts, if confirmed, would constitute an unacceptable attack on the integrity and security of the Union’s institutions and a clear breach of the principle of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU, undermining mutual trust between Member States and the proper functioning of the Union; calls on the Commission to pursue thorough, swift and transparent follow-up, including through its internal security services and, where appropriate, infringement action and other measures to protect EU staff and information; urges the establishment of strengthened counter-intelligence safeguards and mandatory security protocols for contacts with third-country and Member State representatives where risks are identified; and underlines that addressing and deterring espionage and infiltration attempts against EU institutions must form an integral part of the European Democracy Shield’s approach to hybrid threats and hostile interference; |
Or. en
Amendment 1540
Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 75 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 75a. Questions whether former UK officials should be kept in strategic and management posts in the EU; |
Or. fr
Amendment 1541
Nathalie Loiseau, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 76
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 76. Welcomes the recently adopted regulation on the revised rules for the statute and funding of European political parties and foundations; notes the provisions concerning the financing and participation of parties from non-EU countries; calls on the co-legislators to ensure its full and effective implementation; | 76. Welcomes the recently adopted regulation on the revised rules for the statute and funding of European political parties and foundations; notes the provisions concerning the financing and participation of parties from non-EU countries, in particular regarding the fact that non-EU parties should not have any veto powers nor control over European parties; calls on the co-legislators to ensure its full and effective implementation; is of the opinion that stricter rule should be set up in an appropriate timeframe to prevent any financing from non-EU actors; |
Or. en
Amendment 1542
Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 76
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 76. Welcomes the recently adopted regulation on the revised rules for the statute and funding of European political parties and foundations; notes the provisions concerning the financing and participation of parties from non-EU countries; calls on the co-legislators to ensure its full and effective implementation; | 76. Welcomes the recently adopted regulation on the revised rules for the statute and funding of European political parties and foundations; notes the provisions concerning the financing and participation of parties from non-EU countries; calls on the co-legislators to ensure its full and effective implementation; notes that staff recruited to the authority should also include members of opposition parties so as not to undermine its credibility; |
Or. fr
Amendment 1543
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 76
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 76. Welcomes the recently adopted regulation on the revised rules for the statute and funding of European political parties and foundations; notes the provisions concerning the financing and participation of parties from non-EU countries; calls on the co-legislators to ensure its full and effective implementation; | 76. Notes the recently adopted regulation on the revised rules for the statute and funding of European political parties and foundations; notes the provisions concerning the financing and participation of parties from non-EU countries; calls on the co-legislators to ensure its full and effective implementation in a manner that fully respects national competences and does not interfere in the internal affairs of national political parties; |
Or. en
Amendment 1544
Kim Van Sparrentak
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 76
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 76. Welcomes the recently adopted regulation on the revised rules for the statute and funding of European political parties and foundations; notes the provisions concerning the financing and participation of parties from non-EU countries; calls on the co-legislators to ensure its full and effective implementation; | 76. Welcomes the recently adopted regulation on the revised rules for the statute and funding of European political parties and foundations; calls on the co-legislators to ensure its full and effective implementation; |
Or. en
Amendment 1545
Kim Van Sparrentak
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 76 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 76 a. Stresses the need to reinforce our democracies against foreign interference and authoritarian tendencies; calls on the Commission to expand the scope of the annual rule of law report by covering democracy and fundamental rights and to present recommendations for Member States on strengthening their democracies by robust legal guarantees regarding free and fair elections and checks and balances against actions aimed at the destruction of rights and freedoms; |
Or. en
Amendment 1546
Stefano Cavedagna
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 76 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 76 a. Stresses that safeguarding electoral integrity also requires adequate cybersecurity preparedness, supported by industrially proven capabilities for monitoring, testing and strengthening the resilience of electoral infrastructures against cyber-enabled interference; |
Or. en
Amendment 1547
Kim Van Sparrentak
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 77
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 77. Notes that developments in cryptocurrency create a potential vulnerability in terms of both a lack of transparency and of the ability to scrutinise the financing of political parties and movements in Europe; acknowledges the Commission’s commitment to bring together national experts under the umbrella of the ECNE, in close cooperation with other EU networks and stakeholders, to exchange best practices, prepare possible guidelines and promote joint actions, in this regard; calls on the Commission to continue monitoring the implementation of the anti-money laundering package and the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation and to address any potential gaps in the legislation that may need to be filled; | 77. Notes that rapid developments in cryptocurrency, including through decentralised finance (DeFi) and platforms or service providers operating outside the Union, create a potential significant vulnerability in terms of both a lack of transparency and of the ability to scrutinise the financing of political parties and movements in Europe; highlights in particular that, due to their pseudonymous nature, global reach and the possibility to rely on anonymising techniques and services, crypto-assets can be easily exploited to conceal the true source of political donations and to facilitate foreign influence in democratic processes; acknowledges the Commission’s commitment to bring together national experts under the umbrella of the ECNE, in close cooperation with other EU networks and stakeholders, to exchange best practices, prepare possible guidelines and promote joint actions, in this regard; calls on the Commission to continue monitoring the implementation of the anti-money laundering package and the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation, ensure an effective and consistent enforcement and to address without any further delay any potential gaps in the legislation that may need to be filled, especially those that have been already identified by the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) in relation to stablecoins cross-border flows, as they further enhance the risk that crypto-assets can be used as a backdoor for illegal foreign political financing and foreign influence, criminal proceeds and other illicit financial flows, thereby undermining democratic accountability and public trust; calls further on the Commission to put forward enhanced measures to ensure that political donations involving crypto-assets are subject to the know your donor principle and ensure the same transparency and accountability standards as traditional financial contributions; |
Or. en
Amendment 1548
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 77
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 77. Notes that developments in cryptocurrency create a potential vulnerability in terms of both a lack of transparency and of the ability to scrutinise the financing of political parties and movements in Europe; acknowledges the Commission’s commitment to bring together national experts under the umbrella of the ECNE, in close cooperation with other EU networks and stakeholders, to exchange best practices, prepare possible guidelines and promote joint actions, in this regard; calls on the Commission to continue monitoring the implementation of the anti-money laundering package and the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation and to address any potential gaps in the legislation that may need to be filled; | 77. Notes that developments in cryptocurrency create a potential vulnerability in terms of both a lack of transparency and of the ability to scrutinise the financing of political parties and movements in Europe; acknowledges the Commission’s commitment to bring together national experts under the umbrella of the ECNE, in close cooperation with other EU networks and stakeholders, to exchange best practices, prepare non-binding guidelines and promote joint actions, in this regard; calls on the Commission to continue monitoring the implementation of the anti-money laundering package and the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation and to address any potential gaps in the legislation that may need to be filled; |
Or. en
Amendment 1549
Nathalie Loiseau, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 77 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 77 a. Recalls the role of the Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations (APPF) in controlling the financing of European political parties; notes that discrepancies on the rule of financing of political parties from non-EU persons and entities at national level create legislative gaps enabling the transfer of funds that would otherwise not be allowed from national to European parties; insists on the need to have better cooperation between national authorities in charge of controlling the finances of national political parties; is worried by the fact that some organisations, at national level, are not aware of each other’s existence or do not exchange information, creating silos; call the Member States to adopt best practices among them to ensure an independent oversight over the funding of political parties; is worried by the fact that some financial intelligence units do not have the mandate to transmit the information they collect on interference to national and European elections; calls on Member States to revise their mandate in order to improve the flow of information; calls for a reinforcement of the APPF to better coordinate national and European organisations in charge of controlling political party financing; |
Or. en
Amendment 1550
Kim Van Sparrentak
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 77 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 77 a. Is deeply concerned about recent sanctions by the US Trump administration against individuals associated with international organisations, notably UN rapporteur Francesca Albanese and several ICC judges, hampering their ability to access everyday services, in particular financial services; is deeply concerned about recent sanctions by the US Trump administration against former EU Commissioner Thierry Breton and individuals from civil society as a way to put pressure on officials and civil society involved in DSA discussions and implementation and threaten EU regulatory sovereignty; |
Or. en
Amendment 1551
Petar Volgin, Christine Anderson
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 78
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 78. Considers sanctions against foreign entities, countries or individuals that engage in conduct aimed at undermining the democratic integrity of the EU or its Member States to be an important element of the European Democracy Shield’s objectives; further stresses that effective sanctions must include a comprehensive set of activities, including asset freezing and confiscation, attribution and exposure, cost increases and revenue cuts, bans on imports and exports, the denial of access and other relevant restrictive measures; | 78. Considers that sanctions against foreign entities, countries or individuals should be imposed only as a direct and proportionate response to clearly established and evidenced conduct aimed at undermining the democratic integrity of the Member States; |
Or. en
Amendment 1552
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 78
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 78. Considers sanctions against foreign entities, countries or individuals that engage in conduct aimed at undermining the democratic integrity of the EU or its Member States to be an important element of the European Democracy Shield’s objectives; further stresses that effective sanctions must include a comprehensive set of activities, including asset freezing and confiscation, attribution and exposure, cost increases and revenue cuts, bans on imports and exports, the denial of access and other relevant restrictive measures; | 78. Considers sanctions against state and non-state actors and individuals engaged in actions aimed at undermining integrity of the EU, democracy, sovereignty and constitutional order of Member States to be an essential component of the European Democracy Shield; stresses that such sanctions must be swift, targeted and dissuasive, and should include a comprehensive set of measures, including asset freezing and confiscation, clear attribution and public exposure, the imposition of significant economic and financial costs, revenue cuts, bans on imports and exports, travel bans, denial of access to EU markets and financial systems, and other effective, robust and impactful restrictive measures; |
Or. en
Amendment 1553
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 78
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 78. Considers sanctions against foreign entities, countries or individuals that engage in conduct aimed at undermining the democratic integrity of the EU or its Member States to be an important element of the European Democracy Shield’s objectives; further stresses that effective sanctions must include a comprehensive set of activities, including asset freezing and confiscation, attribution and exposure, cost increases and revenue cuts, bans on imports and exports, the denial of access and other relevant restrictive measures; | 78. Considers sanctions against foreign entities, countries or individuals that engage in conduct aimed at undermining the democratic integrity of the EU or its Member States to be an important element of the European Democracy Shield’s objectives; further stresses that effective sanctions must include a comprehensive set of activities, including asset freezing and confiscation, attribution and exposure, cost increases and revenue cuts, bans on imports and exports, the denial of access and other relevant restrictive measures; reiterates its call for the Council to gradually transition to qualified majority voting for decisions in the context of our sanctions regime; |
Or. en
Amendment 1554
Stefano Cavedagna
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 78
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 78. Considers sanctions against foreign entities, countries or individuals that engage in conduct aimed at undermining the democratic integrity of the EU or its Member States to be an important element of the European Democracy Shield’s objectives; further stresses that effective sanctions must include a comprehensive set of activities, including asset freezing and confiscation, attribution and exposure, cost increases and revenue cuts, bans on imports and exports, the denial of access and other relevant restrictive measures; | 78. Considers sanctions against foreign entities, countries or individuals that engage in conduct aimed at undermining the democratic integrity of the EU or its Member States to be an important element of the European Democracy Shield’s objectives, provided that the assessment is unbiased and consistent for all stakeholders involved; further stresses that effective sanctions must include a comprehensive set of activities, including asset freezing and confiscation, attribution and exposure, cost increases and revenue cuts, bans on imports and exports, the denial of access and other relevant restrictive measures; |
Or. en
Amendment 1555
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 78
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 78. Considers sanctions against foreign entities, countries or individuals that engage in conduct aimed at undermining the democratic integrity of the EU or its Member States to be an important element of the European Democracy Shield’s objectives; further stresses that effective sanctions must include a comprehensive set of activities, including asset freezing and confiscation, attribution and exposure, cost increases and revenue cuts, bans on imports and exports, the denial of access and other relevant restrictive measures; | 78. Considers sanctions against foreign entities, countries or individuals that engage in demonstratable conduct aimed at undermining the democratic integrity of the EU or its Member States to be an important element of the protection of the Union and Member States; further stresses that effective sanctions must include a comprehensive set of activities, including asset freezing and confiscation, attribution and exposure, cost increases and revenue cuts, bans on imports and exports, the denial of access and other relevant restrictive measures; |
Or. en
Amendment 1556
Fidias Panayiotou
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 78
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 78. Considers sanctions against foreign entities, countries or individuals that engage in conduct aimed at undermining the democratic integrity of the EU or its Member States to be an important element of the European Democracy Shield’s objectives; further stresses that effective sanctions must include a comprehensive set of activities, including asset freezing and confiscation, attribution and exposure, cost increases and revenue cuts, bans on imports and exports, the denial of access and other relevant restrictive measures; | 78. Considers sanctions against foreign entities, countries or individuals that engage in conduct aimed at undermining the democratic integrity of the EU or its Member States to be an important element of the European Democracy Shield’s objectives; further stresses that effective sanctions must include a comprehensive set of activities, attribution and exposure, cost increases and revenue cuts, bans on imports and exports, the denial of access and other relevant restrictive measures; |
Or. en
Amendment 1557
Tomáš Zdechovský
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 78 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 78 a. Stresses that the effectiveness of the European Democracy Shield’s sanctions toolbox depends on its ability to address not only state-sponsored hybrid activities but also the non-state actors, networks and intermediaries that execute, enable or monetise such activities; recalls that the Union’s restrictive measures against terrorism apply to persons, groups and entities; calls on the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States to ensure that relevant sanctions instruments are consistently leveraged, where legally warranted, against financial, logistical and technical facilitators of hybrid interference, including through online monetisation and covert funding streams; |
Or. en
Amendment 1558
Danilo Della Valle, Konstantinos Arvanitis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 78 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 78 a. While fully acknowledging the legitimate objective of adopting policies to address disinformation and information manipulation, invites the Commission to assess whether EU sanctions to combat disinformation comply with the proportionality requirement under EU law and with Article 11 of the Charter; considers that the right to be heard and adequate legal safeguards must be guaranteed before such measures are applied by the Council, especially where the rights of EU citizens, in particular journalists, risk being undermined; |
Or. en
Amendment 1559
Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 78 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 78a. Notes that subsidised fact-checkers, including EU DisinfoLab, have continued to receive funding and been invited to the EU institutions as experts, despite being reprimanded by the French and Belgian data protection authorities in the Benalla case as a result of political profiling of Twitter accounts; |
Or. fr
Amendment 1560
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 78 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 78 a. Calls on the Council and the Commission to increase the effectiveness and impact of sanctions on Russia to definitively undermine Russia’s ability to continue waging its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine and threatening the security of other neighbouring countries; |
Or. en
Amendment 1561
Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 78 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 78b. Recalls the scandal of the 'Marianne Fund', dedicated to beheaded teacher Samuel Paty, whereby funding was squandered in dubious circumstances; calls for rigorous monitoring of funds aimed at combating hatred and promoting democracy; |
Or. fr
Amendment 1562
Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 78 c (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 78c. Notes that a journalist was fired after putting a question to the European Commission; is concerned about the repeated pressure brought to bear on opposition media in France (CNews, C8, France-Soir); |
Or. fr
Amendment 1563
Konstantinos Arvanitis, Danilo Della Valle
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 79
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 79. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to regularly and closely assess imposed sanctions in terms of optimal efficiency and possible further expansion, including secondary sanctions targeting entities that engage in the circumvention of sanctions; considers that, particularly in the area of Russian hybrid threats and destabilising activities, the EU should further expand its sanctions regime by targeting the financial and technical enablers that sustain disinformation, cyberattacks and election interference, such as crypto exchanges, advertising networks and hosting providers, while also disrupting Russia’s proxy networks in non-EU countries, notably in Africa and the Middle East, by imposing sanctions on media outlets, logistics hubs, and Wagner-linked groups that spread anti-EU narratives; considers that to further raise the cost of hybrid aggression, the EU should expand secondary sanctions on non-EU – and in particular, Chinese – firms that facilitate Russian operations, and that it should ban Russian cyber mercenaries from using EU-based services, such as hosting, domain and cloud services, and publicly expose and impose sanctions on EU politicians or lobbyists covertly funded by Moscow; | 79. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to regularly and closely assess imposed sanctions in terms of optimal efficiency and possible further expansion, including secondary sanctions targeting entities that engage in the circumvention of sanctions; considers that, particularly in the area of Russian hybrid threats and destabilising activities, the EU should further expand its sanctions regime by targeting the financial and technical enablers that sustain disinformation, cyberattacks and election interference, such as crypto exchanges, advertising networks and hosting providers; |
Or. en
Amendment 1564
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 79
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 79. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to regularly and closely assess imposed sanctions in terms of optimal efficiency and possible further expansion, including secondary sanctions targeting entities that engage in the circumvention of sanctions; considers that, particularly in the area of Russian hybrid threats and destabilising activities, the EU should further expand its sanctions regime by targeting the financial and technical enablers that sustain disinformation, cyberattacks and election interference, such as crypto exchanges, advertising networks and hosting providers, while also disrupting Russia’s proxy networks in non-EU countries, notably in Africa and the Middle East, by imposing sanctions on media outlets, logistics hubs, and Wagner-linked groups that spread anti-EU narratives; considers that to further raise the cost of hybrid aggression, the EU should expand secondary sanctions on non-EU – and in particular, Chinese – firms that facilitate Russian operations, and that it should ban Russian cyber mercenaries from using EU-based services, such as hosting, domain and cloud services, and publicly expose and impose sanctions on EU politicians or lobbyists covertly funded by Moscow; | 79. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to regularly and closely assess imposed sanctions in terms of optimal efficiency and possible further expansion, including secondary sanctions targeting entities that engage in the circumvention of sanctions; considers that, particularly in the area of Russian hybrid threats and destabilising activities, the EU should further expand its sanctions regime by targeting the financial and technical enablers that sustain disinformation, cyberattacks and election interference, such as crypto exchanges, advertising networks and hosting providers, while also disrupting Russia’s proxy networks in non-EU countries, notably in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, in particular Cuba and Nicaragua, by imposing sanctions on media outlets, logistics hubs, and Kremlin-linked proxy paramilitary formations such as Wagner Group that carry out acts of terror and hostile destabilising activities; considers that to further raise the cost of hybrid aggression, the EU should expand secondary sanctions on non-EU – and in particular, Chinese firms, including those based in Hong Kong, that facilitate Russian operations, and that it should ban Russian, North Korean, Iranian,Chinese and other hostile cyber mercenaries from using EU-based services, such as hosting, domain and cloud services, and publicly expose and impose sanctions on EU politicians or lobbyists covertly funded by Moscow; |
Or. en
Amendment 1565
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 79
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 79. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to regularly and closely assess imposed sanctions in terms of optimal efficiency and possible further expansion, including secondary sanctions targeting entities that engage in the circumvention of sanctions; considers that, particularly in the area of Russian hybrid threats and destabilising activities, the EU should further expand its sanctions regime by targeting the financial and technical enablers that sustain disinformation, cyberattacks and election interference, such as crypto exchanges, advertising networks and hosting providers, while also disrupting Russia’s proxy networks in non-EU countries, notably in Africa and the Middle East, by imposing sanctions on media outlets, logistics hubs, and Wagner-linked groups that spread anti-EU narratives; considers that to further raise the cost of hybrid aggression, the EU should expand secondary sanctions on non-EU – and in particular, Chinese – firms that facilitate Russian operations, and that it should ban Russian cyber mercenaries from using EU-based services, such as hosting, domain and cloud services, and publicly expose and impose sanctions on EU politicians or lobbyists covertly funded by Moscow; | 79. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to regularly and closely assess imposed sanctions in terms of optimal efficiency and possible further expansion, including secondary sanctions targeting entities that engage in the circumvention of sanctions; considers that, particularly in the area of hybrid threats and destabilising activities by hostile third countries´, the EU should further expand its sanctions regime by targeting the financial and technical enablers that sustain disinformation, cyberattacks and election interference, such as crypto exchanges, advertising networks and hosting providers, while also disrupting proxy networks operated by hostile third countries placed in non-EU countries, by imposing sanctions on media outlets, logistics hubs, and such groups that spread anti-EU narratives which amount to coordinated hostile influence operations rather than legitimate freedom of expressions; considers that to further raise the cost of hybrid aggression, the EU should expand secondary sanctions on non-EU entities, and that it should ban cyber mercenaries acting on behalf of hostile third countries from using EU-based services, such as hosting, domain and cloud services, and publicly expose and impose sanctions on EU politicians or lobbyists who are credibly identified as having been covertly funded by hostile third countries, in full respect of due process and the of innocence; |
Or. en
Amendment 1566
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose, Cecilia Strada
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 79
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 79. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to regularly and closely assess imposed sanctions in terms of optimal efficiency and possible further expansion, including secondary sanctions targeting entities that engage in the circumvention of sanctions; considers that, particularly in the area of Russian hybrid threats and destabilising activities, the EU should further expand its sanctions regime by targeting the financial and technical enablers that sustain disinformation, cyberattacks and election interference, such as crypto exchanges, advertising networks and hosting providers, while also disrupting Russia’s proxy networks in non-EU countries, notably in Africa and the Middle East, by imposing sanctions on media outlets, logistics hubs, and Wagner-linked groups that spread anti-EU narratives; considers that to further raise the cost of hybrid aggression, the EU should expand secondary sanctions on non-EU – and in particular, Chinese – firms that facilitate Russian operations, and that it should ban Russian cyber mercenaries from using EU-based services, such as hosting, domain and cloud services, and publicly expose and impose sanctions on EU politicians or lobbyists covertly funded by Moscow; | 79. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to regularly and closely assess imposed sanctions in terms of optimal efficiency and possible further expansion, including sanctions targeting individuals and entities responsible for active circumvention of the effectiveness of the EU sanctions against Russia; considers that, particularly in the area of Russian hybrid threats and destabilising activities, the EU should further expand its sanctions regime by targeting the financial and technical enablers that sustain disinformation, cyberattacks and election interference, such as crypto exchanges, advertising networks and hosting providers, while also disrupting Russia’s proxy networks in non-EU countries, notably in Africa and the Middle East, by imposing sanctions on media outlets, logistics hubs, and Wagner-linked groups that spread anti-EU narratives; considers that to further raise the cost of hybrid aggression, the EU should expand sanctions targeting non-EU individuals and entities responsible for active circumvention of sanctions– in particular, Chinese – and which facilitate Russian operations, and that it should ban Russian cyber mercenaries from using EU-based services, such as hosting, domain and cloud services, and publicly expose and impose sanctions on EU politicians or lobbyists covertly funded by Moscow; |
Or. en
Amendment 1567
Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius, Helmut Brandstätter
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 79 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 79 a. Believes that EU institutions and Member States should, by default, publicly attribute and call out offensive cyber and FIMI incidents directed against the Union; considers that failing to do so constitutes a missed opportunity to inform the broader public about the scale and persistence of the cyber and FIMI threats the EU faces; further believes that the Union should close the attribution loop by systematically imposing costs on such malicious operations, including through the more active use of cyber and FIMI toolboxes, sectoral sanctions, and by linking eligibility under EU procurement frameworks to the attribution of offensive cyber operations conducted by foreign powers against the EU, in line with the Implementing Act specifying the pre-qualification and award criteria for NZIA auctions; |
Or. en
Amendment 1568
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 79 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 79 a. Calls on the Commission to urgently issue guidance on the level of due diligence expected of online platforms, in particular with regard to advertising and monetisation services that may be misused, directly or indirectly, by sanctioned entities or their proxies, including through intermediaries or opaque payment and distribution arrangements; believes furthermore that such guidance should specify the conditions under which platforms may, where applicable, benefit from the liability exemptions set out in the Digital Services Act, and clearly identify which platform activities fall outside the scope of those exemptions; further calls on the Commission to clarify in which circumstances such activities are considered to constitute intermediary services within the meaning of the DSA; |
Or. en
Amendment 1569
Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 79 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 79a. Points out that European sanctions aimed at protecting democracy cannot be imposed on a national or resident of a Member State without legal proceedings before the court of a Member State; |
Or. fr
Amendment 1570
Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 79 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 79b. Calls on the Member States to impose sanctions on major high street banks that refuse to give loans to authorised political parties and to their elected representatives and candidates; |
Or. fr
Amendment 1571
Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 79 c (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 79c. Notes that elected representatives and political influencers have had their bank accounts closed down without any commercial justification, points out that this is happening more and more frequently, and stresses that this should be addressed by the authorities in order to promote a calm democratic debate; |
Or. fr
Amendment 1572
Tomáš Zdechovský
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 80
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 80. Considers that identifying and naming source countries, rather than individuals or companies, could be an important step towards acknowledging the problem of clear systematic, multi-layered and often state-sponsored interference that countries such as Russia or Iran are engaging in throughout Europe; welcomes the Commission’s decision to list Russia as a high-risk third country under the EU’s anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing framework, in order to preserve the integrity of the EU financial system; recalls that the new Anti-Money Laundering Regulation will provide an additional legal basis for identifying dangerous countries, including those involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; | 80. Considers that identifying and naming source countries, rather than individuals or companies, could be an important step towards acknowledging the problem of clear systematic, multi-layered and often state-sponsored interference that countries such as Russia or Iran are engaging in throughout Europe; welcomes the Commission’s decision to list Russia as a high-risk third country under the EU’s anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing framework, in order to preserve the integrity of the EU financial system; recalls that the new Anti-Money Laundering Regulation will provide an additional legal basis for identifying dangerous countries, including those involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; calls on the Commission to explore the role of the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AMLA) in supporting the detection and coordination of cases involving sanctions circumvention, in close cooperation with national Financial Intelligence Units; |
Or. en
Amendment 1573
Konstantinos Arvanitis, Danilo Della Valle
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 80
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 80. Considers that identifying and naming source countries, rather than individuals or companies, could be an important step towards acknowledging the problem of clear systematic, multi-layered and often state-sponsored interference that countries such as Russia or Iran are engaging in throughout Europe; welcomes the Commission’s decision to list Russia as a high-risk third country under the EU’s anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing framework, in order to preserve the integrity of the EU financial system; recalls that the new Anti-Money Laundering Regulation will provide an additional legal basis for identifying dangerous countries, including those involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; | 80. Takes note of the Commission’s decision to list Russia as a high-risk third country under the EU’s anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing framework, in order to preserve the integrity of the EU financial system; recalls that the new Anti-Money Laundering Regulation will provide an additional legal basis for identifying dangerous countries, including those involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; |
Or. en
Amendment 1574
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 80
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 80. Considers that identifying and naming source countries, rather than individuals or companies, could be an important step towards acknowledging the problem of clear systematic, multi-layered and often state-sponsored interference that countries such as Russia or Iran are engaging in throughout Europe; welcomes the Commission’s decision to list Russia as a high-risk third country under the EU’s anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing framework, in order to preserve the integrity of the EU financial system; recalls that the new Anti-Money Laundering Regulation will provide an additional legal basis for identifying dangerous countries, including those involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; | 80. Considers that identifying and naming source countries, in addition to attributing responsibility to individuals or companies, could be an important step towards acknowledging the problem of clear systematic, multi-layered and often state-sponsored interference that countries such as Russia or Iran are engaging in throughout Europe; welcomes the Commission’s decision to list Russia as a high-risk third country under the EU’s anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing framework, in order to preserve the integrity of the EU financial system and calls for the inclusion of Belarus, which serves as a Kremlin proxy and takes an active part in operations directed against Member States, including acts of sabotage; recalls that the new Anti-Money Laundering Regulation will provide an additional legal basis for identifying dangerous countries, including those involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; |
Or. en
Amendment 1575
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 80
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 80. Considers that identifying and naming source countries, rather than individuals or companies, could be an important step towards acknowledging the problem of clear systematic, multi-layered and often state-sponsored interference that countries such as Russia or Iran are engaging in throughout Europe; welcomes the Commission’s decision to list Russia as a high-risk third country under the EU’s anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing framework, in order to preserve the integrity of the EU financial system; recalls that the new Anti-Money Laundering Regulation will provide an additional legal basis for identifying dangerous countries, including those involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; | 80. Considers that identifying and naming source countries, rather than individuals or companies, could be an important step towards acknowledging the problem of clear systematic, multi-layered and often state-sponsored interference by third countries that are engaging in throughout Europe; notes that the Commission´s decision to list Russia as a high-risk third country under the EU’s anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing framework, in order to preserve the integrity of the EU financial system; recalls that the new Anti-Money Laundering Regulation will provide an additional legal basis for identifying dangerous countries, including those involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; |
Or. en
Amendment 1576
Virginie Joron
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 80 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 80a. Notes in this regard that there was no reaction in Brussels to the Alstom case in France, even though a French man was imprisoned by a third country and a strategic European company was plundered; |
Or. fr
Amendment 1577
Tomáš Zdechovský
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 81
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 81. Underlines that the effectiveness and credibility of EU sanctions depend on strict and consistent enforcement; highlights that the announced revision of the mandate of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) offers an opportunity to strengthen its role to include the investigation and prosecution of sanctions violations; | 81. Underlines that the effectiveness and credibility of EU sanctions depend on strict and consistent enforcement; highlights that the announced revision of the mandate of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) offers an opportunity to strengthen its role to include the investigation and prosecution of sanctions violations; underlines that the credibility of EU restrictive measures depends on strict and consistent enforcement; supports the strengthening of the mandate of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to investigate and prosecute serious cross-border offences related to the circumvention of EU sanctions; |
Or. en
Amendment 1578
Kim Van Sparrentak
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 81
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 81. Underlines that the effectiveness and credibility of EU sanctions depend on strict and consistent enforcement; highlights that the announced revision of the mandate of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) offers an opportunity to strengthen its role to include the investigation and prosecution of sanctions violations; | 81. Underlines that the effectiveness and credibility of EU sanctions depend on strict and consistent enforcement; highlights that the announced revision of the mandate of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) offers an opportunity to strengthen its role to include the investigation and prosecution of sanctions violations; reminds commercial actors from outside the Union operating in the Single Market that non-compliance with Union rules, including breaches of competition law and Single Market rules, may result in exclusion from the Single Market; |
Or. en
Amendment 1579
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 81
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 81. Underlines that the effectiveness and credibility of EU sanctions depend on strict and consistent enforcement; highlights that the announced revision of the mandate of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) offers an opportunity to strengthen its role to include the investigation and prosecution of sanctions violations; | 81. Underlines that the effectiveness and credibility of EU sanctions depend on strict and consistent enforcement; calls therefore on Member States to improve the coordination of enforcement, work on closing loopholes, and further harmonize procedures and enforcement actions; highlights that the announced revision of the mandate of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) offers an opportunity to strengthen its role to include the investigation and prosecution of sanctions violations; |
Or. en
Amendment 1580
Tomas Tobé, Mika Aaltola, Tomáš Zdechovský, Sandra Kalniete, Lena Düpont, Lukas Mandl, Eszter Lakos, Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Ana Miguel Pedro, Fredis Beleris, Andrey Kovatchev
on behalf of the PPE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 81
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 81. Underlines that the effectiveness and credibility of EU sanctions depend on strict and consistent enforcement; highlights that the announced revision of the mandate of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) offers an opportunity to strengthen its role to include the investigation and prosecution of sanctions violations; | 81. Underlines that the effectiveness and credibility of EU sanctions depend on strict and consistent enforcement; highlights that the announced revision of the mandate of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) offers an opportunity to strengthen its role to include the investigation and prosecution of sanctions violations; further stresses that such a reform should be matched by adequate and reinforced funding to enable EPPO to effectively carry out enhanced responsibilities; |
Or. en
Amendment 1581
Danilo Della Valle, Konstantinos Arvanitis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 81
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 81. Underlines that the effectiveness and credibility of EU sanctions depend on strict and consistent enforcement; highlights that the announced revision of the mandate of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) offers an opportunity to strengthen its role to include the investigation and prosecution of sanctions violations; | 81. Underlines that the effectiveness and credibility of EU sanctions depend on strict and consistent enforcement, rigorous safeguards against arbitrary use and abuse, and full compliance with human rights; highlights that the announced revision of the mandate of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) offers an opportunity to strengthen its role to include the investigation and prosecution of sanctions violations; |
Or. en
Amendment 1582
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 81 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 81 a. Calls on the Member States and the Commission to engage proactively and intensify cooperation with Interpol and other relevant organisations and bodies, with a view to putting an end to the systematic, abusive and politically motivated use of red notices, blue notices, diffusions and extradition requests by authoritarian regimes; stresses that such instruments are increasingly weaponised to persecute political opponents, human rights defenders, diaspora communities and EU citizens who have been targeted for opposing dictatorships and their vicious policies; |
Or. en
Amendment 1583
Kim Van Sparrentak
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 81 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 81 a. Recalls that the EU Anti-Coercion Instruments allows the EU to take a wider range of measures where a third country applies or threatens to apply a third-country measure affecting trade or investment in order to prevent or obtain the cessation, modification or adoption of a particular act by the Union or a Member State, thereby interfering in the legitimate sovereign choices of the Union or a Member State; |
Or. en
Amendment 1584
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 81 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 81 b. Condemns the use by Russia, Belarus, Iran, China and other hostile actors of transnational repression targeting human rights defenders, dissidents, diaspora members, as well as EU citizens; stresses that such practices form part of broader campaigns of foreign interference and hybrid subversion conducted inside the European Union, aimed at silencing critics, manipulating democratic processes and weakening public trust in institutions; considers that such hostile actions include targeted killings, abductions, violence, harassment, enforced returns, disappearances and deportations, as well as the strategic misuse of legal instruments, including the abuse of consular services, extradition procedures, red notices and arrests, and non-physical methods such as digital surveillance, intimidation, blackmail and threats against the families of human rights defenders; notes that these practices enable foreign state actors to exercise intimidation, coercion and control beyond their borders, undermine the security, sovereignty and legal order of the Member States, and pose systemic and long-term threats to civic space, democratic institutions and the rule of law both at international level and within the state concerned, as evidenced by reports from the intelligence services of the Member States; further notes that a majority of documented cases on European soil are attributed to Russia, China, Iran and Belarus; calls for a resolute, coordinated and solidarity-based EU response, including deterrence, accountability measures and sanctions against those responsible; |
Or. en
Amendment 1585
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 81 c (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 81 c. Urges the Member States to exercise the utmost caution and apply enhanced scrutiny when considering requests for arrest, detention or extradition originating from regimes with a documented record of abusing international law-enforcement cooperation mechanisms, and to systematically refuse such requests where there are credible risks of political persecution, torture or other serious human rights violations, including in cases involving EU citizens; underlines, in this regard, the politically motivated attempts by the Russian authorities to target Polish President Karol Nawrocki and judges of the International Criminal Court, as emblematic examples of the abuse of legal and law-enforcement instruments for intimidation and retaliation against democratic officials and international justice actors who have bravely stood up to Vladimir Putin; |
Or. en
Amendment 1586
Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 82
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 82. Condemns Russia’s politically motivated use of ‘blacklists’ targeting EU citizens, representatives of state authorities and commercial organisations, journalists, civil society actors and political officials, including democratically elected Members of the European Parliament; calls for a more coordinated and resolute EU response to these arbitrary measures, ensuring the protection and security of those blacklisted and providing them with solidarity and the necessary support; expresses its full support for all individuals affected; | 82. Condemns the politically motivated use of ‘blacklists’, visa bans and other restrictive or retaliatory measures targeting EU citizens, representatives of state authorities and commercial organisations, journalists, civil society actors and political officials, including democratically elected Members of the European Parliament ; expresses concern that such practices, whether deployed by authoritarian regimes or by strategic partners, undermine diplomatic norms and the principle of mutual respect between jurisdictions; stresses that such measures risk exerting undue political pressure on the Union’s regulatory autonomy and fundamental rights framework; calls for a more coordinated and resolute EU response to these arbitrary measures, ensuring the protection and security of those blacklisted and providing them with solidarity and the necessary support; expresses its full support for all individuals affected; |
Or. en
Amendment 1587
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 82
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 82. Condemns Russia’s politically motivated use of ‘blacklists’ targeting EU citizens, representatives of state authorities and commercial organisations, journalists, civil society actors and political officials, including democratically elected Members of the European Parliament; calls for a more coordinated and resolute EU response to these arbitrary measures, ensuring the protection and security of those blacklisted and providing them with solidarity and the necessary support; expresses its full support for all individuals affected; | 82. Condemns Russia’s politically motivated use of ‘blacklists’ targeting EU citizens, representatives of state authorities and commercial organisations, journalists, civil society actors and political officials, including democratically elected Members of the European Parliament; calls for a more coordinated and resolute EU response to these arbitrary measures, ensuring the protection and security of those blacklisted and providing them with solidarity and the necessary support; expresses its full support for all individuals affected; considers, however, that a ban on entry to Russia—a country that, also as a result of the delusional imperial policy of its current rulers, is in civilisational, technological and infrastructural decline, is rather a cause for pride than any real inconvenience; |
Or. en
Amendment 1588
Tomáš Zdechovský, Dan-Ştefan Motreanu, Lukas Mandl, Sandra Kalniete, Sander Smit, Marta Wcisło, Fredis Beleris, Andrey Kovatchev
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 82
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 82. Condemns Russia’s politically motivated use of ‘blacklists’ targeting EU citizens, representatives of state authorities and commercial organisations, journalists, civil society actors and political officials, including democratically elected Members of the European Parliament; calls for a more coordinated and resolute EU response to these arbitrary measures, ensuring the protection and security of those blacklisted and providing them with solidarity and the necessary support; expresses its full support for all individuals affected; | 82. Condemns Russia’s politically motivated use of ‘blacklists’ targeting EU citizens, representatives of state authorities and commercial organisations, journalists, civil society actors and political officials, including democratically elected Members of the European Parliament; calls for a more coordinated and resolute EU response to these arbitrary measures, ensuring the protection and security of those blacklisted and providing them with solidarity and the necessary support; expresses its full support for all individuals affected; calls for the creation of mechanisms for more effective monitoring of sanction enforcement, including through collaboration with civil society and academia; |
Or. en
Amendment 1589
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Christel Schaldemose, Cecilia Strada
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 82
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 82. Condemns Russia’s politically motivated use of ‘blacklists’ targeting EU citizens, representatives of state authorities and commercial organisations, journalists, civil society actors and political officials, including democratically elected Members of the European Parliament; calls for a more coordinated and resolute EU response to these arbitrary measures, ensuring the protection and security of those blacklisted and providing them with solidarity and the necessary support; expresses its full support for all individuals affected; | 82. Condemns all politically motivated use of ‘blacklists’, notably by Russia and Israel, targeting EU citizens, representatives of state authorities and commercial organisations, journalists, civil society actors, humanitarian organisations and political officials, including democratically elected Members of the European Parliament; calls for a more coordinated and resolute EU response to these arbitrary measures, ensuring the protection and security of those blacklisted and providing them with solidarity and the necessary support; expresses its full support for all individuals affected |
Or. en
Amendment 1590
Kim Van Sparrentak
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 82
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 82. Condemns Russia’s politically motivated use of ‘blacklists’ targeting EU citizens, representatives of state authorities and commercial organisations, journalists, civil society actors and political officials, including democratically elected Members of the European Parliament; calls for a more coordinated and resolute EU response to these arbitrary measures, ensuring the protection and security of those blacklisted and providing them with solidarity and the necessary support; expresses its full support for all individuals affected; | 82. Condemns foreign governments’ politically motivated use of ‘blacklists’ targeting EU citizens, representatives of state authorities and commercial organisations, journalists, civil society actors and political officials, including democratically elected Members of the European Parliament; calls for a more coordinated and resolute EU response to these arbitrary measures, ensuring the protection and security of those blacklisted and providing them with solidarity and the necessary support; expresses its full support for all individuals affected; |
Or. en
Amendment 1591
Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 82 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 82 a. Expresses concern over negotiations or arrangements that may grant third countries broad or direct access to national biometric or identity databases of Union citizens in the context of border management or visa-related cooperation; underlines that large-scale exchanges of sensitive personal data raise significant implications for fundamental rights, data protection, democratic oversight and strategic autonomy; stresses that any such initiatives must be subject to full transparency, strict necessity and proportionality tests, robust safeguards and meaningful parliamentary scrutiny in accordance with Article 218 TFEU; calls on the Commission to fully leverage the Union’s geopolitical and economic weight when engaging in negotiations that may affect the rights of Union citizens and the security of critical data infrastructures; emphasises that protecting the integrity, sovereignty and security of European identity and biometric systems constitutes an essential component of the European Democracy Shield and of the Union’s broader efforts to safeguard democratic resilience and fundamental rights in the digital age; |
Or. en
Amendment 1592
Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 82 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 82a. Notes that the Commission's decision to fine X EUR 120 million under the DSA is an attempt to punish and deter Elon Musk personally; is concerned about the use of a survey of 300 Americans, paid USD 3.75, as justification for such a procedure; condemns Brussels' political weaponisation of this legislation to ban dissenting discourse, and the attempts to interfere in elections in Europe and elsewhere; |
Or. fr
Amendment 1593
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, António Tânger Corrêa, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 82 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 82 a. Stresses that international relations should be guided primarily by diplomacy and diplomatic engagement, and that the imposition of sanctions should always be duly, justified, proportionate and transparent and must not be misused or instrumentalized for short-term political interests; |
Or. en
Amendment 1594
Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 82 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 82 a. Condemns the US sanctions against five European individuals engaged in fighting disinformation; considers that they constitute an attack against freedom of opinion and free speech; calls on the US administration to revoke them; |
Or. en
Amendment 1595
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 82 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 82 a. Calls for the creation of mechanisms for more effective monitoring of sanction enforcement, including through collaboration with civil society and academia; |
Or. en
Amendment 1596
Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 82 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 82b. Notes that in more than 90 meetings organised between 2022 and 2024 under the auspices of the Code of Practice on Disinformation, the Commission put pressure on platforms to amend their overall content moderation rules and censor more content; points out that after a meeting with the Commission before the Slovakian elections, TikTok was required to ban content stating 'we need to stop the sexualisation of children'; notes that the Commission may have applied pressure to ensure that content concerning COVID-19 in children was censored, and that that censorship campaign began long before the DSA; notes that, from 2020 onwards, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, and Vice-President Věra Jourová urged platforms to amend their rules and delete content that undermined the prevailing narratives on the COVID-19 pandemic and vaccination1b; | |
| _________________ | |
| 1b https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/republicans-judiciary.house.gov/files/2026-02/THE-FOREIGN-CENSORSHIP-THREAT-PART-II-2-3-26.pdf. |
Or. fr
Amendment 1597
Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 82 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 82 b. Recalls that, since the beginning of the Trump Administration, almost all US institutions aiming at protecting the US from foreign interference have been disbanded; |
Or. en
Amendment 1598
Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 82 c (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 82 c. Condemns transnational repression targeting political opponents, journalists and activists; calls for the setting up of a comprehensive framework to overcome the fragmentation of national responses as well as harmonised penalties for proxy agents engaging in such actions; calls for a screening of Red Notices to prevent their abuse by autocratic states to target exiled political opponents; |
Or. en
Amendment 1599
Kim Van Sparrentak
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 82 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 82 a. Notes an increase in foreign interference and hybrid threats by foreign bad actors aimed at disrupting our societies, for example by spreading disinformation, supporting the far right, disrupting our infrastructures and increase political divisions; notes with concern that Big Tech's algorithms then pump that information around virally; emphasises that foreign bad actors hope the willingness to protect NATO territory will diminish when fear and unrest prevail at home; highlights that the goal is sewing resentment, division and driving people apart; recommends that standing up for our physical security therefore requires not only investment in defence, but also investment in the resilience of our society; emphasises that it is of vital importance that the EU invests in security in a broad sense; calls on the Commission and Member States to ensure that, in addition to the 3.5% spent on defence, we invest the 1.5% required by NATO standards in security in the broadest sense: the resilience of our society; emphasises that this means investing in civil resilience, a strong social foundation and reducing vulnerable dependencies in the areas of energy and technology; stresses that this is the only way the EU and its citizens will become less susceptible to hybrid threats; |
Or. en
Amendment 1600
Kim Van Sparrentak
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 83
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 83. Welcomes the EU Preparedness Union Strategy and underlines that the objectives set out in the strategy are closely interconnected with those of the European Democracy Shield; further emphasises that democratic resilience requires societies to be able to function under exceptional or disruptive conditions, and that reforms aimed at strengthening preparedness should therefore form an integral part of the European Democracy Shield; | 83. Welcomes the EU Preparedness Union Strategy and underlines that the objectives set out in the strategy are closely interconnected with those of the European Democracy Shield; further emphasises that democratic resilience requires societies to be able to function under exceptional or disruptive conditions, and that reforms aimed at strengthening preparedness should therefore form an integral part of the European Democracy Shield; welcomes policy in Member States, such as Sweden and Finland, to foster broad social preparedness, cooperation between government and society, and clear communication about citizens' responsibilities; notes that thousands of companies can be deployed to provide energy or help distribute food and water; stresses that associations can play a role in neighbourhood communication and many (semi-)professionals, veterans and retired people can provide the necessary physical and mental care; stresses that to organise this kind of civil resilience, people need to know how and when they can contribute; notes all Member States should start mapping various organisations, training managers of organisations and companies through scenario exercises and informing citizens about where they can go in times of need; |
Or. en
Amendment 1601
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 83
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 83. Welcomes the EU Preparedness Union Strategy and underlines that the objectives set out in the strategy are closely interconnected with those of the European Democracy Shield; further emphasises that democratic resilience requires societies to be able to function under exceptional or disruptive conditions, and that reforms aimed at strengthening preparedness should therefore form an integral part of the European Democracy Shield; | 83. Welcomes the EU Preparedness Union Strategy and underlines that the objectives set out in the strategy are closely interconnected with those of the European Democracy Shield; further emphasises that democratic resilience requires societies to be able to function under exceptional or disruptive conditions, and that reforms aimed at strengthening preparedness should therefore form an integral part of the European Democracy Shield; underlines that all initiatives under the Democracy Schield should strive for intersectionality and inclusion across all ages, communities, social and economic groups; |
Or. en
Amendment 1602
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 83
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 83. Welcomes the EU Preparedness Union Strategy and underlines that the objectives set out in the strategy are closely interconnected with those of the European Democracy Shield; further emphasises that democratic resilience requires societies to be able to function under exceptional or disruptive conditions, and that reforms aimed at strengthening preparedness should therefore form an integral part of the European Democracy Shield; | 83. Welcomes the EU Preparedness Union Strategy and underlines that the objectives set out in the strategy are closely interconnected with those of the European Democracy Shield; further emphasises that every form of resilience requires societies to be able to function under exceptional or disruptive conditions, and that reforms aimed at strengthening preparedness should therefore form an integral part of the European Democracy Shield; |
Or. en
Amendment 1603
Vasile Dîncu
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 83 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 83 a. Underlines that strengthening resilience and preparedness requires a skilled, protected and well-trained workforce across critical sectors; calls for EU-funded resilience and preparedness programmes to include training, reskilling and social conditionality, in line with Union labour standards; |
Or. en
Amendment 1604
Christophe Gomart
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 83 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 83a. Calls on the Commission to carry out an audit to assess all vulnerabilities and dependencies on non-EU solutions in the field of digital technologies and payments in the EU administrations and institutions; |
Or. fr
Amendment 1605
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 84
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 84. Calls for the swift development and deployment of an EU-wide, interoperable crisis-alert application, providing real-time, reliable, multilingual information to citizens during emergencies; recommends that this app be integrated into national and EU early warning systems, accessible to vulnerable groups, and regularly updated with technological advancements and best practices in crisis management; | 84. Calls for the swift development and deployment of an EU-wide, interoperable crisis-alert application, providing real-time, reliable, multilingual information to citizens during emergencies; recommends that this app be integrated into national and EU early warning systems, accessible to vulnerable groups, and regularly updated with technological advancements and best practices in crisis management; highlights the need to prepare contingency plans and alternative communication tools for crisis situations in which digital services are unavailable or cannot be used, including due to power outages or lack of access to electricity; |
Or. en
Amendment 1606
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 84
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 84. Calls for the swift development and deployment of an EU-wide, interoperable crisis-alert application, providing real-time, reliable, multilingual information to citizens during emergencies; recommends that this app be integrated into national and EU early warning systems, accessible to vulnerable groups, and regularly updated with technological advancements and best practices in crisis management; | 84. Calls for an assessment of existing alert systems and an analysis of the need for, and the feasibility of, the swift development and deployment of an EU-wide, interoperable crisis-alert application providing real-time, reliable and multilingual information to citizens during emergencies; recommends that this app be integrated into national and EU early warning systems, be accessible to all persons in the affected area, with particular emphasis on vulnerable groups, and regularly updated with technological advancements and best practices in crisis management. |
Or. en
Amendment 1607
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 84
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 84. Calls for the swift development and deployment of an EU-wide, interoperable crisis-alert application, providing real-time, reliable, multilingual information to citizens during emergencies; recommends that this app be integrated into national and EU early warning systems, accessible to vulnerable groups, and regularly updated with technological advancements and best practices in crisis management; | 84. Calls for the swift development and deployment of an EU-wide, interoperable crisis-alert application, providing real-time, reliable, multilingual information to residents during emergencies; recommends that this app be integrated into national and EU early warning systems, accessible to vulnerable groups, and regularly updated with technological advancements and best practices in crisis management; |
Or. en
Amendment 1608
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 85
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 85. Welcomes the initiatives in several Member States to distribute a household preparedness booklet, offering clear, practical guidance tailored to Europe’s diverse social and geographic realities to help citizens prepare for emergencies; calls on the Commission to produce an EU-level booklet reflecting the cross-border and multinational context, including recommended emergency supplies, practical self-sufficiency instructions for at least 72 hours, basic first aid advice and specific guidance for vulnerable groups, including elderly people, people with disabilities and families with children; | 85. Notes the initiatives in several Member States to distribute a household preparedness booklet, offering clear, practical guidance tailored to Europe’s diverse social and geographic realities to help citizens prepare for emergencies; Calls on the Commission, upon request, to provide assistance to Member States in the preparation and updating brochures; |
Or. en
Amendment 1609
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 85
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 85. Welcomes the initiatives in several Member States to distribute a household preparedness booklet, offering clear, practical guidance tailored to Europe’s diverse social and geographic realities to help citizens prepare for emergencies; calls on the Commission to produce an EU-level booklet reflecting the cross-border and multinational context, including recommended emergency supplies, practical self-sufficiency instructions for at least 72 hours, basic first aid advice and specific guidance for vulnerable groups, including elderly people, people with disabilities and families with children; | 85. Welcomes the initiatives in several Member States to distribute household preparedness booklets, offering clear, practical guidance for citizens on how to prepare for emergencies; calls on the Commission to assess the need for, and the feasibility of, an EU-level booklets reflecting the cross-border and regional contexts and tailored to Europe's diverse social and geographic realites and the resulting diversity of threats, including recommended emergency supplies, practical self-sufficiency instructions for a minimum of 72 hours, basic first aid advice and specific guidance for vulnerable groups, including elderly people, people with disabilities and families with children; |
Or. en
Amendment 1610
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 85 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 85 a. Considers it unacceptable for governments to deny opposition media access to press conferences; stresses that it is particularly dangerous when, for purely political reasons, authorities exclude media outlets from briefings concerning crisis situations, as occurred during the floods in Poland, when Donald Tusk persistently refused to allow TV Republika, the biggest news TV channel, to attend crisis management meetings and thereby excluded a significant part of society from receiving real-time crisis communications, which could have had a direct impact on their safety; condemns these irresponsible and undemocratic actions and warns against following Donald Tusk’s example; |
Or. en
Amendment 1611
Petar Volgin, Christine Anderson
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 86
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 86. Calls for the organisation of regular large-scale, EU-coordinated preparedness exercises involving EU institutions, Member States, regional and local authorities, the private sector and civil society; recommends that these exercises simulate complex, realistic scenarios, including cyberattacks, critical infrastructure disruptions, coordinated disinformation and hybrid crises, in order to assess response capacities, improve interoperability across governance levels and promote a culture of preparedness at all levels; calls, to this end, for the establishment of a European Preparedness Day; considers that the date for this event should be 24 February, the date of Russia’s unprovoked full-scale military invasion of Ukraine in 2022, as a symbol of the EU’s solidarity with Ukraine and a stark reminder of the necessity for strengthened civilian and defence preparedness against growing threats from authoritarian regimes; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 1612
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 86
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 86. Calls for the organisation of regular large-scale, EU-coordinated preparedness exercises involving EU institutions, Member States, regional and local authorities, the private sector and civil society; recommends that these exercises simulate complex, realistic scenarios, including cyberattacks, critical infrastructure disruptions, coordinated disinformation and hybrid crises, in order to assess response capacities, improve interoperability across governance levels and promote a culture of preparedness at all levels; calls, to this end, for the establishment of a European Preparedness Day; considers that the date for this event should be 24 February, the date of Russia’s unprovoked full-scale military invasion of Ukraine in 2022, as a symbol of the EU’s solidarity with Ukraine and a stark reminder of the necessity for strengthened civilian and defence preparedness against growing threats from authoritarian regimes; | 86. Calls to continue regular large-scale preparedness exercises involving EU institutions, Member States, regional and local authorities, the private sector and civil society; considers that the catalogue of scenarios, which already includes floods, forest fires, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) incidents, earthquakes and medical emergencies, should be expanded to cover threats resulting from Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, as well as hybrid attacks against the collective West; recommends that these exercises simulate complex and realistic scenarios, including cyberattacks, disruptions to critical infrastructure, coordinated disinformation campaigns and hybrid crises, in order to assess response capacities, improve interoperability across governance levels, share best practices and promote a culture of preparedness at all levels; is of the opinion that, as a priority, such exercises should draw on the experience of countries such as Poland, which, particularly in the period immediately following Russia’s aggression, effectively managed multiple crisis situations by bringing together state institutions, local authorities, the private sector and civil society; calls, to this end, for the establishment of a European Preparedness Day; considers that the date for this event should be 24 February, the date of Russia’s unprovoked full-scale brutal invasion of Ukraine in 2022, as a symbol of the EU’s solidarity with Ukraine and a stark reminder of the necessity for strengthened civilian and defence preparedness against growing threats from authoritarian regimes; |
Or. en
Amendment 1613
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 86
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 86. Calls for the organisation of regular large-scale, EU-coordinated preparedness exercises involving EU institutions, Member States, regional and local authorities, the private sector and civil society; recommends that these exercises simulate complex, realistic scenarios, including cyberattacks, critical infrastructure disruptions, coordinated disinformation and hybrid crises, in order to assess response capacities, improve interoperability across governance levels and promote a culture of preparedness at all levels; calls, to this end, for the establishment of a European Preparedness Day; considers that the date for this event should be 24 February, the date of Russia’s unprovoked full-scale military invasion of Ukraine in 2022, as a symbol of the EU’s solidarity with Ukraine and a stark reminder of the necessity for strengthened civilian and defence preparedness against growing threats from authoritarian regimes; | 86. Calls for the organisation of regular large-scale, Member States-coordinated preparedness exercises involving EU institutions, Member States, regional and local authorities, the private sector and civil society; recommends that these exercises simulate complex, realistic scenarios, including cyberattacks, critical infrastructure disruptions, coordinated disinformation and hybrid crises, in order to assess response capacities, improve interoperability across governance levels and promote a culture of preparedness at all levels; |
Or. en
Amendment 1614
Tomáš Zdechovský
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 86
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 86. Calls for the organisation of regular large-scale, EU-coordinated preparedness exercises involving EU institutions, Member States, regional and local authorities, the private sector and civil society; recommends that these exercises simulate complex, realistic scenarios, including cyberattacks, critical infrastructure disruptions, coordinated disinformation and hybrid crises, in order to assess response capacities, improve interoperability across governance levels and promote a culture of preparedness at all levels; calls, to this end, for the establishment of a European Preparedness Day; considers that the date for this event should be 24 February, the date of Russia’s unprovoked full-scale military invasion of Ukraine in 2022, as a symbol of the EU’s solidarity with Ukraine and a stark reminder of the necessity for strengthened civilian and defence preparedness against growing threats from authoritarian regimes; | 86. Calls for the organisation of regular large-scale, EU-coordinated preparedness exercises involving EU institutions, EU Agencies, Member States, regional and local authorities, the private sector and civil society; recommends that these exercises simulate complex, realistic scenarios, including cyberattacks, critical infrastructure disruptions, coordinated disinformation and hybrid crises, in order to assess response capacities, improve interoperability across governance levels and promote a culture of preparedness at all levels; calls, to this end, for the establishment of a European Preparedness Day; considers that the date for this event should be 24 February, the date of Russia’s unprovoked full-scale military invasion of Ukraine in 2022, as a symbol of the EU’s solidarity with Ukraine and a stark reminder of the necessity for strengthened civilian and defence preparedness against growing threats from authoritarian regimes; |
Or. en
Amendment 1615
Stefano Cavedagna
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 86 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 86 a. Recommends that crisis coordination protocols be tested and refined collaboratively with industry partners before any mandatory implementation to ensure their effectiveness and practicality; |
Or. en
Amendment 1616
Fidias Panayiotou
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 87
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 87. Calls on the Commission to examine the possibility of expanding Erasmus+ or similar programmes to include cross-border initiatives on preparedness training for workers in critical sectors, such as firefighters, healthcare workers, civil protection volunteers, public servants and representatives of civil society organisations and the public at large; recommends that these programmes promote cross-border and cross-sectoral knowledge exchange, joint exercises and training on hybrid threats and emergencies, and strengthen local preparedness capacities across all Member States, with a special focus on vulnerable regions; | 87. Calls on the Commission to examine the possibility of expanding Erasmus+ or similar programmes to include cross-border initiatives on preparedness training for workers in critical sectors, such as firefighters, healthcare workers, civil protection volunteers, public servants and representatives of civil society organisations and the public at large; recommends that these programmes promote cross-border and cross-sectoral knowledge exchange, joint exercises and training on hybrid threats and emergencies,including practical digital literacy and cyber-hygiene components such as phishing and social - engineering awarness, secure communications and recognising online manipulation and strengthen local preparedness capacities across all Member States, with a special focus on vulnerable regions; |
Or. en
Amendment 1617
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 87
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 87. Calls on the Commission to examine the possibility of expanding Erasmus+ or similar programmes to include cross-border initiatives on preparedness training for workers in critical sectors, such as firefighters, healthcare workers, civil protection volunteers, public servants and representatives of civil society organisations and the public at large; recommends that these programmes promote cross-border and cross-sectoral knowledge exchange, joint exercises and training on hybrid threats and emergencies, and strengthen local preparedness capacities across all Member States, with a special focus on vulnerable regions; | 87. Reminds of the possibility of expanding and strenghtening Erasmus+ or similar programmes that include cross-border initiatives on preparedness training for workers in critical sectors, such as firefighters, healthcare workers, civil protection volunteers, public servants and representatives of civil society organisations and the public at large; recommends that these programmes promote cross-border and cross-sectoral knowledge exchange, joint exercises and training on hybrid threats and emergencies, and strengthen local preparedness capacities across all Member States, with a special focus on vulnerable regions; warns that any such measures should not result in diminishing the funds allocated to students; |
Or. en
Amendment 1618
Danilo Della Valle, Konstantinos Arvanitis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 87
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 87. Calls on the Commission to examine the possibility of expanding Erasmus+ or similar programmes to include cross-border initiatives on preparedness training for workers in critical sectors, such as firefighters, healthcare workers, civil protection volunteers, public servants and representatives of civil society organisations and the public at large; recommends that these programmes promote cross-border and cross-sectoral knowledge exchange, joint exercises and training on hybrid threats and emergencies, and strengthen local preparedness capacities across all Member States, with a special focus on vulnerable regions; | 87. Calls on the Commission to examine the possibility of expanding Erasmus+ or similar programmes to include cross-border initiatives on preparedness training for workers in critical sectors, such as firefighters, healthcare workers, civil protection volunteers, public servants and representatives of civil society organisations and the public at large; recommends that these programmes promote cross-border and cross-sectoral knowledge exchange, joint exercises and training on threats and emergencies, and strengthen local preparedness capacities across all Member States, with a special focus on vulnerable regions; |
Or. en
Amendment 1619
Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 87
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 87. Calls on the Commission to examine the possibility of expanding Erasmus+ or similar programmes to include cross-border initiatives on preparedness training for workers in critical sectors, such as firefighters, healthcare workers, civil protection volunteers, public servants and representatives of civil society organisations and the public at large; recommends that these programmes promote cross-border and cross-sectoral knowledge exchange, joint exercises and training on hybrid threats and emergencies, and strengthen local preparedness capacities across all Member States, with a special focus on vulnerable regions; | 87. Calls on the Commission to examine the possibility of expanding Erasmus+ or similar programmes for students who are EU citizens to include cross-border initiatives on preparedness training for workers in critical sectors, such as firefighters, healthcare workers, civil protection volunteers, public servants and the public at large; recommends that these programmes promote cross-border and cross-sectoral knowledge exchange, joint exercises and training on hybrid threats and emergencies, and strengthen local preparedness capacities across all Member States, with a special focus on vulnerable regions; |
Or. fr
Amendment 1620
Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 88
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 88. Calls for the accelerated implementation of secure communication systems such as IRIS² and the European Critical Communications System; stresses that these initiatives ensure telecommunications resilience, the continuity of essential services during crises, reduced external dependencies in strategic sectors, and reinforced cybersecurity for these infrastructures; | 88. Calls for the accelerated implementation of secure communication systems such as IRIS² and the European Critical Communications System; stresses that these initiatives ensure telecommunications resilience, the continuity of essential services during crises, reduced external dependencies in strategic sectors, and reinforced cybersecurity for these infrastructures; recalls in this context that China-linked Salt Typhoon targeted European telecom companies; insist on the need for companies to increase their own cybersecurity to ensure citizen’s digital security; |
Or. en
Amendment 1621
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 88
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 88. Calls for the accelerated implementation of secure communication systems such as IRIS² and the European Critical Communications System; stresses that these initiatives ensure telecommunications resilience, the continuity of essential services during crises, reduced external dependencies in strategic sectors, and reinforced cybersecurity for these infrastructures; | 88. Calls for the accelerated implementation of secure communication systems such as IRIS² and the European Critical Communications System, while respecting the competences of the Member States and the effective solutions that have long been in place in several Member States and have been tested in multiple crises; stresses that these initiatives ensure telecommunications resilience, the continuity of essential services during crises, reduced external dependencies in strategic sectors, and reinforced cybersecurity for these infrastructures; |
Or. en
Amendment 1622
Tomas Tobé, Mika Aaltola, Tomáš Zdechovský, Sandra Kalniete, Lena Düpont, Lukas Mandl, Eszter Lakos, Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Ana Miguel Pedro, Fredis Beleris, Andrey Kovatchev
on behalf of the PPE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 88
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 88. Calls for the accelerated implementation of secure communication systems such as IRIS² and the European Critical Communications System; stresses that these initiatives ensure telecommunications resilience, the continuity of essential services during crises, reduced external dependencies in strategic sectors, and reinforced cybersecurity for these infrastructures; | 88. Calls for the accelerated implementation of secure communication systems such as IRIS² and the European Critical Communications System; stresses that these initiatives ensure telecommunications resilience, the continuity of essential services during crises, reduced external dependencies in strategic sectors, and reinforced cybersecurity for these infrastructures, through harmonized spectrum authorization, cybersecurity certification and ICT supply chain security measures in line with the Commission's DNA and CSA proposals; |
Or. en
Amendment 1623
Tomáš Zdechovský
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 89
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 89. Calls for enhanced coordination between EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, the Member States and international partners through shared situational awareness platforms, common methodologies and rapid, secure information-sharing mechanisms; stresses that these tools enable a coherent, agile and coordinated response to hybrid threats, improve risk anticipation and strengthen the EU’s collective preparedness and resilience; | 89. Calls for enhanced coordination between EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, the Member States and international partners through shared situational awareness platforms, common methodologies and rapid, secure information-sharing mechanisms; stresses that these tools enable a coherent, agile and coordinated response to hybrid threats, improve risk anticipation and strengthen the EU’s collective preparedness and resilience; highlights, in this context, the added value of structured cooperation with democratic partners exposed to similar threats, notably Taiwan, which has ample experience in countering FIMI campaigns, including those targeting elections and societal cohesion; recognizes Taiwan’s whole-of-society approach and best practices can contribute to strengthening shared situational awareness, early-warning capacities and the overall effectiveness of the European Democracy Shield; encourages therefore the EU and Member States to further cooperation with Taiwan in building social resilience and countering FIMI; |
Or. en
Amendment 1624
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 89
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 89. Calls for enhanced coordination between EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, the Member States and international partners through shared situational awareness platforms, common methodologies and rapid, secure information-sharing mechanisms; stresses that these tools enable a coherent, agile and coordinated response to hybrid threats, improve risk anticipation and strengthen the EU’s collective preparedness and resilience; | 89. Calls for enhanced coordination between EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, the Member States and like-minded international partners through shared situational awareness platforms, common methodologies and rapid, secure information-sharing mechanisms; stresses that these tools enable a coherent, agile and coordinated response to hybrid threats, improve risk anticipation and strengthen the EU’s collective preparedness and resilience; |
Or. en
Amendment 1625
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 89
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 89. Calls for enhanced coordination between EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, the Member States and international partners through shared situational awareness platforms, common methodologies and rapid, secure information-sharing mechanisms; stresses that these tools enable a coherent, agile and coordinated response to hybrid threats, improve risk anticipation and strengthen the EU’s collective preparedness and resilience; | 89. Calls for enhanced coordination between EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, the Member States and international partners through shared situational awareness platforms, common methodologies and rapid, secure information-sharing mechanisms; stresses that these tools enable a continuous exchange of information and the sharing of best practices , improve risk anticipation and strengthen the EU’s collective preparedness and resilience; |
Or. en
Amendment 1626
Danilo Della Valle, Konstantinos Arvanitis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 89
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 89. Calls for enhanced coordination between EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, the Member States and international partners through shared situational awareness platforms, common methodologies and rapid, secure information-sharing mechanisms; stresses that these tools enable a coherent, agile and coordinated response to hybrid threats, improve risk anticipation and strengthen the EU’s collective preparedness and resilience; | 89. Calls for enhanced coordination between EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, the Member States and international partners through shared situational awareness platforms, common methodologies and rapid, secure information-sharing mechanisms; stresses that these tools enable a coherent, agile and coordinated response to different threats, improve risk anticipation and strengthen the EU’s collective preparedness and resilience; |
Or. en
Amendment 1627
Vasile Dîncu
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 89 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 89 a. Emphasises that preparedness and resilience are collective responsibilities requiring societal participation; supports the development of EU-wide preparedness tools that empower citizens while respecting social inclusion, accessibility and democratic values; |
Or. en
Amendment 1628
Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 89 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 89 a. Welcomes the involvement and ownership of the issue by the presidencies of the Council of the European Union regarding the fight against foreign interference; invites however the presidencies to avoid recreating new structures and concepts every six months; |
Or. en
Amendment 1629
Jaroslav Bžoch, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 90
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 90. Highlights the need to mainstream preparedness within the 2028-2034 MFF, in order to build credible resilience and achieve a sufficient level of civilian and defence preparedness; urges the Commission to develop targeted financial instruments combining relevant defence and civil security instruments, such as the Defending Europe Facility and the Securing Europe Facility, in order to provide sufficient and stable funding for resilience-building projects, technological innovation and dual-use capabilities, civil preparedness initiatives, critical infrastructure protection, and efforts to strengthen the EU’s industrial and technological sovereignty; notes that dedicated funding streams should also prioritise local preparedness efforts, particularly in territories most exposed to vulnerabilities and hybrid threats; | 90. Highlights the need to provide and allocate funds for the development and purchase of technological equipment to combat disinformation and foreign interference; notes that dedicated funding streams should also prioritise local preparedness efforts; |
Or. en
Amendment 1630
Tomáš Zdechovský
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 90
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 90. Highlights the need to mainstream preparedness within the 2028-2034 MFF, in order to build credible resilience and achieve a sufficient level of civilian and defence preparedness; urges the Commission to develop targeted financial instruments combining relevant defence and civil security instruments, such as the Defending Europe Facility and the Securing Europe Facility, in order to provide sufficient and stable funding for resilience-building projects, technological innovation and dual-use capabilities, civil preparedness initiatives, critical infrastructure protection, and efforts to strengthen the EU’s industrial and technological sovereignty; notes that dedicated funding streams should also prioritise local preparedness efforts, particularly in territories most exposed to vulnerabilities and hybrid threats; | 90. Highlights the need to mainstream preparedness within the 2028-2034 MFF, in order to build credible resilience and achieve a sufficient level of civilian and defence preparedness; urges the Commission to develop targeted financial instruments combining relevant defence and civil security instruments, such as the Defending Europe Facility and the Securing Europe Facility, in order to provide sufficient and stable funding for resilience-building projects, technological innovation and dual-use capabilities, civil preparedness initiatives, critical infrastructure protection, and efforts to strengthen the EU’s industrial and technological sovereignty; notes that dedicated funding streams should also prioritise local preparedness efforts, particularly in territories most exposed to vulnerabilities and hybrid and information threats; |
Or. en
Amendment 1631
Danilo Della Valle, Konstantinos Arvanitis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 90
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 90. Highlights the need to mainstream preparedness within the 2028-2034 MFF, in order to build credible resilience and achieve a sufficient level of civilian and defence preparedness; urges the Commission to develop targeted financial instruments combining relevant defence and civil security instruments, such as the Defending Europe Facility and the Securing Europe Facility, in order to provide sufficient and stable funding for resilience-building projects, technological innovation and dual-use capabilities, civil preparedness initiatives, critical infrastructure protection, and efforts to strengthen the EU’s industrial and technological sovereignty; notes that dedicated funding streams should also prioritise local preparedness efforts, particularly in territories most exposed to vulnerabilities and hybrid threats; | 90. Highlights the need to mainstream preparedness within the 2028-2034 MFF, in order to build credible resilience and achieve a sufficient level of civilian and defence preparedness; urges the Commission to develop targeted financial instruments combining relevant defence and civil security instruments, such as the Defending Europe Facility and the Securing Europe Facility, in order to provide sufficient and stable funding for resilience-building projects, technological innovation and dual-use capabilities, civil preparedness initiatives, critical infrastructure protection, and efforts to strengthen the EU’s industrial and technological sovereignty; notes that dedicated funding streams should also prioritise local preparedness efforts, particularly in territories most exposed to vulnerabilities and threats; |
Or. en
Amendment 1632
Eszter Lakos, Ana Miguel Pedro, Tomas Tobé, Mika Aaltola, Tomáš Zdechovský
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 90 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 90 a. Calls for the establishment of a publicly available annual EU-level activity report. The report should provide a structured overview of Member States’ preparedness for hybrid threats, including their institutional frameworks, strategic capabilities, preventive measures, response mechanisms and remaining vulnerabilities; stresses that such a report should present, in a clear and accessible manner, the overall state of preparedness across the Union, trends over time and key challenges identified, while respecting national security considerations; underlines that the annual activity report should serve as an interface for public information, enabling citizens to understand how democratic institutions and critical systems are protected against hybrid attacks; |
Or. en
Amendment 1633
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 90 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 90 a. welcomes civil initiatives and courage to support EU’s defence effort from a safe environment by taking initiative and detecting irregular activities through Open Source Intelligence (OSINT); commends the courage of the seven German students and their team leader who identified, tracked and incriminated a Russian ship that was secretly sending out reconnaissance drones above Germany; |
Or. en
Amendment 1634
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 90 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 90 b. Emphasises the need for investment in Open Source Intelligence research and analysis networks, and their role in countering influence operations, FIMI, and hybrid threats; |
Or. en
Amendment 1635
Fredis Beleris
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 91
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 91. Recommends that the EU’s decision-making institutions review and optimise their strategies and contingency plans in case of an open military conflict against one or more Member States and similar crisis scenarios; stresses, furthermore, the need to ensure the highest levels of safety and security in all EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, including in the area of cybersecurity and the security and integrity of information, and to create the necessary conditions in this regard, including ensuring accredited secure communication channels and adequate meeting rooms for ‘in camera’ meetings; underlines the need to strictly enforce rules on breaches of information security and confidentiality, in particular in the context of a heightened risk of espionage and sabotage; stresses that, even outside of open military conflict, hybrid threats continue to pose ever higher risks to the daily functioning of the EU; | 91. Recommends that the EU’s decision-making institutions review and optimise their strategies and contingency plans in case of an open military conflict against one or more Member States and similar crisis scenarios; calls on the EU’s decision-making institutions to treat threats of the use of force and irredentist claims directed against Member States by third countries as a hybrid threat to the Union’s collective security and prosperity, which may also influence public opinion, voting behaviour, and democratic processes; stresses, furthermore, the need to ensure the highest levels of safety and security in all EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, including in the area of cybersecurity and the security and integrity of information, and to create the necessary conditions in this regard, including ensuring accredited secure communication channels and adequate meeting rooms for ‘in camera’ meetings; underlines the need to strictly enforce rules on breaches of information security and confidentiality, in particular in the context of a heightened risk of espionage and sabotage; stresses that, even outside of open military conflict, hybrid threats continue to pose ever higher risks to the daily functioning of the EU; |
Or. en
Amendment 1636
Danilo Della Valle, Konstantinos Arvanitis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 91
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 91. Recommends that the EU’s decision-making institutions review and optimise their strategies and contingency plans in case of an open military conflict against one or more Member States and similar crisis scenarios; stresses, furthermore, the need to ensure the highest levels of safety and security in all EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, including in the area of cybersecurity and the security and integrity of information, and to create the necessary conditions in this regard, including ensuring accredited secure communication channels and adequate meeting rooms for ‘in camera’ meetings; underlines the need to strictly enforce rules on breaches of information security and confidentiality, in particular in the context of a heightened risk of espionage and sabotage; stresses that, even outside of open military conflict, hybrid threats continue to pose ever higher risks to the daily functioning of the EU; | 91. Recommends that the EU’s decision-making institutions review and optimise their strategies and contingency plans in case of an open military conflict against one or more Member States and similar crisis scenarios; stresses, furthermore, the need to ensure the highest levels of safety and security in all EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, including in the area of cybersecurity and the security and integrity of information, and to create the necessary conditions in this regard, including ensuring accredited secure communication channels and adequate meeting rooms for ‘in camera’ meetings; underlines the need to strictly enforce rules on breaches of information security and confidentiality, in particular in the context of a heightened risk of espionage and sabotage; |
Or. en
Amendment 1637
Tomáš Zdechovský, Lukas Mandl, Sandra Kalniete, Dan-Ştefan Motreanu, Marta Wcisło, Andrey Kovatchev, Tomas Tobé, Mika Aaltola
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 91
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 91. Recommends that the EU’s decision-making institutions review and optimise their strategies and contingency plans in case of an open military conflict against one or more Member States and similar crisis scenarios; stresses, furthermore, the need to ensure the highest levels of safety and security in all EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, including in the area of cybersecurity and the security and integrity of information, and to create the necessary conditions in this regard, including ensuring accredited secure communication channels and adequate meeting rooms for ‘in camera’ meetings; underlines the need to strictly enforce rules on breaches of information security and confidentiality, in particular in the context of a heightened risk of espionage and sabotage; stresses that, even outside of open military conflict, hybrid threats continue to pose ever higher risks to the daily functioning of the EU; | 91. Recommends that the EU’s decision-making institutions review and optimise their strategies and contingency plans in case of an open military conflict against one or more Member States and similar crisis scenarios; stresses, furthermore, the need to ensure the highest levels of safety and security in all EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, including in the area of cybersecurity and the security and integrity of information, and to create the necessary conditions in this regard, including ensuring accredited secure communication channels and adequate meeting rooms for ‘in camera’ meetings; underlines the need to strictly enforce rules on breaches of information security and confidentiality, including through effective investigation and prosecution of such breaches, in particular in the context of a heightened risk of espionage and sabotage; stresses that, even outside of open military conflict, hybrid threats continue to pose ever higher risks to the daily functioning of the EU |
Or. en
Amendment 1638
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 91
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 91. Recommends that the EU’s decision-making institutions review and optimise their strategies and contingency plans in case of an open military conflict against one or more Member States and similar crisis scenarios; stresses, furthermore, the need to ensure the highest levels of safety and security in all EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, including in the area of cybersecurity and the security and integrity of information, and to create the necessary conditions in this regard, including ensuring accredited secure communication channels and adequate meeting rooms for ‘in camera’ meetings; underlines the need to strictly enforce rules on breaches of information security and confidentiality, in particular in the context of a heightened risk of espionage and sabotage; stresses that, even outside of open military conflict, hybrid threats continue to pose ever higher risks to the daily functioning of the EU; | 91. Recommends that the EU’s decision-making institutions review and optimise their strategies and contingency plans in case of an open military conflict against one or more Member States and similar crisis scenarios including the activation of Article 42.7 TEU; stresses, furthermore, the need to ensure the highest levels of safety and security in all EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, including in the area of cybersecurity and the security and integrity of information, and to create the necessary conditions in this regard, including ensuring accredited secure communication channels and adequate meeting rooms for ‘in camera’ meetings; underlines the need to strictly enforce rules on breaches of information security and confidentiality, in particular in the context of a heightened risk of espionage and sabotage; stresses that, even outside of open military conflict, hybrid threats continue to pose ever higher risks to the daily functioning of the EU; |
Or. en
Amendment 1639
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 91
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 91. Recommends that the EU’s decision-making institutions review and optimise their strategies and contingency plans in case of an open military conflict against one or more Member States and similar crisis scenarios; stresses, furthermore, the need to ensure the highest levels of safety and security in all EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, including in the area of cybersecurity and the security and integrity of information, and to create the necessary conditions in this regard, including ensuring accredited secure communication channels and adequate meeting rooms for ‘in camera’ meetings; underlines the need to strictly enforce rules on breaches of information security and confidentiality, in particular in the context of a heightened risk of espionage and sabotage; stresses that, even outside of open military conflict, hybrid threats continue to pose ever higher risks to the daily functioning of the EU; | 91. Recommends that the EU’s decision-making institutions in a close cooperation with Member States review and optimise their strategies and contingency plans in case of an open military conflict against one or more Member States and similar crisis scenarios; stresses, furthermore, the need to ensure the highest levels of safety and security in all EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, including in the area of cybersecurity and the security and integrity of information, and to create the necessary conditions in this regard, including ensuring accredited secure communication channels and adequate meeting rooms for ‘in camera’ meetings; underlines the need to strictly enforce rules on breaches of information security and confidentiality, in particular in the context of a heightened risk of espionage and sabotage; stresses that, even outside of open military conflict, hybrid threats continue to pose ever higher risks to the daily functioning of the EU; |
Or. en
Amendment 1640
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 91 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 91 a. Highlights that efforts to counter disinformation, FIMI, and influence operation broadly need to focus on systematically disrupting these threats by addressing tactics, threat actors, and systemic risks; notes that programmes for countering information manipulation should focus on active disruption of information threats; |
Or. en
Amendment 1641
Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 92
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 92. Welcomes the Commission’s efforts to strengthen physical and information security within the EU institutions, as outlined in the Corporate Management Board note of October 2025, including plans for secure meeting rooms, enhanced security clearance procedures for staff handling classified information, and the establishment of the Security College to ensure regular updates on threat developments; notes that these measures respond to heightened risks from espionage, foreign interference and hybrid threats targeting EU decision-making processes; stresses, however, that physical security upgrades must be complemented by robust cybersecurity protocols and counter-intelligence capabilities to address the full spectrum of infiltration risks; calls for the swift adoption of the Commission proposal for a regulation on information security in the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union (COM/2022/0119); recalls that the Cybersecurity Regulation for the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies recommends a cybersecurity budget of 10 % of the overall information and communications technology budget for EU entities; | 92. Welcomes the Commission’s efforts to strengthen physical and information security within the EU institutions, as outlined in the Corporate Management Board note of October 2025, including plans for secure meeting rooms, enhanced security clearance procedures for staff handling classified information, and the establishment of the Security College to ensure regular updates on threat developments; notes that these measures respond to heightened risks from espionage, foreign interference and hybrid threats targeting EU decision-making processes; stresses, however, that physical security upgrades must be complemented by robust cybersecurity protocols and counter-intelligence capabilities to address the full spectrum of infiltration risks; calls for the swift adoption of the Commission proposal for a regulation on information security in the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union (COM/2022/0119); recalls that the Cybersecurity Regulation for the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies recommends a cybersecurity budget of 10 % of the overall information and communications technology budget for EU entities; welcomes CERT-EU’s work and insist on the need to have sufficient budget and ensure proper staffing; |
Or. en
Amendment 1642
Danilo Della Valle, Konstantinos Arvanitis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 92
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 92. Welcomes the Commission’s efforts to strengthen physical and information security within the EU institutions, as outlined in the Corporate Management Board note of October 2025, including plans for secure meeting rooms, enhanced security clearance procedures for staff handling classified information, and the establishment of the Security College to ensure regular updates on threat developments; notes that these measures respond to heightened risks from espionage, foreign interference and hybrid threats targeting EU decision-making processes; stresses, however, that physical security upgrades must be complemented by robust cybersecurity protocols and counter-intelligence capabilities to address the full spectrum of infiltration risks; calls for the swift adoption of the Commission proposal for a regulation on information security in the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union (COM/2022/0119); recalls that the Cybersecurity Regulation for the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies recommends a cybersecurity budget of 10 % of the overall information and communications technology budget for EU entities; | 92. Welcomes the Commission’s efforts to strengthen physical and information security within the EU institutions, as outlined in the Corporate Management Board note of October 2025, including plans for secure meeting rooms, enhanced security clearance procedures for staff handling classified information, and the establishment of the Security College to ensure regular updates on threat developments; notes that these measures respond to heightened risks from espionage, foreign interference and threats targeting EU decision-making processes; stresses, however, that physical security upgrades must be complemented by robust cybersecurity protocols and counter-intelligence capabilities to address the full spectrum of infiltration risks; calls for the swift adoption of the Commission proposal for a regulation on information security in the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union (COM/2022/0119); recalls that the Cybersecurity Regulation for the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies recommends a cybersecurity budget of 10 % of the overall information and communications technology budget for EU entities; |
Or. en
Amendment 1643
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 92 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 92 a. Calls upon the Commission, Member States, together with the European Parliament, to initiate an annual review process of the Democracy Shield, ensuring commitments are delivered on, that implementation is effective, and that ambition is consistently raised; |
Or. en
Amendment 1644
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 92 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 92 b. Considers that the Special Committee on the EU Democracy Shield is needed to oversee the effective implementation of the Shield or alternatively a cross-Committee Working Group must be set up to carry on the work of overseeing the implementation of the Democracy Shield; |
Or. en
Amendment 1645
Nathalie Loiseau, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 93 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 93 a. Recommends again to ensure appropriate security clearance for Parliament officials and political group staff, and evaluation of when security clearance is needed for APAs when dealing with foreign affairs, security and defence or trade issues, such as is in place at the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU; calls, therefore, for appropriate cooperation with national security services to ensure that such security clearances are processed swiftly; calls on national authorities to follow procedures and a common timeframe whenever they are requested to give security clearance to MEPs and Parliament staff, as well as for any security screening related to the EU institutions; recommends that sensitive meetings be organised only with Members and staff having obtained a security clearance; |
Or. en
Amendment 1646
Nathalie Loiseau, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 93 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 93 b. Is worried by the links maintained by certain MEPs with regimes who openly interfere in European and Member States democratic processes; notes that sensitive meetings and official European Parliament’s mission abroad should not be open to MEPs expressing support for countries openly hostile to the EU and interfering in EU internal affairs; |
Or. en
Amendment 1647
Jaroslav Bžoch, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 94
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 94. Notes, in the context of Parliament’s internal security, that the use by Members and staff of private mobile phones and other devices such as laptops for business purposes constitutes a vulnerability that could be exploited to attack the institution; underlines that Members and staff should be equipped with the necessary IT devices, such as mobile phones and laptops, to perform their tasks; welcomes, in this context, the security screenings offered to Members and staff, upon request, to detect potential spyware on private devices; calls on the administration to extend and systematise this screening to cover all devices used for Parliament-related work; calls for clearer rules and systematic and appropriate guidance to Members and staff, and for safeguards to mitigate these risks, especially during missions; | 94. Notes, in the context of Parliament’s internal security, that the use by Members and staff of private mobile phones and other devices such as laptops for business purposes constitutes a vulnerability that could be exploited to attack the institution; underlines that Members and staff should be equipped with the necessary IT devices, such as mobile phones and laptops, including secure internet connectivity enabling them to work online when travelling abroad, as necessary, , to perform their tasks; welcomes, in this context, the security screenings offered to Members and staff, upon request, to detect potential spyware on private devices; calls on the administration to extend and systematise this screening to cover all devices used for Parliament-related work; calls for clearer rules and systematic and appropriate guidance to Members and staff, and for safeguards to mitigate these risks, especially during missions; |
Or. en
Amendment 1648
Christophe Gomart
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 94
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 94. Notes, in the context of Parliament’s internal security, that the use by Members and staff of private mobile phones and other devices such as laptops for business purposes constitutes a vulnerability that could be exploited to attack the institution; underlines that Members and staff should be equipped with the necessary IT devices, such as mobile phones and laptops, to perform their tasks; welcomes, in this context, the security screenings offered to Members and staff, upon request, to detect potential spyware on private devices; calls on the administration to extend and systematise this screening to cover all devices used for Parliament-related work; calls for clearer rules and systematic and appropriate guidance to Members and staff, and for safeguards to mitigate these risks, especially during missions; | 94. Notes, in the context of Parliament’s internal security, that the use by Members and staff of private mobile phones and other devices such as laptops for business purposes constitutes a vulnerability that could be exploited to attack the institution; underlines that Members and staff (including trainees) should be equipped with the necessary IT devices, such as mobile phones and laptops, to perform their tasks; welcomes, in this context, the security screenings offered to Members and staff, upon request, to detect potential spyware on private devices; calls on the administration to extend and systematise this screening to cover all devices used for Parliament-related work; calls for clearer rules and systematic and appropriate guidance to Members and staff, and for safeguards to mitigate these risks, especially during missions; |
Or. fr
Amendment 1649
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 94
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 94. Notes, in the context of Parliament’s internal security, that the use by Members and staff of private mobile phones and other devices such as laptops for business purposes constitutes a vulnerability that could be exploited to attack the institution; underlines that Members and staff should be equipped with the necessary IT devices, such as mobile phones and laptops, to perform their tasks; welcomes, in this context, the security screenings offered to Members and staff, upon request, to detect potential spyware on private devices; calls on the administration to extend and systematise this screening to cover all devices used for Parliament-related work; calls for clearer rules and systematic and appropriate guidance to Members and staff, and for safeguards to mitigate these risks, especially during missions; | 94. Notes, in the context of Parliament’s internal security, that the use by Members and staff of private mobile phones and other devices such as laptops for business purposes constitutes a vulnerability that could be exploited to attack the institution; underlines that Members and staff should be equipped with the necessary IT devices when appropriate, such as mobile phones and laptops, to perform their tasks; welcomes, in this context, the security screenings offered to Members and staff, upon request, to detect potential spyware on private devices; calls on the administration to extend and systematise this screening to cover all devices used for Parliament-related work; calls for clearer rules and systematic and appropriate guidance to Members and staff, and for safeguards to mitigate these risks, especially during missions; |
Or. en
Amendment 1650
Danilo Della Valle, Konstantinos Arvanitis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 94 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 94 a. Expresses deep concern over the outsourcing of critical EU surveillance and digital investigation capabilities to Israeli spyware companies, many of which operate within EU territory by exploiting regulatory loopholes, thereby undermining European digital sovereignty; Deplores the contradiction between proclaimed EU "digital sovereignty" and the reality of subcontracting advanced surveillance, spyware, intrusion tools, and analytics to non-EU providers like Israel and the US, while dual-use Israeli startups continue receiving significant EU funding; condemns the use of Israeli spyware against journalists, opposition figures, civil society, and even EU officials, which normalizes occupation-style surveillance logics within European democracies and hinders autonomous EU foreign policy on the Israel-Palestine dossier by granting external actors indirect leverage over intelligence capabilities; Stresses that Israel's role in EU cybersecurity represents structural penetration rather than mere technical cooperation, shifting the center of digital security from public European interests to opaque industrial-military ties abroad, rendering EU sovereignty over data and cybersecurity largely nominal; |
Or. en
Amendment 1651
Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 94 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 94a. Points out that while Brussels talks about a democracy shield, patriotic leaders and voices are being physically attacked:Charlie Kirk, shot dead;Andrej Babiš, Czech Prime Minister, hit with a metal object;Robert Fico, Slovakian Prime Minister, victim of an assassination attempt;and even Jordan Bardella, attacked in November by a retired man who was a repeat offender;notes that this violence goes in only one direction; | |
| regrets that political actors no longer unanimously condemn these threats to democracy; |
Or. fr
Amendment 1652
Jaroslav Bžoch, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 94 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 94 a. underlines that EU staff should be equipped with secure work mobile phones and laptops, as well as other devices ensuring permanent and mobile internet connectivity; stresses that the use of unsecured Wi-Fi networks, in particular outside the EU or outside the coverage of EU institutions' networks, should be avoided, and that only secure networks should be used on EU institutions´ premises; |
Or. en
Amendment 1653
Danilo Della Valle, Konstantinos Arvanitis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 94 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 94 b. Urges the Commission and Council to conduct an immediate audit of all EU and Member State contracts with Israeli cybersecurity firms, including data flows, compliance with GDPR and the Digital Services Act, and risks to sovereignty; calls on the Commission and Council to suspend Horizon Europe funding to Israeli entities involved in spyware or dual-use surveillance technologies until full transparency and ethical compliance are ensured; |
Or. en
Amendment 1654
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 94 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 94 b. Emphasises that electoral law falls strictly within the competences of the Member States; recalls that the Commission may provide support or assistance where appropriate, but cannot assume the role of a supervisory, regulatory or decision-making authority in this area; |
Or. en
Amendment 1655
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 94 c (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 94 c. Recalls that the European democracy is based on elections and on the right for voters to choose freely and secretly the representatives they wish, within the constitutional and legal framework of their respective Member States; |
Or. en