Sittings · Document
Draft report (2025/2069(INI)) 2026-02-12
Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield
Amendment 596
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| -1 underlines that, in accordance with Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union, the limits of the Union’s competences are governed by the principle of conferral, and their exercise is subject to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; expresses doubts as to whether the ambitions of the Commission and the EEAS, as presented inter alia in the context of the so-called European Democracy Shield, do not go beyond those competences and constitute an interference with the sovereignty of the Member States, in particular in the area of the organisation of elections; |
Or. en
Amendment 597
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 1. Welcomes the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the establishment of a European Democracy Shield and the continued efforts to build on the work already undertaken under the European democracy action plan and the Defence of Democracy package; is of the view that the core mission of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect European democracy from external threats, and ultimately contribute to safeguarding the European way of life, the rule of law and the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; | 1. Welcomes the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the establishment of a European Democracy Shield and the continued efforts to build on the work already undertaken under the European democracy action plan and the Defence of Democracy package; is of the view that the core mission of the European Democracy Shield should be to promote the healthy functioning of liberal democracy and to protect it from internal and external threats, ultimately contributing to safeguarding the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; underlines however that soft policy measures are insufficient tools where democratic values are deliberately undermined; recalls that soft measures can help in situations of involuntary noncompliance but are unlikely to be effective when noncompliance is deliberate; notes that the Democracy Shield relies on soft policy measures, whereas most of the issues it aims to address are those where democratic values are not incidentally, but rather deliberately, undermined; calls therefore on the Commission to continue working on strong and binding actions to protect democracy, starting with those included in this report, so that the magnitude of the solutions is equivalent to the magnitude of the problems identified; |
Or. en
Amendment 598
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 1. Welcomes the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the establishment of a European Democracy Shield and the continued efforts to build on the work already undertaken under the European democracy action plan and the Defence of Democracy package; is of the view that the core mission of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect European democracy from external threats, and ultimately contribute to safeguarding the European way of life, the rule of law and the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; | 1. Notes the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the establishment of a European Democracy Shield and the continued efforts to build on the work already undertaken under the European democracy action plan and the Defence of Democracy package; is of the view that the core mission of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect European democracies from external threats, and ultimately contribute to safeguarding the European civilization heritage, the rule of law and the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, while fully respecting Mamber States' constitutional responsibilities in protecting their own democratic processes and recognising that Union competences are limited by the principle of conferral and must be exercised in accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, as laid down in Article 5 TEU; |
Or. en
Amendment 599
Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 1. Welcomes the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the establishment of a European Democracy Shield and the continued efforts to build on the work already undertaken under the European democracy action plan and the Defence of Democracy package; is of the view that the core mission of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect European democracy from external threats, and ultimately contribute to safeguarding the European way of life, the rule of law and the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; | 1. Welcomes the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the establishment of a European Democracy Shield and the continued efforts to build on the work already undertaken under the European democracy action plan and the Defence of Democracy package; is of the view that the core mission of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect European democracy from external threats, and ultimately contribute to safeguarding the European way of life, the rule of law and the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; recalls that the Union has shown political ambition in adopting a comprehensive digital regulatory framework and stresses that the credibility of the European Democracy Shield now depends on demonstrating equal political ambition in enforcing these rules effectively, consistently and without compromise. |
Or. en
Amendment 600
Fabrice Leggeri, Virginie Joron, Marieke Ehlers
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 1. Welcomes the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the establishment of a European Democracy Shield and the continued efforts to build on the work already undertaken under the European democracy action plan and the Defence of Democracy package; is of the view that the core mission of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect European democracy from external threats, and ultimately contribute to safeguarding the European way of life, the rule of law and the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; | 1. Notes the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the establishment of a European Democracy Shield; is of the view that the freedom of expression, opinion and information, and values enshrined in Article 2 TEU must be protected; |
Or. en
Amendment 601
Kim Van Sparrentak
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 1. Welcomes the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the establishment of a European Democracy Shield and the continued efforts to build on the work already undertaken under the European democracy action plan and the Defence of Democracy package; is of the view that the core mission of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect European democracy from external threats, and ultimately contribute to safeguarding the European way of life, the rule of law and the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; | 1. Takes note of joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the establishment of a European Democracy Shield and the continued efforts to build on the work already undertaken under the European democracy action plan and the Defence of Democracy package; is of the view that the core mission of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect European democracy and ultimately contribute to safeguarding the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; considers the goal for a European Democracy Shield an important element of the work of the Commission in fighting foreign interference, hybrid threats and disinformation, believes however that the proposed text lacks ambition, foresight and necessary capacity to achieve its objectives; |
Or. en
Amendment 602
Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 1. Welcomes the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the establishment of a European Democracy Shield and the continued efforts to build on the work already undertaken under the European democracy action plan and the Defence of Democracy package; is of the view that the core mission of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect European democracy from external threats, and ultimately contribute to safeguarding the European way of life, the rule of law and the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; | 1. Welcomes the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the establishment of a European Democracy Shield and the continued efforts to build on the work already undertaken under the European democracy action plan and the Defence of Democracy package; is of the view that the core mission of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect European democracy from internal and external threats, adopting a 360° approach, and ultimately contribute to safeguarding the European way of life, the rule of law and the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; recalls that the Democracy Shield is part of a continuum, between civilian and law enforcement aspects to CFSP and CSDP responses; |
Or. en
Amendment 603
Petar Volgin, Christine Anderson
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 1. Welcomes the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the establishment of a European Democracy Shield and the continued efforts to build on the work already undertaken under the European democracy action plan and the Defence of Democracy package; is of the view that the core mission of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect European democracy from external threats, and ultimately contribute to safeguarding the European way of life, the rule of law and the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; | 1. Notes the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the establishment of a European Democracy Shield; is of the view that the core mission of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect European democracy from both internal and external threats, and ultimately contribute to safeguarding the European way of life, the rule of law and the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; |
Or. en
Amendment 604
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 1. Welcomes the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the establishment of a European Democracy Shield and the continued efforts to build on the work already undertaken under the European democracy action plan and the Defence of Democracy package; is of the view that the core mission of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect European democracy from external threats, and ultimately contribute to safeguarding the European way of life, the rule of law and the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; | 1. Welcomes the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the establishment of a European Democracy Shield and the continued efforts to build on the work already undertaken under the European democracy action plan and the Defence of Democracy package; is of the view that the core mission of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect European democracy from external threats and their proxies inside the EU, and ultimately contribute to safeguarding the European way of life, the rule of law and the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; |
Or. en
Amendment 605
Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 1. Welcomes the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the establishment of a European Democracy Shield and the continued efforts to build on the work already undertaken under the European democracy action plan and the Defence of Democracy package; is of the view that the core mission of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect European democracy from external threats, and ultimately contribute to safeguarding the European way of life, the rule of law and the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; | 1. Welcomes the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the establishment of a European Democracy Shield and the continued efforts to build on the work already undertaken under the European democracy action plan and the Defence of Democracy package; is of the view that the core mission of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect European democracy from external threats and internal vulnerabilities, and ultimately contribute to safeguarding the fundamental rights, the rule of law and the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; |
Or. en
Amendment 606
Danilo Della Valle, Jonas Sjöstedt, Konstantinos Arvanitis, Li Andersson
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 1. Welcomes the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the establishment of a European Democracy Shield and the continued efforts to build on the work already undertaken under the European democracy action plan and the Defence of Democracy package; is of the view that the core mission of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect European democracy from external threats, and ultimately contribute to safeguarding the European way of life, the rule of law and the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; | 1. Welcomes the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the establishment of a European Democracy Shield and the continued efforts to build on the work already undertaken under the European democracy action plan and the Defence of Democracy package; is of the view that the core mission of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect European democracic processes from external threats, and ultimately contribute to safeguarding the rule of law and the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; |
Or. en
Amendment 607
Fidias Panayiotou
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 1 a. Calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the European Parliament, Member States and relevant EU bodies, to develop clearer, transparent and commonly agreed criteria for the detection, attribution and assessment of foreign interference and disinformation campaigns, including: indicators distinguishing coordinated foreign interference from domestic political expression; methodologies combining intelligence, academic research and open-source analysis; safeguards to ensure full respect for fundamental rights, freedom of expression and political pluralism. |
Or. en
Amendment 608
Fidias Panayiotou
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 1 b. Stresses that the European Parliament should play a central role in shaping and monitoring the Union’s strategic response to foreign interference and disinformation, including through early-warning briefings, access to relevant threat assessments, and structured cooperation with national parliaments. |
Or. en
Amendment 609
Fidias Panayiotou
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 c (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 1 c. Calls for strengthened control by the European Parliament over the implementation of Union legislation related to electoral integrity, disinformation and foreign interference, including through: regular reporting obligations for the Commission and relevant EU agencies; structured dialogues with the European Parliament’s competent committees; the possibility for the European Parliament to request targeted evaluations and audits where implementation gaps or risks to democratic processes are identified |
Or. en
Amendment 610
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 2. Notes with concern the increasingly complex and evolving threat landscape faced by the EU and its Member States, characterised by FIMI, hybrid attacks and disinformation campaigns conducted by malicious third-country actors; stresses that these are hostile actions that undermine the democratic foundations of the EU by fomenting division, diminishing public trust in institutions and exploiting societal vulnerabilities, frequently leveraging advanced digital technologies; | 2. Notes with concern the increasingly complex and evolving threat landscape faced by the EU and its Member States, characterised by FIMI, hybrid attacks and disinformation campaigns conducted by malicious domestic and third-country actors; stresses that these are hostile actions that undermine the democratic foundations of the EU by fomenting division, diminishing public trust in institutions and exploiting societal vulnerabilities, frequently leveraging advanced digital technologies; further stresses that hybrid warfare goes beyond cyber or information attacks alone, and encompasses the economic, technological and societal dimensions of strategic confrontation; considers that Europe’s dependence on external data, critical technologies and supply chains constitutes a major vulnerability that can be exploited for coercive purposes; |
Or. en
Amendment 611
Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 2. Notes with concern the increasingly complex and evolving threat landscape faced by the EU and its Member States, characterised by FIMI, hybrid attacks and disinformation campaigns conducted by malicious third-country actors; stresses that these are hostile actions that undermine the democratic foundations of the EU by fomenting division, diminishing public trust in institutions and exploiting societal vulnerabilities, frequently leveraging advanced digital technologies; | 2. Notes with concern the increasingly complex and evolving threat landscape faced by the EU and its Member States, characterised by FIMI, hybrid attacks and disinformation campaigns conducted by malicious third-country actors; stresses that these are hostile actions that undermine the democratic foundations of the EU by fomenting division, diminishing public trust in institutions and exploiting societal vulnerabilities, frequently leveraging advanced digital technologies; underlines that such techniques increasingly affect all layers of society and a wide range of sectors, including media, education, public administration, economic activity and electoral processes contributing to an environment in which such threats become increasingly complex and challenging to anticipate and mitigate; |
Or. en
Amendment 612
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 2. Notes with concern the increasingly complex and evolving threat landscape faced by the EU and its Member States, characterised by FIMI, hybrid attacks and disinformation campaigns conducted by malicious third-country actors; stresses that these are hostile actions that undermine the democratic foundations of the EU by fomenting division, diminishing public trust in institutions and exploiting societal vulnerabilities, frequently leveraging advanced digital technologies; | 2. Notes with concern the increasingly complex and evolving threat landscape faced by the EU and its Member States, characterised by Russian imperialism, including its aggression against Ukraine, its efforts to undermine Western institutions and transatlantic ties, its attempts to re-establish spheres of influence, and the use of both kinetic and non-kinetic methods, such as FIMI, hybrid attacks and disinformation campaigns conducted by malicious third-country actors; stresses that these are hostile actions that undermine the democratic foundations of the EU by fomenting division, diminishing public trust in institutions and exploiting societal vulnerabilities, frequently leveraging advanced digital technologies; |
Or. en
Amendment 613
Kim Van Sparrentak, Hannah Neumann
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 2. Notes with concern the increasingly complex and evolving threat landscape faced by the EU and its Member States, characterised by FIMI, hybrid attacks and disinformation campaigns conducted by malicious third-country actors; stresses that these are hostile actions that undermine the democratic foundations of the EU by fomenting division, diminishing public trust in institutions and exploiting societal vulnerabilities, frequently leveraging advanced digital technologies; | 2. Notes with concern the increasingly complex and evolving threat landscape faced by the EU and its Member States, characterised by FIMI, hybrid attacks , surveillance-enabled coercion, transnational repression and disinformation campaigns conducted by malicious actors; stresses that these are hostile actions that undermine the democratic foundations of the EU by fomenting division, diminishing public trust in institutions and exploiting societal vulnerabilities, frequently leveraging advanced digital technologies; points out that the current measures proposed under the Democracy Shield do not cater to this complex landscape and therefore falls short of protecting the EU’s democracy; |
Or. en
Amendment 614
Vasile Dîncu
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 2. Notes with concern the increasingly complex and evolving threat landscape faced by the EU and its Member States, characterised by FIMI, hybrid attacks and disinformation campaigns conducted by malicious third-country actors; stresses that these are hostile actions that undermine the democratic foundations of the EU by fomenting division, diminishing public trust in institutions and exploiting societal vulnerabilities, frequently leveraging advanced digital technologies; | 2. Notes with concern the increasingly complex and evolving threat landscape faced by the EU and its Member States, characterised by FIMI, hybrid attacks and disinformation campaigns conducted by malicious third-country actors, as well as internal threats to the rule of law and fundamental rights within the Union; stresses that safeguarding democracy requires a consistent approach to tackling both external interference and domestic illiberal trends that undermine the democratic foundations of the EU by fomenting division, diminishing public trust in institutions and exploiting societal vulnerabilities, frequently leveraging advanced digital technologies; |
Or. en
Amendment 615
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 2. Notes with concern the increasingly complex and evolving threat landscape faced by the EU and its Member States, characterised by FIMI, hybrid attacks and disinformation campaigns conducted by malicious third-country actors; stresses that these are hostile actions that undermine the democratic foundations of the EU by fomenting division, diminishing public trust in institutions and exploiting societal vulnerabilities, frequently leveraging advanced digital technologies; | 2. Notes with concern the increasingly complex and evolving threat landscape faced by the EU and its Member States, characterised by FIMI, hybrid attacks, intimidation attempts, and disinformation campaigns conducted by malicious third-country actors; stresses that these are hostile actions that undermine the democratic foundations of the EU by fomenting division, diminishing public trust in institutions and exploiting societal vulnerabilities, frequently leveraging advanced digital technologies; reminds that the fragmentation of the European Union remains the crucial vulnerability remedying which is only possible with deeper level of EU integration; |
Or. en
Amendment 616
Tomáš Zdechovský
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 2. Notes with concern the increasingly complex and evolving threat landscape faced by the EU and its Member States, characterised by FIMI, hybrid attacks and disinformation campaigns conducted by malicious third-country actors; stresses that these are hostile actions that undermine the democratic foundations of the EU by fomenting division, diminishing public trust in institutions and exploiting societal vulnerabilities, frequently leveraging advanced digital technologies; | 2. Notes with concern the increasingly complex and evolving threat landscape faced by the EU and its Member States, characterised by FIMI, hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns conducted by malicious third-country actors; stresses that such hostile actions undermine democratic processes by fomenting division, diminishing public trust in institutions and exploiting societal vulnerabilities, often through the use of advanced digital technologies; underlines that efforts to counter disinformation should prioritise coordinated manipulation and inauthentic amplification practices rather than individual lawful expression; |
Or. en
Amendment 617
Sandra Kalniete
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 2. Notes with concern the increasingly complex and evolving threat landscape faced by the EU and its Member States, characterised by FIMI, hybrid attacks and disinformation campaigns conducted by malicious third-country actors; stresses that these are hostile actions that undermine the democratic foundations of the EU by fomenting division, diminishing public trust in institutions and exploiting societal vulnerabilities, frequently leveraging advanced digital technologies; | 2. Notes with concern the increasingly complex and evolving threat landscape faced by the EU and its Member States, characterised by FIMI, hybrid attacks and disinformation campaigns conducted by malicious third-country actors; stresses that these are hostile actions that undermine the democratic foundations of the EU by fomenting division, diminishing public trust in institutions and exploiting societal vulnerabilities, frequently leveraging advanced digital technologies; and negatively impacting economy, including financial markets, businesses, public spending and long-term growth; |
Or. en
Amendment 618
Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 2. Notes with concern the increasingly complex and evolving threat landscape faced by the EU and its Member States, characterised by FIMI, hybrid attacks and disinformation campaigns conducted by malicious third-country actors; stresses that these are hostile actions that undermine the democratic foundations of the EU by fomenting division, diminishing public trust in institutions and exploiting societal vulnerabilities, frequently leveraging advanced digital technologies; | 2. Notes with concern the increasingly complex and evolving threat landscape faced by the EU, its Member States, its neighbourhood and partner democracies around the world, characterised by FIMI, hybrid attacks and disinformation campaigns conducted by malicious third-country actors; stresses that these are hostile actions that undermine the democratic foundations of the EU by fomenting division, diminishing public trust in institutions and exploiting societal vulnerabilities, frequently leveraging advanced digital technologies; |
Or. en
Amendment 619
Christophe Gomart
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 2. Notes with concern the increasingly complex and evolving threat landscape faced by the EU and its Member States, characterised by FIMI, hybrid attacks and disinformation campaigns conducted by malicious third-country actors; stresses that these are hostile actions that undermine the democratic foundations of the EU by fomenting division, diminishing public trust in institutions and exploiting societal vulnerabilities, frequently leveraging advanced digital technologies; | 2. Notes with concern the increasingly complex and evolving threat landscape faced by the EU and its Member States, characterised by FIMI, hybrid attacks and disinformation campaigns conducted by malicious third-country actors, but also by some Member States themselves; stresses that these are hostile actions that undermine the democratic foundations of the EU by fomenting division, diminishing public trust in institutions and exploiting societal vulnerabilities, frequently leveraging advanced digital technologies; |
Or. fr
Amendment 620
Eugen Tomac
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 2. Notes with concern the increasingly complex and evolving threat landscape faced by the EU and its Member States, characterised by FIMI, hybrid attacks and disinformation campaigns conducted by malicious third-country actors; stresses that these are hostile actions that undermine the democratic foundations of the EU by fomenting division, diminishing public trust in institutions and exploiting societal vulnerabilities, frequently leveraging advanced digital technologies; | 2. Notes with concern the increasingly complex and evolving threat landscape faced by the EU and its Member States, characterised by foreign interference in elections, FIMI, hybrid attacks and disinformation campaigns conducted by malicious third-country actors; stresses that these are hostile actions that undermine the democratic foundations of the EU by fomenting division, diminishing public trust in institutions and exploiting societal vulnerabilities, frequently leveraging advanced digital technologies; |
Or. en
Amendment 621
Petar Volgin
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 2. Notes with concern the increasingly complex and evolving threat landscape faced by the EU and its Member States, characterised by FIMI, hybrid attacks and disinformation campaigns conducted by malicious third-country actors; stresses that these are hostile actions that undermine the democratic foundations of the EU by fomenting division, diminishing public trust in institutions and exploiting societal vulnerabilities, frequently leveraging advanced digital technologies; | 2. Notes with concern the increasingly complex and evolving threat landscape faced by the EU and its Member States, characterised by centralization of power in non-elected, supranational bodies, FIMI, hybrid attacks, censorship and disinformation campaigns; stresses that these are hostile actions that undermine the democratic foundations of the EU by fomenting division, diminishing public trust in institutions and exploiting societal vulnerabilities, frequently leveraging advanced digital technologies; |
Or. en
Amendment 622
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 2 a. Stresses that trust in public institutions and in the quality, accessibility and reliability of public services is a fundamental pillar of democratic resilience; notes that systemic deficiencies in Member States, including in judicial independence, media pluralism and anti-corruption frameworks, create structural vulnerabilities within the Union that are weaponised by internal and external actors to undermine trust in European institutions, fuel social tensions and weaken democratic resilience; underlines that strengthening citizens’ confidence in democratic governance, public administration and services of general interest is essential to counter FIMI and to reinforce the stability and legitimacy of democratic systems across the EU; believes, therefore, that strengthening democratic resilience must begin with restoring societal trust and addressing erosions of the rule of law that degrade the Union’s resilience to hybrid threats, undermine mutual trust among Member States and hinder collective responses to foreign interference; calls for social cohesion, democratic legitimacy and institutional trust to be treated as integral components of the EU’s security and democratic resilience frameworks; calls on the EU and its Member States, in this context, to design the upcoming European Union security strategy through a holistic approach that recognises how inequalities, social deprivation and the perception that democratic systems fail to address citizens’ concerns create vulnerabilities exploitable by hostile actors; |
Or. en
Amendment 623
Jonas Sjöstedt, Li Andersson, Konstantinos Arvanitis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 2 a. Stresses the need for the European Union to adopt a robust gendered perspective in identifying, preventing, and responding to foreign and domestic interference and disinformation targeting democratic principles, explicitly recognising anti-gender disinformation and coordinated attacks on sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) and LGBTIQ+ rights as a key vector of anti-democratic interference; underlines that the EU’s commitment to democracy, the rule of law, and human rights must include systematic action to counter funding networks targeting gender equality and marginalised communities; calls for increased transparency, monitoring, and accountability regarding financial and political support for actors engaged in coordinated anti-gender interference within the Union; |
Or. en
Amendment 624
Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 2 a. Stresses that foreign information manipulation and interference targeting the Union can originate from a wide range of external actors, including strategic competitors as well as partners and allies; underlines that the Union’s structural dependence on non-European digital platforms, infrastructures and information ecosystems increases exposure to external influence, regulatory misalignment and democratic vulnerabilities; calls, therefore, for a decisive strengthening of the Union’s digital autonomy and technological sovereignty, including through the development and scaling-up of European digital infrastructures and platforms that are anchored in European values, fundamental rights and democratic accountability; |
Or. en
Amendment 625
Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 2 a. Stresses that foreign hybrid interference strategies premised on attrition should not be assessed solely by their immediate disruptive impact, but also by their cumulative political and strategic consequences, including the potential to consolidate Union-wide resolve and clarify adversarial roles; calls for future assessments to distinguish clearly between tactical disruption and strategic effect; |
Or. en
Amendment 626
Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 2 b. Underlines that deterrence based exclusively on resilience and protection risks imposing permanent defensive costs on the Union while failing to address the strategic incentives underpinning hostile attritional campaigns; calls on the Commission and the High Representative to assess whether current responses risk confirming adversarial assumptions of escalation aversion, attribution paralysis or cost asymmetry, and to report to Parliament on how existing diplomatic, legal and political instruments under the Treaties could be used more coherently to strengthen deterrence; |
Or. en
Amendment 627
Jonas Sjöstedt, Li Andersson, Konstantinos Arvanitis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 2 b. Underlines that gender-based disinformation constitutes a serious threat to democracy by deterring women and LGBTIQ+ people from political and civic participation and by undermining progress towards equal, inclusive, and democratic societies; |
Or. en
Amendment 628
Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 c (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 2 c. Stresses that not all forms of controversial, polarising or coordinated political communication within the Union constitute foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI); underlines the need to clearly distinguish between (i) foreign-directed manipulation operations and (ii) domestic political expression, advocacy or activism, including when amplified through lawful digital means; warns against conceptual inflation that risks classifying legitimate democratic contestation as interference; |
Or. en
Amendment 629
Jonas Sjöstedt, Li Andersson, Konstantinos Arvanitis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 c (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 2 c. Calls on the European Union to strengthen its response to disinformation and information manipulation targeting women and LGBTIQ+ people and their rights through a multi-stakeholder approach involving governments, international organisations, media, online platforms, fact-checking organisations, academic research, and civil society organisations working on gender equality, SRHR, and LGBTIQ+ rights, as highlighted by the European External Action Service (EEAS, 2023); |
Or. en
Amendment 630
Jonas Sjöstedt, Li Andersson, Konstantinos Arvanitis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 d (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 2 d. Calls on the EU to monitor and research gendered disinformation, allocate adequate resources to understanding its misogynistic and discriminatory roots, support and engage with women’s and LGBTIQ+ rights civil society organisations to strengthen resilience through education and community-led, feminist solutions, develop proactive counter-narratives, integrate best practices into EU policies and campaigns, and urges online platforms to improve diversity and cultural competence training for content moderators and systematically involve independent experts; |
Or. en
Amendment 631
Petar Volgin, Christine Anderson
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 3. Considers Russia as the primary external threat to Europe’s democratic integrity; reiterates its view that Russia is a state sponsor of terrorism; underlines the urgent need for a comprehensive, coherent and forward-looking strategy to effectively address these challenges and safeguard European democracy; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 632
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 3. Considers Russia as the primary external threat to Europe’s democratic integrity; reiterates its view that Russia is a state sponsor of terrorism; underlines the urgent need for a comprehensive, coherent and forward-looking strategy to effectively address these challenges and safeguard European democracy; | 3. Considers Russia to be the primary external threat to Europe’s security and democratic integrity; believes that hostile actions carried out by Russia against EU and NATO member states—such as assassinations, including those using banned chemical agents like Novichok and acts of sabotage endangering the lives of European citizens, amount to a form of undeclared war against the collective West; recalls that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has waged aggressive wars against its neighbours, occupies parts of their territories as in the cases of Georgia and Moldova, and has committed numerous war crimes—from Chechnya, through Syria and Libya, to the brutal atrocities in Ukraine; stresses that, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, Russia, through this inherent pattern of aggression and violence, violates the UN Charter and fundamental obligations of peaceful coexistence; reiterates its view that Russia is a state sponsor of terrorism; underlines the urgent need for a comprehensive, coherent and forward-looking strategy to effectively address these challenges and safeguard European democracy, while also remaining vigilant regarding similar threats posed by other authoritarian regimes; |
Or. en
Amendment 633
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 3. Considers Russia as the primary external threat to Europe’s democratic integrity; reiterates its view that Russia is a state sponsor of terrorism; underlines the urgent need for a comprehensive, coherent and forward-looking strategy to effectively address these challenges and safeguard European democracy; | 3. Considers Russia as the primary external threat to Europe’s security and democratic integrity; reiterates its view that Russia is a state sponsor of terrorism; notes however other longstanding, as well as recent, actors that equally challenge the Union’s security and democratic integrity through hybrid threats and other hostile or coercive activities; underlines the urgent need for a comprehensive, coherent and forward-looking strategy to effectively address these challenges and safeguard European democracy; calls on the EU and its Member States to adopt a principle of information deterrence as an integral component of the European Democracy Shield, including coordinated public attribution of hostile operations, strategic counter-narratives, swifter application of diplomatic responses and, where necessary, restrictive measures towards state actors responsible for systematic campaigns of foreign information manipulation and interference; |
Or. en
Amendment 634
Vasile Dîncu
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 3. Considers Russia as the primary external threat to Europe’s democratic integrity; reiterates its view that Russia is a state sponsor of terrorism; underlines the urgent need for a comprehensive, coherent and forward-looking strategy to effectively address these challenges and safeguard European democracy; | 3. Considers Russia as the primary external threat to Europe’s democratic integrity while also noting the systemic challenges posed by the assertive posture of some of the key global players; notes with concern the EU’s critical dependence on digital services and infrastructure based in third countries, which renders the Union vulnerable to political shifts in strategic partner nations; reiterates its view that Russia is a state sponsor of terrorism; underlines the urgent need for a comprehensive, coherent and forward-looking strategy based on the principle of strategic autonomy to effectively address these challenges and safeguard European democracy; |
Or. en
Amendment 635
Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 3. Considers Russia as the primary external threat to Europe’s democratic integrity; reiterates its view that Russia is a state sponsor of terrorism; underlines the urgent need for a comprehensive, coherent and forward-looking strategy to effectively address these challenges and safeguard European democracy; | 3. Considers Russia as the primary external threat to Europe’s democratic integrity; reiterates its view that Russia is a state sponsor of terrorism and criminal organisations engaged in human and drug trafficking in North Africa and the Sahel region; underlines the urgent need for a comprehensive, coherent and forward-looking strategy to effectively address these challenges and safeguard European democracy; |
Or. en
Amendment 636
Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 3. Considers Russia as the primary external threat to Europe’s democratic integrity; reiterates its view that Russia is a state sponsor of terrorism; underlines the urgent need for a comprehensive, coherent and forward-looking strategy to effectively address these challenges and safeguard European democracy; | 3. Considers that the European Democracy Shield should be conceived as a process-driven framework enabling the Union to anticipate and respond to shifting internal and external pressures on democratic systems, whatever their source ; underlines the urgent need for a comprehensive, coherent and forward-looking strategy to effectively address these challenges and safeguard European democracy; |
Or. en
Amendment 637
Fabrice Leggeri, Virginie Joron, Marieke Ehlers
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 3. Considers Russia as the primary external threat to Europe’s democratic integrity; reiterates its view that Russia is a state sponsor of terrorism; underlines the urgent need for a comprehensive, coherent and forward-looking strategy to effectively address these challenges and safeguard European democracy; | 3. Recognises the existence of external threat to Europe’s democratic integrity from third countries and militant groups, especially Islamist organisations such as the so-called Muslim Brotherhood; underlines the urgent need for a comprehensive, coherent and forward-looking strategy to effectively address these challenges and safeguard European democracy; |
Or. en
Amendment 638
Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 3. Considers Russia as the primary external threat to Europe’s democratic integrity; reiterates its view that Russia is a state sponsor of terrorism; underlines the urgent need for a comprehensive, coherent and forward-looking strategy to effectively address these challenges and safeguard European democracy; | 3. Considers Russia as the primary external threat to Europe’s democratic integrity; reiterates its view that Russia is a state sponsor of terrorism and separatist movements in Europe; underlines the urgent need for a comprehensive, coherent and forward-looking strategy to effectively address these challenges and safeguard European democracy; |
Or. en
Amendment 639
Danilo Della Valle
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 3. Considers Russia as the primary external threat to Europe’s democratic integrity; reiterates its view that Russia is a state sponsor of terrorism; underlines the urgent need for a comprehensive, coherent and forward-looking strategy to effectively address these challenges and safeguard European democracy; | 3. Considers Russia, the United States and Israel as the primary external threat to Europe’s democratic integrity; underlines the urgent need for a comprehensive, coherent and forward-looking strategy to effectively address these challenges and safeguard European democracy; |
Or. en
Amendment 640
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 3 a. Expresses deep concern at the accelerating attacks on multilateralism, the erosion of the rules-based international order, and the weakening of long-standing alliances that have historically safeguarded global stability; notes in this context recent shifts in United States policy that have contributed to increased uncertainty in international cooperation and collective action, notably the decision of 7 January 2026 by the US President to withdraw from, suspend participation in, or terminate engagement with a significant number of international organisations, including numerous UN bodies; expresses its serious concern that such a move could undermine the financial sustainability of the UN system, weaken multilateral cooperation at a time when it is most needed and embolden authoritarian and revisionist actors, who have historically sought to exploit any withdrawal or disengagement by Western powers from international organisations; stresses therefore the urgent need for the European Union to reinforce its leadership in supporting and strengthening multilateral organisations, to uphold democratic institutions both within and beyond its borders, and to safeguard the principles of checks and balances as essential pillars of resilient, rules-based societies through strengthened political and financial support for these institutions to uphold the rules-based international order; |
Or. en
Amendment 641
Kim Van Sparrentak
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 3 a. Deeply regrets that the US Trump Administration's security strategy calls for the EU “to abandon its failed focus on regulatory suffocation” and calls for “unapologetic celebrations of European nations’ individual character and history”, “encourages its political allies in Europe to promote this revival of spirit” and states “the growing influence of patriotic European parties indeed gives cause for great optimism.”; Is concerned about recent attempted attacks on the EU's regulatory sovereignty and the explicit and active support of the Trump administration for far right parties, such as the AfD; notes with deep concern the actions of the State Department around the 250th anniversary celebrations of US independence which include funding of think tanks, or support of political groups, seeking to undermine European governments policies; |
Or. en
Amendment 642
Sandra Kalniete
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 3 a. Emphasises the importance of preservation of Europe’s historical memory and remembrance , particularly in the current context while Russia’s tactics to erode trust in democratic system include the manipulation and falsification of historical facts, reiterates its support for building a pan-European memorial on the Solidarnosc Esplanade to the victims of 20th century totalitarian regimes; considers this memorial a joint European endeavor, grounded in Europe’s common historical experience and contributing to democratic resilience; invites the Commission to issue a report on European remembrance to be addressed in early 2027. |
Or. en
Amendment 643
Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 3 a. Recalls that, in addition to Russia, China, Iran, or North Korea, pose critical challenges to the EU; is extremely concerned by the US Administration attitude towards Europe, in particular as described by the National Security Strategy; considers that the US Administration open willingness to interfere in European affairs is a critical threat to Europe’s democratic integrity; |
Or. en
Amendment 644
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 3 a. Regrets the emergence of the US President, his administration and the oligarchs as an additional threat to European democracy; urges the Commission not to yield to US pressure and threats, but to enforce Europe's digital rules and uphold European sovereignty. |
Or. en
Amendment 645
Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 3 b. Recalls the threat posed by non-state actors such as online platforms or ultra-conservative religious groups; is worried that such group will push for a shift in interpretation of “religious freedom” to attack the equal rights for women, LGBTI+ communities or minority group; calls on the Member States to coordinate in responding to attacks from such extremists groups, including in barring them from influencing, including financing, political parties in the European Union; notes that Alliance Defending Freedom, a conservative legal advocacy group behind the overturning of Roe v Wade in the US, spreads hard-right Christian ideology and has increased its global spending on litigation and other campaigns; calls on the Member States and the Commission to prevent any funding from by the US State Departement of Maga-aligned think-tanks and charities across Europe to disseminate Washington’s policy positions; |
Or. en
Amendment 646
Kim Van Sparrentak
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 3 b. Points out that the EU adopted an Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI), which entered into force on 27 December 2023, to protect the EU and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries; |
Or. en
Amendment 647
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4. Reiterates its conviction that the key policy priorities outlined in the European Democracy Shield initiative – including combating FIMI and hybrid threats, strengthening electoral resilience, enhancing cybersecurity, supporting civil society and promoting independent and investigative journalism – must be firmly embedded and sufficiently funded within the upcoming MFF; | 4. Reiterates its conviction that the key policy priorities outlined in the European Democracy Shield initiative – including combating FIMI and hybrid threats, strengthening electoral resilience, enhancing cybersecurity, supporting civil society, strengthening free and independent media, and promoting independent and investigative journalism – must be firmly embedded and sufficiently funded within the upcoming MFF; underlines that Russia is strategically investing billions in FIMI and hybrid attacks and countering such a strategy requires having a coherent centralised vision and a matching budget; underscores that investment in democracy is crucial for competitiveness, security and sovereignty. |
Or. en
Amendment 648
Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4. Reiterates its conviction that the key policy priorities outlined in the European Democracy Shield initiative – including combating FIMI and hybrid threats, strengthening electoral resilience, enhancing cybersecurity, supporting civil society and promoting independent and investigative journalism – must be firmly embedded and sufficiently funded within the upcoming MFF; | 4. Reiterates its conviction that the key policy priorities outlined in the European Democracy Shield initiative – including combating FIMI and hybrid threats, strengthening electoral resilience, enhancing cybersecurity, supporting civil society, strengthening free and independent media and promoting independent and investigative journalism – must be firmly embedded and sufficiently funded within the upcoming MFF; stresses, in this regard, that clearly defined objectives and measurable actions are essential to ensure effective allocation of resources and to avoid fragmentation or inefficiencies in funding; |
Or. en
Amendment 649
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4. Reiterates its conviction that the key policy priorities outlined in the European Democracy Shield initiative – including combating FIMI and hybrid threats, strengthening electoral resilience, enhancing cybersecurity, supporting civil society and promoting independent and investigative journalism – must be firmly embedded and sufficiently funded within the upcoming MFF; | 4. Reiterates its conviction that the key policy priorities outlined in the European Democracy Shield initiative – including combating FIMI and hybrid threats, enhancing cybersecurity, supporting civil society and promoting independent and investigative journalism – must be firmly embedded and sufficiently funded by the Member States, with supportive funds within the upcoming MFF; calls for strengthening units dedicated to fighting FIMI within EEAS by creating additional specialised posts, in order to enhance analytical, strategic communication and operational capacity, instead of funding new institutions; |
Or. en
Amendment 650
Danilo Della Valle, Konstantinos Arvanitis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4. Reiterates its conviction that the key policy priorities outlined in the European Democracy Shield initiative – including combating FIMI and hybrid threats, strengthening electoral resilience, enhancing cybersecurity, supporting civil society and promoting independent and investigative journalism – must be firmly embedded and sufficiently funded within the upcoming MFF; | 4. Reiterates its conviction that the key policy priorities outlined in the European Democracy Shield initiative – including combating FIMI, strengthening electoral resilience, enhancing cybersecurity, supporting civil society and promoting independent and investigative journalism – must be part of the upcoming MFF; calls on the Commission to submit to Parliament every six months a detailed report setting out the selection criteria used for the allocation of funds, resources and the actual impact of the funding on editorial independence and plurality of information in the European Union; |
Or. en
Amendment 651
Eugen Tomac
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4. Reiterates its conviction that the key policy priorities outlined in the European Democracy Shield initiative – including combating FIMI and hybrid threats, strengthening electoral resilience, enhancing cybersecurity, supporting civil society and promoting independent and investigative journalism – must be firmly embedded and sufficiently funded within the upcoming MFF; | 4. Reiterates its conviction that the key policy priorities outlined in the European Democracy Shield initiative – including combating FIMI and hybrid threats, strengthening electoral resilience, enhancing cybersecurity, supporting civil society and promoting independent and investigative journalism – must be firmly embedded and sufficiently funded within the upcoming MFF; highlights in this context the urgent need to reverse the significant decline in funding available to European civil society organisations working on election integrity, counter-FIMI and democratic resilience; |
Or. en
Amendment 652
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Fidias Panayiotou
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4. Reiterates its conviction that the key policy priorities outlined in the European Democracy Shield initiative – including combating FIMI and hybrid threats, strengthening electoral resilience, enhancing cybersecurity, supporting civil society and promoting independent and investigative journalism – must be firmly embedded and sufficiently funded within the upcoming MFF; | 4. Reiterates its conviction that the key policy priorities outlined in the European Democracy Shield initiative – including combating FIMI and hybrid threats, strengthening electoral resilience, enhancing cybersecurity, supporting civil society organisations delivering genuine public-interest services, without engaging in political activism or advocacy and promoting independent and investigative journalism – must be firmly embedded and sufficiently funded within the upcoming MFF; |
Or. en
Amendment 653
Tomáš Zdechovský, Dan-Ştefan Motreanu, Eszter Lakos, Lukas Mandl, Sandra Kalniete, Tomas Tobé, Mika Aaltola, Marta Wcisło, Fredis Beleris, Andrey Kovatchev
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4. Reiterates its conviction that the key policy priorities outlined in the European Democracy Shield initiative – including combating FIMI and hybrid threats, strengthening electoral resilience, enhancing cybersecurity, supporting civil society and promoting independent and investigative journalism – must be firmly embedded and sufficiently funded within the upcoming MFF; | 4. Reiterates its conviction that the key policy priorities outlined in the European Democracy Shield initiative – including combating FIMI and hybrid threats, strengthening electoral resilience, enhancing cybersecurity, supporting civil society and promoting independent and investigative journalism – must be firmly embedded and sufficiently funded within the upcoming MFF; underlines that investment in democracy is crucial for competitiveness, security and sovereignty; |
Or. en
Amendment 654
Kim Van Sparrentak, Hannah Neumann
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4. Reiterates its conviction that the key policy priorities outlined in the European Democracy Shield initiative – including combating FIMI and hybrid threats, strengthening electoral resilience, enhancing cybersecurity, supporting civil society and promoting independent and investigative journalism – must be firmly embedded and sufficiently funded within the upcoming MFF; | 4. Reiterates its conviction that the key policy priorities outlined in the European Democracy Shield initiative – including combating FIMI and hybrid threats, strengthening electoral resilience, enhancing cybersecurity, supporting civil society, countering surveillance-enabled coercion, and promoting independent and investigative journalism – must be firmly embedded and sufficiently funded within the upcoming MFF; |
Or. en
Amendment 655
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4. Reiterates its conviction that the key policy priorities outlined in the European Democracy Shield initiative – including combating FIMI and hybrid threats, strengthening electoral resilience, enhancing cybersecurity, supporting civil society and promoting independent and investigative journalism – must be firmly embedded and sufficiently funded within the upcoming MFF; | 4. Reiterates its conviction that the key policy priorities outlined in the European Democracy Shield initiative – including combating FIMI and hybrid threats, strengthening electoral resilience, enhancing cybersecurity, supporting civil society, strengthening free and independent media and promoting independent and investigative journalism – must be sufficiently funded within the upcoming MFF; |
Or. en
Amendment 656
Fabrice Leggeri, Virginie Joron, Marieke Ehlers
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4. Reiterates its conviction that the key policy priorities outlined in the European Democracy Shield initiative – including combating FIMI and hybrid threats, strengthening electoral resilience, enhancing cybersecurity, supporting civil society and promoting independent and investigative journalism – must be firmly embedded and sufficiently funded within the upcoming MFF; | 4. Reiterates its conviction that the key policy priorities outlined in the European Democracy Shield initiative – including combating FIMI and hybrid threats, strengthening electoral resilience, enhancing cybersecurity and promoting independent and investigative journalism – must not constitute justification for mechanisms of generalized surveillance of citizens in the EU; |
Or. en
Amendment 657
Michał Wawrykiewicz, Mika Aaltola, Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, Tomas Tobé, Sandra Kalniete, Eszter Lakos, Tomáš Zdechovský
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4 a. Calls on the European Commission to establish - in cooperation with the European Parliament - a structured mechanism for the annual review of the Democracy Shield; stresses that this review, conducted within the framework of the European Parliament, should include a systematic assessment of the implementation of the commitments made, the effectiveness of implementation at Union and Member State level, and the adequacy of available resources; furthermore, underlines that the review process should provide a basis for gradually raising the level of ambition of the Democracy Shield, including by identifying gaps, emerging threats, and best practices, with a view to strengthening the Union's resilience to democratic erosion, external interference, and hybrid threats. |
Or. en
Amendment 658
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4 a. Is deeply concerned about the alleged acts of secret surveillance and espionage carried out by the Hungarian authorities against officials of the European Commission, as well as the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF); stresses that, if proved, such actions constitute a serious breach of mutual trust and loyal cooperation among Member States and EU institutions and could represent a grave threat to the interests, security and proper functioning of the Union, including at the highest levels of decision-making; calls for the establishment of a comprehensive framework to prevent, detect and respond to such hostile activities, including through strengthened protection of Union staff and institutions, training and specific briefings ahead of missions; |
Or. en
Amendment 659
Tomáš Zdechovský
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4 a. Welcomes the Commission’s indication that defence spending should also be used to invest in democratic resilience, coming under such instruments as the European Defence Fund, Horizon Europe, Digital Europe, the SAFE instrument (Security Action for Europe) and the European Defence Industry Programme; Such spending should be used to support technological excellence, as well as countering and disrupting hybrid and information threats, as well as citizen participation efforts to ensure citizen input into and legitimation of European funding decisions; |
Or. en
Amendment 660
Csaba Molnár
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4 a. Deeply condemns the reported systematic espionage organised by the Hungarian government, including activities allegedly conducted out of the Permanent Representation of Hungary to the Union in 2015–2019, when Commissioner Várhelyi served as Permanent Representative; deplores that such espionage has taken place within the Union by a Member State, thereby undermining mutual trust and institutional integrity; calls on the Commission to reinforce Union-level prevention, detection and response to such internal threats; |
Or. en
Amendment 661
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4 a. Expresses serious concern about the use of the concept of a so-called “militant democracy” as a political justification for actions contrary to the constitution and the law, which weaken institutional checks and balances and undermine legal certainty; stresses that such practices by the Tusk government, which disregard the constitution, the rule of law, the separation of powers and due process, have nothing in common with genuine democracy; |
Or. en
Amendment 662
Eugen Tomac
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4 a. Stresses that foreign interference in elections is not limited to election periods, but relies on permanent digital infrastructures, influence networks and monetisation mechanisms that remain active outside electoral cycles; underlines therefore that the European Democracy Shield must operate on a continuous basis and not as a time-limited or event-driven response tool; |
Or. en
Amendment 663
Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4 a. Welcomes the broad scope of the Democracy Shield, which appropriately encompasses both Member States, candidate and neighbouring countries; emphasises that extending its reach beyond the Union’s borders is essential to ensure coherence as democratic stability within the Union is intrinsically linked to developments in its neighbourhood ; |
Or. en
Amendment 664
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4 a. Underscores its support for the Commission’s commitment to mainstream democratic resilience into programmes including Creative Europe, Digital Europe, the Justice Programme, Horizon Europe, Erasmus+, the European Competitiveness Fund, the Global Europe Instrument, and the National and Regional Partnership Plans; |
Or. en
Amendment 665
Vasile Dîncu
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4 a. Stresses that the protection of democracy and societal resilience constitute a European public good; underlines that all Member States, regardless of size or geographic location, must benefit equally from Union-level protection against hybrid threats, foreign interference and disinformation; |
Or. en
Amendment 666
Sandro Ruotolo, Krzysztof Brejza, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Saskia Bricmont, Diana Riba i Giner, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Hannah Neumann, Leoluca Orlando, Chloé Ridel, Brando Benifei, Lucia Yar, Raffaele Topo, Marco Tarquinio, Daniel Freund, Pierfrancesco Maran
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4 a. Deplores the lack of action in implementing the European Parliament recommendation of 15 June 2023 to the Council and the Commission; urges the Commission to promptly come forward with legislative proposals in accordance with paragraph 136; |
Or. en
Amendment 667
Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4 a. Is of the opinion that the Democracy Shield should be the key element protecting new European citizens’ rights, namely a European right to information and a European right to settings on social media application to protect users from filter bubbles; |
Or. en
Amendment 668
Kim Van Sparrentak, Hannah Neumann
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4 a. Critically takes note that the Joint Communication on the European Democracy Shield makes no mention of transnational repression, which poses a significant threat to democracy, sovereignty, security and fundamental rights in the EU; |
Or. en
Amendment 669
Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4 b. Calls for the establishment of a “democratic responsibility” for private companies to ensure a functional civic space, in which debate can take place; in doing so, considers that advertisers would be encouraged to invest in news media, thus endorsing our democratic society; considers that these measures could have a positive impact on these companies based on the principle of “name and praise”; |
Or. en
Amendment 670
Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4 b. Stresses that the Union’s level of ambition in safeguarding democratic integrity must not be lowered on the basis of how its regulatory or policy framework may be perceived by external actors, and that the protection of democratic values and institutions should remain the Union’s primary guiding principle; |
Or. en
Amendment 671
Tomáš Zdechovský
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4 b. Calls on the Commission and Member States, together with the European Parliament, to agree on a percentage of European and national defence spending which is allocated to democratic resilience including countering hybrid threats, information threats, and preparedness; |
Or. en
Amendment 672
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4 b. Strongly condemns the efforts of the People’s Republic of China to undermine democratic institutions worldwide through political interference, transnational repressions, economic pressure, disinformation campaigns and the export of digital authoritarian technologies; |
Or. en
Amendment 673
Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 c (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4 c. Notes with concern the mismatch between the adversarial and increasingly sophisticated nature of the threats the European Democracy Shield seeks to address and the predominantly soft-law measures proposed in response; regrets that a significant number of announced actions rely on non-binding instruments, such as guidance and Commission recommendations, as well as on voluntary commitments by Member States and other stakeholders, which may limit their effectiveness and legal impact; calls for the introduction of clearer binding mechanisms and enforceable measures where appropriate in order to ensure credible and timely implementation; |
Or. en
Amendment 674
Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 c (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4 c. Calls for strengthened EU-level protections ensuring that editorial statutes, newsroom independence mechanisms and the participation of journalists in key editorial decisions are respected and enforceable, in line with the European Media Freedom Act; underlines that democratic resilience requires that editorial choices be determined by taking into account journalistic principles and public interest; |
Or. en
Amendment 675
Tomáš Zdechovský, Dan-Ştefan Motreanu, Lukas Mandl, Sandra Kalniete, Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Marta Wcisło, Fredis Beleris, Andrey Kovatchev
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 c (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4 c. Reiterates its support for the REARM Europe programme, and welcomes the Commission proposal to enable defence spending to be allocated to democratic resilience as a core component of security, combatting hybrid and information threats, which should include REARM Europe; |
Or. en
Amendment 676
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 c (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4 c. Expresses deep concern over China’s coercive actions against democracies worldwide, in particular its ongoing military, political and information pressure against Taiwan, whose democratic system represents a direct challenge to totalitarian communist narratives; |
Or. en
Amendment 677
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 d (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4 d. Calls on the EU and its Member States to strengthen democratic resilience by reducing strategic dependencies on authoritarian regimes, protecting critical infrastructure and digital networks, supporting democratic partners in the Indo-Pacific such as Taiwan, and developing coordinated countermeasures against foreign interference and coercion; |
Or. en
Amendment 678
Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 d (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4 d. Urges the EU and Member States to act promptly to protect Europe’s information sovereignty and safeguard professional media content “Made in Europe” by Europeans; calls on the EU and the Member States to enable legislative and economic tools that could allow for the development of a platform “Made in Europe”; |
Or. en
Amendment 679
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 e (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4 e. underlines that democracy cannot be “defended” by methods that contradict its own fundamental principles; recalls that the true protection of democratic institutions requires strict respect for the will of the people, the constitution, independent courts and the equal application of the law to all political actors; |
Or. en
Amendment 680
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 2
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| European Centre for Democratic Resilience | European centres for democratic resilience |
Or. en
Amendment 681
Stefano Cavedagna
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4 a. Calls on the Commission not to pursue the establishment of a European Centre for Democracy; considers that creating such a body would raise serious concerns regarding Member States’ sovereignty and risk interfering with national competences; stresses that the creation of a new supranational structure in this field could undermine the independence and impartiality required for initiatives related to democratic governance, while duplicating existing mechanisms; |
Or. en
Amendment 682
Eugen Tomac
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 4 b. Stresses that long-term democratic resilience cannot be achieved solely through regulatory or enforcement measures, but requires sustained investment in citizens’ critical thinking skills, media and digital literacy, and civic education, as core components of the European Democracy Shield. |
Or. en
Amendment 683
Stefano Cavedagna
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 5. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a European Centre for Democratic Resilience (the Centre) as a necessary and logical step towards enhanced coordination of efforts to withstand evolving common threats, in particular FIMI and disinformation; notes its approach of a gradual phasing-in of functions and operations, including a gradual increase in Member State participation; welcomes the Commission’s assurance that it is already working on setting up the Centre under the leadership of the Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection, with the express aim of ensuring that it is operational in the course of 2026; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to regularly update and involve Parliament in the process of implementing the European Democracy Shield and the Centre; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 684
Fabrice Leggeri, Virginie Joron, Marieke Ehlers, António Tânger Corrêa
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 5. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a European Centre for Democratic Resilience (the Centre) as a necessary and logical step towards enhanced coordination of efforts to withstand evolving common threats, in particular FIMI and disinformation; notes its approach of a gradual phasing-in of functions and operations, including a gradual increase in Member State participation; welcomes the Commission’s assurance that it is already working on setting up the Centre under the leadership of the Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection, with the express aim of ensuring that it is operational in the course of 2026; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to regularly update and involve Parliament in the process of implementing the European Democracy Shield and the Centre; | 5. Rejects the European Commission's proposal to establish a European Centre for Democratic Resilience and calls for the work on its establishment to be halted; calls on the Commission to inform Parliament of developments; |
Or. en
Amendment 685
Christophe Gomart
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 5. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a European Centre for Democratic Resilience (the Centre) as a necessary and logical step towards enhanced coordination of efforts to withstand evolving common threats, in particular FIMI and disinformation; notes its approach of a gradual phasing-in of functions and operations, including a gradual increase in Member State participation; welcomes the Commission’s assurance that it is already working on setting up the Centre under the leadership of the Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection, with the express aim of ensuring that it is operational in the course of 2026; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to regularly update and involve Parliament in the process of implementing the European Democracy Shield and the Centre; | 5. Notes the Commission's proposal for a European Centre for Democratic Resilience (the Centre) and expresses reservation about the establishment of a new permanent structure, as it could cause institutional duplication and ambiguity in the division of responsibilities; stresses that, in the interests of effective coordination and optimal use of existing resources, the tasks envisaged for this Centre should be integrated into and attached to Europol, which already has recognised operational expertise and well-established cooperation mechanisms with Member States; considers that attaching the Centre to Europol would be a more coherent response to the evolving common threats, in particular FIMI and disinformation; points out that, in this context, activities could be carried out as part of a coalition of willing countries within Europol, rather than taking the form of a new autonomous structure; stresses the need to closely involve Member States in governance and decision-making mechanisms within Europol's existing institutional framework; calls on the Commission, in its continued work under the leadership of the Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection, to give priority to functional integration within Europol with a view to achieving swift and effective implementation by 2026; stresses the importance of keeping Parliament regularly informed and closely involved in the process. |
Or. fr
Amendment 686
Sandro Ruotolo
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 5. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a European Centre for Democratic Resilience (the Centre) as a necessary and logical step towards enhanced coordination of efforts to withstand evolving common threats, in particular FIMI and disinformation; notes its approach of a gradual phasing-in of functions and operations, including a gradual increase in Member State participation; welcomes the Commission’s assurance that it is already working on setting up the Centre under the leadership of the Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection, with the express aim of ensuring that it is operational in the course of 2026; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to regularly update and involve Parliament in the process of implementing the European Democracy Shield and the Centre; | 5. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a European Centre for Democratic Resilience (the Centre) as a necessary and logical step to enhanced coordination of efforts to withstand evolving common threats, in particular FIMI and disinformation; Stresses the need to strengthen the operational dimension of the European Democracy Shield through the creation of a dedicated hub, which could take the form of a pilot project; Stresses that this dedicated hub should function as the operational component of the European Democracy Shield, tasked with translating threat analysis and early warning into concrete, timely and evidence-based operational output; notes its approach of a gradual phasing-in of functions and operations, including a gradual increase in Member State participation; welcomes the Commission’s assurance that it is already working on setting up the Centre under the leadership of the Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection, with the express aim of ensuring that it is operational in the course of 2026; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to regularly update and involve Parliament in the process of implementing the European Democracy Shield and the Centre; |
Or. en
Amendment 687
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 5. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a European Centre for Democratic Resilience (the Centre) as a necessary and logical step towards enhanced coordination of efforts to withstand evolving common threats, in particular FIMI and disinformation; notes its approach of a gradual phasing-in of functions and operations, including a gradual increase in Member State participation; welcomes the Commission’s assurance that it is already working on setting up the Centre under the leadership of the Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection, with the express aim of ensuring that it is operational in the course of 2026; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to regularly update and involve Parliament in the process of implementing the European Democracy Shield and the Centre; | 5. Notes the Commission´s proposal for European Centre for the Resilience of Democracy as a voluntary coordination hub for Member States to support the exchange of information and best practices in order to withstand evolving common threats, in particular FIMI and disinformation, while fully respecting Member States´ competences, national constitutional traditions and the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; |
Or. en
Amendment 688
Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 5. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a European Centre for Democratic Resilience (the Centre) as a necessary and logical step towards enhanced coordination of efforts to withstand evolving common threats, in particular FIMI and disinformation; notes its approach of a gradual phasing-in of functions and operations, including a gradual increase in Member State participation; welcomes the Commission’s assurance that it is already working on setting up the Centre under the leadership of the Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection, with the express aim of ensuring that it is operational in the course of 2026; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to regularly update and involve Parliament in the process of implementing the European Democracy Shield and the Centre; | 5. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a European Centre for Democratic Resilience (the Centre) as a necessary and logical step towards enhanced coordination of efforts to withstand evolving common threats, in particular but not limited to FIMI and disinformation; notes its approach of a gradual phasing-in of functions and operations, including a gradual increase in Member State participation; welcomes the Commission’s assurance that it is already working on setting up the Centre under the leadership of the Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection, with the express aim of ensuring that it is operational in the course of 2026; deplores however the lack of clarity regarding the timeline and concrete milestones for the progressive roll-out of the Centre’s development, as the reference to a "gradual" implementation based on voluntary participation of Member States does not provide sufficient predictability, accountability or operational certainty; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to regularly update and involve Parliament in the process of implementing the European Democracy Shield and the Centre; |
Or. en
Amendment 689
Andrey Kovatchev
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 5. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a European Centre for Democratic Resilience (the Centre) as a necessary and logical step towards enhanced coordination of efforts to withstand evolving common threats, in particular FIMI and disinformation; notes its approach of a gradual phasing-in of functions and operations, including a gradual increase in Member State participation; welcomes the Commission’s assurance that it is already working on setting up the Centre under the leadership of the Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection, with the express aim of ensuring that it is operational in the course of 2026; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to regularly update and involve Parliament in the process of implementing the European Democracy Shield and the Centre; | 5. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a European Centre for Democratic Resilience (the Centre) as a necessary and logical step towards enhanced coordination of efforts to withstand evolving common threats, in particular FIMI and disinformation; considers that the establishment of the Centre should represent a qualitative shift from fragmented coordination towards a more integrated, operational and strategic EU-level capacity; notes its approach of a gradual phasing-in of functions and operations, including a gradual increase in Member State participation, while stressing that this should not delay the Centre’s ability to act effectively; welcomes the Commission’s assurance that it is already working on setting up the Centre under the leadership of the Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection, with the express aim of ensuring that it is operational in the course of 2026; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to regularly update and involve Parliament in the process of implementing the European Democracy Shield and the Centre; |
Or. en
Amendment 690
Vasile Dîncu
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 5. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a European Centre for Democratic Resilience (the Centre) as a necessary and logical step towards enhanced coordination of efforts to withstand evolving common threats, in particular FIMI and disinformation; notes its approach of a gradual phasing-in of functions and operations, including a gradual increase in Member State participation; welcomes the Commission’s assurance that it is already working on setting up the Centre under the leadership of the Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection, with the express aim of ensuring that it is operational in the course of 2026; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to regularly update and involve Parliament in the process of implementing the European Democracy Shield and the Centre; | 5. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a European Centre for Democratic Resilience (the Centre) as a necessary and logical step towards enhanced coordination of efforts to withstand evolving common threats, in particular FIMI and disinformation; regrets, however, the voluntary nature of Member State participation proposed by the Commission, which risks creating a two-speed security architecture; calls for a mandatory framework to ensure equal protection across the Union; notes its approach of a gradual phasing-in of functions and operations, including a gradual increase in Member State participation; welcomes the Commission’s assurance that it is already working on setting up the Centre under the leadership of the Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection, with the express aim of ensuring that it is operational in the course of 2026; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to regularly update and involve Parliament in the process of implementing the European Democracy Shield and the Centre; |
Or. en
Amendment 691
Danilo Della Valle
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 5. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a European Centre for Democratic Resilience (the Centre) as a necessary and logical step towards enhanced coordination of efforts to withstand evolving common threats, in particular FIMI and disinformation; notes its approach of a gradual phasing-in of functions and operations, including a gradual increase in Member State participation; welcomes the Commission’s assurance that it is already working on setting up the Centre under the leadership of the Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection, with the express aim of ensuring that it is operational in the course of 2026; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to regularly update and involve Parliament in the process of implementing the European Democracy Shield and the Centre; | 5. Express concern about the risk that the Commission’s proposal for a European Centre for Democratic Resilience (the Centre) could become a tool for indirect censorship of dissenting but equally legitimate democratic opinions; notes its approach of a gradual phasing-in of functions and operations, including a gradual increase in Member State participation; denounces the creation of an another centralised bureaucratic structure, with additional costs for European taxpayers and duplication of existing mechanisms such as the EEAS Rapid Alert System; |
Or. en
Amendment 692
Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 5. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a European Centre for Democratic Resilience (the Centre) as a necessary and logical step towards enhanced coordination of efforts to withstand evolving common threats, in particular FIMI and disinformation; notes its approach of a gradual phasing-in of functions and operations, including a gradual increase in Member State participation; welcomes the Commission’s assurance that it is already working on setting up the Centre under the leadership of the Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection, with the express aim of ensuring that it is operational in the course of 2026; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to regularly update and involve Parliament in the process of implementing the European Democracy Shield and the Centre; | 5. Notes the Commission’s proposal for a European Centre for Democratic Resilience (the Centre) as a possible contribution to coordination against foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI); recalls however that, in the absence of a legislative act based on a specific Treaty legal basis, the Centre cannot exercise operational, coordinative, methodological or decision-shaping functions vis-à-vis Member States, and that its activities must be limited to internal coordination and voluntary, non-binding exchange of information, fully respecting Articles 4(2) and 5 TEU; |
Or. en
Amendment 693
Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 5. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a European Centre for Democratic Resilience (the Centre) as a necessary and logical step towards enhanced coordination of efforts to withstand evolving common threats, in particular FIMI and disinformation; notes its approach of a gradual phasing-in of functions and operations, including a gradual increase in Member State participation; welcomes the Commission’s assurance that it is already working on setting up the Centre under the leadership of the Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection, with the express aim of ensuring that it is operational in the course of 2026; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to regularly update and involve Parliament in the process of implementing the European Democracy Shield and the Centre; | 5. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a European Centre for Democratic Resilience (the Centre) as a necessary and logical step towards enhanced harmonisation of efforts to withstand evolving common threats, in particular FIMI and disinformation; notes its approach of a gradual phasing-in of functions and operations, including a gradual increase in Member State participation; is of the opinion that the participation in the Centre should be mandatory to all Member States as all are targets of interference; welcomes the Commission’s assurance that it is already working on setting up the Centre under the leadership of the Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection, with the express aim of ensuring that it is operational in the course of 2026; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to regularly update and involve Parliament in the process of implementing the European Democracy Shield and the Centre; |
Or. en
Amendment 694
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 5. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a European Centre for Democratic Resilience (the Centre) as a necessary and logical step towards enhanced coordination of efforts to withstand evolving common threats, in particular FIMI and disinformation; notes its approach of a gradual phasing-in of functions and operations, including a gradual increase in Member State participation; welcomes the Commission’s assurance that it is already working on setting up the Centre under the leadership of the Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection, with the express aim of ensuring that it is operational in the course of 2026; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to regularly update and involve Parliament in the process of implementing the European Democracy Shield and the Centre; | 5. Takes note of the Commission’s proposal for a European Centre for Democratic Resilience (the Centre) as a necessary and logical step towards enhanced coordination of efforts to withstand evolving common threats, in particular FIMI and disinformation; notes its approach of a gradual phasing-in of functions and operations, including a gradual increase in Member State participation, regretting however that participation remains voluntary; strongly believes that participation should be mandatory to all Member States in order to guarantee that the Centre is able to have full awareness of threats and plays an efficient and effective role in responding to common threats ; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to regularly update and involve Parliament in the process of implementing the European Democracy Shield and the Centre; believes that civil society should also be involved in the setting-up of the Centre; |
Or. en
Amendment 695
Tomáš Zdechovský
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 5. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a European Centre for Democratic Resilience (the Centre) as a necessary and logical step towards enhanced coordination of efforts to withstand evolving common threats, in particular FIMI and disinformation; notes its approach of a gradual phasing-in of functions and operations, including a gradual increase in Member State participation; welcomes the Commission’s assurance that it is already working on setting up the Centre under the leadership of the Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection, with the express aim of ensuring that it is operational in the course of 2026; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to regularly update and involve Parliament in the process of implementing the European Democracy Shield and the Centre; | 5. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a European Centre for Democratic Resilience (the Centre) as a necessary and logical step towards enhanced coordination of efforts to withstand evolving common threats, in particular FIMI and disinformation; notes its approach of a gradual phasing-in of functions and activities, including a gradual increase in Member State participation; underlines that the Centre should build primarily on strengthened cooperation, information-sharing and coordination among existing EU institutions and agencies, Member States and other relevant and credible actors engaged in the protection of democratic values, rather than on the establishment of new standalone structures; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to regularly update and involve Parliament in the process of implementing the European Democracy Shield; |
Or. en
Amendment 696
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 5. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a European Centre for Democratic Resilience (the Centre) as a necessary and logical step towards enhanced coordination of efforts to withstand evolving common threats, in particular FIMI and disinformation; notes its approach of a gradual phasing-in of functions and operations, including a gradual increase in Member State participation; welcomes the Commission’s assurance that it is already working on setting up the Centre under the leadership of the Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection, with the express aim of ensuring that it is operational in the course of 2026; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to regularly update and involve Parliament in the process of implementing the European Democracy Shield and the Centre; | 5. Notes the Commission’s proposal for a European Centre for Democratic Resilience (the Centre) with its approach of a gradual phasing-in of functions and operations, including a gradual increase in Member State participation; notes the Commission’s assurance that it is already working on setting up the Centre under the leadership of the Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection, with the express aim of ensuring that it is operational in the course of 2026; notes that the idea of establishing a supranational body responsible for democratic resilience has not gained recognition within the structures of the NATO; strongly questions both the legal basis and the necessity of establishing such a body within the European Union; |
Or. en
Amendment 697
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 5 a. stresses that participation by Member States in any centre of excelence must remain strictly voluntary and based on their explicit consent, in full respect of the principles of subsidiarity and national competence; it must not exercise any form of oversight, assessment or control over Member States’ democratic systems, electoral processes or information spaces; underlines that such a centre should serve as a platform for coordination, expertise-sharing, technical assistance and support upon request by Member States; |
Or. en
Amendment 698
Vasile Dîncu
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 5 a. Stresses that enhanced Union-level action to protect democracy must be accompanied by strong democratic oversight; calls for regular reporting to the European Parliament on the implementation of the European Democracy Shield, including its budgetary, operational and strategic dimensions; |
Or. en
Amendment 699
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 5 b. Reminds about effective and close cooperation in the combatting FIMI between the Member States, EEAS, NATO, various partners, including civil society; states that the Commission may play a supporting role in this field within the limits of the competences conferred upon it; |
Or. en
Amendment 700
Stefano Cavedagna
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 6. Recalls however, that the proposal lacks sufficient operational detail, clear budgetary allocations, a specific governance structure, a concrete mandate and a timeline; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does not explicitly link the centre to any of the actions outlined therein, which remain in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS; expresses concern that if the Centre remains only another hub, network, platform or framework among others this could further reduce the EU’s capacity to make efficient use of the full spectrum of tools available at present, and add to the shortcomings identified in the joint communication, including reduced reactiveness, fragmentation and stretched budgets; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 701
Kim Van Sparrentak
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 6. Recalls however, that the proposal lacks sufficient operational detail, clear budgetary allocations, a specific governance structure, a concrete mandate and a timeline; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does not explicitly link the centre to any of the actions outlined therein, which remain in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS; expresses concern that if the Centre remains only another hub, network, platform or framework among others this could further reduce the EU’s capacity to make efficient use of the full spectrum of tools available at present, and add to the shortcomings identified in the joint communication, including reduced reactiveness, fragmentation and stretched budgets; | 6. Recalls the call of the European Parliament resolution of 9 March 2022 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation (INGE 1 report) for an establishment of a well-resourced and independent Centre, reiterated by the European Parliament resolution of 1 June 2023 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation (ING2 report); notes however, that the proposal lacks sufficient operational detail, clear allocations of dedicated budgetary resources and personnel, a specific governance structure, a concrete mandate, powers and a timeline; emphasises that the centre should be well-equipped to effectively trace and monitor foreign interference and hybrid attacks, analyse these, exchange information and coordinate responses; points out that all organisations and institutions affiliated with the Centre should be independent, in particular from big tech companies and must not receive funding from entities that stand in direct opposition to the objectives of the Centre; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does not explicitly link the centre to any of the actions outlined therein, which remain in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS; expresses concern that if the Centre remains only another hub, network, platform or framework among others this could further reduce the EU’s capacity to make efficient use of the full spectrum of tools available at present, and add to the shortcomings identified in the joint communication, including reduced reactiveness, fragmentation and stretched budgets; |
Or. en
Amendment 702
Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 6. Recalls however, that the proposal lacks sufficient operational detail, clear budgetary allocations, a specific governance structure, a concrete mandate and a timeline; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does not explicitly link the centre to any of the actions outlined therein, which remain in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS; expresses concern that if the Centre remains only another hub, network, platform or framework among others this could further reduce the EU’s capacity to make efficient use of the full spectrum of tools available at present, and add to the shortcomings identified in the joint communication, including reduced reactiveness, fragmentation and stretched budgets; | 6. Recalls however, that the proposal lacks sufficient operational detail, clear budgetary allocations, a specific governance structure, a concrete mandate and a timeline; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does not explicitly link the centre to any of the actions outlined therein, which remain in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS; expresses concern that if the Centre remains only another hub, network, platform or framework among others this could further reduce the EU’s capacity to make efficient use of the full spectrum of tools available at present, and add to the shortcomings identified in the joint communication, including reduced reactiveness, fragmentation and stretched budgets; underlines that the added value of the European Centre for Democratic Resilience should lie in coordination, not duplication; stresses that its working methods and data use must be fully interoperable with existing EU and national structures; calls for reinforced parliamentary scrutiny and structured cooperation with civil society, journalists and independent fact-checkers; insists on the urgent need to further clarify the Centre’s legal basis, mandate, governance and decision-making structures, as well as its sustainable financing. |
Or. en
Amendment 703
Tomáš Zdechovský, Dan-Ştefan Motreanu, Eszter Lakos, Lukas Mandl, Sandra Kalniete, Sander Smit, Marta Wcisło, Fredis Beleris, Andrey Kovatchev
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 6. Recalls however, that the proposal lacks sufficient operational detail, clear budgetary allocations, a specific governance structure, a concrete mandate and a timeline; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does not explicitly link the centre to any of the actions outlined therein, which remain in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS; expresses concern that if the Centre remains only another hub, network, platform or framework among others this could further reduce the EU’s capacity to make efficient use of the full spectrum of tools available at present, and add to the shortcomings identified in the joint communication, including reduced reactiveness, fragmentation and stretched budgets; | 6. Recalls, however, that the proposal lacks sufficient operational detail, clear budgetary allocations, a specific governance structure, a concrete mandate and a timeline; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does not yet sufficiently articulate how the envisaged coordination is linked to the actions outlined therein, which remain embedded in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS; underlines the importance of ensuring that the Centre’s role is clearly defined in a way that strengthens coherence, reduces fragmentation and enhances the effective use of existing tools, and cautions that without such clarity the added value of the European Democracy Shield risks being diluted; stresses therefore that the Centre’s primary function should be to facilitate structured cooperation, information-sharing and coordination among existing EU and national actors, building on their mandates and expertise, rather than replicating functions already in place; highlights that timelines must reflect urgent need and rapidly changing realities, and that resourcing must realistically meet those needs; |
Or. en
Amendment 704
Christophe Gomart
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 6. Recalls however, that the proposal lacks sufficient operational detail, clear budgetary allocations, a specific governance structure, a concrete mandate and a timeline; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does not explicitly link the centre to any of the actions outlined therein, which remain in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS; expresses concern that if the Centre remains only another hub, network, platform or framework among others this could further reduce the EU’s capacity to make efficient use of the full spectrum of tools available at present, and add to the shortcomings identified in the joint communication, including reduced reactiveness, fragmentation and stretched budgets; | 6. Recalls however, that the proposal lacks sufficient operational detail, clear budgetary allocations, a specific governance structure, a concrete mandate and a timeline; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does not explicitly link the centre to any of the actions outlined therein, which remain in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS; stresses that insufficient clarification of these competences could jeopardise Member States' support and hinder the adoption and effective implementation of the initiative, but attaching it to Europol, a recognised agency that is already fully integrated into Member States' practices, would pave the way for rapid ownership and more consistent implementation; expresses concern that if the Centre remains only another hub, network, platform or framework among others this could further reduce the EU’s capacity to make efficient use of the full spectrum of tools available at present, and add to the shortcomings identified in the joint communication, including reduced reactiveness, fragmentation and stretched budgets; |
Or. fr
Amendment 705
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 6. Recalls however, that the proposal lacks sufficient operational detail, clear budgetary allocations, a specific governance structure, a concrete mandate and a timeline; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does not explicitly link the centre to any of the actions outlined therein, which remain in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS; expresses concern that if the Centre remains only another hub, network, platform or framework among others this could further reduce the EU’s capacity to make efficient use of the full spectrum of tools available at present, and add to the shortcomings identified in the joint communication, including reduced reactiveness, fragmentation and stretched budgets; | 6. Regrets however, that the proposal lacks a proper establishment of a Centre, granting it a clear mandate and empowerment through a legal act, coupled with budgetary allocations, a specific governance structure, and a timeline; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does not explicitly link the centre to any of the actions outlined therein, which remain in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS; expresses concern that if the Centre remains only another hub, network, platform or framework among others this could further reduce the EU’s capacity to make efficient use of the full spectrum of tools available at present, lead to duplication of work, and add to the shortcomings identified in the joint communication, including reduced reactiveness, fragmentation and stretched budgets; firmly believes thus that the Centre should serve both as an aggregator and consolidator of existing European-level action, and as an additional European layer to assist, amplify and complement national actions; |
Or. en
Amendment 706
Eugen Tomac
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 6. Recalls however, that the proposal lacks sufficient operational detail, clear budgetary allocations, a specific governance structure, a concrete mandate and a timeline; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does not explicitly link the centre to any of the actions outlined therein, which remain in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS; expresses concern that if the Centre remains only another hub, network, platform or framework among others this could further reduce the EU’s capacity to make efficient use of the full spectrum of tools available at present, and add to the shortcomings identified in the joint communication, including reduced reactiveness, fragmentation and stretched budgets; | 6. Recalls however, that the proposal lacks sufficient operational detail, clear budgetary allocations, a specific governance structure, a concrete mandate and a timeline; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does not explicitly link the centre to any of the actions outlined therein, which remain in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS; expresses concern that if the Centre remains only another hub, network, platform or framework among others this could further reduce the EU’s capacity to make efficient use of the full spectrum of tools available at present, and add to the shortcomings identified in the joint communication, including reduced reactiveness, fragmentation and stretched budgets; In this context, calls for the European Centre for Democratic Resilience to be designed and implemented as a structurally autonomous entity, supported by stable and predictable financial resources, in order to avoid further fragmentation and to ensure coherent and timely action across the Union. |
Or. en
Amendment 707
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 6. Recalls however, that the proposal lacks sufficient operational detail, clear budgetary allocations, a specific governance structure, a concrete mandate and a timeline; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does not explicitly link the centre to any of the actions outlined therein, which remain in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS; expresses concern that if the Centre remains only another hub, network, platform or framework among others this could further reduce the EU’s capacity to make efficient use of the full spectrum of tools available at present, and add to the shortcomings identified in the joint communication, including reduced reactiveness, fragmentation and stretched budgets; | 6. Recalls however, that the proposal lacks sufficient operational detail, clear budgetary allocations, a specific governance structure, a concrete mandate and a timeline; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does not explicitly link the centre to any of the actions outlined therein, which remain in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS; expresses concern that if the Centre remains only another hub, network, platform or framework among others this could further reduce the EU’s capacity to make efficient use of the full spectrum of tools available at present, and add to the shortcomings identified in the joint communication, including reduced reactiveness, fragmentation and stretched budgets; highlights that timelines must reflect urgent need and rapidly changing realities, and that resourcing must realistically meet those needs; cautions against unnecessary duplication or fragmentation of efforts; |
Or. en
Amendment 708
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 6. Recalls however, that the proposal lacks sufficient operational detail, clear budgetary allocations, a specific governance structure, a concrete mandate and a timeline; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does not explicitly link the centre to any of the actions outlined therein, which remain in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS; expresses concern that if the Centre remains only another hub, network, platform or framework among others this could further reduce the EU’s capacity to make efficient use of the full spectrum of tools available at present, and add to the shortcomings identified in the joint communication, including reduced reactiveness, fragmentation and stretched budgets; | 6. Recalls however, that the proposal lacks Treaty legal basis and sufficient operational detail, clear budgetary allocations, a specific governance structure, a concrete mandate and a timeline; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does not explicitly link the centre to any of the actions outlined therein, which remain in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS; expresses concern that if the Centre remains only another hub, network, platform or framework among others this could further reduce the EU’s capacity to make efficient use of the full spectrum of tools available at present, and add to the shortcomings identified in the joint communication, including reduced reactiveness, fragmentation and stretched budgets; in the light of the above, calls for this concept to be abandoned and for efforts to be focused instead on strengthening the fight against FIMI within already existing bodies; |
Or. en
Amendment 709
Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 6. Recalls however, that the proposal lacks sufficient operational detail, clear budgetary allocations, a specific governance structure, a concrete mandate and a timeline; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does not explicitly link the centre to any of the actions outlined therein, which remain in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS; expresses concern that if the Centre remains only another hub, network, platform or framework among others this could further reduce the EU’s capacity to make efficient use of the full spectrum of tools available at present, and add to the shortcomings identified in the joint communication, including reduced reactiveness, fragmentation and stretched budgets; | 6. Considers that, because of the lack of a legal base, the proposal lacks sufficient operational detail, clear budgetary allocations, a specific governance structure, a concrete mandate and a timeline; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does therefore not explicitly link the centre to any of the actions outlined therein, which remain in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS; notes that the Centre remains only another hub, network, platform or framework among others and would therefore contribute to stretched budgets; |
Or. en
Amendment 710
Danilo Della Valle
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 6. Recalls however, that the proposal lacks sufficient operational detail, clear budgetary allocations, a specific governance structure, a concrete mandate and a timeline; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does not explicitly link the centre to any of the actions outlined therein, which remain in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS; expresses concern that if the Centre remains only another hub, network, platform or framework among others this could further reduce the EU’s capacity to make efficient use of the full spectrum of tools available at present, and add to the shortcomings identified in the joint communication, including reduced reactiveness, fragmentation and stretched budgets; | 6. Calls on the Commission to publicly disclose the full list of potential beneficiaries of funds from the European Center for Democratic Resilience, including any established links to EU officials or private foundations; calls on the Commission to involve the Parliament in the monitoring of the activities of the Centre; calls on the Commission to present to the Parliament, within three months, a comparative report supported by verifiable data, demonstrating how the Centre addresses genuine gaps in democratic resilience without unduly expanding the scope of EU surveillance over European citizens; |
Or. en
Amendment 711
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 6. Recalls however, that the proposal lacks sufficient operational detail, clear budgetary allocations, a specific governance structure, a concrete mandate and a timeline; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does not explicitly link the centre to any of the actions outlined therein, which remain in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS; expresses concern that if the Centre remains only another hub, network, platform or framework among others this could further reduce the EU’s capacity to make efficient use of the full spectrum of tools available at present, and add to the shortcomings identified in the joint communication, including reduced reactiveness, fragmentation and stretched budgets; | 6. Recalls, that the proposal lacks a clear legal basis; sufficient operational detail, clear budgetary allocations, a specific governance structure, a concrete mandate and a timeline; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does not explicitly link the centre to any of the actions outlined therein, which remain in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS without adequate Member States’ oversight; expresses concern that if the Centre remains only another hub, network, platform or framework among others this could further reduce the EU’s capacity to make efficient use of the full spectrum of tools available at present, lead to unnecessary duplication and bureaucratic expansion and exacerbate the shortcomings identified in the joint communication, including reduced reactiveness, fragmentation and stretched budgets; |
Or. en
Amendment 712
Fabrice Leggeri, Virginie Joron, Marieke Ehlers
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 6. Recalls however, that the proposal lacks sufficient operational detail, clear budgetary allocations, a specific governance structure, a concrete mandate and a timeline; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does not explicitly link the centre to any of the actions outlined therein, which remain in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS; expresses concern that if the Centre remains only another hub, network, platform or framework among others this could further reduce the EU’s capacity to make efficient use of the full spectrum of tools available at present, and add to the shortcomings identified in the joint communication, including reduced reactiveness, fragmentation and stretched budgets; | 6. Recalls however, that the proposal lacks a clear legal basis, sufficient operational detail, clear budgetary allocations, a specific governance structure, a concrete mandate and a timeline; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does not explicitly link the centre to any of the actions outlined therein, which remain in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS; expresses concern that the Centre will only be another hub, network, platform or framework among others this could further reduce the EU’s capacity to make efficient use of the full spectrum of tools available at present, lead to unnecessary duplication and bureaucratic expansion and add to the shortcomings identified in the joint communication, including reduced reactiveness, fragmentation and stretched budgets; |
Or. en
Amendment 713
Andrey Kovatchev
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 6. Recalls however, that the proposal lacks sufficient operational detail, clear budgetary allocations, a specific governance structure, a concrete mandate and a timeline; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does not explicitly link the centre to any of the actions outlined therein, which remain in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS; expresses concern that if the Centre remains only another hub, network, platform or framework among others this could further reduce the EU’s capacity to make efficient use of the full spectrum of tools available at present, and add to the shortcomings identified in the joint communication, including reduced reactiveness, fragmentation and stretched budgets; | 6. Recalls however, that the proposal lacks sufficient operational detail, clear budgetary allocations, a specific governance structure, a concrete mandate and a timeline; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does not explicitly link the centre to any of the actions outlined therein, which remain in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS; expresses concern that if the Centre remains only another hub, network, platform or framework among others this could further reduce the EU’s capacity to make efficient use of the full spectrum of tools available at present, risk duplication of efforts and institutional ambiguity, and add to the shortcomings identified in the joint communication, including reduced reactiveness, fragmentation and stretched budgets; |
Or. en
Amendment 714
Konstantinos Arvanitis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 6. Recalls however, that the proposal lacks sufficient operational detail, clear budgetary allocations, a specific governance structure, a concrete mandate and a timeline; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does not explicitly link the centre to any of the actions outlined therein, which remain in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS; expresses concern that if the Centre remains only another hub, network, platform or framework among others this could further reduce the EU’s capacity to make efficient use of the full spectrum of tools available at present, and add to the shortcomings identified in the joint communication, including reduced reactiveness, fragmentation and stretched budgets; | 6. Recalls however, that the proposal lacks sufficient operational detail, clear budgetary allocations, a specific governance structure, a concrete mandate and a timeline; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does not explicitly link the centre to any of the actions outlined therein, which remain in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS; expresses concern that if the Centre remains only another hub, network, platform or framework among others this could further reduce the EU’s capacity to make efficient use of the full spectrum of tools available at present, and add to the shortcomings identified in the joint communication, including lack of operational specificity reduced reactiveness, fragmentation and stretched budgets; |
Or. en
Amendment 715
Vasile Dîncu
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 6. Recalls however, that the proposal lacks sufficient operational detail, clear budgetary allocations, a specific governance structure, a concrete mandate and a timeline; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does not explicitly link the centre to any of the actions outlined therein, which remain in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS; expresses concern that if the Centre remains only another hub, network, platform or framework among others this could further reduce the EU’s capacity to make efficient use of the full spectrum of tools available at present, and add to the shortcomings identified in the joint communication, including reduced reactiveness, fragmentation and stretched budgets; | 6. Recalls however, that the proposal lacks sufficient operational detail, clear budgetary allocations, a specific governance structure, a concrete mandate and a timeline; insists that the Centre must function primarily as a coordination and knowledge hub and must not become a "super-structure" that duplicates functions already performed by the Commission, particularly regarding the enforcement of the Digital Services Act (DSA); expresses concern that if the Centre remains only another hub, network, platform or framework among others this could further reduce the EU’s capacity to make efficient use of the full spectrum of tools available at present, and add to the shortcomings identified in the joint communication, including reduced reactiveness, fragmentation and stretched budgets; |
Or. en
Amendment 716
Pina Picierno
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 6 a. calls for the European Centre for Democratic Resilience to be established as a permanent structure of the Union endowed with autonomous legal personality, with an explicit operational mandate for the identification, analysis, attribution and countering of information manipulation operations, foreign interference and hybrid threats; stresses that the Centre must be equipped with stable, multidisciplinary staff, including FIMI analysts, OSINT experts, cybersecurity and financial tracking specialists, and be authorised to coordinate cross-border task forces with the competent authorities of the Member States; calls on the Member States to ensure the real-time transmission of relevant data to the Centre; requests that the Centre be able to activate rapid response mechanisms in cases of serious and immediate threats to the integrity of democratic processes; |
Or. en
Amendment 717
Danilo Della Valle
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 6 a. Notes that the EU spends €80 million annually – nearly €1 billion over a decade – to media projects via IMREG (€40M since 2017), Journalism Partnerships (€50M), EDMO (€27M) and partnerships with news agencies, often without disclosure, creating structural dependencies that incentivise pro-EU narratives, self-censorship and marginalisation of dissent while claiming to promote media pluralism; notes that these practices, extended to foreign influence operations (€10M to Ukraine in 2025), risk to generate double standards that undermine press freedom, accountability and the Union’s democratic credibility; calls on the Commission and the Council to conduct an independent audit of all EU media financing schemes since 2017, with full public disclosure of beneficiaries and content produced; |
Or. en
Amendment 718
Saskia Bricmont, Sandro Ruotolo, Krzysztof Brejza, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Lucia Yar, Diana Riba i Giner, Hannah Neumann, Chloé Ridel, Leoluca Orlando
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 6 a. Recalls the EP report of the PEGA Inquiry Committee containing recommendations to fight the illegal use of spyware, in particular intrusive spyware; laments that the Commission to this date has not taken the recommendations on board, even though issues prevail; points out that this puts all EU citizens, in particular civil society actors, journalists, academics, human rights defenders but also institutions at considerable risk at exposure especially to foreign interference; therefore proposes that at minimum the Centre should integrate the propose EU Tech Lab to counter intrusive spyware as an element to protect democracy and answer to the growing issues surrounding the proliferation of spyware; |
Or. en
Amendment 719
Kim Van Sparrentak
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 6 a. Recalls the EP report of the PEGA Inquiry Committee containing recommendations to fight the illegal use of spyware, in particular intrusive spyware; laments that the Commission to this date has not taken the recommendations on board, even though issues prevail; points out that this puts all EU citizens, in particular civil society actors, journalists, academics, human rights defenders but also institutions at considerable risk at exposure especially to foreign interference; therefore proposes that at minimum the Centre should integrate the proposed EU Tech Lab to counter intrusive spyware to protect democracy and answer to the growing issues surrounding the proliferation of spyware; |
Or. en
Amendment 720
Stefano Cavedagna
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 7. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication provides an extensive mapping of existing counter-FIMI and disinformation and resilience frameworks, structures, tools, initiatives and programmes, and a list of the actions which the Commission and the EEAS have committed to undertake; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to propose a clear timeline for their gradual phasing-in and integration within the Centre, with 2026 to be set as the deadline for such integration; calls for this integration to include relevant DSA supervisory and enforcement mechanisms, especially with a view to identifying and minimising systemic risk, coordinating efforts to counter information manipulation campaigns, ensuring operational responsibility for an enhanced Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the maintenance and operation of a unified FIMI intelligence database, and developing the EUvsDisinfo resource, the ECNE, and the Commission’s Task Force on Disinformation and Strategic Communication, among others; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 721
Christophe Gomart
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 7. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication provides an extensive mapping of existing counter-FIMI and disinformation and resilience frameworks, structures, tools, initiatives and programmes, and a list of the actions which the Commission and the EEAS have committed to undertake; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to propose a clear timeline for their gradual phasing-in and integration within the Centre, with 2026 to be set as the deadline for such integration; calls for this integration to include relevant DSA supervisory and enforcement mechanisms, especially with a view to identifying and minimising systemic risk, coordinating efforts to counter information manipulation campaigns, ensuring operational responsibility for an enhanced Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the maintenance and operation of a unified FIMI intelligence database, and developing the EUvsDisinfo resource, the ECNE, and the Commission’s Task Force on Disinformation and Strategic Communication, among others; | 7. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication provides an extensive mapping of existing counter-FIMI and disinformation and resilience frameworks, structures, tools, initiatives and programmes, and a list of the actions which the Commission and the EEAS have committed to undertake; emphasises, in the light of this detailed mapping of existing frameworks and structures, the need to thoroughly assess the added value, operational relevance and complementarity of the Centre in order to prevent duplication with existing mechanisms, agencies and initiatives, and considers that linking tasks envisaged for the Centre to Europol would enhance its operational effectiveness, as Europol is recognised as an institution and is trusted by Member States, thereby paving the way for rapid ownership and effective implementation; calls on the Commission and the EEAS, therefore, to clearly demonstrate the real need for the Centre to be established and brought into effect, as well as details of its links with existing structures, including the option of functional integration within Europol, before its full implementation; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to propose a clear timeline for their gradual phasing-in and integration within the Centre, with 2026 to be set as the deadline for such integration, or, if appropriate, for the integration of its tasks in Europol; calls for this integration to include relevant DSA supervisory and enforcement mechanisms, especially with a view to identifying and minimising systemic risk, coordinating efforts to counter information manipulation campaigns, ensuring operational responsibility for an enhanced Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the maintenance and operation of a unified FIMI intelligence database, and developing the EUvsDisinfo resource, the ECNE, and the Commission’s Task Force on Disinformation and Strategic Communication, among others; |
Or. fr
Amendment 722
Tomáš Zdechovský, Dan-Ştefan Motreanu, Eszter Lakos, Lukas Mandl, Sandra Kalniete, Marta Wcisło, Fredis Beleris, Andrey Kovatchev
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 7. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication provides an extensive mapping of existing counter-FIMI and disinformation and resilience frameworks, structures, tools, initiatives and programmes, and a list of the actions which the Commission and the EEAS have committed to undertake; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to propose a clear timeline for their gradual phasing-in and integration within the Centre, with 2026 to be set as the deadline for such integration; calls for this integration to include relevant DSA supervisory and enforcement mechanisms, especially with a view to identifying and minimising systemic risk, coordinating efforts to counter information manipulation campaigns, ensuring operational responsibility for an enhanced Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the maintenance and operation of a unified FIMI intelligence database, and developing the EUvsDisinfo resource, the ECNE, and the Commission’s Task Force on Disinformation and Strategic Communication, among others; | 7. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication provides an extensive mapping of existing counter-FIMI and disinformation and resilience frameworks, structures, tools, initiatives and programmes, and a list of the actions which the Commission and the EEAS have committed to undertake; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to propose a clear timeline for their gradual phasing-in and integration within the Centre, with 2026 to be set as the deadline for such integration; calls for this integration to include relevant DSA supervisory and enforcement mechanisms, especially with a view to identifying and minimising systemic risk, coordinating efforts to counter information manipulation campaigns, ensuring operational responsibility for an enhanced Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the deployment and operation of a unified FIMI intelligence database, and developing the EUvsDisinfo resource, the ECNE, and the Commission’s Task Force on Disinformation and Strategic Communication, among others; underlines the need for common open source methodologies, and effective collaboration across networks of actors including open source intelligence researchers, fact-checkers, journalists, communicators, and policy-makers; stresses that such integration should build in particular on the work and expertise of existing EU agencies and bodies, including Europol, Eurojust, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), Frontex and CEPOL, as well as competent national authorities; |
Or. en
Amendment 723
Kim Van Sparrentak
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 7. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication provides an extensive mapping of existing counter-FIMI and disinformation and resilience frameworks, structures, tools, initiatives and programmes, and a list of the actions which the Commission and the EEAS have committed to undertake; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to propose a clear timeline for their gradual phasing-in and integration within the Centre, with 2026 to be set as the deadline for such integration; calls for this integration to include relevant DSA supervisory and enforcement mechanisms, especially with a view to identifying and minimising systemic risk, coordinating efforts to counter information manipulation campaigns, ensuring operational responsibility for an enhanced Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the maintenance and operation of a unified FIMI intelligence database, and developing the EUvsDisinfo resource, the ECNE, and the Commission’s Task Force on Disinformation and Strategic Communication, among others; | 7. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication provides an extensive mapping of existing counter-FIMI and disinformation and resilience frameworks, structures, tools, initiatives and programmes, and a list of the actions which the Commission and the EEAS have committed to undertake; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to propose a clear timeline for their gradual phasing-in and integration within the Centre, with 2026 to be set as the deadline for such integration; calls for this integration to include the sharing of analyses and cooperation with relevant DSA supervisory and enforcement mechanisms including the European Board for Digital Services, , especially with a view to identifying and minimising systemic risk, coordinating efforts to counter information manipulation campaigns, ensuring operational responsibility for an enhanced Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the maintenance and operation of a unified FIMI intelligence database, and developing the EUvsDisinfo resource, the ECNE, and the Commission’s Task Force on Disinformation and Strategic Communication, among others; calls on the Commission to ensure that this integration also includes taking stock of the state of coordinated attacks on media integrity and independence per Member State, and use existing rules as well as upcoming legislative reviews to put ensure quality journalism can survive in times of predatory content crawling and AI-generated reviews; |
Or. en
Amendment 724
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 7. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication provides an extensive mapping of existing counter-FIMI and disinformation and resilience frameworks, structures, tools, initiatives and programmes, and a list of the actions which the Commission and the EEAS have committed to undertake; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to propose a clear timeline for their gradual phasing-in and integration within the Centre, with 2026 to be set as the deadline for such integration; calls for this integration to include relevant DSA supervisory and enforcement mechanisms, especially with a view to identifying and minimising systemic risk, coordinating efforts to counter information manipulation campaigns, ensuring operational responsibility for an enhanced Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the maintenance and operation of a unified FIMI intelligence database, and developing the EUvsDisinfo resource, the ECNE, and the Commission’s Task Force on Disinformation and Strategic Communication, among others; | 7. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication provides an extensive mapping of existing counter-FIMI and disinformation and resilience frameworks, structures, tools, initiatives and programmes, and a list of the actions which the Commission and the EEAS have committed to undertake, which however are insufficient in the current context; regrets the absence of recognition of the work undertaken by the European Parliament in this field; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to study the feasibility of their gradual phasing-in and integration within the Centre; |
Or. en
Amendment 725
Sandro Ruotolo
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 7. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication provides an extensive mapping of existing counter-FIMI and disinformation and resilience frameworks, structures, tools, initiatives and programmes, and a list of the actions which the Commission and the EEAS have committed to undertake; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to propose a clear timeline for their gradual phasing-in and integration within the Centre, with 2026 to be set as the deadline for such integration; calls for this integration to include relevant DSA supervisory and enforcement mechanisms, especially with a view to identifying and minimising systemic risk, coordinating efforts to counter information manipulation campaigns, ensuring operational responsibility for an enhanced Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the maintenance and operation of a unified FIMI intelligence database, and developing the EUvsDisinfo resource, the ECNE, and the Commission’s Task Force on Disinformation and Strategic Communication, among others; | 7. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication provides an extensive mapping of existing counter-FIMI and disinformation and resilience frameworks, structures, tools, initiatives and programmes, and a list of the actions which the Commission and the EEAS have committed to undertake; highlights that the hub to be created should develop common procedures for the structured collection, preservation and analysis of evidence related to FIMI and disinformation, in support of the enforcement of existing EU legislation, in particular the Digital Services Act and the European Media Freedom Act; Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to propose a clear timeline for their gradual phasing-in and integration within the Centre, with 2026 to be set as the deadline for such integration; calls for this integration to include relevant DSA supervisory and enforcement mechanisms, especially with a view to identifying and minimising systemic risk, coordinating efforts to counter information manipulation campaigns, ensuring operational responsibility for an enhanced Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the maintenance and operation of a unified FIMI intelligence database, and developing the EUvsDisinfo resource, the ECNE, and the Commission’s Task Force on Disinformation and Strategic Communication, among others; |
Or. en
Amendment 726
Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 7. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication provides an extensive mapping of existing counter-FIMI and disinformation and resilience frameworks, structures, tools, initiatives and programmes, and a list of the actions which the Commission and the EEAS have committed to undertake; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to propose a clear timeline for their gradual phasing-in and integration within the Centre, with 2026 to be set as the deadline for such integration; calls for this integration to include relevant DSA supervisory and enforcement mechanisms, especially with a view to identifying and minimising systemic risk, coordinating efforts to counter information manipulation campaigns, ensuring operational responsibility for an enhanced Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the maintenance and operation of a unified FIMI intelligence database, and developing the EUvsDisinfo resource, the ECNE, and the Commission’s Task Force on Disinformation and Strategic Communication, among others; | 7. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication provides an extensive mapping of existing counter-FIMI and disinformation and resilience frameworks, structures, tools, initiatives and programmes, and a list of the actions which the Commission and the EEAS have committed to undertake; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to propose a clear timeline for their gradual phasing-in and integration within the Centre, with 2026 to be set as the deadline for such integration; calls for this integration to include relevant DSA supervisory and enforcement mechanisms, especially with a view to identifying and minimising systemic risk, coordinating efforts to counter information manipulation campaigns, ensuring operational responsibility for an enhanced Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the maintenance and operation of a unified FIMI intelligence database, and developing the EUvsDisinfo resource, the ECNE, and the Commission’s Task Force on Disinformation and Strategic Communication, among others; notes, however, that where full integration is not feasible or proportionate, the Commission and the EEAS should clearly identify and formalise strengthened cooperation mechanisms, including structured partnerships and operational coordination arrangements with relevant EU agencies and bodies ; |
Or. en
Amendment 727
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 7. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication provides an extensive mapping of existing counter-FIMI and disinformation and resilience frameworks, structures, tools, initiatives and programmes, and a list of the actions which the Commission and the EEAS have committed to undertake; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to propose a clear timeline for their gradual phasing-in and integration within the Centre, with 2026 to be set as the deadline for such integration; calls for this integration to include relevant DSA supervisory and enforcement mechanisms, especially with a view to identifying and minimising systemic risk, coordinating efforts to counter information manipulation campaigns, ensuring operational responsibility for an enhanced Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the maintenance and operation of a unified FIMI intelligence database, and developing the EUvsDisinfo resource, the ECNE, and the Commission’s Task Force on Disinformation and Strategic Communication, among others; | 7. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication provides an extensive mapping of existing counter-FIMI and disinformation and resilience frameworks, structures, tools, initiatives and programmes, and a list of the actions which the Commission and the EEAS have committed to undertake; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to propose a clear timeline for their gradual phasing-in within the scope of their respective mandates; warns against integration lacking a Treaty basis which, in practice, would amount to consolidation within the Commission, including relevant DSA supervisory and enforcement mechanisms, especially with a view to identifying and minimising systemic risk, coordinating efforts to counter information manipulation campaigns, ensuring operational responsibility for an enhanced Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the maintenance and operation of a unified FIMI intelligence database, and developing the EUvsDisinfo resource, the ECNE, and the Commission’s Task Force on Disinformation and Strategic Communication, among others, which risks leading to the establishment of a centralised body subordinated to the Commission, dangerously expanding its competences and weakening the community-based dimension within the EEAS; |
Or. en
Amendment 728
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 7. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication provides an extensive mapping of existing counter-FIMI and disinformation and resilience frameworks, structures, tools, initiatives and programmes, and a list of the actions which the Commission and the EEAS have committed to undertake; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to propose a clear timeline for their gradual phasing-in and integration within the Centre, with 2026 to be set as the deadline for such integration; calls for this integration to include relevant DSA supervisory and enforcement mechanisms, especially with a view to identifying and minimising systemic risk, coordinating efforts to counter information manipulation campaigns, ensuring operational responsibility for an enhanced Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the maintenance and operation of a unified FIMI intelligence database, and developing the EUvsDisinfo resource, the ECNE, and the Commission’s Task Force on Disinformation and Strategic Communication, among others; | 7. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication provides an extensive mapping of existing counter-FIMI and disinformation and resilience frameworks, structures, tools, initiatives and programmes, and a list of the actions which the Commission and the EEAS have committed to undertake; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to propose a clear timeline for their gradual phasing-in and integration within the Centre, with 2026 to be set as the deadline for such integration; calls for this integration to include relevant DSA supervisory and enforcement mechanisms, especially with a view to identifying and minimising systemic risk, coordinating efforts to counter information manipulation campaigns, ensuring operational responsibility for an enhanced Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the deployment and operation of a unified FIMI intelligence database, and developing the EUvsDisinfo resource, the ECNE, and the Commission’s Task Force on Disinformation and Strategic Communication, among others; underscores the need for common open source methodologies, and effective collaboration across networks of actors including open source intelligence researchers, fact-checkers, journalists, communicators, and policy-makers; |
Or. en
Amendment 729
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 7. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication provides an extensive mapping of existing counter-FIMI and disinformation and resilience frameworks, structures, tools, initiatives and programmes, and a list of the actions which the Commission and the EEAS have committed to undertake; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to propose a clear timeline for their gradual phasing-in and integration within the Centre, with 2026 to be set as the deadline for such integration; calls for this integration to include relevant DSA supervisory and enforcement mechanisms, especially with a view to identifying and minimising systemic risk, coordinating efforts to counter information manipulation campaigns, ensuring operational responsibility for an enhanced Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the maintenance and operation of a unified FIMI intelligence database, and developing the EUvsDisinfo resource, the ECNE, and the Commission’s Task Force on Disinformation and Strategic Communication, among others; | 7. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication provides an extensive mapping of existing counter-FIMI and disinformation and resilience frameworks, structures, tools, initiatives and programmes, and a list of the actions which the Commission and the EEAS have committed to undertake; calls on the Commission to prioritise the effective use of existing instruments and the practical exchange of information with the Member States, rather than creating new structures or centralised mechanisms at EU level; stresses that any further action in this field must fully respect, Member States’ competences, national sovereignty and democratic accountability, and must not lead to any extension of EU competences or to restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms; |
Or. en
Amendment 730
Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 7. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication provides an extensive mapping of existing counter-FIMI and disinformation and resilience frameworks, structures, tools, initiatives and programmes, and a list of the actions which the Commission and the EEAS have committed to undertake; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to propose a clear timeline for their gradual phasing-in and integration within the Centre, with 2026 to be set as the deadline for such integration; calls for this integration to include relevant DSA supervisory and enforcement mechanisms, especially with a view to identifying and minimising systemic risk, coordinating efforts to counter information manipulation campaigns, ensuring operational responsibility for an enhanced Rapid Alert System (RAS) and the maintenance and operation of a unified FIMI intelligence database, and developing the EUvsDisinfo resource, the ECNE, and the Commission’s Task Force on Disinformation and Strategic Communication, among others; | 7. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication provides an extensive mapping of existing counter-FIMI and disinformation and resilience frameworks, structures, tools, initiatives and programmes, and a list of the actions which the Commission and the EEAS have committed to undertake; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to propose a clear timeline for their gradual phasing-in and integration within the Centre, with 2026 to be set as the deadline for such integration; calls for this integration to include relevant DSA supervisory and enforcement mechanisms, especially with a view to identifying and minimising systemic risk, coordinating efforts to counter information manipulation campaigns, ensuring operational responsibility for an enhanced Rapid Alert System (RAS) able to address information manipulation in real time, and the maintenance and operation of a unified FIMI intelligence database, and developing the EUvsDisinfo resource, the ECNE, and the Commission’s Task Force on Disinformation and Strategic Communication, among others; |
Or. en
Amendment 731
Andrey Kovatchev
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 7 a. Calls on the EC to expand, adequately fund and operationally reinforce the EUvsDisinfo website and database, including through broader coverage of smaller languages; underlines the importance of systematic monitoring of disinformation campaigns originating not only from Russia but also from other foreign actors, including China and Iran, as well as from internal actors within the Union that relay or amplify similar narratives; |
Or. en
Amendment 732
Sander Smit
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 7 a. Notes that supervisory and enforcement mechanisms should not be used in a manner that leads to the restriction of certain, albeit unpopular, opinions or political dissents. Stresses, therefore, that content moderation and risk-mitigation measures should be strictly proportionate, ensuring that the fight against foreign interference does not become a vehicle for limiting legitimate public and political debate within the EU. |
Or. en
Amendment 733
Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 7 a. Warns that assigning the Centre tasks such as threat anticipation, early-warning systems, crisis protocols, development of joint methodologies or support for operational cooperation would amount to the creation of a de facto EU body exercising discretionary influence, in contradiction with Article 292 TFEU, Articles 4(2) and 5 TEU and the Meroni and ESMA case law; |
Or. en
Amendment 734
Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 7 a. Stresses that the objective of the Centre should not be limited to acting merely as a connective or networking hub linking existing initiatives, but should include a clear operational and strategic role, with the capacity to provide coordination, guidance and tangible support at Union level, thereby ensuring added value beyond existing structures ; |
Or. en
Amendment 735
Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 7 b. Calls on the Commission to clarify explicitly which of the functions described in the Joint Communication cannot be exercised without a proper legal basis and to revise the presentation of the Centre accordingly; |
Or. en
Amendment 736
Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 c (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 7 c. Calls for any coordination mechanism established under the European Democracy Shield to be subject to clear governance rules, ex ante mandates, reporting obligations to the European Parliament, and effective judicial review, in order to ensure compliance with subsidiarity, proportionality and institutional balance; |
Or. en
Amendment 737
Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 d (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 7 d. Stresses that the Centre must not be assigned functions that involve determining the truthfulness, legitimacy or political acceptability of narratives, viewpoints or opinions; underlines that its role must remain strictly limited to identifying foreign-directed manipulation patterns, technical interference indicators and coordination structures, without engaging in content adjudication; |
Or. en
Amendment 738
Stefano Cavedagna
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 8. Welcomes the Commission’s recognition of the need to engage with the Member States and Parliament on the Centre’s mandate, structure and working methods, and calls on the Commission to initiate the process by proposing, by Q1 2027, a legal basis for establishing the Centre as an EU entity with a clear institutional statute and positioning, governance structure and parliamentary oversight mechanisms; emphasises that institutional clarity is essential to enable the Centre to act decisively while remaining accountable; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 739
Fabrice Leggeri, Virginie Joron, Marieke Ehlers
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 8. Welcomes the Commission’s recognition of the need to engage with the Member States and Parliament on the Centre’s mandate, structure and working methods, and calls on the Commission to initiate the process by proposing, by Q1 2027, a legal basis for establishing the Centre as an EU entity with a clear institutional statute and positioning, governance structure and parliamentary oversight mechanisms; emphasises that institutional clarity is essential to enable the Centre to act decisively while remaining accountable; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 740
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 8. Welcomes the Commission’s recognition of the need to engage with the Member States and Parliament on the Centre’s mandate, structure and working methods, and calls on the Commission to initiate the process by proposing, by Q1 2027, a legal basis for establishing the Centre as an EU entity with a clear institutional statute and positioning, governance structure and parliamentary oversight mechanisms; emphasises that institutional clarity is essential to enable the Centre to act decisively while remaining accountable; | 8. Welcomes the Commission’s recognition of the need to engage with the Member States and Parliament on the Centre’s mandate, structure and working methods, and calls on the Commission to initiate the process by proposing, prior to Q1 2027, a legal basis for establishing the Centre as an EU entity with a clear institutional statute and positioning, governance structure and parliamentary oversight mechanisms; emphasises that institutional clarity is essential to enable the Centre to act decisively while remaining accountable; stresses that the Centre should meaningfully engage on all level of governance including with local authorities to ensure the Centre’s effectiveness, democratic legitimacy, and impact local communities; |
Or. en
Amendment 741
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 8. Welcomes the Commission’s recognition of the need to engage with the Member States and Parliament on the Centre’s mandate, structure and working methods, and calls on the Commission to initiate the process by proposing, by Q1 2027, a legal basis for establishing the Centre as an EU entity with a clear institutional statute and positioning, governance structure and parliamentary oversight mechanisms; emphasises that institutional clarity is essential to enable the Centre to act decisively while remaining accountable; | 8. Welcomes the Commission’s recognition of the need to engage with the Member States and Parliament on the Centre’s mandate, structure and working methods, and calls on the Commission to initiate the process by proposing, by Q1 2027, a legal basis for establishing the Centre as an EU entity with a clear institutional statute and positioning, governance structure and parliamentary oversight mechanisms; reminds that the legal basis should be sound and firmly connected to the Treaty and strictly within the EU competences; emphasises that institutional clarity is essential to enable the Centre to act decisively while remaining accountable; |
Or. en
Amendment 742
Kim Van Sparrentak
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 8. Welcomes the Commission’s recognition of the need to engage with the Member States and Parliament on the Centre’s mandate, structure and working methods, and calls on the Commission to initiate the process by proposing, by Q1 2027, a legal basis for establishing the Centre as an EU entity with a clear institutional statute and positioning, governance structure and parliamentary oversight mechanisms; emphasises that institutional clarity is essential to enable the Centre to act decisively while remaining accountable; | 8. Welcomes the Commission’s recognition of the need to engage with the Member States and Parliament on the Centre’s mandate, structure and working methods, and calls on the Commission to initiate the process by proposing, by Q1 2027, a legal basis for establishing the Centre as an EU entity with a clear institutional statute and positioning, governance structure and parliamentary oversight mechanisms; emphasises that institutional clarity is essential to enable the Centre to act decisively while remaining accountable; is concerned however that the participation of Member States experts foreseen so far is only voluntary; |
Or. en
Amendment 743
Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 8. Welcomes the Commission’s recognition of the need to engage with the Member States and Parliament on the Centre’s mandate, structure and working methods, and calls on the Commission to initiate the process by proposing, by Q1 2027, a legal basis for establishing the Centre as an EU entity with a clear institutional statute and positioning, governance structure and parliamentary oversight mechanisms; emphasises that institutional clarity is essential to enable the Centre to act decisively while remaining accountable; | 8. Welcomes the Commission’s recognition of the need to engage with the Member States and Parliament on the Centre’s mandate, structure and working methods, and calls on the Commission to initiate the process by proposing, by Q1 2027, a legal basis for establishing the Centre as a Centre of excellence with a clear institutional statute and positioning, governance structure and parliamentary oversight mechanisms; emphasises that institutional clarity is essential to enable the Centre to act decisively while remaining accountable; notes that the Centre of excellence should have a contact point in every Member State; |
Or. en
Amendment 744
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 8. Welcomes the Commission’s recognition of the need to engage with the Member States and Parliament on the Centre’s mandate, structure and working methods, and calls on the Commission to initiate the process by proposing, by Q1 2027, a legal basis for establishing the Centre as an EU entity with a clear institutional statute and positioning, governance structure and parliamentary oversight mechanisms; emphasises that institutional clarity is essential to enable the Centre to act decisively while remaining accountable; | 8. Welcomes the Commission’s recognition of the need to engage with the Member States and Parliament on the Centre’s mandate, structure and working methods; calls on the Commission to ensure that any cooperation in this field takes the form of voluntary coordination hub for Member States, aimed at facilitating the exchange of relevant information, best practices and situational awareness on FIMI, disinformation and resilience; |
Or. en
Amendment 745
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 8. Welcomes the Commission’s recognition of the need to engage with the Member States and Parliament on the Centre’s mandate, structure and working methods, and calls on the Commission to initiate the process by proposing, by Q1 2027, a legal basis for establishing the Centre as an EU entity with a clear institutional statute and positioning, governance structure and parliamentary oversight mechanisms; emphasises that institutional clarity is essential to enable the Centre to act decisively while remaining accountable; | 8. Welcomes the Commission’s recognition of the need to engage with the Member States and Parliament on the Centre’s mandate, structure and working methods, and calls on the Commission to swiftly propose a legal actfor the establishment of the Centre, possibly as an EU entity with a clear institutional statute and positioning, governance structure and parliamentary oversight mechanisms; emphasises that institutional and legal clarity is essential to enable the Centre to act decisively while remaining accountable; |
Or. en
Amendment 746
Tomáš Zdechovský, Dan-Ştefan Motreanu, Lukas Mandl, Sandra Kalniete, Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Marta Wcisło, Fredis Beleris, Andrey Kovatchev
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 8 a. notes that hostile states finance or otherwise control media outlets, websites and online platforms in order to undermine democratic institutions and public trust in the EU; recalls that the Union and its Member States already possess substantial capacities to detect and document such activities, including the EEAS StratCom Task Forces and EUvsDisinfo, national authorities and intelligence and security services, as well as independent initiatives, yet regrets that these findings are not systematically translated into EU-level consequences; calls therefore on the Commission and the EEAS, within the framework of the European Democracy Shield, to establish a structured mechanism to compile and regularly update an evidence-based mapping or list of such platforms, with a view to enabling proportionate responses ranging from transparency and public warning mechanisms to restrictive measures, sanctions or access limitations, in line with Union law and fundamental rights; |
Or. en
Amendment 747
Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 8 a. Insists on robust parliamentary oversight of the Centre, including regular reporting on the impact of its activities on fundamental rights, in particular freedom of expression, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and the principle of pluralism; |
Or. en
Amendment 748
Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 8 a. Deplores that the Centre’s functioning is envisaged as relying primarily on voluntary Member State participation, which risks creating fragmentation, uneven levels of commitment and reduced operational effectiveness ; |
Or. en
Amendment 749
Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 8 b. Recalls that proposals to revise or expand the mandates of Union agencies in the context of countering foreign interference must strictly respect the principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality; cautions against the gradual transformation of coordination bodies into operational authorities with indirect influence over media environments, political discourse or national democratic processes; underlines that any such changes must be based on a clear Treaty legal basis and remain subject to full parliamentary scrutiny; |
Or. en
Amendment 750
Stefano Cavedagna
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 9. Calls on the Commission to endow the Centre with a clear mandate and decision-making mechanisms, thus allowing it to function as an independent centre of excellence for detecting and analysing FIMI and disinformation operations, as a capability-building platform establishing common definitions, standards, training and technical tools across the EU, and as an operational backbone providing real-time coordination of technical support in countering active information manipulation campaigns; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 751
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, António Tânger Corrêa, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 9. Calls on the Commission to endow the Centre with a clear mandate and decision-making mechanisms, thus allowing it to function as an independent centre of excellence for detecting and analysing FIMI and disinformation operations, as a capability-building platform establishing common definitions, standards, training and technical tools across the EU, and as an operational backbone providing real-time coordination of technical support in countering active information manipulation campaigns; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 752
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 9. Calls on the Commission to endow the Centre with a clear mandate and decision-making mechanisms, thus allowing it to function as an independent centre of excellence for detecting and analysing FIMI and disinformation operations, as a capability-building platform establishing common definitions, standards, training and technical tools across the EU, and as an operational backbone providing real-time coordination of technical support in countering active information manipulation campaigns; | 9. Considers that the Commission does not have a mandate to establish such a centre; considers that decision-making mechanisms in this area fall within the exclusive competences of the Member States; recalls the existence of relevant bodies both within EEAS, as well as the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, established in 2017 by the first nine participating States, NATO and the European Union, thus allowing it to function as an independent centre of excellence for detecting and analysing FIMI and disinformation operations, as a capability-building platform establishing common definitions, standards, training and technical tools across the EU, and as an operational backbone providing real-time coordination of technical support in countering active information manipulation campaigns; insists that any such bodies should not adopt binding acts, opinions or assessments with effects on national information spaces or public debate; and that its decision-making mechanisms are limited to internal coordination and support functions; |
Or. en
Amendment 753
Kim Van Sparrentak, Hannah Neumann
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 9. Calls on the Commission to endow the Centre with a clear mandate and decision-making mechanisms, thus allowing it to function as an independent centre of excellence for detecting and analysing FIMI and disinformation operations, as a capability-building platform establishing common definitions, standards, training and technical tools across the EU, and as an operational backbone providing real-time coordination of technical support in countering active information manipulation campaigns; | 9. Calls on the Commission to endow the Centre with a clear mandate, investigative powers and decision-making mechanisms and competences to act, thus allowing it to function as an independent centre of excellence for detecting, analysing and combatting FIMI and disinformation operations, as a capability-building platform establishing common definitions, standards, training and technical tools across the EU, and as an operational backbone providing real-time coordination of technical support in countering active information manipulation campaigns; calls on the Commission to ensure that the Centre's investigations and analyses feed directly into the enforcement actions related to the Digital Services Act, the TTPA, the AIA and other relevant legislation, and frequently informes the Digital Services Coordinators in the Member States; highlights that transnational repression should be included in the Centre’s mandate or that a similar centre specifically mandated for transnational repression should be established; |
Or. en
Amendment 754
Tomáš Zdechovský
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 9. Calls on the Commission to endow the Centre with a clear mandate and decision-making mechanisms, thus allowing it to function as an independent centre of excellence for detecting and analysing FIMI and disinformation operations, as a capability-building platform establishing common definitions, standards, training and technical tools across the EU, and as an operational backbone providing real-time coordination of technical support in countering active information manipulation campaigns; | 9. Calls on the Commission to endow the Centre with a clear mandate and decision-making mechanisms, thus allowing it to function as an independent centre of excellence for detecting and analysing FIMI and disinformation operations, and for facilitating operational follow-up through competent EU and national authorities, as a capability-building platform establishing common definitions, standards, training and technical tools across the EU, and as an operational backbone providing real-time coordination of technical support in countering active information manipulation campaigns; underlines the importance of the Democratic Resilience Centre Stakeholder Forum as a space for active collaboration among stakeholders across sectors; insists that the Centre must also provide opportunities for connections and learning between governments and diverse stakeholders across borders; |
Or. en
Amendment 755
Sandro Ruotolo
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 9. Calls on the Commission to endow the Centre with a clear mandate and decision-making mechanisms, thus allowing it to function as an independent centre of excellence for detecting and analysing FIMI and disinformation operations, as a capability-building platform establishing common definitions, standards, training and technical tools across the EU, and as an operational backbone providing real-time coordination of technical support in countering active information manipulation campaigns; | 9. Calls on the Commission to endow the Centre with a clear mandate and decision-making mechanisms, thus allowing it to function as an independent centre of excellence for detecting and analysing FIMI and disinformation operations, as a capability-building platform establishing common definitions, standards, training and technical tools across the EU, and as an operational backbone providing real-time coordination of technical support in countering active information manipulation campaigns; recalls that the Hub should be civilian and non-regulatory in nature, have no sanctioning powers, exclude automated decision-making, and operate in full compliance with fundamental rights, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the General Data Protection Regulation; |
Or. en
Amendment 756
Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 9. Calls on the Commission to endow the Centre with a clear mandate and decision-making mechanisms, thus allowing it to function as an independent centre of excellence for detecting and analysing FIMI and disinformation operations, as a capability-building platform establishing common definitions, standards, training and technical tools across the EU, and as an operational backbone providing real-time coordination of technical support in countering active information manipulation campaigns; | 9. Stresses the need for the Centre to have the capacity to act swiftly in crisis situations, particularly in the run-up to and during elections, in order to translate situational awareness into effective action; calls, therefore, on the Commission to endow the Centre with a clear mandate and decision-making mechanisms, thus allowing it to function as an independent centre of excellence for detecting and analysing FIMI and disinformation operations, as a capability-building platform establishing common definitions, standards, training and technical tools across the EU, and as an operational backbone providing real-time coordination of technical support in countering active information manipulation campaigns; |
Or. en
Amendment 757
Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 9. Calls on the Commission to endow the Centre with a clear mandate and decision-making mechanisms, thus allowing it to function as an independent centre of excellence for detecting and analysing FIMI and disinformation operations, as a capability-building platform establishing common definitions, standards, training and technical tools across the EU, and as an operational backbone providing real-time coordination of technical support in countering active information manipulation campaigns; | 9. Calls on the Commission to endow the Centre with a clear mandate and decision-making mechanisms, thus allowing it to function as an independent centre of excellence for detecting and analysing FIMI and disinformation operations, as a capability-building platform establishing common definitions, standards, training and technical tools across the EU, and as an operational backbone providing real-time coordination of technical support in countering active information manipulation campaigns; stresses that its mission should not be limited to externally driven threats but should also encompass coordinated domestic manipulation campaigns and systemic internal risks affecting the Union’s information environment; |
Or. en
Amendment 758
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 9. Calls on the Commission to endow the Centre with a clear mandate and decision-making mechanisms, thus allowing it to function as an independent centre of excellence for detecting and analysing FIMI and disinformation operations, as a capability-building platform establishing common definitions, standards, training and technical tools across the EU, and as an operational backbone providing real-time coordination of technical support in countering active information manipulation campaigns; | 9. Calls on the Commission to endow the Centre with a clear mandate and decision-making mechanisms, thus allowing it to function as an independent centre of excellence for detecting and analysing FIMI and disinformation operations, as a capability-building platform establishing common definitions, standards, training and technical tools across the EU, and as an operational backbone providing real-time coordination of technical support in countering active information manipulation campaigns; notes that the interference tactics of malign actors will evolve over time alongside technological progress and the Centre's mandate should allow for flexibility in order to address new challenges. |
Or. en
Amendment 759
Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 9. Calls on the Commission to endow the Centre with a clear mandate and decision-making mechanisms, thus allowing it to function as an independent centre of excellence for detecting and analysing FIMI and disinformation operations, as a capability-building platform establishing common definitions, standards, training and technical tools across the EU, and as an operational backbone providing real-time coordination of technical support in countering active information manipulation campaigns; | 9. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the Centre has a clearly defined and limited mandate focused on information exchange, analytical support and voluntary cooperation between Member States, without exercising operational coordination functions, real-time intervention roles or discretionary authority over national responses or communication environments; |
Or. en
Amendment 760
Andrey Kovatchev
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 9. Calls on the Commission to endow the Centre with a clear mandate and decision-making mechanisms, thus allowing it to function as an independent centre of excellence for detecting and analysing FIMI and disinformation operations, as a capability-building platform establishing common definitions, standards, training and technical tools across the EU, and as an operational backbone providing real-time coordination of technical support in countering active information manipulation campaigns; | 9. Calls on the Commission to endow the Centre with a clear mandate and decision-making mechanisms, thus allowing it to function as an independent centre of excellence for detecting and analysing FIMI and disinformation operations, as a capability-building platform establishing common definitions, standards, training and technical tools across the EU, and as an operational backbone providing real-time coordination of technical support in countering active information manipulation campaigns, in close cooperation with national authorities and relevant EU bodies; |
Or. en
Amendment 761
Kim Van Sparrentak
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 9 a. Considers that the Centre can be integrated into one decentralised and independent EU digital agency in order to ensure that all expertise on disinformation, foreign interference and FIMI is gathered in one place instead of fragmented across the Union; believes that this is the most effective way to avoid fragmentation of knowledge and resources, political interference and can ensure cost-effectiveness in the enforcement of European digital legislation; underlines that by establishing a single agency instead of many different authorities across Member States compliance for companies, especially SMEs can be improved and facilitated; therefore calls on the Commission to urgently put forward a proposal to harmonise enforcement and cooperation mechanisms of the digital policy acquis in form an EU Digital Agency; |
Or. en
Amendment 762
Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 9 a. Welcomes, in principle, the concept of a stakeholder platform; notes, however, that its purpose, structure and added value remain insufficiently defined; underlines that it is currently unclear how this platform would differ from, complement or build upon existing networks and initiatives, as well as how stakeholders’ contributions would concretely feed into the Centre’s decision-making processes and operational activities; |
Or. en
Amendment 763
Ana Catarina Mendes, Evin Incir, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 9 a. Stresses, however, that the Centre should not be limited to countering FIMI, as democratic resilience faces a broader set of structural and societal challenges; calls for the Centre to be designed as a holistic and multidisciplinary initiative, addressing threats as democratic disengagement, declining trust in institutions, and the erosion of civic participation; |
Or. en
Amendment 764
Stefano Cavedagna
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 10. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the Centre is mandated with the responsibility to safeguard the integrity of democratic processes at EU level; reaffirms that the Member States’ operational structures constitute a first line of defence; stresses, however, that their primary responsibility does not exhaust the EU’s legitimate interests with regard to countering FIMI and disinformation; calls on the Commission to clarify that the Centre must serve dual and mutually-reinforcing objectives, namely to coordinate the activities of the Member States in this area and enhance their operational capacity, and to protect the democratic interests of the EU; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 765
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, António Tânger Corrêa, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 10. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the Centre is mandated with the responsibility to safeguard the integrity of democratic processes at EU level; reaffirms that the Member States’ operational structures constitute a first line of defence; stresses, however, that their primary responsibility does not exhaust the EU’s legitimate interests with regard to countering FIMI and disinformation; calls on the Commission to clarify that the Centre must serve dual and mutually-reinforcing objectives, namely to coordinate the activities of the Member States in this area and enhance their operational capacity, and to protect the democratic interests of the EU; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 766
Sandro Ruotolo
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 10. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the Centre is mandated with the responsibility to safeguard the integrity of democratic processes at EU level; reaffirms that the Member States’ operational structures constitute a first line of defence; stresses, however, that their primary responsibility does not exhaust the EU’s legitimate interests with regard to countering FIMI and disinformation; calls on the Commission to clarify that the Centre must serve dual and mutually-reinforcing objectives, namely to coordinate the activities of the Member States in this area and enhance their operational capacity, and to protect the democratic interests of the EU; | 10. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the Centre is mandated with the responsibility to safeguard the integrity of democratic processes at EU level; reaffirms that the Member States’ operational structures constitute a first line of defence; stresses, however, that their primary responsibility does not exhaust the EU’s legitimate interests with regard to countering FIMI and disinformation; notes that coordinated information manipulation campaigns often target the Union information space as a whole, thereby justifying a dedicated EU-level operational capacity to protect democratic processes beyond purely national contexts; calls on the Commission to clarify that the Centre must serve dual and mutually-reinforcing objectives, namely to coordinate the activities of the Member States in this area and enhance their operational capacity, and to protect the democratic interests of the EU; |
Or. en
Amendment 767
Tomáš Zdechovský
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 10. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the Centre is mandated with the responsibility to safeguard the integrity of democratic processes at EU level; reaffirms that the Member States’ operational structures constitute a first line of defence; stresses, however, that their primary responsibility does not exhaust the EU’s legitimate interests with regard to countering FIMI and disinformation; calls on the Commission to clarify that the Centre must serve dual and mutually-reinforcing objectives, namely to coordinate the activities of the Member States in this area and enhance their operational capacity, and to protect the democratic interests of the EU; | 10. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the Centre is mandated with the responsibility to safeguard the integrity of democratic processes at EU level; reaffirms that the Member States’ operational structures constitute a first line of defence; stresses, however, that their primary responsibility does not exhaust the EU’s legitimate interests with regard to countering FIMI and disinformation; calls on the Commission to clarify that the Centre must serve dual and mutually-reinforcing objectives, namely to coordinate the activities of the Member States in this area and enhance their operational capacity, and to protect the democratic interests of the EU; stresses that where activities undermine EU law or democratic processes, the Centre’s coordination role should ensure a direct link to bodies competent to initiate investigations and judicial proceedings; |
Or. en
Amendment 768
Tomáš Zdechovský, Dan-Ştefan Motreanu, Lukas Mandl, Sandra Kalniete, Fredis Beleris, Andrey Kovatchev
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 10. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the Centre is mandated with the responsibility to safeguard the integrity of democratic processes at EU level; reaffirms that the Member States’ operational structures constitute a first line of defence; stresses, however, that their primary responsibility does not exhaust the EU’s legitimate interests with regard to countering FIMI and disinformation; calls on the Commission to clarify that the Centre must serve dual and mutually-reinforcing objectives, namely to coordinate the activities of the Member States in this area and enhance their operational capacity, and to protect the democratic interests of the EU; | 10. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the Centre is mandated with the responsibility to safeguard the integrity of democratic processes at EU level; reaffirms that the Member States’ operational structures constitute a first line of defence; stresses, however, that their primary responsibility does not exhaust the EU’s legitimate interests with regard to countering FIMI and disinformation; calls on the Commission to clarify that the Centre must serve dual and mutually-reinforcing objectives, namely to coordinate the activities of the Member States in this area and enhance their operational capacity, and to protect the democratic interests of the EU; notes that forthcoming revisions of the mandates of Europol, Eurojust, EPPO, Frontex and CEPOL in 2027 provide an opportunity to strengthen the operational dimension of the European Democracy Shield; |
Or. en
Amendment 769
Tomáš Zdechovský, Dan-Ştefan Motreanu, Eszter Lakos, Lukas Mandl, Sandra Kalniete, Sander Smit, Marta Wcisło, Andrey Kovatchev
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 10. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the Centre is mandated with the responsibility to safeguard the integrity of democratic processes at EU level; reaffirms that the Member States’ operational structures constitute a first line of defence; stresses, however, that their primary responsibility does not exhaust the EU’s legitimate interests with regard to countering FIMI and disinformation; calls on the Commission to clarify that the Centre must serve dual and mutually-reinforcing objectives, namely to coordinate the activities of the Member States in this area and enhance their operational capacity, and to protect the democratic interests of the EU; | 10. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the Centre is mandated with the responsibility to safeguard the integrity of democratic processes at EU level; reaffirms that the Member States’ operational structures constitute a first line of defence; stresses, however, that their primary responsibility does not exhaust the EU’s legitimate interests with regard to countering FIMI and disinformation; calls on the Commission to clarify that the Centre must serve dual and mutually-reinforcing objectives, namely to coordinate the activities of the Member States in this area and enhance their operational capacity, and to protect the democratic interests of the EU; notes that the Centre must not operate on the basis of a lowest common denominator, but rather convene a coalition of the willing which would enable rapid effective action; |
Or. en
Amendment 770
Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 10. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the Centre is mandated with the responsibility to safeguard the integrity of democratic processes at EU level; reaffirms that the Member States’ operational structures constitute a first line of defence; stresses, however, that their primary responsibility does not exhaust the EU’s legitimate interests with regard to countering FIMI and disinformation; calls on the Commission to clarify that the Centre must serve dual and mutually-reinforcing objectives, namely to coordinate the activities of the Member States in this area and enhance their operational capacity, and to protect the democratic interests of the EU; | 10. Recalls that the protection of democratic processes, including electoral systems and political communication environments, remains primarily the responsibility of the Member States; stresses that any Union-level activity must be strictly limited to identifying and analysing foreign-directed information manipulation and interference, while fully respecting Articles 4(2) and 5 TEU and avoiding any role in the governance or supervision of domestic political discourse; |
Or. en
Amendment 771
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 10. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the Centre is mandated with the responsibility to safeguard the integrity of democratic processes at EU level; reaffirms that the Member States’ operational structures constitute a first line of defence; stresses, however, that their primary responsibility does not exhaust the EU’s legitimate interests with regard to countering FIMI and disinformation; calls on the Commission to clarify that the Centre must serve dual and mutually-reinforcing objectives, namely to coordinate the activities of the Member States in this area and enhance their operational capacity, and to protect the democratic interests of the EU; | 10. Calls on the Commission to strictly respect, in accordance with the principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality, the limits of its competences regarding the responsibility to safeguard the integrity of democratic processes at EU level; reaffirms that the Member States’ operational structures constitute a first an the most important line of defence; stresses that their primary responsibility does not exhaust the EU’s legitimate interests with regard to countering FIMI and disinformation; |
Or. en
Amendment 772
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 10. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the Centre is mandated with the responsibility to safeguard the integrity of democratic processes at EU level; reaffirms that the Member States’ operational structures constitute a first line of defence; stresses, however, that their primary responsibility does not exhaust the EU’s legitimate interests with regard to countering FIMI and disinformation; calls on the Commission to clarify that the Centre must serve dual and mutually-reinforcing objectives, namely to coordinate the activities of the Member States in this area and enhance their operational capacity, and to protect the democratic interests of the EU; | 10. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the Centre is mandated with the responsibility to coordinate and protect the integrity of democratic processes at EU level; reaffirms that the Member States’ operational structures constitute a first line of defence; stresses, however, that their primary responsibility does not exhaust the EU’s legitimate interests with regard to countering FIMI and disinformation and ensuring electoral integrity; Calls also on the Commission to ensure that the Centre’s coordination encompasses existing efforts by civil society and academia through the proposed stakeholders platform; |
Or. en
Amendment 773
Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 11. Calls on Member States that lack dedicated operational structures to establish or substantially strengthen dedicated national FIMI and disinformation detection and response institutions with the Centre’s support; calls on the Commission to establish a roadmap for Member State capacity development; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 774
Stefano Cavedagna
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 11. Calls on Member States that lack dedicated operational structures to establish or substantially strengthen dedicated national FIMI and disinformation detection and response institutions with the Centre’s support; calls on the Commission to establish a roadmap for Member State capacity development; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 775
Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 11. Calls on Member States that lack dedicated operational structures to establish or substantially strengthen dedicated national FIMI and disinformation detection and response institutions with the Centre’s support; calls on the Commission to establish a roadmap for Member State capacity development; | 11. Calls on Member States that lack dedicated operational structures to establish or substantially strengthen dedicated national FIMI and disinformation detection and response institutions with the Centre’s support; calls on the Commission to establish a roadmap for Member State capacity development; stresses that, where systemic shortcomings or recurring vulnerabilities are identified, relevant findings and developments should be duly reflected in the Commission’s annual Rule of Law Report, in a structured and proportionate manner, including, where appropriate, dedicated sub-sections addressing disinformation and media integrity under the media pluralism and freedom pillar, and electoral integrity and safeguards against undue influence under the checks and balances pillar, with a view to ensuring coherence, transparency and early identification of cross-border risks to democratic resilience; |
Or. en
Amendment 776
Tomáš Zdechovský
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 11. Calls on Member States that lack dedicated operational structures to establish or substantially strengthen dedicated national FIMI and disinformation detection and response institutions with the Centre’s support; calls on the Commission to establish a roadmap for Member State capacity development; | 11. Calls on Member States that lack dedicated operational structures to establish or substantially strengthen dedicated national FIMI and disinformation detection and response institutions with the Centre’s support; calls on the Commission to establish a roadmap and evaluation for Member State capacity development; recalls that preventive measures, including research, analysis and cooperation with academia, independent experts, think tanks and civil society, should complement, and not replace, operational and enforcement action; |
Or. en
Amendment 777
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 11. Calls on Member States that lack dedicated operational structures to establish or substantially strengthen dedicated national FIMI and disinformation detection and response institutions with the Centre’s support; calls on the Commission to establish a roadmap for Member State capacity development; | 11. Calls on Member States that lack dedicated operational structures to establish or substantially strengthen dedicated national FIMI and disinformation detection and response institutions with the Centre’s support; calls on the Commission to establish a roadmap and evaluation process for Member State capacity development; |
Or. en
Amendment 778
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri, Fidias Panayiotou
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 11. Calls on Member States that lack dedicated operational structures to establish or substantially strengthen dedicated national FIMI and disinformation detection and response institutions with the Centre’s support; calls on the Commission to establish a roadmap for Member State capacity development; | 11. Calls on Member States that lack dedicated operational structures to establish or substantially strengthen national FIMI and disinformation detection and response capacities; calls on the Commission to support Member States upon request, through technical assistance, information-sharing and best practices; |
Or. en
Amendment 779
Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 12. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of empowering the Centre to administer and allocate dedicated EU grants under relevant EU programmes, including the Digital Europe Programme, the Connecting Europe Facility, Horizon Europe, the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme, and the proposed AgoraEU programme, and to authorise it to issue calls for proposals and to select, oversee and evaluate projects in areas within its mandate, in particular the EDMO, media literacy initiatives and other relevant European, regional and cross-border initiatives devoted to countering FIMI, strengthening democratic resilience and promoting information integrity; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 780
Stefano Cavedagna
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 12. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of empowering the Centre to administer and allocate dedicated EU grants under relevant EU programmes, including the Digital Europe Programme, the Connecting Europe Facility, Horizon Europe, the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme, and the proposed AgoraEU programme, and to authorise it to issue calls for proposals and to select, oversee and evaluate projects in areas within its mandate, in particular the EDMO, media literacy initiatives and other relevant European, regional and cross-border initiatives devoted to countering FIMI, strengthening democratic resilience and promoting information integrity; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 781
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 12. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of empowering the Centre to administer and allocate dedicated EU grants under relevant EU programmes, including the Digital Europe Programme, the Connecting Europe Facility, Horizon Europe, the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme, and the proposed AgoraEU programme, and to authorise it to issue calls for proposals and to select, oversee and evaluate projects in areas within its mandate, in particular the EDMO, media literacy initiatives and other relevant European, regional and cross-border initiatives devoted to countering FIMI, strengthening democratic resilience and promoting information integrity; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 782
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 12. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of empowering the Centre to administer and allocate dedicated EU grants under relevant EU programmes, including the Digital Europe Programme, the Connecting Europe Facility, Horizon Europe, the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme, and the proposed AgoraEU programme, and to authorise it to issue calls for proposals and to select, oversee and evaluate projects in areas within its mandate, in particular the EDMO, media literacy initiatives and other relevant European, regional and cross-border initiatives devoted to countering FIMI, strengthening democratic resilience and promoting information integrity; | 12. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of empowering the Centre to administer dedicated EU funding under relevant EU programmes in areas within its mandate; |
Or. en
Amendment 783
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 12. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of empowering the Centre to administer and allocate dedicated EU grants under relevant EU programmes, including the Digital Europe Programme, the Connecting Europe Facility, Horizon Europe, the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme, and the proposed AgoraEU programme, and to authorise it to issue calls for proposals and to select, oversee and evaluate projects in areas within its mandate, in particular the EDMO, media literacy initiatives and other relevant European, regional and cross-border initiatives devoted to countering FIMI, strengthening democratic resilience and promoting information integrity; | 12. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of empowering the Centre to administer and allocate dedicated EU grants under relevant EU programmes, including the Digital Europe Programme, the Connecting Europe Facility, Horizon Europe, the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme, and the proposed AgoraEU programme, and to authorise it to issue calls for proposals and to select, oversee and evaluate projects in areas within its mandate, in particular the EDMO, media literacy initiatives and other relevant European, regional and cross-border initiatives devoted to countering FIMI, strengthening democratic resilience and promoting information integrity; calls on the Commission to avoid programming that disperses and fragments efforts, or that creates unsustainable temporary small-scale initiatives, but to focus on coordinated strategic scalable efforts that enable sustainability for civil society, media, and SME actors; |
Or. en
Amendment 784
Tomáš Zdechovský, Dan-Ştefan Motreanu, Lukas Mandl, Sandra Kalniete, Sander Smit, Marta Wcisło, Fredis Beleris, Andrey Kovatchev
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 12. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of empowering the Centre to administer and allocate dedicated EU grants under relevant EU programmes, including the Digital Europe Programme, the Connecting Europe Facility, Horizon Europe, the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme, and the proposed AgoraEU programme, and to authorise it to issue calls for proposals and to select, oversee and evaluate projects in areas within its mandate, in particular the EDMO, media literacy initiatives and other relevant European, regional and cross-border initiatives devoted to countering FIMI, strengthening democratic resilience and promoting information integrity; | 12. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of empowering the Centre to administer and allocate dedicated EU grants under relevant EU programmes, including the Digital Europe Programme, the Connecting Europe Facility, Horizon Europe, the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme, and the proposed AgoraEU programme, and to authorise it to issue calls for proposals and to select, oversee and evaluate projects in areas within its mandate, in particular the EDMO, media literacy initiatives and other relevant European, regional and cross-border initiatives devoted to countering FIMI, strengthening democratic resilience and promoting information integrity; calls on the Commission to avoid programming that disperses and fragments efforts, or that creates unsustainable temporary small-scale initiatives, but to focus on coordinated strategic scalable efforts that enable sustainability for civil society, media, and SME actors; |
Or. en
Amendment 785
Kim Van Sparrentak
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 12. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of empowering the Centre to administer and allocate dedicated EU grants under relevant EU programmes, including the Digital Europe Programme, the Connecting Europe Facility, Horizon Europe, the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme, and the proposed AgoraEU programme, and to authorise it to issue calls for proposals and to select, oversee and evaluate projects in areas within its mandate, in particular the EDMO, media literacy initiatives and other relevant European, regional and cross-border initiatives devoted to countering FIMI, strengthening democratic resilience and promoting information integrity; | 12. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of empowering the Centre to administer and allocate dedicated EU grants under the current Multiannual Financial Framework and relevant EU programmes, including the Digital Europe Programme, the Connecting Europe Facility, Horizon Europe, the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme, mobilising the remaining margins and availabilities, and the proposed AgoraEU programme under the next MFF, and to authorise it to issue calls for proposals and to select, oversee and evaluate projects in areas within its mandate, in particular the EDMO, media literacy initiatives and other relevant European, regional and cross-border initiatives devoted to countering FIMI, strengthening democratic resilience and promoting information integrity; |
Or. en
Amendment 786
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 12. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of empowering the Centre to administer and allocate dedicated EU grants under relevant EU programmes, including the Digital Europe Programme, the Connecting Europe Facility, Horizon Europe, the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme, and the proposed AgoraEU programme, and to authorise it to issue calls for proposals and to select, oversee and evaluate projects in areas within its mandate, in particular the EDMO, media literacy initiatives and other relevant European, regional and cross-border initiatives devoted to countering FIMI, strengthening democratic resilience and promoting information integrity; | 12. Calls on the Commission to ensure that management and allocation of dedicated EU grants under relevant EU programmes, including the Digital Europe Programme, the Connecting Europe Facility, Horizon Europe, the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme, and the proposed AgoraEU programme, remain with proven existing bodies and procedures; stresses that no new EU structure, including the Centre, should be empowered to issue calls for proposals or to select, oversee or evaluate projects; calls for strengthened transparency, audit and accountability requirements regarding the allocation of such funding; |
Or. en
Amendment 787
Nathalie Loiseau, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Bart Groothuis, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 12. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of empowering the Centre to administer and allocate dedicated EU grants under relevant EU programmes, including the Digital Europe Programme, the Connecting Europe Facility, Horizon Europe, the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme, and the proposed AgoraEU programme, and to authorise it to issue calls for proposals and to select, oversee and evaluate projects in areas within its mandate, in particular the EDMO, media literacy initiatives and other relevant European, regional and cross-border initiatives devoted to countering FIMI, strengthening democratic resilience and promoting information integrity; | 12. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of empowering the Centre to administer and allocate dedicated EU grants under relevant EU programmes whenever they relate to countering FIMI, strengthening democratic resilience and promoting information integrity, such as the Digital Europe Programme, the Connecting Europe Facility, Horizon Europe, the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme, and the proposed AgoraEU programme, and to authorise it to issue calls for proposals and to select, oversee and evaluate projects in areas within its mandate, in particular the EDMO, media literacy initiatives and other relevant European, regional and cross-border initiatives; |
Or. en
Amendment 788
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 12 a. Calls on the Commission and other institutions to disclose and to establish permanent transparency mechanisms concerning cases of scholarships and similar forms of financial support granted to citizens of EU Member States with the explicit aim of sponsoring anti-government activities; underlines that external funding, whether by Member States, EU institutions or external actors, of activities openly directed against policies pursued by democratically elected authorities that have received a clear public mandate to implement reforms constitutes an unacceptable attack on democracy; |
Or. en
Amendment 789
Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Sandro Gozi
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 12 a. Calls on the Commission, in the context of establishing the European Centre for Democratic Resilience, to develop together with Member States and the relevant EU regulatory coordination structures, a periodic mapping of enforcement and resilience capacities related to information integrity, including staffing, technical capabilities and training needs of Digital Services Coordinators and national media regulators, with a view to identifying gaps, promoting best-practice exchange and supporting targeted capacity-building in Member States with structural shortfalls. |
Or. en
Amendment 790
Andrey Kovatchev
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 12 a. Calls on the Commission to substantially reinforce and provide adequate resources for the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), including by expanding beyond its current network of hubs through the establishment of country-specific hubs in all Member States, in order to better address local disinformation dynamics and ensure more targeted and effective responses; stresses the need to further strengthen EDMO’s work on digital and media literacy by scaling up education and training programmes for citizens, journalists, fact-checkers and educators; |
Or. en
Amendment 791
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 12 a. Underscores the importance of the Democratic Resilience Centre Stakeholder Forum as a space for active collaboration among stakeholders across sectors; insists that the Centre must also provide opportunities for connections and learning between governments and diverse stakeholders across borders; |
Or. en
Amendment 792
Stefano Cavedagna
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 13. Calls on the Commission to provide a dedicated EU budget line for the Centre’s operations, with a clear separation between operational funding and general coordination costs; calls on the Commission to secure sufficient human resources and bridge funding from existing budgets to enable preparatory work before the 2028-2034 MFF; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 793
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 13. Calls on the Commission to provide a dedicated EU budget line for the Centre’s operations, with a clear separation between operational funding and general coordination costs; calls on the Commission to secure sufficient human resources and bridge funding from existing budgets to enable preparatory work before the 2028-2034 MFF; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 794
Jaroslav Bžoch, Marieke Ehlers, António Tânger Corrêa, Virginie Joron, Fabrice Leggeri
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 13. Calls on the Commission to provide a dedicated EU budget line for the Centre’s operations, with a clear separation between operational funding and general coordination costs; calls on the Commission to secure sufficient human resources and bridge funding from existing budgets to enable preparatory work before the 2028-2034 MFF; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 795
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Sophie Wilmès, Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 13. Calls on the Commission to provide a dedicated EU budget line for the Centre’s operations, with a clear separation between operational funding and general coordination costs; calls on the Commission to secure sufficient human resources and bridge funding from existing budgets to enable preparatory work before the 2028-2034 MFF; | 13. Calls on the Commission to provide a dedicated EU budget line for the Centre’s operations, with a clear separation between operational funding and general coordination costs; calls on the Commission to secure sufficient human resources and bridge funding from existing budgets to enable preparatory work before the 2028-2034 MFF; reiterates that the integrated Centre that unifies fragmented EU tools and institutions will yield significant power and thus warrants continued democratic scrutiny that should be undertaken by the European Parliament; |
Or. en
Amendment 796
Kim Van Sparrentak
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 13. Calls on the Commission to provide a dedicated EU budget line for the Centre’s operations, with a clear separation between operational funding and general coordination costs; calls on the Commission to secure sufficient human resources and bridge funding from existing budgets to enable preparatory work before the 2028-2034 MFF; | 13. Calls on the Commission to provide a sufficient and predictable funding for the Centre and its activities, including sufficient staff and financial resources under the next MFF, and a dedicated EU budget line for the Centre’s operations, with a clear separation between operational funding and general coordination costs; furthermore calls on the Commission to secure sufficient human resources and bridge funding from existing budgets to enable preparatory work before the 2028-2034 MFF; |
Or. en
Amendment 797
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 13. Calls on the Commission to provide a dedicated EU budget line for the Centre’s operations, with a clear separation between operational funding and general coordination costs; calls on the Commission to secure sufficient human resources and bridge funding from existing budgets to enable preparatory work before the 2028-2034 MFF; | 13. Calls on the Commission to provide a dedicated EU budget line for the Centre’s operations, with a clear separation between operational funding and general coordination costs; calls on the Commission to secure sufficient human resources and bridge funding from existing budgets to enable preparatory work before the 2028-2034 MFF, without diverting financial or human resources from other ongoing programmes and initiatives; |
Or. en
Amendment 798
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of establishing a financing mechanism to complement the dedicated budget line for the Centre’s operations, based on contributions from VLOPs; recalls that the banking sector funds banking resolution mechanisms, pharmaceutical companies support safety monitoring, and polluting industries bear environmental costs; calls for a mechanism whereby social media platforms contribute proportionally to the infrastructure required to counter negative external influences and systemic risks related to their services, both as regards FIMI and disinformation and building resilience; underlines that such contributions would not only be in line with established European principles of responsibility and accountability but would also ensure that the costs of protecting democratic discourse are shared by those who profit most from the digital information ecosystem; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 799
Christine Anderson, Petar Volgin
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of establishing a financing mechanism to complement the dedicated budget line for the Centre’s operations, based on contributions from VLOPs; recalls that the banking sector funds banking resolution mechanisms, pharmaceutical companies support safety monitoring, and polluting industries bear environmental costs; calls for a mechanism whereby social media platforms contribute proportionally to the infrastructure required to counter negative external influences and systemic risks related to their services, both as regards FIMI and disinformation and building resilience; underlines that such contributions would not only be in line with established European principles of responsibility and accountability but would also ensure that the costs of protecting democratic discourse are shared by those who profit most from the digital information ecosystem; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 800
Stefano Cavedagna
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of establishing a financing mechanism to complement the dedicated budget line for the Centre’s operations, based on contributions from VLOPs; recalls that the banking sector funds banking resolution mechanisms, pharmaceutical companies support safety monitoring, and polluting industries bear environmental costs; calls for a mechanism whereby social media platforms contribute proportionally to the infrastructure required to counter negative external influences and systemic risks related to their services, both as regards FIMI and disinformation and building resilience; underlines that such contributions would not only be in line with established European principles of responsibility and accountability but would also ensure that the costs of protecting democratic discourse are shared by those who profit most from the digital information ecosystem; | deleted |
Or. en
Amendment 801
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of establishing a financing mechanism to complement the dedicated budget line for the Centre’s operations, based on contributions from VLOPs; recalls that the banking sector funds banking resolution mechanisms, pharmaceutical companies support safety monitoring, and polluting industries bear environmental costs; calls for a mechanism whereby social media platforms contribute proportionally to the infrastructure required to counter negative external influences and systemic risks related to their services, both as regards FIMI and disinformation and building resilience; underlines that such contributions would not only be in line with established European principles of responsibility and accountability but would also ensure that the costs of protecting democratic discourse are shared by those who profit most from the digital information ecosystem; | 14. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of establishing a financing mechanism to complement the dedicated budget line for the Centre’s operations, based on contributions from the actors that represent the most risk for democratic integrity while at the same time extract the most benefit from their actions; |
Or. en
Amendment 802
Tomáš Zdechovský
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of establishing a financing mechanism to complement the dedicated budget line for the Centre’s operations, based on contributions from VLOPs; recalls that the banking sector funds banking resolution mechanisms, pharmaceutical companies support safety monitoring, and polluting industries bear environmental costs; calls for a mechanism whereby social media platforms contribute proportionally to the infrastructure required to counter negative external influences and systemic risks related to their services, both as regards FIMI and disinformation and building resilience; underlines that such contributions would not only be in line with established European principles of responsibility and accountability but would also ensure that the costs of protecting democratic discourse are shared by those who profit most from the digital information ecosystem; | 14. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of establishing a financing mechanism to complement the dedicated budget line for the Centre’s operations, based on contributions from VLOPs; recalls that the banking sector funds banking resolution mechanisms, pharmaceutical companies support safety monitoring, and polluting industries bear environmental costs; calls for a mechanism whereby social media platforms contribute proportionally to the infrastructure required to counter external influences and systemic risks related to their services undermining democratic principles, both as regards FIMI and disinformation and building resilience; underlines that such contributions would not only be in line with established European principles of responsibility and accountability but would also ensure that the costs of protecting democratic discourse are shared by those who profit most from the digital information ecosystem; calls on the Commission to assess the establishment of a mandatory financial contribution mechanism for very large online platforms and very large online search engines, proportionate to their systemic risks and revenues generated in the Union, to support the protection of democratic processes, countering FIMI and disinformation, and strengthening cyber resilience; |
Or. en
Amendment 803
Vasile Dîncu
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of establishing a financing mechanism to complement the dedicated budget line for the Centre’s operations, based on contributions from VLOPs; recalls that the banking sector funds banking resolution mechanisms, pharmaceutical companies support safety monitoring, and polluting industries bear environmental costs; calls for a mechanism whereby social media platforms contribute proportionally to the infrastructure required to counter negative external influences and systemic risks related to their services, both as regards FIMI and disinformation and building resilience; underlines that such contributions would not only be in line with established European principles of responsibility and accountability but would also ensure that the costs of protecting democratic discourse are shared by those who profit most from the digital information ecosystem; | 14. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of establishing a financing mechanism to complement the dedicated budget line for the Centre’s operations, based on contributions from VLOPs and large media conglomerates; stresses that any such mechanism must be accompanied by the strongest possible guarantees of independence and the total absence of conflicts of interest to ensure that private funding does not influence the Centre’s strategic priorities or operational decisions ; recalls that the banking sector funds banking resolution mechanisms, pharmaceutical companies support safety monitoring, and polluting industries bear environmental costs; calls for a mechanism whereby social media platforms contribute proportionally to the infrastructure required to counter negative external influences and systemic risks related to their services, both as regards FIMI and disinformation and building resilience; underlines that such contributions would not only be in line with established European principles of responsibility and accountability but would also ensure that the costs of protecting democratic discourse are shared by those who profit most from the digital information ecosystem; |
Or. en
Amendment 804
Jaroslav Bžoch
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of establishing a financing mechanism to complement the dedicated budget line for the Centre’s operations, based on contributions from VLOPs; recalls that the banking sector funds banking resolution mechanisms, pharmaceutical companies support safety monitoring, and polluting industries bear environmental costs; calls for a mechanism whereby social media platforms contribute proportionally to the infrastructure required to counter negative external influences and systemic risks related to their services, both as regards FIMI and disinformation and building resilience; underlines that such contributions would not only be in line with established European principles of responsibility and accountability but would also ensure that the costs of protecting democratic discourse are shared by those who profit most from the digital information ecosystem; | 14. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of establishing a financing mechanism to complement the dedicated budget line for operations which should cover the fight against disinformation and foreign interference, based on contributions from VLOPs; recalls that the banking sector funds banking resolution mechanisms, pharmaceutical companies support safety monitoring, and polluting industries bear environmental costs; calls for a mechanism whereby social media platforms contribute proportionally to the infrastructure required to counter negative external influences and systemic risks related to their services, both as regards FIMI and disinformation and building resilience; stresses that such contributions should also support technological innovation, including through financing of research and development and the deployment of relevant technological tools and solutions via the Union budget;) ; underlines that such contributions would not only be in line with established European principles of responsibility and accountability but would also ensure that the costs of protecting democratic discourse are shared by those who profit most from the digital information ecosystem; |
Or. en
Amendment 805
Sophie Wilmès, Sandro Gozi, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Helmut Brandstätter, Bart Groothuis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of establishing a financing mechanism to complement the dedicated budget line for the Centre’s operations, based on contributions from VLOPs; recalls that the banking sector funds banking resolution mechanisms, pharmaceutical companies support safety monitoring, and polluting industries bear environmental costs; calls for a mechanism whereby social media platforms contribute proportionally to the infrastructure required to counter negative external influences and systemic risks related to their services, both as regards FIMI and disinformation and building resilience; underlines that such contributions would not only be in line with established European principles of responsibility and accountability but would also ensure that the costs of protecting democratic discourse are shared by those who profit most from the digital information ecosystem; | 14. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of establishing a financing mechanism to complement the dedicated budget line for the Centre’s operations, based on contributions from VLOPs; announces its intention to further develop the parameters, governance options and safeguards of such a mechanism through a forthcoming own-initiative report, with a view to providing political guidance and fostering an informed interinstitutional debate ; recalls that the banking sector funds banking resolution mechanisms, pharmaceutical companies support safety monitoring, and polluting industries bear environmental costs; calls for a mechanism whereby social media platforms contribute proportionally to the infrastructure required to counter negative external influences and systemic risks related to their services, both as regards FIMI and disinformation and building resilience; underlines that such contributions would not only be in line with established European principles of responsibility and accountability but would also ensure that the costs of protecting democratic discourse are shared by those who profit most from the digital information ecosystem; |
Or. en
Amendment 806
Danilo Della Valle, Konstantinos Arvanitis
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of establishing a financing mechanism to complement the dedicated budget line for the Centre’s operations, based on contributions from VLOPs; recalls that the banking sector funds banking resolution mechanisms, pharmaceutical companies support safety monitoring, and polluting industries bear environmental costs; calls for a mechanism whereby social media platforms contribute proportionally to the infrastructure required to counter negative external influences and systemic risks related to their services, both as regards FIMI and disinformation and building resilience; underlines that such contributions would not only be in line with established European principles of responsibility and accountability but would also ensure that the costs of protecting democratic discourse are shared by those who profit most from the digital information ecosystem; | 14. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of establishing a financing mechanism to complement the dedicated budget line for the Centre’s operations, based on contributions from VLOPs calculated based on their profit; recalls that the banking sector funds banking resolution mechanisms, pharmaceutical companies support safety monitoring, and polluting industries bear environmental costs; calls for a mechanism whereby social media platforms contribute proportionally to the infrastructure required to counter negative external influences and systemic risks related to their services, both as regards FIMI and disinformation and building resilience; underlines that such contributions would not only be in line with established European principles of responsibility and accountability but would also ensure that the costs of protecting democratic discourse are shared by those who profit most from the digital information ecosystem; |
Or. en
Amendment 807
Helmut Brandstätter, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Sandro Gozi, Petras Auštrevičius
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of establishing a financing mechanism to complement the dedicated budget line for the Centre’s operations, based on contributions from VLOPs; recalls that the banking sector funds banking resolution mechanisms, pharmaceutical companies support safety monitoring, and polluting industries bear environmental costs; calls for a mechanism whereby social media platforms contribute proportionally to the infrastructure required to counter negative external influences and systemic risks related to their services, both as regards FIMI and disinformation and building resilience; underlines that such contributions would not only be in line with established European principles of responsibility and accountability but would also ensure that the costs of protecting democratic discourse are shared by those who profit most from the digital information ecosystem; | 14. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of establishing a financing mechanism to complement the dedicated budget line for the Centre’s operations, based on contributions from VLOPs as a share of their profits; recalls that the banking sector funds banking resolution mechanisms, pharmaceutical companies support safety monitoring, and polluting industries bear environmental costs; calls for a mechanism whereby social media platforms contribute proportionally to the infrastructure required to counter negative external influences and systemic risks related to their services, both as regards FIMI and disinformation and building resilience; underlines that such contributions would not only be in line with established European principles of responsibility and accountability but would also ensure that the costs of protecting democratic discourse are shared by those who profit most from the digital information ecosystem; |
Or. en
Amendment 808
Kim Van Sparrentak
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of establishing a financing mechanism to complement the dedicated budget line for the Centre’s operations, based on contributions from VLOPs; recalls that the banking sector funds banking resolution mechanisms, pharmaceutical companies support safety monitoring, and polluting industries bear environmental costs; calls for a mechanism whereby social media platforms contribute proportionally to the infrastructure required to counter negative external influences and systemic risks related to their services, both as regards FIMI and disinformation and building resilience; underlines that such contributions would not only be in line with established European principles of responsibility and accountability but would also ensure that the costs of protecting democratic discourse are shared by those who profit most from the digital information ecosystem; | 14. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of establishing a financing mechanism to complement the dedicated budget line for the Centre’s operations, based on contributions from VLOPs; recalls that the banking sector funds banking resolution mechanisms, pharmaceutical companies support safety monitoring, and polluting industries bear environmental costs; calls for a mechanism whereby online platforms and online advertising networks contribute proportionally to the infrastructure required to counter negative external influences and systemic risks related to their services, both as regards FIMI and disinformation and building resilience; underlines that such contributions would not only be in line with established European principles of responsibility and accountability but would also ensure that the costs of protecting democratic discourse are shared by those who profit most from the digital information ecosystem; |
Or. en
Amendment 809
Fabrice Leggeri, Virginie Joron
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of establishing a financing mechanism to complement the dedicated budget line for the Centre’s operations, based on contributions from VLOPs; recalls that the banking sector funds banking resolution mechanisms, pharmaceutical companies support safety monitoring, and polluting industries bear environmental costs; calls for a mechanism whereby social media platforms contribute proportionally to the infrastructure required to counter negative external influences and systemic risks related to their services, both as regards FIMI and disinformation and building resilience; underlines that such contributions would not only be in line with established European principles of responsibility and accountability but would also ensure that the costs of protecting democratic discourse are shared by those who profit most from the digital information ecosystem; | 14. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of establishing a financing mechanism to support Member States' operations against disinformation and foreign influence, based on contributions from VLOPs; recalls that the banking sector funds banking resolution mechanisms, pharmaceutical companies support safety monitoring, and polluting industries bear environmental costs; calls for a mechanism whereby social media platforms contribute proportionally to the infrastructure required to counter negative external influences and systemic risks related to their services, both as regards FIMI and disinformation and building resilience; underlines that such contributions would not only be in line with established European principles of responsibility and accountability but would also ensure that the costs of protecting democratic discourse are shared by those who profit most from the digital information ecosystem; |
Or. en
Amendment 810
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 2 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| Deficiencies in the democratic resilience of EU institutions |
Or. en
Amendment 811
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14 a. Strongly condemns any misuse of Union funds and any form of non-transparent or disproportionate influence by non-governmental organisations on legislative processes; expresses serious concern over allegations, widely referred to in public debate as the “Greengate” affair, and calls for full transparency, accountability and independent investigations into the allocation and use of Union funding; calls on the Commission to clarify the political responsibilities of senior officials, including former Executive Vice-President Frans Timmermans, in relation to funding structures and policy coordination; stresses that any institutional capture, misuse of public funds or indirect foreign or ideological interference is incompatible with democratic standards and the rule of law; |
Or. en
Amendment 812
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14 b. Condemns the systemic failures revealed by the ‘Qatargate’ corruption scandal, which, according to ongoing judicial investigations and widely reported media findings, demonstrated that a third country was allegedly able to penetrate the European Parliament through financial stimulation, intermediaries and covert networks, including cases involving Members of the European Parliament such as Eva Kaili and Marc Tarabella, and raising scrutiny in relation to senior officials including Henrik Hololei; stresses that these developments expose serious structural weaknesses in the Union’s internal integrity, ethics and security frameworks; calls for a comprehensive reform of the EU’s anticorruption regime to prevent foreign interference from within EU institutions; |
Or. en
Amendment 813
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 c (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14 c. Expresses serious concern over documented meetings and contacts between senior EU officials and individuals closely associated with sanctioned Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska, closly linked to Putin and involving former Commissioner for Justice Didier Reynders; condemns shortcomings in transparency, ethical oversight and institutional risk awareness that may create opportunities for hostile foreign influence; calls for reinforced anticorruption rules, mandatory disclosure of high-level meetings and strengthened independent oversight mechanisms within EU institutions that are regrettably not covered by the current EU anti-corruption leghal framework; |
Or. en
Amendment 814
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 d (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14 d. Strongly condemns the revolving door phenomenon whereby senior political leaders from Member States assume high-level positions in state-controlled enterprises of hostile third countries after leaving office, notably in the Russian energy sector, including Gazprom, as illustrated by former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder; considers that such conduct gravely undermines the Union’s security, weakens public trust and exposes the EU to foreign leverage; calls for binding and enforceable cooling-off periods and stricter post-mandate restrictions at both national and EU level; |
Or. en
Amendment 815
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 e (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14 e. Reiterates its call on the European Commission to comply with the European Parliament’s requests to include, in Commission's annual rule-of-law report, a dedicated chapter assessing the rule-of-law situation within the institutions themselves; |
Or. en
Amendment 816
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 f (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14 f. Calls on the EU institutions, and the Commission in particular, to ensure genuine transparency; condemns the Commission for the lack of sincere cooperation with the European Parliament, as demonstrated by repeated delays in responding to parliamentary questions and by replies that lack substantive content and fail to address the issues raised or provide clear answers to the questions asked; |
Or. en
Amendment 817
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 g (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14 g. Considers it unacceptable that the Commission refuses access for journalists, citizens and their representatives in the European Parliament to documents that could place the Commission and its President in an unfavourable light; points to judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union requiring the disclosure of such documents, including correspondence of the Commission President regarding vaccines procurement during Covid-19, and calls on the Commission to respect basic standards of transparency and democratic oversight; |
Or. en
Amendment 818
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 h (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14 h. Notes with concern the growing shift from a collegial executive towards a more presidential model within the Commission; observes that policy initiatives are increasingly controlled by the President’s office, limiting internal debate and the diversity of views; expresses concern about the emergence of a more vertical Commission structure, which consolidates the dominance of the President herself, as well as reports of questionable governance practices under the Commission President; calls for a swift return to fully democratic and transparent practices; regrets that the principle of the Commission as a “college of equals”, in which all Commissioners share collective responsibility, no longer appears to be fully respected; warns that such developments risk reducing the independence of individual Commissioners and strengthening political control from the centre; expresses concern over controversial and politically driven senior appointments, the formation of a closed circle lacking representation of views other than the federalist mainstream, and the persistent lack of adequate geographical balance in key positions within the Commission’s administration; |
Or. en
Amendment 819
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 i (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14 i. Opposes the hidden and creeping consolidation of a dominant position by the European Commission under the leadership of President von der Leyen; considers that the institutional balance between the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament is a fundamental principle of the Union’s legal order and a precondition for democratic legitimacy; expresses particular concern over attempts to overshadow the role of the High Representative/Vice-President and to absorb competences traditionally associated with that office, as illustrated by the controversial initiative to establish a European Democratic Resilience Centre within the Commission’s structures, as well as INTCEL; calls for the abandonment of such ambitions, which run counter to treaties and the principle of interinstitutional balance; |
Or. en
Amendment 820
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 j (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14 j. Expresses its utmost outrage at the existence of a network, confirmed by the court verdict in the case of former MEP Nathan Gill, which, as revealed by the Polish services, delivered speeches from the parliamentary floor written by Russian intelligence in exchange for bribes and took part in initiatives orchestrated by them, such as the observation of fake elections or referendums in territories occupied by Russia; recalls that, according to the findings of the Polish services, which provided the Parliament’s authorities with information on the scheme and methods of its operations, the Russians were paying a network involving several MEPs; once again underlines the need for stricter integrity rules for MEPs and high-level EU officials; |
Or. en
Amendment 821
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 k (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14 k. Expresses outrage at the fact that the Commission has seized upon the case involving Pablo González, alias Pavel Rubtsov, an agent from the Russian military intelligence agency (GRU), who acted under cover as a journalist, as a pretext for launching an attack on a Member State; calls on the Commission to apologise to Poland – a country beyond whose border a full-scale war is in progress, and which is the target of hybrid attacks by Moscow and Minsk – for this heinous attack, and to withdraw the document that compromises the Commission and its procedures for examining the rule of law situation in a Member State; calls on the Commission to clarify and make public the details of the organisations and officials that lobbied the Commission in favour of the Russian spy and the attack on Poland; |
Or. en
Amendment 822
Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 l (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14 l. Supports efforts to disclose in full the internal documents of the Commission relating to the alleged interference in the internal affairs of Slovenia; calls on the Commission to ensure the immediate and comprehensive publication of all relevant correspondence and records; urges the Commission to clarify the steps taken following the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union concerning the conduct of its then Vice-President Věra Jourová; calls for appropriate corrective and, where relevant, disciplinary measures, as well as the establishment of effective safeguards to prevent similar conduct in the future; calls on the President of the Commission to respond without further delay to repeated requests for transparency and follow-up action; |
Or. en
Amendment 823
Ana Catarina Mendes, Kathleen Van Brempt, Sandro Ruotolo, Vasile Dîncu, Csaba Molnár, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Pina Picierno, Birgit Sippel, Christel Schaldemose
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14 a. Firmly rejects all attempts to condition the design, implementation and enforcement of policies, including in the digital realm, and calls on the creation of a European Democracy Shield that is able to protect the Union from any external political and economic pressures that undermine its digital and information sovereignty; Considers that the Union’s capacity to safeguard its democratic processes and information space requires a high degree of strategic autonomy and independence from non-EU digital platforms and infrastructures; |
Or. en
Amendment 824
Cristian Terheş
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 3 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| FIMI |
Or. en
Amendment 825
Cristian Terheş
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14 a. Underlines that Foreign Information Manipation and Interference (FIMI) must be understood as a coordinated and intentional activity conducted by foreign state or state-linked actors, or by proxies acting on their behalf, aimed at influencing political processes, public opinion and societal dynamics in another state, which extends far beyond the dissemination of false or misleading information in conventional or digital media; highlights that FIMI encompasses covert, deceptive and manipulative practices designed to distort democratic debate, undermine trust in institutions, create divisions and polarise societies and weaken social cohesion; points out that FIMI operates across multiple domains of social life and uses strategic cognitive-psychological methods designed to shape decision-making processes, individual and collective perception, identity formation, cultural norms, historical memory, moral frameworks and religious belief systems, while exploiting technological infrastructures, media ecosystems and economic or political vulnerabilities; outlines, therefore, that FIMI constitutes a hybrid threat to democratic governance, national security and the integrity of the information environment, requiring a comprehensive, whole-of-society and whole-of-government response; |
Or. en
Amendment 826
Cristian Terheş
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 b (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14 b. Recognises that “reflexive control”, a concept originating in Soviet military theory and defined as the deliberate shaping of an adversary’s decision-making environment through the transmission of carefully calibrated information, seeks to induce the target to adopt choices that advance the influencing actor’s strategic objectives; notes with concern that the Russian Federation has incorporated such techniques into its broader hybrid influence operations targeting democratic institutions, electoral processes and policy formation; stresses that these practices, which extend beyond conventional disinformation, exploit cognitive biases, institutional vulnerabilities and cultural narratives in order to distort perception, encourage miscalculation and influence outcomes without the use of overt coercion, thereby undermining rational decision-making and democratic governance; |
Or. en
Amendment 827
Cristian Terheş
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 c (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14 c. Underlines that the method of "reflexive control" operates by systematically introducing tailored informational inputs into a target’s decision-making cycle in order to subtly shape perceptions, narrow perceived options and influence choices over time in ways that are difficult to detect, attribute or counter through conventional FIMI responses; notes that such techniques have been observed in hybrid and cognitive influence operations targeting European decision-makers and public opinion; stresses that these frameworks can distort policy debates, embed self-reinforcing narratives within EU institutions and Member States, and ultimately contribute to policy outcomes that inadvertently advance external strategic interests rather than the Union’s own security objectives; |
Or. en
Amendment 828
Cristian Terheş
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 d (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14 d. Stresses that the development and sustained resourcing of a comprehensive EU FIMI toolkit — capable of systematically identifying infringements, documenting responses and evaluating their effectiveness — must explicitly integrate reflexive control detection and countermeasures into its operational architecture, in order to safeguard the integrity of EU decision-making and enhance policy resilience against sophisticated cognitive influence operations; calls on the Commission, in close coordination with the European External Action Service and the Member States, to ensure necessary resources to prioritise the incorporation of reflexive control analytical frameworks, specialised training modules and operational protocols into institutional FIMI capabilities, and to strengthen structured information-sharing and best-practice exchange with relevant international partners; |
Or. en
Amendment 829
Cristian Terheş
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 e (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14 e. Recognises that FIMI increasingly targets the cognitive and emotional foundations of societies by shaping how individuals interpret reality, assign meaning to events and construct values, identities and loyalties, thereby influencing behaviour and decision-making in indirect and often imperceptible ways; notes that such manipulation may occur not only through overt propaganda but also via educational, cultural and religious institutions, community networks, symbolic narratives and trusted authority figures; stresses that confining FIMI analysis to the information or media sphere risks overlooking long-term influence strategies aimed at normalising externally driven narratives, embedding self-reinforcing belief systems and gradually weakening societal resilience, including through the instrumentalisation of religion, tradition and perceived moral authority; emphasises therefore the need for a genuinely holistic EU approach to countering FIMI, integrating cognitive, cultural, social and faith-sensitive dimensions into detection, risk assessment and response mechanisms, and ensuring coherence across policy-making, strategic communication, education, diplomacy and community engagement in order to safeguard democratic values, pluralism and informed decision-making across all spheres of public life; |
Or. en
Amendment 830
Cristian Terheş
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 f (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14 f. Notes that in 2015 Russia changed its National Security Strategy to explicitly include the preservation and development of “traditional Russian spiritual and moral values” as a national interest and strategic priority, and that the 2021 National Security Strategy further elevated this focus, embedding the protection of spiritual and moral values into state security alongside political, military, economic, and informational considerations; emphasizes that this has been reinforced through subsequent policy instruments, including the 2022 presidential decree on preserving and strengthening traditional Russian spiritual and moral values 9a; underlines that these developments reflect the securitisation of religion and morality in official policy and provide a doctrinal basis for leveraging ecclesiastical and cultural networks in support of Russian geopolitical objectives; notes that, based on these changes, the Russian Orthodox Church has increasingly been instrumentalised as a malign actor, serving as a vector for advancing Kremlin influence, undermining democratic processes, and projecting Russian soft power abroad; highlights that countering such coordinated influence requires a comparable EU response; welcomes that, for the first time, the European Parliament resolution of 21 January 2026 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2025 acknowledges the valuable contribution of religious actors, faith communities, and interfaith dialogue, calling for systemic attention to these factors in EU missions and operations 8a; stresses, however, that this represents only a preliminary step to counterbalance the full scope of the Kremlin apparatus; underlines the need for the EU to create dedicated taskforces, specialized training for diplomats and field personnel, and operational frameworks to anticipate, detect, and mitigate the strategic instrumentalisation of religion and cultural networks in Russian hybrid influence operations; | |
| _________________ | |
| 8a https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2026-0013_EN.html | |
| 9a https://senegal.mid.ru/en/press-centre/news/on_approving_the_fundamentals_of_state_policy_to_preserve_and_strengthen_traditional_russian_spiritu/ |
Or. en
Amendment 831
Cristian Terheş
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 g (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14 g. Underlines with grave concern that in January 2026, Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service issued a public statement attacking His All-Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, branding him an “Antichrist in a cassock” and accusing him of collaborating with the West to “undermine Orthodox Christianity” and detach local churches from Moscow’s influence in Ukraine, the Baltic states, and Eastern Europe10a; notes that this attack, demonstrates how religious narratives are being mobilized to delegitimise alternative centres of Orthodox authority and to frame Orthodox ecclesiastical autocephaly as a Western-aligned threat; highlitghts that the explicitly theological framing of this denunciation illustrates the instrumentalisation of religious discourse to discredit alternative centres of Orthodox authority and to portray ecclesiastical independence as a geopolitical threat aligned with the West; further expresses grave concern regarding 2025 reports alleging that former senior ROC official Metropolitan Hilarion maintained cooperation with Russian military intelligence and facilitated the use of church premises for clandestine meetings of Russian operatives11a; underlines that these developments do not constitute isolated incidents but reflect a pattern of structured coordination between Russian secret services and ROC with the objective of advancing broader geopolitical, informational, and influence operations under the cover of religious engagement; | |
| _________________ | |
| 10a https://greekherald.com.au/news/russian-secret-service-accuses-ecumenical-patriarch-of-undermining-orthodoxy/ | |
| 11a https://theins.ru/en/news/286488 |
Or. en
Amendment 832
Cristian Terheş
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 h (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14 h. Underlines with concern the destabilising and divisive effects of the “Russkiy Mir” (“Russian World”) doctrine, which advances a civilisational narrative uniting Russian language, culture, and Orthodoxy under Moscow’s spiritual and political leadership; notes that this concept transcends purely religious or cultural engagement and functions as an ideological framework that legitimises interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, particularly where Orthodox or Russian-speaking communities are present; highlights, in particular, the invocation of “Russkiy Mir” narratives in Serbia and Montenegro to frame opposition to NATO integration and to portray Western institutions as hostile to Orthodoxy; |
Or. en
Amendment 833
Cristian Terheş
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 i (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14 i. Underlines with grave concern that in early 2026 Russian intelligence launched an operation in Montenegro amplifying unfounded claims that Patriarch Bartholomew planned to grant autocephaly to the Montenegrin Orthodox Church12a, aiming to sow discord and undermine Montenegrin sovereignty; notes that the operation exploited local divisions between supporters of the Serbian Orthodox Church and advocates of Montenegrin ecclesiastical independence, using nationalist and religious rhetoric to delegitimise pro-European positions; recognises that this reflects a broader pattern of Russian hybrid influence, where intelligence and allied ecclesiastical networks leverage religious and identity narratives to weaken democratic resilience and challenge Montenegro’s Euro-Atlantic alignment; | |
| _________________ | |
| 12a https://eualive.net/russian-intelligence-launches-special-church-operation-targeting-montenegro/ |
Or. en
Amendment 834
Cristian Terheş
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 j (new)
| Motion for a resolution | Amendment |
| 14 j. Underlines with grave concern that in March 2024, a document approved by the Russian Orthodox Church–led World Russian People’s Council officially described Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a “holy war,”; notes that this rhetoric represents a deliberate fusion of ecclesiastical authority with state military objectives, serving to sacralize violence, legitimize territorial conquest, and mobilize religious identity in support of Kremlin policy; recognises that such messaging, emanating from a prominent religious institution with international reach, contributes to the ideological justification of conflict, reinforces pro-Russian narratives abroad, and exacerbates divisions within the global Orthodox community, further illustrating the weaponization of religion as an instrument of Russian soft power and influence operations; |
Or. en